

# CRIMINOLOGY

## POLICE, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN A DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETY

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*This Article deals with minorities' perceptions of the police in "deeply divided societies." These societies are generally characterized by political disagreements, and the literature shows that most researchers emphasize the centrality of the political variable in order to understand police-minority interactions. This Article acknowledges the centrality of the political variable and adds a cultural variable that may improve the understanding of police-minority relations in a deeply divided society. In some societies, the disparity in the perceptions of majority and minority groups cannot be attributed solely to the political variable, but also to cultural differences. This is especially prominent in the case of native or immigrant minorities. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that this cultural pluralism will be reflected in minorities' interaction with and its perception of the police.*

*Findings from a survey conducted in Israel indicate that political disagreements between Jews and Arabs have negatively affected the Arab minority's perceptions of the police. This Article also shows that the Arab minority group is not homogenous in regard to their relationship with the police; there are significant political and cultural differences among Arab sub-groups (Muslim, Christian, and Druze). The Druze hold similar political orientations to the Jewish majority, and consequently their perceptions of the police were found to be more positive than those of Muslim Arabs. Nevertheless, both Druze and Muslim Arabs expressed*

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*restricted receptivity to contact with the police when police practices threatened their community cultural codes. The findings from this research call for both a deeper analysis of the relationships between minority groups and the police, and for a more attentive probe of the distinctions among minority groups.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

A review of the academic literature in the field of police-minority relations in deeply divided societies reveals that tense relations between the minority and the police are a frequent phenomenon. One of the sources of this tension is the political and social marginality of the minority, which is most often accompanied by unbalanced and unfair policing.<sup>1</sup> Researchers emphasize the centrality of the political variable in understanding police-minority interactions in deeply divided societies. In fact, often hovering above deeply divided democratic societies is the question of the legitimacy of the political regime in the eyes of the minority group.

The tense relations between the Arab minority in Israel and the police are common knowledge. Throughout the history of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel, this tension was sharply brought into relief in several mass political events, with the most violent example in October 2000. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon paid a visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, an act perceived by the Arab minority as violating the sanctity of the Al-Aksa Mosque. The visit incited eight days of violent riots that ended with twelve Arab citizens dead, all of them by police gunfire. This event emphasized the influence of political variables on minority relations with the police in Israel, and yet this is not the sole variable on which we should focus.

In deeply divided societies where divisions are also based on different ethnicities, emphasis is put on the cultural distinction between the majority and the minority. This distinction is liable to find its expression in the cultural perception of governmental institutions, including the police. The impact of cultural pluralism on police-minority relations is reinforced due to the under-representation of members of the minority in the police force. The combination of these factors exacerbates the cultural disparity between

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<sup>1</sup> See JOHN D. BREWER, *BLACK AND BLUE: POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA* (1994) [hereinafter BREWER, *BLACK AND BLUE*]; RONALD WEITZER, *POLICING UNDER FIRE: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND* (1995) [hereinafter WEITZER, *POLICING UNDER FIRE*]; RONALD WEITZER, *TRANSFORMING SETTLER STATES: COMMUNAL CONFLICT AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND ZIMBABWE* (1990) [hereinafter WEITZER, *TRANSFORMING SETTLER STATES*]; John D. Brewer, *Policing in Divided Societies: Theorizing a Type of Policing*, 1 *POLICING & SOC'Y* 179 (1991).

the service-providers—police officers who belong to the majority group—and service-users—members of the minority group. We can assume that where there is greater cultural disparity between the majority and minority, there will be greater tension in minority-police relations. The Israeli-Arab minority is a native, traditional minority that differs significantly in culture from the Jewish majority, who are culturally Western-oriented. This cultural distinction, and not just political variables, will be reflected in minority attitudes toward the police.

This Article aims to evaluate the impact of political and cultural variables on minority perceptions of the police in deeply divided societies. First, I will try to illustrate the distinction between political and cultural variables and explain how making this distinction facilitates a better understanding of police-minority relations in deeply divided societies. Then I will compare the attitudes of Israeli Arabs and Jews toward the police and turn to the core of this Article: an in-depth analysis of the attitudes of different Arab sub-groups (Muslims, Christians, and Druze) toward the Israeli police. In so doing, I wish to elaborate upon the cultural explanations for the existing tension, along with the more obvious political reasons.

## II. POLITICS VERSUS CULTURE

When analyzing police-minority relations, the line between political and cultural variables can become quite vague. Nevertheless, I will try to argue that there is an analytical distinction between the two variables that has significant ramifications on police-minority relations. The political aspect in police-minority relations becomes manifest when we ask the following questions: How do minority groups perceive the role of the police in the construction of the (controversial) socio-political order? What is the image of the police in society? What do the police represent among minority groups? Are the police there “to protect and to serve” or “to chase after and repress”? What styles of policing are practiced toward minority groups? Is it “high” or “low” policing?

Criminological and sociological scholars have tried to answer these questions by addressing the socio-political variables that characterize several minority groups. Many studies have pointed to the tense relations that often exist between police and minorities in various societies. There is evidence of high rates of minority arrest and incarceration, high rates of police violence toward minorities, and negative attitudes among minorities

toward the police.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, stereotypical images of minorities are prevalent among police officers. Most commonly, police view minority members as a potential criminal threat.<sup>3</sup>

Research also shows high rates of crime among minorities. These crime rates are influenced by various social factors associated with minority status.<sup>4</sup> For example, evidence shows overrepresentation of broken families, high rates of divorce, high residential density, low economic status, high levels of unemployment, and high adolescent drop-out rates. These variables increase social disorganization and affect crime rates. In addition, minority populations tend to be younger and more likely to be visible in the streets.<sup>5</sup> All of these factors create a supportive environment for the development of criminal behavior and, in turn, increase the contact

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<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSON, *MINORITIES AND THE POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA* (1969); ROBERT BLAUNER, *RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA* (1972); RANDALL KENNEDY, *RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW* (1997); AUSTIN T. TURK, *CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER* (1969); SAMUEL WALKER, *THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION* (3d ed. 1999); Scott H. Decker, *Citizen Attitudes Toward the Police: A Review of Past Findings and Suggestions for Future Policy*, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 80 (1981); Joe R. Feagin, *The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places*, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 101 (1991); Simon Holdaway, *Police Race Relations in England and Wales: Theory, Policy, and Practice*, 7 POLICE & SOC'Y 49 (2003); David Jacobs & Ronald Helms, *Collective Outbursts, Politics, and Punitive Resources: Toward a Political Sociology of Spending on Social Control*, 77 SOC. FORCES 1497 (1999); Michael D. Reisig & Roger B. Parks, *Experience, Quality of Life, and Neighborhood Context: A Hierarchical Analysis of Satisfaction with Police*, 17 JUST. Q. 607 (2000); Tom R. Tyler, *Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police*, 8 POLICE Q. 322 (2005); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, *Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct*, 51 SOC. PROBS. 305 (2004).

<sup>3</sup> E.g., HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., *TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS* (1967); PAMELA IRVING JACKSON, *MINORITY GROUP THREAT, CRIME, AND POLICING: SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SOCIAL CONTROL* (1989); Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, *Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context*, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 951 (1996); Feagin, *supra* note 2; Malcolm D. Holmes, *Minority Threat and Police Brutality: Determinants of Civil Rights Criminal Complaints in U.S. Municipalities*, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2000); Karen F. Parker et al., *Racial Threat, Concentrated Disadvantage and Social Control: Considering the Macro-Level Sources of Variation in Arrests*, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 1111 (2005); Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, *Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime*, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717 (2001).

