<html> <head> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html"> <title>Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks</title> <meta name="keywords" content="Corporate human rights responsibility, corporate social responsibility, multinational corporations, extractive industries, manufacturing industries, domestic adjudication, extraterritorial/universal jurisdiction, civil and criminal remedies."> <meta name="description" content=""> <meta name="dc.title" content="Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks"> <meta name="dc.subject.name.corporate" content="Northwestern University (Chicago, IL)"> <meta name="dc.subject" content="Academic,Law,Intellectual Property"> <meta name="dc.publisher" content="Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law"> <meta name="dc.creator" content="Caroline Kaeb"> <meta name="dc.date.modified" content="6/6/2008 3:17:38 PM"> <meta name="dc.language" content="eng"> <meta name="dc.rights" content="Copyright 2005 Northwestern University,"> <meta name="e-mail" content="j-monteverde2006@law.northwestern.edu"> <meta name="robot" content="Index, Follow"><script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/journals/JIHR/js/JIHR.js"></script><link REL="stylesheet" HREF="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/Styles/JIHRdefault05.css" TYPE="text/css"> </head> <body bgcolor="#ffffff"> <form name="docMetadata"><input type="hidden" name="title" value="Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks"><input type="hidden" name="author" value="Caroline Kaeb"><input type="hidden" name="pagination" value=""><input type="hidden" name="startpage" value=""><input type="hidden" name="endpage" value=""><input type="hidden" name="issueTitle" value=""><input type="hidden" name="issueDate" value="Spring 2008"><input type="hidden" name="vol" value="6"><input type="hidden" name="n" value="2"><input type="hidden" name="jTitle" value="Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights"><input type="hidden" name="cite" value=""></form> <table CELLSPACING="0" WIDTH="100%"> <tr VALIGN="TOP"> <td ALIGN="left" WIDTH="50%"><span class="citation">Cite as: 6 Nw. U. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 327<i> at </i>http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5</span></td> <td ALIGN="right" WIDTH="50%"><span class="copyright"><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/">JIHR Home</a> &gt; <a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/"> Volume 6</a> &gt; <a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/"> Issue 2</a> (Spring 2008) </span></td> </tr> </table><a name="ARTICLETOP"></a><br><br><div class="journalTitle">Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights</div> <h1 class="section1"></h1> <div class="title">Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks</div><br><div class="title"></div><br><div class="title"></div><br><div class="title"></div> <div class="author">Caroline Kaeb<sup><a id="*" name="*" href="#note*">*</a></sup></div> <div class="author"></div> <div class="infoLinks"><a style="text-decoration: underline;" href="Kaeb.pdf">pdf version</a></div> <div style="display:none;"><br><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDA0NCVB" onClick="return targetopener(this)">I.Introduction</a><blockquote class="outline"></blockquote><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDADRCVB" onClick="return targetopener(this)">II.Human Rights in a Business Context: the Extractive Industries </a><blockquote class="outline"><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDA5SCVB" onClick="return targetopener(this)">A.Complicity Charges: the Case of Shell in Nigeria</a><br><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDA2SDVB" onClick="return targetopener(this)">B.Human Rights Problems in the Extractive Industries: A Widespread and Multi-faceted Issue </a><br></blockquote><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDA3DS0" onClick="return targetopener(this)">III.Human Rights in a Business Context: the Manufacturing Industries</a><blockquote class="outline"><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDAHFS0" onClick="return targetopener(this)">A.Corporate Structures </a><br><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDAWHS0" onClick="return targetopener(this)">B.The Case of Nike</a><br><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDAPSS0" onClick="return targetopener(this)">C.Beyond Nike: MNCs' Responsibility for Human Rights Performance of Supplier Factories</a><br></blockquote><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5/index.htm#IDA5YS0" onClick="return targetopener(this)">IV.Conclusions</a><blockquote class="outline"></blockquote></div><a name="IDA0NCVB"></a><h2 class="section2"><a name="IDA3NCVB"></a>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Introduction</h2><a name="para1" id="para1"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;1</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Gross human rights violations -- such as forced displacement, forced labor, genocide and torture -- have long made international headlines and been on the political agenda of the international community. In a changing and globalized world, human rights violations are no longer associated solely with governments, but also with multinational corporations ("MNCs"). The Business and Human Rights Resource Center -- widely acknowledged as providing the broadest array of "balanced information of business and human rights"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note1" name="1">1</a></sup></span> -- has documented abuses ranging from health and safety violations in the workplace, to murder, torture, and forced displacement at the hands of military and security forces protecting company facilities. Indeed, attention to corporate human rights responsibility, the issue's significance for contemporary business practice, and the need for regulative outreach to non-state actors have increased tremendously. </p><a name="para2" id="para2"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;2</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Often the human rights performance of corporations and their host governments overseas are intertwined and complicate the allocation of responsibility. The latest case to feature extensively in international headlines,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note2" name="2">2</a></sup></span> that is emblematic of interdependencies between states and corporation, concerns the oil operations of the France-based Total S.A. ("Total") in Myanmar (formerly Burma). The activities of Total in conjunction with the U.S.-based Unocal Corp. ("Unocal") in Burma resulted in prominent litigation against the respective corporations in European and North-American jurisdictions. Major cases against MNCs<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note3" name="3">3</a></sup></span> for human rights violations committed abroad have been brought in both U.S courts under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note4" name="4">4</a></sup></span> ("ATS") and European domestic courts.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note5" name="5">5</a></sup></span> Like its joint venture partner Unocal, Total was alleged to have used forced labor provided by the Burmese government to build a pipeline. The case against Total on charges of complicity in crimes against humanity has just been reopened in Belgian courts, after cases against Unocal in U.S. courts and against Total in French courts had been settled on similar charges.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note6" name="6">6</a></sup></span> The case of Total shows that out-of-court settlements will not protect MNCs in the long-run from liability; rather, corporations themselves, NGOs with human rights agendas, academics, and policymakers must recognize and address the significance of corporate human rights issues. </p><a name="para3" id="para3"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;3</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This article presents a case study on corporate human rights performance in the extractive and manufacturing industries in various country contexts. The analysis evolves around two main studies on Royal Dutch/Shell and Nike which shed light on the dynamics underlying contemporary business practices in host countries and the sector-specific patterns of human rights problems. In particular, the studies explore human rights violations related to business activities in terms of the local political situation and corporate structures of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Additional examples from the respective industrial sector further illustrate: first, the various kinds of alleged human rights violations; second, the corporation's potential involvement in the abuses in the context of the legal standards at stake; and finally, the implications of public scrutiny and litigation for corporate policies. Thus, the article intends to give an account of liability risks<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note7" name="7">7</a></sup></span> for both the extractive and manufacturing sectors that is closely related to policy parameters. </p><a name="para4" id="para4"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;4</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One reason for focusing on alleged abuses in the extractive and manufacturing sectors is that these sectors have been the subject of intense public scrutiny and criticism for their human rights performance abroad. Also, these industrial sectors illustrate challenges of corporate human rights responsibility and implications for corporate policies that are common and applicable to most other sectors. The analysis will show that corporations tend to shift from formally denying to acknowledging and assuming responsibility for their impact on society. </p><a name="IDADRCVB"></a><h2 class="section2"><a name="IDAGRCVB"></a>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Human Rights in a Business Context: the Extractive Industries<span class="underline"></span></h2><a name="para5" id="para5"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;5</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This section analyzes human rights violations in the extractive sector by focusing on the activities of Royal Dutch/Shell<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note8" name="8">8</a></sup></span> and its Nigerian subsidiary ("Shell")<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note9" name="9">9</a></sup></span>, the biggest oil producer in Nigeria with a longstanding history of oil extraction in the Niger delta. The main reason for focusing on Shell is that many of its oil facilities are close to local communities that have continuously and increasingly protested the exploitation of their land over the last decade.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note10" name="10">10</a></sup></span> In the face of protests, Shell has become more vulnerable to accusations of complicity in human rights violations committed by government security forces. Furthermore, the case of Shell in Nigeria shows a pattern of human rights problems that is intrinsic to most oil and mining corporations. </p><a name="para6" id="para6"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;6</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The following sections describe human rights violations that occur in the midst of business operations in the host country<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note11" name="11">11</a></sup></span> and elaborate on the common parameters of liability risks in the extractive industries. </p><a name="IDA5SCVB"></a><div class="section3">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Complicity Charges: the Case of Shell in Nigeria</div><a name="para7" id="para7"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;7</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Shell is peculiar compared to other oil corporations: rather than relying on support from its home government, it cooperates closely with host governments to initiate and maintain its oil operations abroad.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note12" name="12">12</a></sup></span> Given these close relationships, Shell was particularly vulnerable to charges of complicity in state human rights abuses against local communities in the oil areas -- especially against the Ogoni people. </p><a name="IDA3TCVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAAUCVB"></a>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Corporate Structures in the Local Political Context</span></div><a name="para8" id="para8"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;8</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;When facing allegations of human rights violations, Shell, like many other oil companies, often points to the difficult political and social environment in which it conducts its oil operations.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note13" name="13">13</a></sup></span> In 1999, Shell -- while acknowledging that human rights problems surrounded its oil operations in Nigeria -- stressed that "major human rights violations do not generally exist in a vacuum, but within a nexus of corruption, poverty, poor public services and infrastructure, governmental instability and other factors which make it difficult for business to operate."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note14" name="14">14</a></sup></span> Thus, the boundaries between the local political context in which human rights violations occur and a corporation's intrinsic sphere of influence and responsibility are often blurred.</p><a name="para9" id="para9"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;9</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Indeed, the environment in which MNCs operate is often characterized by deep frictions among opposing local factions, usually the official government and local communities.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note15" name="15">15</a></sup></span> Such tense situations in the host country make it difficult to draw the line between governmental and corporate responsibility for human rights violations.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note16" name="16">16</a></sup></span></p><a name="para10" id="para10"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;10</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A closer look at the corporate structures of oil companies and their relationship with host governments is necessary to define the scope of corporate human rights responsibility. In many oil extracting countries, the oil industry is nationalized; as a result, oil corporations often operate in a joint venture with the host government. For example, Royal Dutch/Shell's Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), is a minority shareholder in a joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company; Shell serves as the operating partner in the joint venture making all operational decisions.