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, *JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENTS IN RELATION TO DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES* (1942).

<sup>5</sup> E.g., Richard Block, *Community, Environment, and Violent Crime*, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1979); Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, *Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory*, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774 (1989).

between minorities and the police. Police officers face many obstacles in policing underclass minority neighborhoods because criminals and innocent citizens may share the same socio-economic characteristics.<sup>6</sup> This, in turn, increases complaints from minority groups regarding racial profiling by the police.<sup>7</sup>

Research shows that a tense and alienated relationship between police and the minority community strongly discourages police officers from enforcing criminal laws while also dissuading minorities from collaborating with police to prevent and report crime.<sup>8</sup> The primary complaint of minority groups is that they are simultaneously over-policed as suspects and under-policed as victims, which has reduced their confidence in and willingness to collaborate with the police.<sup>9</sup>

The political explanation of police-minority relations is quite common in many researches; nevertheless, it lacks any reference to the impact of societal-cultural diversity on minority interactions and perceptions of the police. The cultural explanation of police-minority relations focuses on the impact of police organizational culture and how it affects interactions with minority groups. The pertinent questions are: How does the cultural context of police activity interact with the cultural pluralism of some minority groups? How do the cultural characteristics of the minority groups affect their perceptions of police organizational knowledge? To what extent are police officers aware of the various cultural characteristics of the different communities in society?

The cultural approach focuses on the interaction between the formal rules of the police and the sub-cultural values of minority groups. Some of the disparities between the majority and the minority are not merely political, but can also be attributed to cultural differences, such as language, religion, customs, family structure, informal social control, moral perceptions, and gender relations. Some cultural minorities act according to their own cultural norms and consequently may be accused of committing crimes because the legal culture of the state reflects the views of the

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<sup>6</sup> See Rodney Stark, *Deviant Places: A Theory of the Ecology of Crime*, 25 *CRIMINOLOGY* 893 (1987).

<sup>7</sup> RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, *RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM* (2006); BRIAN L. WITHROW, *RACIAL PROFILING: FROM RHETORIC TO REASON* (2006).

<sup>8</sup> *E.g.*, HUNG-EN SUNG, *THE FRAGMENTATION OF POLICING IN AMERICAN CITIES: TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF POLICE-CITIZEN RELATIONS* (2002).

<sup>9</sup> See BENJAMIN BOWLING, *VIOLENT RACISM: VICTIMIZATION, POLICING AND SOCIAL CONTEXT* (1998); Harry Blagg & Giulietta Valuri, *Aboriginal Community Patrols in Australia: Self-Policing, Self-Determination and Security*, 14 *POLICING & SOC'Y* 313 (2004).

dominant group. Examples of such cases include bigamy, family honor murder, spousal and child abuse, parent-child suicide, acts of blood revenge, and celebratory shooting. It is reasonable to expect that the interactions of the minority with the police will reflect these cultural differences.

Some studies have claimed that the police generally represent and act in accordance with the culture of the dominant group, and this is further emphasized by the under-representation of minority members in the police force.<sup>10</sup> As a result, some actions taken by the police might be viewed as culturally inappropriate by traditional communities. Standard police procedure among the majority group may create unpredictable reactions in the minority community due to cultural differences.

### III. POLICE-MINORITY RELATIONS IN A DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETY

There is no better case that draws attention to the dominance of the political explanation in police-minority relations than the example of deeply divided societies.<sup>11</sup> These are societies divided along ethnic lines where the state traditionally is affiliated with the dominant group.<sup>12</sup> Examples of these societies include Northern Ireland until 1969, Israel, Georgia, Estonia, and Latvia.<sup>13</sup> The minority perceives the state as non-neutral, and this view, as a result, decreases the legitimacy of the government and police in the eyes of the minority. The minority's perception of the police is not only influenced by police actions, but also by what the police represent to the

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<sup>10</sup> Edna Erez et al., Introduction: Policing a Multicultural Society, 7 *POLICE & SOC'Y* (SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (2003); Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Policing the Plight of Indigenous Australians: Past Conflicts and Present Challenges, 7 *POLICE & SOC'Y* (SPECIAL ISSUE) 77 (2003).

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., MIKE BROGDEN & CLIFFORD SHEARING, *POLICING FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA* (1993); DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, *SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ITALY AND GERMANY* (1995); JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, *POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND: PROPOSALS FOR A NEW START* (1999); RICHARD MAPSTONE, *POLICING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: A STUDY OF PART TIME POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND* (1994); WEITZER, *POLICING UNDER FIRE*, *supra* note 1; JOHN WHYTE, *INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND* (1990); Graham Ellison & Greg Martin, *Policing, Collective Action and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign*, 51 *BRIT. J. SOC.* 681 (2000).

<sup>12</sup> For more research on deeply divided societies, see AREND LIJPHART, *PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES* (1999); Sammy Smooha & Theodor Hanf, *The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies*, 33 *INT'L J. COMP. SOC.* 26 (1992); Pierre L. Van Den Berghe, *Multicultural Democracy: Can It Work?*, 8 *NATIONS & NATIONALISM* 433 (2002).

<sup>13</sup> For further elaboration, see THE FATE OF ETHNIC DEMOCRACY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (Sammy Smooha & Priit Järve eds., 2005) (discussing "ethnic democracy").

people.<sup>14</sup> Such perceived illegitimacy produces a threat to internal security, and the bulk of the state's policing resources are therefore consigned to the management of political offenses.<sup>15</sup> This pattern affects the nature of police activities in deeply divided societies so that when policing public events, for example, the police generally practice a "zero tolerance" policy toward minority group protesters and regard their actions as political subversion against the state.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, the policing of non-political crimes among the minority is typically less effective. This is due to police neglect of incidents that occur in the minority community, particularly when the crime bears no threat to the dominant group.<sup>17</sup> Weak police performance in the minority community is also attributable to the minority group's lack of cooperation with the police. The literature shows that the main reason that minority groups in deeply divided societies tend to avoid cooperation with the police is due to political disagreements between majority and minority communities.<sup>18</sup>

Ronald Weitzer, a sociologist at George Washington University, has developed a comprehensive model of the policing of deeply divided societies based on his research in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe.<sup>19</sup> Weitzer's model describes police policies or practices as institutionally biased against members of the subordinate minority group. There is chronic over-representation of the dominant ethnic group in the police force, especially in the top ranks. The police tend to repress the regime's

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<sup>14</sup> WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE, *supra* note 1.

<sup>15</sup> GRAHAM ELLISON & JIM SMYTH, THE CROWNED HARP: POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND (2000); AOGAN MULCAHY, POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND: CONFLICT, LEGITIMACY AND REFORM (2006); WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE, *supra* note 1; Andrew Goldsmith, *Policing Weak States: Citizen Safety and State Responsibility*, 13 POLICING & SOC'Y 3 (2003).