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note17" name="17">17</a></sup></span> Thus, corporate and governmental interests in the protection of oil facilities and oil production are largely intertwined. This interdependence provides the basis for complicity charges against MNCs, as well as calls by communities and NGOs for oil corporations to use their joint venture influence to promote greater respect for human rights in governmental policies.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note18" name="18">18</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDAPWCVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDASWCVB"></a>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Setting the Scene: Security on the Ground</span></div><a name="para11" id="para11"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;11</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Complicity charges against MNCs must be evaluated in light of the security risks in the host country. Security issues are one of the most urgent problems facing oil corporations in many of their operating countries. According to Human Rights Watch ("HRW"), sabotage of pipeline projects, intimidation of company and contractor staff, and hostage-taking do occur, even though companies and local communities dispute the prevalence of these incidents, particularly sabotage.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note19" name="19">19</a></sup></span></p><a name="para12" id="para12"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;12</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;These security risks are rooted in protests against corporate policies that often have detrimental effects on local communities. In Nigeria, for instance, the Ogoni people allege that Shell Nigeria coercively appropriated land for oil production without adequate compensation and caused environmental degradation.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note20" name="20">20</a></sup></span> The unequal distribution of gains for Shell and losses for local communities has sparked protests that result in security risks to the oil corporation. </p><a name="para13" id="para13"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;13</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In order to protect their staff and facilities, oil corporations hire so-called "supernumerary police," trained and recruited by the Nigerian police. Additionally, corporations may enlist Nigerian government security forces, such as the Mobile Police.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note21" name="21">21</a></sup></span> Furthermore, the Nigerian government has set up special Task Forces to handle security issues in the oil production areas, such as the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force that was created to respond to the Ogoni crisis. Because these multiple relationships create several lines along which human rights abuses can occur, each incident needs to be examined individually in order to allocate responsibility for the abuses.</p><a name="IDAZYCVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDA2YCVB"></a>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">The Range of Liability Risks</span></div><a name="para14" id="para14"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;14</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Human rights violations are most commonly committed by government security forces in response to protests against oil operations.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note22" name="22">22</a></sup></span> Major MNCs, such as Shell and Chevron Corporation ("Chevron"), have been accused of complicity in crimes against humanity, summary execution, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, and other violations of international law, such as infringements on the right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right to peaceful assembly and association.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note23" name="23">23</a></sup></span></p><a name="para15" id="para15"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;15</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Complicity charges were brought against Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary SPDC in U.S. courts under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in <i>Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum</i><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note24" name="24">24</a></sup></span> and <i>Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum</i>.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note25" name="25">25</a></sup></span> Like the <i>Wiwa </i>plaintiffs, the <i>Kiobel</i> plaintiffs claimed that they and their kin were subjected to human rights violations by the Nigerian government, violations in which the corporate defendants were complicit.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note26" name="26">26</a></sup></span> The allegations against Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary are substantially similar in both cases and hinge upon two sets of incidents.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note27" name="27">27</a></sup></span> The first set involved violations against local residents by Nigerian military police/security forces allegedly requested by Shell Nigeria in order to protect company facilities and contain protests. Specifically, <i>Wiwa </i>and<i> Kiobel </i>plaintiffs claimed that the security forces beat and shot locals protesting the destruction of their property for pipeline construction purposes in April 1993, and shot three people, killing one of them, in October 1993 near a Shell flow station at Korokoro, Rivers State, Nigeria.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note28" name="28">28</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs alleged that the military police used vehicles supplied by Royal Dutch/Shell and that corporate staff were present during the assaults.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note29" name="29">29</a></sup></span></p><a name="para16" id="para16"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;16</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The second set of incidents involved the arbitrary detention, trial and ultimate execution in 1995 of the "Ogoni 9," including Ken Saro-Wiwa and Barinem Kiobel, all leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MSOP).<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note30" name="30">30</a></sup></span> After eight months of detention without being charged, Ken Saro-Wiwa (president of the MSOP) and other leaders of the protest movement were put on trial before a special court under "formal" charges of murder.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note31" name="31">31</a></sup></span> Owens Wiwa -- son of Ken Saro-Wiwa -- was subject to multiple unlawful detentions from December 1993 until April 1994, and was allegedly assaulted and tortured repeatedly during his detentions.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note32" name="32">32</a></sup></span></p><a name="para17" id="para17"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;17</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The plaintiffs in <i>Wiwa </i>and<i> Kiobel </i>alleged that Royal Dutch/Shell -- operating directly and through its Nigerian subsidiary -- cooperated and even conspired with Nigerian authorities in order to contain the protest movement and secure its oil operations in the Niger Delta.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note33" name="33">33</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs claimed that the trial failed to satisfy international standards of due process because there was no possibility for appeal and witnesses were bribed by the defendants to give false testimony.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note34" name="34">34</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants offered Ken Saro-Wiwa his freedom in exchange for an end to the MSOP's international protests against Shell.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note35" name="35">35</a></sup></span></p><a name="para18" id="para18"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;18</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;On February 22, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in <i>Wiwa</i> denied most of the defendant's motions to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to file their actions under the ATS and the TVPA.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note36" name="36">36</a></sup></span> In September 2006, the court in <i>Kiobel</i> granted the motions to dismiss with regard to extrajudicial killings, forced exile, destruction of property, and right to life, liberty and personal assembly.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note37" name="37">37</a></sup></span> However, the court preserved the general claim of aiding and abetting under the ATS and the particular claims concerning crimes against humanity and torture, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note38" name="38">38</a></sup></span> The court certified all issues for interlocutory appeal.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note39" name="39">39</a></sup></span></p><a name="para19" id="para19"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;19</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The claims against Royal Dutch/Shell reveal a broad range of human rights problems facing MNCs. Whereas the first set of incidents involves abuses committed by security forces that are either contracted, requested by, or otherwise acting with the awareness of the corporation, the second set of cases pertains to more general allegations of corporate support of repressive policies in the host country. </p><a name="para20" id="para20"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;20</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The distinction between these types of human rights problems correspond to the categories of beneficial and so-called silent complicity. The Global Compact identifies three categories of corporate complicity -- direct complicity, beneficial complicity and silent complicity.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note40" name="40">40</a></sup></span> On one end of the spectrum is direct complicity, and on the other is silent complicity, mere presence in a country with repressive policies. Beneficial complicity lies somewhere in between.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note41" name="41">41</a></sup></span></p><a name="para21" id="para21"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;21</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Direct complicity exists where a corporation knowingly assists violations of international law committed by a state; to date, direct complicity has only been found in a limited number of cases.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note42" name="42">42</a></sup></span> So-called "silent complicity" refers to non-action, for example, the silence of a corporation in the face of systematic or continuous human rights violations by host country authorities. Under this concept, silence is deemed not to be neutral;<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note43" name="43">43</a></sup></span> rather, the company is expected to "raise systematic and continuous human rights abuses with the appropriate authorities."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note44" name="44">44</a></sup></span> For example, corporations were accused of "silent complicity" for investing and operating in apartheid South Africa, since their business activities arguably helped to perpetuate a regime of discrimination and racism.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note45" name="45">45</a></sup></span> Thus, a multitude of corporations were sued under the ATS in U.S Courts.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note46" name="46">46</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs claimed that the corporation's mere business activity in apartheid South Africa constituted a violation of the law of nations and thus created a cause of action under the ATS.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note47" name="47">47</a></sup></span> The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that it "must be extremely cautious in permitting suits here based upon a corporation's doing business in countries with less than stellar human rights records"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note48" name="48">48</a></sup></span> and thus decided that a corporation's business activities alone are not sufficient to provide a basis for ATS jurisdiction.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note49" name="49">49</a></sup></span> In October 2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims and remanded for further proceedings.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note50" name="50">50</a></sup></span></p><a name="para22" id="para22"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;22</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Beneficial complicity, also referred to as indirect complicity,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note51" name="51">51</a></sup></span> is more difficult to conceptualize since it lies at the edge of accountability and liability.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note52" name="52">52</a></sup></span> It pertains to situations where there is no direct corporate involvement in the execution of human rights violations by a third party, but the violations occur in the context of business activities and the corporation benefits from the violations.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note53" name="53">53</a></sup></span> The most common example of beneficial complicity is the situation where security forces use repressive measures when protecting company facilities or containing peaceful protests.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note54" name="54">54</a></sup></span> The major lawsuit against Unocal in U.S. courts involves allegations of beneficial complicity in the human rights violations committed by the government in the furtherance of an oil pipeline project.