<sup>16</sup> DELLA PORTA, *supra* note 11; MERCEDES S. HINTON, THE STATE ON THE STREETS: POLICE AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (2006); P. A. J. WADDINGTON, LIBERTY AND ORDER: PUBLIC ORDER POLICING IN A CAPITAL CITY (1994); Vince Boudreau, *Prekarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy*, in REPRESSION AND MOBILIZATION 33 (Christian Davenport et al. eds., 2005); Ellison & Martin, *supra* note 11.

<sup>17</sup> See BLALOCK, *supra* note 3; BOWLING, *supra* note 9; JACKSON, *supra* note 3; Feagin, *supra* note 2; Holmes, *supra* note 3; Stephanie L. Kent & David Jacobs, *Minority Threat and Police Strength from 1980 to 2000: A Fixed-Effects Analysis of Nonlinear and Interactive Effects in Large U.S. Cities*, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 731 (2005); Gustavo S. Mesch & Ilan Talmud, *The Influence of Community Characteristics on Police Performance in a Deeply Divided Society: The Case of Israel*, 31 SOC. FOCUS 233 (1998).

<sup>18</sup> See MCGARRY & O'LEARY, *supra* note 11; MULCAHY, *supra* note 15; WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE, *supra* note 1; WEITZER, TRANSFORMING SETTLER STATES, *supra* note 1.

<sup>19</sup> WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE, *supra* note 1.

opponents, holding dual responsibility for ordinary crime control and homeland security. In the absence of effective mechanisms of accountability, the police in these countries also enjoy legal systems that provide them with great latitude in their ability to control the minority population, including with respect to the use of force.<sup>20</sup>

The Weitzer model addresses very important political dimensions in police-minority relations in deeply divided societies, but lacks any reference to the cultural explanation. The reason might be that when Weitzer developed the model, he focused his analysis on Northern Ireland. There are few cultural dissimilarities between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority in this country that might influence the relationship with the police. In contrast, in Israel there are marked cultural distinctions between the Arab native minority and the Jewish majority that might affect relations with the police. Arabs are part of a Mediterranean, Islamic-Arabic culture, while Jewish culture is often more Western-oriented. These differences are manifested in various cultural expressions, including languages (Hebrew versus Arabic), religion (Jewish versus Muslim, Christian, and Druze), family structure (nuclear family versus extended family), residential patterns (urban versus rural or patrilocal),<sup>21</sup> interrelations among the extended family (weak versus strong), the role of the clan as an informal social control institution (among Arabs), gender relations and segregation, and leisure patterns.

Arab society is still largely governed by traditional social structures and has not undergone radical urbanization, with a significant percentage of Arabs living in rural villages.<sup>22</sup> Communities have preserved informal mechanisms of social control.<sup>23</sup> The Arab society in Israel exhibits some of the characteristics of a stateless society, especially with regard to the culture of lawlessness (toward some Israeli laws) and community self-policing.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> BREWER, BLACK AND BLUE, *supra* note 1; WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE, *supra* note 1.

<sup>21</sup> A patrilocal residence is one in which the family unit lives near the male relations. The concept of location may extend to a larger area such as a village, town, or clan area.

<sup>22</sup> Majid al-Haj, *Ethnic Relations in an Arab Town in Israel*, in STUDIES IN ISRAELI ETHNICITY: AFTER THE INGATHERING (Alex Weingrod ed., 1985).

<sup>23</sup> JOSEPH GINAT, BLOOD REVENGE: FAMILY HONOR, MEDIATION AND OUTCASTING (1997); BRYNJAR LIA, A POLICE FORCE WITHOUT A STATE: A HISTORY OF THE PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (2006); Manar Hasan, *The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of Women in the Name of Family Honor*, 21 J. ISRAELI HIST. 1 (2002).

<sup>24</sup> See STANLEY COHEN, INT'L CENTRE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL AMONG THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1990); LIA, *supra* note 23; Ginat, *supra* note 23.

The stateless characteristics of the Arab minority intensify as a result of the social and geographical segregation of Arabs and Jews in Israel.<sup>25</sup> These cultural characteristics are prevalent enough to influence the relations between the minority and the police.

The cultural variable in police-minority relations is not applicable solely to deeply divided societies. It is relevant also to several Western immigrant societies—including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia—where native minorities still live in segregated communities and hold different cultural codes from the white majority, especially in terms of traditionally informal social control.<sup>26</sup> This makes police work a very complex task in these communities. Furthermore, several Western countries host immigrants from non-Western cultures, and some of these immigrant groups have maintained cultural codes from their homelands, even creating a Diaspora in their host countries.<sup>27</sup> The immigrants are generally unfamiliar with the culture of the host country, and their vulnerability may make them targets for abuse by criminals in the community.<sup>28</sup> These immigrants may in fact hesitate to contact the police since many come from countries or cultures that had poor relationships with the police.<sup>29</sup> To sum up, in the case of native and immigrant minorities, the political variable is quite important when analyzing police-minority

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<sup>25</sup> See Smootha & Hanf, *supra* note 12; Ghazi Falah, *Living Together Apart: Residential Segregation in Mixed Arab-Jewish Cities in Israel*, 33 URB. STUD. 23 (1996).

<sup>26</sup> See DENNIS P. FORCESE, *POLICING CANADIAN SOCIETY* (1992); Jharna Chatterjee & Liz Elliott, *Restorative Policing in Canada: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Community Justice Forums, and the Youth Criminal Justice Act*, 4 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 347 (2003); Mazerolle et al., *supra* note 10.

<sup>27</sup> Wing Hong Chui & Lai-Kwan Regin Ip, *Policing in a Multicultural Society: A Queensland Case Study*, 6 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 279 (2005); Eric D. Poole & Mark R. Pogrebin, *Crime and Law Enforcement in the Korean American Community*, 13 POLICE STUD. INT'L REV. POLICE DEV. 57 (1990).

<sup>28</sup> IMMIGRATION AND CRIME: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENCE (Ramiro Martinez, Jr., & Abel Valenzuela, Jr., eds., 2006); Stephen Egharevba, *African Immigrants' Perception of Police in Finland: Is It Based on the Discourse of Race or Culture?*, 34 INT'L J. SOC. L. 42 (2006); Lars Holmberg & Britta Kyvsgaard, *Are Immigrants and Their Descendants Discriminated Against in the Danish Criminal Justice System?*, 4 J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIME PREVENTION 125 (2003); David J. Smith, *Ethnic Origins, Crime, and Criminal Justice in England and Wales*, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 101 (Michael H. Tonry ed., 1997).

<sup>29</sup> Robert C. Davis et al., *Immigrants and the Criminal Justice System: An Exploratory Study*, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 21 (1998); Robert C. Davis & Nicole J. Henderson, *Willingness to Report Crimes: The Role of Ethnic Group Membership and Community Efficacy*, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 564 (2003); Cecilia Menjivar & Cynthia L. Bejarano, *Latino Immigrants' Perceptions of Crime and Police Authorities in the United States: A Case Study from the Phoenix Metropolitan Area*, 27 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 120 (2004).

relations. However, we miss a significant part of the picture by ignoring the impact of cultural differences on the majority and the minority and how these differences may affect the minority's perceptions of the police.