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note55" name="55">55</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA3CDVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAADDVB"></a>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Complicity Standards under the Ninth Circuit Ruling</span></div><a name="para23" id="para23"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;23</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Complicity standards were first defined with respect to corporate liability under the ATS by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in <i>Doe v. Unocal</i>.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note56" name="56">56</a></sup></span> Relying heavily on standards developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the court held that complicity requires "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note57" name="57">57</a></sup></span>; under this reasonable knowledge test, a plaintiff must show that the corporation "knew or had reason to know" that its actions assisted the crime.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note58" name="58">58</a></sup></span> This <i>mens rea</i> requirement creates an important nexus between the action of the direct perpetrator and the corporation.</p><a name="para24" id="para24"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;24</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A broad array of indicators may establish this nexus, including the fact that a corporation derives economic benefits from the violations; in such cases, the complicity is often referred to as "beneficial/beneficiary complicity."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note59" name="59">59</a></sup></span> Other indicators may include the nature of the business relation, i.e. the level of corporate control in a private-public joint venture, the continuation of corporate assistance despite awareness of the violations, and the presence of a common goal.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note60" name="60">60</a></sup></span> Neither scholars nor courts have settled yet which indicators establish the required nexus.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note61" name="61">61</a></sup></span> Ralph Steinhardt, a prominent scholar in the field, points to the difficulty to "handle the intermediate case where a corporation simply benefits [from abuses], without contractual nexus," i.e. the corporation is not connected with the government by contract regarding joint venture projects or provision of security services.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note62" name="62">62</a></sup></span></p><a name="para25" id="para25"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;25</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The <i>Unocal </i>court also had to define the <i>actus reus</i> requirement to establish complicity. Granting Unocal's motion for summary judgment in 2000, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California argued that Unocal's conduct did not satisfy the standard of "active participation" in using forced labor, as the corporation merely knowingly accepted the benefits of forced labor utilized in furtherance of a joint pipeline project with the government.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note63" name="63">63</a></sup></span> Following the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the Court of Appeals rejected this view and held that the act of assistance does not have to actually cause the violations of the principal, here the host government.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note64" name="64">64</a></sup></span> Rather, the court deemed it sufficient that the acts of the accomplice have a "[substantial] effect on the commission of the crime," such that the abuses would "most probably" not have occurred "in the same way" without the participation of the corporation.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note65" name="65">65</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDAPGDVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDASGDVB"></a>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Agency and Joint Action Liability</span></div><a name="para26" id="para26"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;26</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;To establish third-party liability for corporate human rights abuses under the ATS, U.S. courts have preferred the theory of aiding and abetting under international law, as seen in the court's decision in <i>Unocal</i>.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note66" name="66">66</a></sup></span></p><a name="para27" id="para27"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;27</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;However, imputation may also be established under federal common law rules, such as joint venture liability, agency liability and reckless disregard.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note67" name="67">67</a></sup></span> In <i>Wiwa</i>, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that Royal Dutch/Shell "dominated and controlled" Shell Nigeria and thus principles of agency liability applied.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note68" name="68">68</a></sup></span> Under agency law, the corporation, as the principal, is liable for the acts of the agent and cannot put forward as a defense that the agent was merely authorized to perform lawful, non-tortious acts.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note69" name="69">69</a></sup></span> Accordingly, the plaintiffs claimed that the existence of an agency relationship between Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary rendered Shell responsible for the "willful participa[tion]" of its Nigerian subsidiary in "joint action" with Nigerian government that violated the plaintiffs' rights.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note70" name="70">70</a></sup></span> However, the court found that there was no need to employ this theory of imputation since the plaintiffs presented sufficient facts to support an immediate "significant cooperative action" between Royal Dutch/Shell and the Nigerian government in committing the abuses at issue.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note71" name="71">71</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA2IDVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDA5IDVB"></a>6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">The Corporate <i>Actus Reus</i></span></div><a name="para28" id="para28"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;28</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Corporate acts that consitute an <i>actus reus</i> and trigger complicity liability may take on various forms. Often human rights violations are preceded by a corporation's request for security protection by government forces. In <i>Wiwa, </i>for example, the plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch/Shell directly, or through its local subsidiary, "recruited the Nigerian police and military to suppress MSOP" and ensure that oil "development activities could proceed 'as usual.'"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note72" name="72">72</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs further alleged that Royal Dutch/Shell made payments to the military, provided logistical support (such as transportation and weapons),<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note73" name="73">73</a></sup></span> and participated in the overall planning and coordination of the "security operations" by attending regular meetings with the security forces.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note74" name="74">74</a></sup></span></p><a name="para29" id="para29"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;29</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Wiwa </i>is not the only case concerning abuses by security forces. In an incident at Umuechem in 1990, Shell was also accused of being complicit in the "killing of eighty unarmed civilians and the destruction of hundreds of homes" by security forces whose protection Shell had explicitly requested.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note75" name="75">75</a></sup></span><span class="underline"></span></p><a name="para30" id="para30"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;30</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Corporations often contest their alleged connection to public security forces<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note76" name="76">76</a></sup></span> which is difficult to reconstruct since the criminal acts do not occur in a corporation's inner "sphere of influence."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note77" name="77">77</a></sup></span> Shell acknowledged direct payment to Nigerian security forces on at least one occasion.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note78" name="78">78</a></sup></span> However, it strongly denied inferences that a security arrangement involving possible payment to the Special Task Force in the Ogoni region existed, even though the <i>Guardian</i> reported in 1995 about a Nigerian government document implying an arrangement of such kind.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note79" name="79">79</a></sup></span> While Royal Dutch/Shell increasingly acknowledges its responsibility for human rights violations by security forces,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note80" name="80">80</a></sup></span> its local subsidiaries have been more reluctant to accept such responsibility.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note81" name="81">81</a></sup></span> Still, even Shell Nigeria admits to "the gap between its intentions and its current performance."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note82" name="82">82</a></sup></span> Though quite tentative, this statement reflects rising awareness of the human rights problems. </p><a name="para31" id="para31"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;31</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Cases in which subcontracted security forces commit excessive acts may involve indirect corporate complicity. However, where corporate staff are present when military forces commit abuses -- as was alleged of Shell -- and take no steps to prevent the abuses from occurring, the nexus between corporate acts and human rights abuses is even closer and implicates direct complicity.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note83" name="83">83</a></sup></span></p><a name="para32" id="para32"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;32</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In this context, legal responsibilities are difficult to allocate because the effects of the corporate acts are often not immediate, but rather intermediated by political dynamics in the host country. For instance, Shell once called for the intervention of the naval forces, whose subsequent deployment of the Mobile Police led to the assault of numerous local community members.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note84" name="84">84</a></sup></span> In such instances, corporations often defend themselves by referring to their mere legal obligation to inform Nigerian authorities when a threat to oil production exists.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note85" name="85">85</a></sup></span></p><a name="para33" id="para33"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;33</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Furthermore, determining either the nature or degree of private-public involvement and cooperation is not an easy task; defining in clear terms the realm of corporate responsibilities stemming from this relationship is even more complex. Certainly, oil corporations tend to operate in difficult political and social environments. Nonetheless, the economic interest in oil production -- on the part of both corporations and host governments -- has exacerbated frictions with local communities in the oil producing areas, deepened discontent in the delta, and might have often lead to repressive government responses.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note86" name="86">86</a></sup></span> This undeniable link should be taken into consideration when determining the responsibility of MNCs for human rights abuses.</p><a name="IDASODVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAVODVB"></a>7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">The Extraterritorial Reach of Jurisdiction</span></div><a name="para34" id="para34"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;34</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Wiwa </i>holds MNCs liable for human rights abuses occurring in the context of their business activities abroad. The liability risk for MNCs is particularly significant since U.S. courts assert personal jurisdiction over business entities incorporated under the sitting jurisdiction, as well as over non-resident units of MNCs where an affiliate is present in U.S. jurisdiction and has a "sufficient" relationship with the non-resident unit.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note87" name="87">87</a></sup></span> Precisely, the relationship must be of such a nature that "two [entities] can be regarded as a single unit for the service or process."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note88" name="88">88</a></sup></span> To determine whether a sufficient relationship exists, courts consider various factors, including ownership, control, and the (even temporary) presence of corporate officials of the non-resident entity on U.S. territory.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note89" name="89">89</a></sup></span></p><a name="para35" id="para35"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;35</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Under these standards, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals asserted personal jurisdiction over the two holding companies: Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (incorporated in the Netherlands) and Shell Transport and Trading Co. (incorporated in the UK).<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note90" name="90">90</a></sup></span> The court found that an Investor Relations Office in New York was "facilitating the relations of the parent holding companies with the investment community."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note91" name="91">91</a></sup></span> Thus, a sufficient relationship between the affiliate and non-resident units was established even though the Investors Relations Office was "nominally part of Shell Oil Company" -- whose shares are all held by the independent U.S subsidiary<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note92" name="92">92</a></sup></span> -- and not of the parent holdings.