#### IV. ARABS IN ISRAEL: BETWEEN POLITICAL THREAT AND CULTURAL ESTRANGEMENT

Arabs inside Israel's "Green Line" constitute about 17% of Israel's population, or 1.1 million people.<sup>30</sup> They are a native minority and part of the Palestinian nation. For more than 100 years, the Palestinian people have been engaged in a violent and ongoing national conflict with the Jewish national movement and, at a later stage, with the State of Israel. Immediately upon its establishment following the war in 1948, the State of Israel endorsed full, formal citizenship for members of the Arab minority who continued to reside in Israel. The national Palestinian identity of the Arab minority transformed them, in the eyes of the Jewish majority, into a group that was affiliated with the enemy and which possessed "dual loyalty." The solution to this threat was to enforce military rule on the minority community from 1948 to 1966. Though military rule has ended, it has not reduced the high threat perception currently held by the Jewish majority toward the Arab minority. A recent survey has shown that a majority of Israeli Jews (67%) believe that the Arab community's high birthrate endangers the state; that Arabs are intent on changing the state's Jewish character (72%); that Arabs might assist enemies of the state (78%); and that Arabs might launch a popular revolt (72%). It also showed that a majority of Israeli Jews (84%) fear Arabs because of their support of the Palestinian people and believe that most Israeli Arabs would be more loyal to a Palestinian state than to Israel (66%).<sup>31</sup>

The majority of the Israeli-Arab population lives in three geographic areas: the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev—areas at the periphery (and frontier) of Israeli society. Although there is an urban middle-class sector, a large number of Arabs live in rural towns and villages and continue to abide by traditional forms of social organization. In fact, 90% of Israeli Arabs

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<sup>30</sup> The so-called Green Line is the 1949 Armistice line established following the war of 1948; later it became known as the pre-1967 border in order to demarcate the Arab territories occupied following the 1967 War (the West Bank, Gaza strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights). My use of the term the "Arabs in Israel" excludes the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the Druze in the Golan Heights. If we chose to include these groups, then the Arabs in Israel would constitute about 19.9% (1.43 million) of the State of Israel's population. CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ANNUAL POPULATION REPORT, 2003 (2006).

<sup>31</sup> SAMMY SMOOHA, INDEX OF ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS IN ISRAEL (2004).

live in small towns populated by Arabs exclusively. Only eight cities are ethnically mixed, and these are extremely segregated residentially.<sup>32</sup> Such segregation is accepted by many Israelis; only a minority of Jews or Arabs express willingness to live in a mixed neighborhood.<sup>33</sup>

The Arab minority is not a single homogenous group, but rather is characterized by an inner diversity that affects its relationship with the police. One of the features of this diversity is the religious-ethnic divide among Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins.<sup>34</sup> Ethnic distinctions among Arabs in Israel are institutionalized; for example, the State of Israel recognizes religious-ethnic divides and finances separate institutions for each of the Arab religious-ethnic groups. The sub-ethnic distinctions of the Arab minority are not limited solely to the religious aspect, but are also manifested in the political attitudes and behaviors of the various Arab groups.

Druze have a basic difference from Muslims and Christians in their relations with the State of Israel.<sup>35</sup> The Druze are an Arab ethnic group culturally. However, the Druze peoples' political identification with Palestinian national motifs is very weak, and thus they are perceived as less threatening by the Israeli state.<sup>36</sup> Members of the Druze group share similar political orientations with the Jewish majority and are in fact drafted into the Israeli armed forces and the police.<sup>37</sup> In light of this, we may expect that compared to other Arab sub-groups, the Druze will express relatively more positive attitudes toward the police.

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<sup>32</sup> Falah, *supra* note 25.

<sup>33</sup> Sammy Smooha, *The Arab Minority in Israel: Radicalization or Politicization?*, in *ISRAEL: STATE AND SOCIETY, 1948-1988: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWRY* (Peter Y. Medding ed., 1989); *see also* Smooha & Hanf, *supra* note 12.

<sup>34</sup> According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the ethnic distribution of the Arab population is as follows: a majority (65%) are non-Bedouin Muslims, 9% are Christians, 9% are Druze, and 17% are Bedouins. The majority of the Bedouins reside in the southern police district, while the majority of Druze and Christians reside in the Northern District. CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, *supra* note 30.

<sup>35</sup> The Druze are a religious community, considered to be an offshoot of the Ismaili Islam, found primarily in Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. In Israel, the Druze are the only Arabs who are allowed to fight for the Israel Defense Forces, and many of them serve in the Israeli police.

<sup>36</sup> Sammy Smooha, *Part of the Problem and Part of the Solution: National Security and the Arab Minority*, in *NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL* 81 (Y. Avner ed., 1993).

<sup>37</sup> Hillel Frisch, *The Druze Minority in the Israeli Military: Traditionalizing an Ethnic Policing Role*, 20 *ARMED FORCES & SOC.* 53 (1993).

Although the Druze share similar political orientations with the Jewish majority, they still preserve the traditional ways of life in their segregated communities, customs that are very similar to those of the Muslim Arabs. This is quite salient in their patterns of patrilocal residence, the centrality of the extended family as an informal social control mechanism, and their maintenance of social separation between the genders. These characteristics indicate that the Druze politically identify with the Jews, but culturally identify with the Muslim Arabs. In recent years, few clashes between the police and the Druze have erupted, and these mostly have stemmed from the difference between the modern and traditional cultures. In October 2007, a violent clash took place between the police and the Druze citizens of a small northern village called Pki'in. Several Druze vigilantes from the community burned some new cellular antennas that were installed in the village. The people of the village believed that the cellular antennas were responsible for the increase in cancer rates in their community. More than 200 police officers sent to arrest the vigilantes were met with harsh community resistance. The police used live ammunition and many citizens and police officers were wounded. Some of the wounded police officers were Druze. This incident emphasizes the traditional structure of Druze society in Israel and its potential conflict with law enforcement.

When addressing the population of the Christian Arabs, we face the same complexity. Because they identify strongly with the Palestinian national identity and share the Muslim Arabs' political orientation, one might assume the Christian Arabs' attitudes toward the police to be more negative. However, the lifestyle of most Christian Arabs is more Western-oriented, similar to that of the Jewish population. In addition, this community is largely urban, better situated economically, and in consequence highly represented in the Israeli-Arab elite class.<sup>38</sup> The birthrate is significantly low among Christian Arabs; it is even lower than the rate among Jews and significantly differs from that of Muslims and Druze. The practice of naming children to reflect a European-Christian heritage and the use of foreign languages in daily speech are culturally Western characteristics of the Christian Arabs. Furthermore, Christian Arabs occupy a higher class position compared to the rest of the Arab sub-groups, especially in terms of educational attainment and income.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Amalia Sa'ar, *Carefully on the Margins: Christian Palestinians in Haifa Between Nation and State*, 25 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 215, 215-16 (1998).

<sup>39</sup> V. Kraus & Y. Yonay, *The Power and Limits of Ethnonationalism: Palestinians and Eastern Jews in Israel, 1974-1991*, 51 BRIT. J. SOC'Y 550 (2000). The Christian schools in

Accordingly, we may conclude that the Christian Arabs are politically very close to the Muslim Arabs but culturally different from them, and from the Druze. Consequently, they still view themselves as a distinct cultural-religious minority among Arabs in Israel.<sup>40</sup>

I have several research hypotheses for this study. I expect that the political and cultural differences within the Arab minority will create a complex picture of their perceptions toward the police. For example, I expect that the Druze will express positive attitudes toward the police in the political context. At the same time, I suspect that they will share similar (negative) attitudes to those of Muslim Arabs when community cultural codes are threatened by police practices. I also expect that Christian Arabs, similarly to Muslim Arabs, will express negative attitudes toward the police in the political context, but at the same time, they will be more likely than Muslim and Druze to contact the police for assistance due to their class position and Westernized cultural orientation.