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note93" name="93">93</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA4QDVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDABRDVB"></a>8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Shell's Response: A Changed Human Rights Approach</span></div><a name="para36" id="para36"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;36</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the face of public scrutiny of its operations, particularly in Nigeria, Shell adopted a stakeholder-sensitive corporate policy that holds itself responsible for an inner sphere of employee rights and an outer sphere of community rights and security policies.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note94" name="94">94</a></sup></span> Thus, Shell incorporated a model of corporate human rights responsibilities in its management agenda that follows the policy guidelines of the Global Compact.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note95" name="95">95</a></sup></span> Generally, corporations in the extractive and energy sector have become increasingly aware of the human rights problems surrounding security arrangements. Thus, many corporations which were subject to public scrutiny, including Shell, Chevron, Rio Tinto and AngloGold Ashanti, participated in a multi-stakeholder dialogue with various governments and NGOs that resulted in the adoption of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note96" name="96">96</a></sup></span> These Principles set out best practices for extractive corporations in forming their relationships with public and private security forces.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note97" name="97">97</a></sup></span></p><a name="para37" id="para37"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;37</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;But the difficulty in assigning "relevant performance measures (metrics) that can be verified," as pointed out by Shell, accentuates the practical problems that MNCs face in carrying out their responsibilities outside the workplace, and needs further analysis as well as better legal standards and guidelines.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note98" name="98">98</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA2SDVB"></a><div class="section3">B.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Human Rights Problems in the Extractive Industries: A Widespread and Multi-faceted Issue </div><a name="para38" id="para38"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;38</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Human rights problems are not peculiar to Shell in Nigeria. A multitude of corporations in the extractive industries face similar problems in various country contexts. In order to illustrate the patterns elaborated above, the following section outlines further human rights abuses that have occurred in the context of extractive operations and have drawn public scrutiny. </p><a name="IDAWTDVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAZTDVB"></a>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Killings, Arbitrary Detention, Torture in Nigeria</span></div><a name="para39" id="para39"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;39</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Claims were brought against the U.S.-based ChevronTexaco Corporation<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note99" name="99">99</a></sup></span> ("Chevron") in <i>Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp.</i>, alleging liability for "their own acts and the acts of CNL" (Chevron Nigeria Limited) in two incidents that occurred in the Nigerian Delta region.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note100" name="100">100</a></sup></span> The first took place in May 1998 and resulted in the shooting of protesters at Chevron's Parabe offshore platform and the subsequent detention and torture of the protest leader.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note101" name="101">101</a></sup></span> The protesters were residents of the Niger Delta demanding a larger contribution from Chevron toward the development of the oil extracting area.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note102" name="102">102</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs claimed that CNL acted "in concert with" Chevron when it recruited Nigerian government forces to intervene and transported their soldiers in CNL-leased helicopters.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note103" name="103">103</a></sup></span> Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that CNL personnel were on board the helicopters.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note104" name="104">104</a></sup></span> CNL confirmed that a CNL employee was in one helicopter for observatory purposes, but lacked control over the Nigerian military action.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note105" name="105">105</a></sup></span> The second incident, as described by the plaintiffs, occurred in January 1999; soldiers in a CNL-leased helicopter opened fire on two villages, Opia and Ikenyan, injuring and killing several people.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note106" name="106">106</a></sup></span> The soldiers were allegedly paid by CNL the day after the attacks.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note107" name="107">107</a></sup></span> Chevron's spokesman Charles Stewart acknowledged the payment to the soldiers, but stressed that the money was merely part of regular payments to Nigerian soldiers for protecting its facilities.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note108" name="108">108</a></sup></span></p><a name="para40" id="para40"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;40</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;On March 22, 2004, the District Court for the Northern District of California denied Chevron's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs presented evidence of an "extraordinarily close relationship between the parents and subsidiaries prior to, during and after the attacks."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note109" name="109">109</a></sup></span> Moreover, the court found that the relationship could be sufficient for a reasonable jury to qualify the local subsidiary as an agent of Chevron, for whose actions the latter can be held liable.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note110" name="110">110</a></sup></span> Factors supporting an agency relationship included the high volume of communications between the defendant and its local subsidiary on the days of the security incidents, close parent-subsidiary monitoring, integral company policies, and overlap in management staff.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note111" name="111">111</a></sup></span></p><a name="para41" id="para41"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;41</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Finally on August 14, 2007, the court issued a series of orders denying other motionsby Chevron for summary judgment.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note112" name="112">112</a></sup></span> Accordingly, since the plaintiffs had established enough evidence that "CNL personnel were directly involved in the attacks, that CNLhad paid and transported the GSF [Nigerian government security forces], and that CNL knew that GSF were prone to use excessive force,"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note113" name="113">113</a></sup></span> the case went to trial.