#### V. ARAB-POLICE RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

The Or Commission—formed to investigate the violent clashes between the police (and the Border Police)<sup>41</sup> and the Israeli Arab minority in October of 2000—has noted that many Arabs do not believe that the police serve the Arab population, but are instead the “long arm” of a regime designed to control and suppress Arab political activities. At the same time, many police officers view Arabs as disloyal citizens. The police are inconsistent in enforcing ordinary criminal laws in Arab communities, a practice that leads to a degree of unchecked crime within minority communities.<sup>42</sup>

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Israel have a reputation as elite schools and of offering a better quality of education than public Arab schools. Sa'ar, *supra* note 38, at 217-18.

<sup>40</sup> Sa'ar, *supra* note 38, at 231.

<sup>41</sup> The Border Police was established in 1953 with the main function of preventing terrorist sabotage activities and the infiltration of Palestinians from neighboring Arab countries. COHEN, *supra* note 24. Over the years, this unit has become semi-militaristic and has come to deal mostly with public order policing. Arab protest in Israel has a traumatic and violent history of encounters with the Border Police. Furthermore, the Border Police is very active in the Palestinian territories, especially in policing terrorism, patrolling, and public order policing. These activities have given it a very negative reputation among Arabs in Israel. See Badi Hasisi & Ronald Weitzer, *Police Relations with Arabs and Jews in Israel*, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 728 (2007).

<sup>42</sup> OR COMM'N, REPORT OF THE STATE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO INVESTIGATE THE CLASHES BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND ISRAELI CITIZENS IN OCTOBER 2000 (2003).

There is minimal research on police-minority relations in Israel, most of which emphasizes the negative attitudes of Israeli Arabs toward the police.<sup>43</sup> In one poll, only 53% of Israeli Arabs felt that they should obey the police, compared to 85% of Jews.<sup>44</sup> Surveys conducted between 2000 and 2002 show that Arab respondents express negative attitudes toward the police.<sup>45</sup> In the 2001 poll, approximately 70% of Arabs thought that the police force was not egalitarian in its attitude toward all citizens of Israel, while only 35% of Jews agreed. The violent clashes between the police and Arab citizens in the October 2000 mass events significantly influenced this disparity in views. Still, even by the time of the 2002 poll, a significant majority of Arab respondents (62%) maintained their belief that the police are not egalitarian toward all citizens of Israel.

Taking into consideration the political and cultural diversity among Israeli Arabs (Muslim, Christian, and Druze), it is surprising that we could not find even one researcher who addressed the impact of this diversity on the attitudes of Arab minority sub-groups toward the police. The current research is therefore quite original.

#### VI. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data for this study comes from a telephone survey which was conducted over a period of two weeks in March 2003 among adult Arabs and Jews over the age of eighteen residing in the Israeli police force's Northern District. The Northern District ranges from the Hadera Valley (Wadi Ara) to the Lebanese border. The majority (70%) of the Israeli-Arab population lives in the Northern District, typically in communities that are highly segregated from the Jewish population.

Data was collected from a representative telephone sample drawn from locales in the Northern District with more than 1,000 residents. The sample included 255 Jewish and 471 Arab respondents. The 471 Arab respondents included 328 Muslims, 77 Christians, and 66 Druze Arabs.<sup>46</sup> Cluster sampling was used to ensure that each group was adequately represented in

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<sup>43</sup> Hasisi & Weitzer, *supra* note 41, at 740-42 (2007); Arye Rattner, *The Margins of Justice: Attitudes Towards the Law and the Legal System Among Jews and Arabs in Israel*, 4 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 358 (1994); David Weisburd et al., *Community Policing in Israel: Resistance and Change*, 25 POLICING 80 (2002).

<sup>44</sup> IRA CAHANMAN & TAMAR TZEMACH, *ISRAELI POLICE IN THE EYE OF THE PUBLIC: ATTITUDES ON SELECTED ISSUES* (1991).

<sup>45</sup> ARYE RATTNER & DANA YAGIL, *THE CULTURE OF LAW: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE EYE OF THE ISRAELI SOCIETY* (2002).

<sup>46</sup> Bedouin Arabs were excluded from the sample due to their small number in the Northern District.

the sample, and the response rate was 40% both for Arab and Jewish respondents. Interviews were conducted both in Arabic and Hebrew by Arab or Jewish interviewers matched to the respondent's background.

#### A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

In this study, two themes in citizens' attitudes toward the police were examined: trust in the police and community receptivity to contacting the police. The trust variable includes five measures in a five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" in regard to the following statements: "I have trust in the police;" "I have trust in the Border Police" (also known as the Border Patrol); "The police do their job fairly;" "The police work to prevent crime near my residence;" and "I would permit a member of my family to become a police officer" (Cronbach's alpha = .77).<sup>47</sup> The receptivity variable includes four measures in a five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" in regard to the following statements: "Reporting criminals to the police in my view is informing on them;" "I feel that police officers are not welcome in my community;" "In the event that I become a victim of property crime, I will report the crime to the police;" and "In the event that I become a victim of violent crime, I will report the crime to the police."<sup>48</sup> The receptivity variable eventually combined two items: willingness to report property crimes and willingness to report a violent crime to the police (Cronbach's alpha = .66).

#### B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables in this study include the standard demographic factors of age, gender, and social class, with the latter measured by educational attainment. Most studies of police-citizen relations find that age is a significant predictor of attitudes toward the police, with young people more likely than older age groups to hold negative views of the police.<sup>49</sup> Gender and class, however, are less consistent predictors.

I suspect that the fear of crime may affect the public perception of the police.<sup>50</sup> Some studies have found that people who are fearful of crime may

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<sup>47</sup> See Table 1.

<sup>48</sup> See Table 3.

<sup>49</sup> B. Brown & W. Benedict, *Perceptions of the Police: Past Findings, Methodological Issues, Conceptual Issues, and Policy Implications*, 25 POLICING 543, 554 (2002).

<sup>50</sup> Allen E. Liska et al., *Fears of Crime as a Social Fact*, 60 SOC. FORCES 760 (1982).

blame the police for the crime they fear.<sup>51</sup> Fear of crime is measured in the present study by the following question: "To what extent are you afraid of becoming a victim of violent crime?" Responses were rated on a scale of 1 (not afraid at all) to 5 (very afraid).

A significant part of the Israeli-Arab minority holds dissident political attitudes toward the regime and rejects the Jewish identity of the state. I expect that those Arabs who express moderate attitudes toward the Israeli state will be more favorable in their perceptions of the police and more receptive to contacting the police. This variable was measured by asking Arab respondents if Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state, can guarantee equal rights to its Israeli-Arab citizens.<sup>52</sup>

We know that highly controversial incidents involving the police may have an immediate and powerful effect on citizens' opinions, particularly when the incident involves members of one's own ethnic group. In Israel, it is possible that Arab communities that experienced a violent conflict with the police in October 2000 would evaluate the police negatively. Arab respondents were asked whether their community had experienced such an incident.<sup>53</sup> Approximately half of our Arab respondents reported that such a clash had occurred in their community (scored 1) and the other half reported no such incident (scored 0). This variable was measured for Arab respondents only.

In a society as politicized as Israel, a person's ethnicity might be expected to influence his or her evaluations of the police. The variable of ethnicity distinguishes between Arabs and Jewish respondents, and also among Arab sub-groups (Muslims, Christians, and Druze).

## VII. ANALYSIS

I compared the attitudes and preferences of Arabs, Jews, and Arab sub-groups (Muslims, Christians, and Druze) regarding the two key dimensions of police-citizen relations—trust and receptivity. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted. In the multivariate models, a linear regression analysis was performed only for the Arab respondents on each of the two indices reflecting the main dependent variables. The trust index of the police combined five items: trust in the police, trust in the Border Police, the fair performance of the police, the perception of police crime

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<sup>51</sup> See Brown & Benedict, *supra* note 49; Mary Holland Baker et al., *The Impact of a Crime Wave: Perceptions, Fear, and Confidence in the Police*, 17 *LAW & SOC'Y REV.* 319 (1983).

<sup>52</sup> This variable was measured for Arab respondents only.

<sup>53</sup> This variable is labeled police-community clash.

prevention efforts near the respondent's residence, and the likelihood of permitting a member of one's family to become a police officer. The receptivity scale combined two items: willingness to report property crimes and willingness to report a violent crime to the police.

#### A. TRUST IN THE POLICE

**Table 1**

*Trust in Law Enforcement Institutions and Police Performance*

	Percentage Agreeing	
	Mean (Standard Deviation)	
	Jews (N = 255)	Arabs (N = 471)
<sup>a</sup> Trust the Israel Police***	59.6 3.72 (1.10)	44.8 3.35 (1.32)
<sup>b</sup> Trust the Border Police***	82.1 4.27 (0.97)	39.3 2.96 (1.60)
<sup>c</sup> The police do their job fairly***	54.1 3.54 (1.12)	32.1 2.84 (1.43)
<sup>d</sup> Police work to prevent crime near your residence***	42.1 3.21 (1.19)	32.3 2.93 (1.34)
<sup>e</sup> You would permit a member of your family to become a police officer***	60.4 3.65 (1.55)	47.3 3.06 (1.78)

Asterisks denote significance levels from analysis of variance. \* < .05 \*\* < .01 \*\*\* < .001

<sup>a</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "I have trust in the police?" The response format was ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>b</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "I have trust in the Border Police?" The response format was ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>c</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "The police do their job fairly." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>d</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "The police work to prevent crime near my residence." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>e</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "I would permit a member of your family to become a police officer." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

The findings in Table 1 show that the police are highly trusted among Jewish respondents in comparison to relatively low levels of trust among Arab respondents—59.6% and 44.8%, respectively. A significant disparity between Jews and Arabs was found in relation to trust in the Border Police—82% and 39.3%, respectively. Jewish respondents are more likely to evaluate the performance of the police as fair and are also more satisfied with police crime control than are Arab respondents. The data in Table 1 also show that Jewish respondents are more inclined than Arab respondents to permit a member of their family to join the police force.

**Table 2**

*Means (Standard Deviation) of Trust in Law Enforcement Institutions and Police Performance, by Arab Sub-Ethnic Group*

	Arab Sub-Ethnicity Percentage Agreeing Mean (Standard Deviation)		
	Muslims <i>N</i> = 328	Christians <i>N</i> = 77	Druze <i>N</i> = 66
Trust the Israel Police**	40.2 3.25 (1.33)	41.6 3.30 (1.34)	63.6 3.74 (1.25)
Trust the Border Police***	31.4 2.70 (1.58)	41.7 3.04 (1.60)	75.8 4.09 (1.28)
The police do their job fairly***	32.2 2.84 (1.45)	26 2.75 (1.38)	41 3.05 (1.43)
Police work to prevent crime near your residence	30 2.88 (1.33)	39 3.06 (1.35)	32.2 2.92 (1.38)
You would permit a member of your family to become a police officer***	35.7 2.65 (1.71)	55.8 3.35 (1.76)	84.8 4.35 (1.33)

Asterisks denote significance levels from analysis of variance. \* < .05 \*\* < .01 \*\*\* < .001

Table 2 presents the attitudes of Arab sub-groups (Muslims, Christians, and Druze). Findings from the table show that Druze respondents hold more positive attitudes toward the police than do Muslim and Christian Arabs. The Druze's level of trust in the police and Border

Police is very similar to that of Jewish respondents.<sup>54</sup> More than Muslim and Christian Arabs, the Druze tend to evaluate the performance of the police as fair. Furthermore, the Druze are even more enthusiastic than the Jews about a member of their family joining the police (84.8%), and they significantly differ in their views on this issue from Muslim and Christian Arabs.

#### B. RECEPTIVITY TO THE POLICE

**Table 3**

*Receptivity to the Police*

	Percentage Agreeing	
	Mean (Standard Deviation)	
	Jews N = 255	Arabs N = 471
<sup>a</sup> Reporting criminals to the police in my view is informing on them***	15.7 1.87 (1.36)	31.0 2.55 (1.63)
<sup>b</sup> I feel that police officers are not welcome in my community***	15.8 1.82 (1.38)	34.7 2.73 (1.60)
<sup>c</sup> Willingness to report property crime to police***	85.8 4.49 (1.07)	68.4 4.01 (1.40)
<sup>d</sup> Willingness to report violent crime to police***	81.6 4.41 (1.07)	65.6 3.89 (1.45)

Asterisks denote significance levels from analysis of variance. \* < .05 \*\* < .01 \*\*\* < .001

<sup>a</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "Reporting criminals to the police in my view is informing on them." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>b</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "I feel that police officers are not welcome in my community." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>c</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "In case you become a victim of property crime, you will report the crime to the police." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>d</sup> The respondents were asked if they agree with the statement, "In case you become a victim of violent crime, you will report the crime to the police." The response format is ordinal; the ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

<sup>54</sup> See Table 1.

A receptive relationship between the police and the community is crucial for effective police performance. Table 3 shows that Arab respondents are more cautious than Jewish respondents in their interaction with the police. In comparison with Jewish respondents, Arabs generally endorse the statement, "Reporting criminals to the police is like informing on them." Similar views are also shown by the response indicating that police officers are not welcome in the community. Furthermore, this dynamic is observed in the case of reporting both property and violent crimes, as Arab respondents seem to feel restricted from either reporting crimes or complaining. This constrained relationship between the police and the Arab minority may be best explained by the political variable. Similar findings were documented among non-dominant groups in Northern Ireland and South Africa.<sup>55</sup>

**Table 4***Receptivity to the Police, by Arab Sub-Ethnic Group*

	Arab Sub-Ethnicity		
	Percentage Agreeing Mean (Standard Deviation)		
	Muslims N = 328	Christians N = 77	Druze N = 66
Reporting criminals to the police in my view is informing on them	30.4 2.53 (1.64)	23.4 2.35 (1.53)	40.0 2.78 (1.74)
I feel that police officers are not welcome in my community	36.8 2.83 (1.61)	32.5 2.68 (1.52)	30.8 2.42 (1.60)
Willingness to report property crime to police***	67.7 3.97 (1.43)	83.1 4.44 (1.09)	60.6 3.73 (1.51)
Willingness to report violent crime to police*	63.7 3.81 (1.50)	75.0 4.28 (1.18)	66.7 3.92 (1.38)

Asterisks denote significance levels from analysis of variance. \* < .05 \*\* < .01 \*\*\* < .001

As noted earlier, the Druze hold similar political attitudes to those of Jews, so if the explanation for police receptivity were solely political, then I would expect the Druze to express more receptivity to the police. Findings in Table 4 show that this is not the case. In reality, the Druze express

<sup>55</sup> John Brewer, *Policing, in* THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE: SOUTH AFRICA, ISRAEL, AND NORTHERN IRELAND (H. Gilomee & J. Gagliano eds., 1990); see BREWER, BLACK AND BLUE, *supra* note 1; WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE, *supra* note 1.

similar attitudes to those of Muslims in all aspects of police receptivity. They even endorse, more than Muslims, the statement that reporting criminals to the police is like informing on them (40%). Thirty percent of Druze respondents think that police officers are not welcome in their communities, and the Druze express an unwillingness, similar to that of Muslims, to report property and violent crimes to the police.

These findings suggest that the political explanation is not entirely adequate to explain the Arab minority's lack of receptivity to the police. However, that the Druze share a similar political orientation with Israeli Jews while maintaining cultural similarities with the Muslims, and this might be the explanation. The cultural explanation is also manifest when focusing on Christian Arabs' receptivity to the police. Table 4 shows that although Christian Arabs share a similar political orientation with Muslim Arabs (as expressed in their negative attitudes toward the police in Table 2), they still are significantly more willing to contact the police in the event of property and violent crimes, and in this they are more similar to Israeli Jews.

The data presented above point to differences among Arab sub-groups. The Druze express positive perceptions of the police in the political context, but like Muslim Arabs, they are more restricted in their willingness to contact the police. Conversely, Christian Arabs express negative perceptions of the police in the political context, but also express positive perceptions in regard to making contact with the police. At this stage, I will first try to determine if these differences persist, independent of the influence of other variables. The survey included questions regarding respondents' demographic attributes and other potentially relevant predictors. Second, I will try to determine what other factors, in addition to ethnic background, predict the Arab minority's perceptions of the police in Israel.

I conducted a multivariate analysis to estimate the effect of several predictors on the public's perceptions of the police. This was done in two stages. First, I used the complete survey sample including Israeli Jews as the reference category. By conditioning out this variable, I could estimate the impact of the independent variables and focus on the differences between each Arab minority group relative to Israeli Jews. Second, I estimated the model solely for the Israeli Arab minority sub-groups, excluding Jewish respondents since some of the independent variables were measured only for Arab respondents—e.g., endorsing the Jewish-

democratic state in Israel and experiencing violent clashes with the police during the October 2000 events.<sup>56</sup>

In general, the police trust model in Table 5 is more powerful than the community receptivity model, as indicated by the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> figures in the models.<sup>57</sup> We can see in the police trust model that education has a strong effect on predicting the public's trust in the police: the higher the education of the respondents, the lower their support of the police. This finding can be explained by the effect of education on the politicization of public awareness of police performance.

**Table 5**

*Regression Estimates for Effects of Predictors on Public Perceptions of the Police*

	Trust Model b (β)	Receptivity Model b (β)
Education	-.34 (-.25)***	.02 (.03)
Gender (1= male)	-.60 (-.07)*	-.69 (-.15)**
Fear of Crime	.31 (.11)**	.21 (.14)***
Ethnicity		
Jewish (ref.)	_____	_____
Muslim	-4.25 (-.48)***	-1.15 (-.25)***
Christian	-2.68 (-.19)***	-.21 (-.03)
Druze	-.77 (-.05)	-1.33 (-.17)***
R <sup>2</sup> (Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> )	.22 (.21)	.10 (.09)
N	654	712

Asterisks denote significance levels from analysis of variance. \* < .05 \*\* < .01 \*\*\* < .001

Gender has significant impact both on the trust and the receptivity model. Women tend to express more trust and be more receptive in their interaction with the police than men. One reason that Israeli women hold positive views of the police may have to do with the fact that they are more concerned than men about becoming victims of crime.<sup>58</sup>

Fear of crime may affect one's perceptions of the police insofar as the police are evaluated for their performance in preventing or solving crimes.<sup>59</sup> The findings indicate that fear of violent victimization affects both the trust

<sup>56</sup> See Table 6.

<sup>57</sup> Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was conducted to verify if any independent variable in the model is a linear function of other independent variables. VIF values were less than two among all variables in the models.

<sup>58</sup> See Hasisi & Weitzer, *supra* note 41.

<sup>59</sup> See Brown & Benedict, *supra* note 49.

and the receptivity models; the greater the fear of crime, the higher the evaluation of the police and the greater the inclination to contact the police. As suggested above, this finding might be affected by the fact that the fear of crime is more prominent among women.

Finally, I examined the effect of Arab sub-ethnicity in both models using Israeli Jews as the reference group. The results show that ethnic differences persist. Net of the other factors, Muslim and Christian Arabs are more likely than Druze (and Jews) to hold negative perceptions of the police in the trust model. Reviewing the receptivity model, we can see that Druze are more similar to Muslims in their restricted receptivity to the police, whereas Christian Arabs express receptive attitudes similar to those expressed by Jewish respondents in regard to contacting the police.

In the second stage, I estimated the trust and receptivity models solely for Arab respondents. In the police trust model we can see that education has a strong effect on predicting Arab trust of the police. The higher the education of an Arab individual, the lower their support of the police. One reason that highly educated Arabs might be critical of the police is that they typically live, not with middle-class Jews, but with poor and working-class Arabs, and therefore experience the same kind of treatment from the police.<sup>60</sup> Education had no significant effect on the receptivity model.

**Table 6**

*Regression Estimates for Effects of Predictors on  
Israeli Arab Perceptions of the Police*

	Trust Model	Receptivity Model
	b (β)	b (β)
Education	-.46 (-.27)***	-.05 (-.06)
Gender (1= male)	-.71 (-.06)	-.64 (-.13)**
Fear of Crime	.40 (.12)**	.32 (.21)***
Community-Police Clash (Oct. 2000)	-1.00 (-.10)*	-.15 (-.03)
Israel as a Jewish-democratic state can guarantee equal rights to the Israeli Arabs	1.2 (.19)***	.13 (.09)*
Ethnicity		
Druze (ref.)		
Muslim	-3.12 (.27)***	.21 (.04)
Christian	-1.80 (-.13)*	1.20 (.18)**
R <sup>2</sup> (Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> )	.25 (.24)	.11 (.10)
N	425	454

Asterisks denote significance levels from analysis of variance. \* < .05 \*\* < .01 \*\*\* < .001

<sup>60</sup> NOH LEWIN-EPSTEIN & MOSHE SEMYONOV, *THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL'S ECONOMY: PATTERNS OF ETHNIC INEQUALITY* (1993).

Fear of crime may affect one's perceptions of the police insofar as the police are evaluated for their performance in preventing or solving crimes.<sup>61</sup> The findings indicate that fear of violent victimization affects both the trust and the receptivity models; the greater the fear of crime, the higher the evaluation of the police and the greater the inclination to contact the police.

Gender had no significant impact on the trust model, but there was some impact on the receptivity model. Arab women tend to be more receptive in their interaction with the police than Arab men. One reason that Arab women might be more receptive to contacting the police may have to do with the fact that they are more concerned than Arab men about becoming victims of crime, especially when traditional social controls in the Arab community are gender-biased.<sup>62</sup> Another reason may have to do with the negative political image of the police among Arab men, who frequently—more than Arab women—experience violent clashes with police at political events.<sup>63</sup>

Police-community conflict during the riots of October 2000 had a significant effect on the trust model of policing. Arabs who report that their community had experienced a violent clash with police officers are more inclined to express negative attitudes toward the police. This finding is consistent with other studies that document the effects of highly controversial policing incidents on citizens' perceptions of the police.<sup>64</sup> This variable has no significant effect in the case of the receptivity model.

I expected that Arabs who agree that Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state, can guarantee equal rights to its Arab citizens would be more supportive of the police. This was confirmed in the two models: Arab respondents who agree with the statement express more positive attitudes toward the police and are more inclined to contact the police. The effect of this variable is, however, more salient in the (political) trust model.

Finally, I examined the effect of Arab sub-ethnicity in both models. The results show that ethnic differences persist; net of the other factors, Muslim and Christian Arabs were more likely than Druze to hold negative

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<sup>61</sup> See Brown & Benedict, *supra* note 49.

<sup>62</sup> See WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE, ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE STATUS AND RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN WOMEN IN ISRAEL (2006); Hasan, *supra* note 23; Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, *Law, Politics, and Violence Against Women: a Case Study of Palestinians in Israel*, 21 LAW & POL'Y 190, 196 (1999).

<sup>63</sup> See Hasisi & Weitzer, *supra* note 41.

<sup>64</sup> Robert J. Kaminski & Eric S. Jefferis, *The Effect of a Violent Televised Arrest on Public Perceptions of the Police*, 21 POLICING 683 (1998); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, *Perceptions of Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience*, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 435 (2002).

perceptions of the police in the trust model. When reviewing the receptivity model, we can see that Druze are more similar to Muslims in their restricted receptivity to the police, whereas Christian Arabs express more receptive attitudes than Muslim and Druze in regard to contacting the police.

#### VIII. DISCUSSION

Most of the research on police-minority relations in deeply divided societies has emphasized the political explanation, yet very little research has addressed the influence of cultural pluralism on police-community relations. In this article I have tried to elaborate on the influence of the cultural diversity and resistance of the Arab native minority in Israel upon police performance, alongside political variables.

The major contribution of this Article is that it sheds light on the differences within minority groups and their ramifications on police-minority relations. We usually refer to minority groups as a coherent, homogeneous group. By doing so, we may miss important distinctions within the minority group that have an effect on their relations with the police. This Article shows that, depending upon political and cultural affiliations, the Arab minority has different perceptions toward the police. Arabs who hold similar political attitudes to the Jewish majority (i.e., the Druze) expressed positive attitudes toward the police. By the same token, Arabs with a cultural similarity to the Jewish majority (i.e., the Christians) expressed a more open receptivity to the police. Both political and cultural variables contributed to a better understanding of police-minority relations in Israel.

This research can be extended to explore the relationship between police and minorities in other countries. Native-aboriginal populations reside in several Western countries, and recent studies have revealed the tense relationship between the police and the aboriginal population in these countries.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, this research can also be extended to several Western countries who host immigrants from different cultures. Several studies have shown the tense relations between these immigrant groups and the police. This Article suggests that a deeper analysis of the relationships between minority groups and the police should be conducted, and that researchers should be more attentive in their analysis of the differences within minority groups.

This research can also be extended to explore the relationship between the police and other social groups in Israeli society. Indeed, the Jewish

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<sup>65</sup> Blagg & Valuri, *supra* note 9.

population is not a homogenous group in cultural terms. For instance, ultra-Orthodox Jews are culturally distinguishable from the secular Jewish majority. Consequently, they hold significant negative attitudes toward the police.<sup>66</sup> Further research should be directed toward analyzing police performance as perceived by ultra-Orthodox Jews, which might clarify the impact of cultural diversity on their criminal behavior and attitudes toward the police.

There are some limitations to this research that should be mentioned. Less than 25% of the statistical variance is explained in each model, and this raises the question of what factors are not taken into account and how they might affect the findings. The suggested models take into account many possible variables that have confounded other studies. Nonetheless, as in all multivariate analyses, we should be cautious in drawing conclusions.<sup>67</sup> Future studies should even more closely specify their models of minority attitudes toward the police.

#### IX. CONCLUSION

This Article offers a framework for analyzing police-minority relations in deeply divided societies. In these kinds of societies, the regime has severe problems with its legitimacy among the minority group, which in turn affects the group's relationship with the police. Research shows that the political and cultural disparities between Arabs and Jews in Israel have reduced the trust and the willingness of Israeli Arabs to cooperate with the police. The political explanations assume that the major source of the tension between the police and the minority group stem from political variables, and in order to improve this relationship, socio-political reforms regarding the minority group are necessary. The cultural explanations assume that the tensions between the police and the minority group are also influenced by cultural variables, and not just socio-political factors. Thus, in order to improve the relationship between the minority and the police, cultural reforms are required in order to change the police culture both in

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<sup>66</sup> MINISTRY OF PUB. SEC., STATE OF ISRAEL, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ISRAELI POLICE (2002); MINISTRY OF PUB. SEC., STATE OF ISRAEL, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ISRAELI POLICE (2001); RAFI SMITH, KEREN SHARVIT & SMITH CONSULTING & RESEARCH INC., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ISRAELI POLICE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2000); MINISTRY OF PUB. SEC., STATE OF ISRAEL, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ISRAELI POLICE (1999).

<sup>67</sup> David Weisburd, *Magic and Science in Multivariate Sentencing Models: Reflecting on the Limits of Statistical Methods*, 35 ISRAEL L. REV. 225 (2001).

the making of management-level and street-level decisions with respect to minority groups.<sup>68</sup>

The cultural and political differences between Jews and Arabs in Israel pose a challenge for police performance in the minority community. While the police are focused on law enforcement, they must also be aware of and sensitive to the cultural distinctiveness of the minority community and suitably adjust themselves to it when providing services to Arab citizens. Increased distribution of community police stations in Arab communities would create better access to police and facilitate the procedure of filing complaints. In order to improve Arab-police relations, a multicultural approach is needed. This approach could be put into practice by recruiting more Arab policemen and policewomen, especially non-Bedouin Muslims<sup>69</sup> and, at the same time, by creating strong ties between the local political leadership and the chiefs of police stations, ties which have proven to be valuable in times of crisis.<sup>70</sup>

However, a multicultural approach is not without risk. A policy of cultural relativity that is too flexible in the policing of a minority group is liable to create a differential enforcement of laws and may even perpetuate criminal behaviors. I conclude that a balanced approach to police presence is necessary and that greater consideration and judgment should be exercised when enforcing the law. The complex task of policing the Arab minority in Israel must take into account the population's political and cultural composition, balancing its particular and diverse needs with the need to maintain the rule of the law.

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<sup>68</sup> Janet Chan, *Changing Police Culture*, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1996).

<sup>69</sup> Although non-Bedouin Muslims compose about 12% of the Israeli population, their representation in the police force is less than 2%. See Hasisi & Weitzer, *supra* note 41.

<sup>70</sup> INDEP. COMM'N ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 81-90 (1999).