</p><a name="IDAOXDVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDARXDVB"></a>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Murder, Rape and Torture in Furtherance of Forced Labor in Burma</span></div><a name="para42" id="para42"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;42</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One of the most prominent corporate human rights cases to-date was settled in California state and federal courts. The case concerned charges against Unocal<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note114" name="114">114</a></sup></span> for complicity in human rights violations in relation to the Yadana pipeline project in Burma (today Myanmar) in the 1990s. The pipeline project was a joint-venture between the U.S.-based Unocal, the state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, Thailand's major oil exploration firm PTTEP, and the French corporation Total.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note115" name="115">115</a></sup></span> Unocal was allegedly complicit in the murder, rape, and torture of local residents by the Burmese Military, which Unocal had contracted to provide security services to the pipeline project. The plaintiffs claimed that the abuses were committed in furtherance of forced labor for the construction of the pipeline.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note116" name="116">116</a></sup></span></p><a name="para43" id="para43"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;43</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Though ultimately vacated and settled out-of-court,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note117" name="117">117</a></sup></span> the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court's summary judgment on the major ATS claims,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note118" name="118">118</a></sup></span> held that "the evidence . . . supports the conclusion that Unocal gave practical assistance to the Burmese Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note119" name="119">119</a></sup></span> According to the court, the practical assistance "took the form of hiring the Burmese Military to provide security and build infrastructure along the pipeline route" and giving logistical information to the military about where to provide security in daily meetings.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note120" name="120">120</a></sup></span> Given the District Court's finding that Unocal knew that forced labor was used,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note121" name="121">121</a></sup></span> the Ninth Circuit further held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Unocal "knew or should reasonably have known" that its payment and provision of logistical information would "assist or encourage the Myanmar Military to subject Plaintiffs to forced labour."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note122" name="122">122</a></sup></span> In response to allegations of complicity in forced labor, a Unocal spokesman said that the company acknowledged that human rights abuses may have taken place in Burma, but that Unocal operated under high ethical standards and rejected allegations of complicity with the military as unsubstantiated.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note123" name="123">123</a></sup></span></p><a name="para44" id="para44"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;44</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Similar charges against another partner in the Yadana joint venture pipeline project, the French corporation Total, were filed in French and Belgian courts.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note124" name="124">124</a></sup></span> The victims claimed that Total also provided logistical and financial support to the military, which had coerced locals into labor for the construction of the pipeline.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note125" name="125">125</a></sup></span></p><a name="para45" id="para45"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;45</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Although French courts only exercise home state jurisdiction,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note126" name="126">126</a></sup></span> Belgian courts, like those of the U.S., exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over suspects of foreign nationality for international crimes committed abroad.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note127" name="127">127</a></sup></span> The French Total case was ultimately settled,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note128" name="128">128</a></sup></span> but in Belgium, criminal proceedings initiated in 2002 by four Myanmar refugees<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note129" name="129">129</a></sup></span> have just been reopened after the Belgian Constitutional Court held that a person recognized as a refugee in Belgium enjoys the same rights as a Belgian citizen.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note130" name="130">130</a></sup></span> Thus, the provisions of the Belgian Criminal Code prescribing criminal jurisdiction over crimes -- especially international crimes<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note131" name="131">131</a></sup></span> -- committed abroad allowed further investigation and prosecution of the case against Total.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note132" name="132">132</a></sup></span></p><a name="para46" id="para46"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;46</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;According to the leading/largest French news agency, Total's only comment regarding the reopening of the Belgian case has been that the corporation has "taken note" of it.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note133" name="133">133</a></sup></span> In general, Total recognizes the controversy surrounding its presence abroad, particularly in Myanmar, while stressing the difficult political context in which oil corporations usually operate. On its corporate webpage, Total states: "Unfortunately, the world's oil and gas reserves are not necessarily located in democracies, as a glance at a map shows."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note134" name="134">134</a></sup></span></p><a name="para47" id="para47"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;47</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the face of public critique of their relations with repressive governments, Total has made human rights performance an integral part of its Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR") policies, describing its effort to address the "critical issue of human rights" in its business operations abroad as an effort to "reconcil[e] security [for its employees and assets] and human rights"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note135" name="135">135</a></sup></span> as well as to spur community development.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note136" name="136">136</a></sup></span> Total has subscribed to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and implemented a two-pronged policy to (1) conduct human rights training sessions for its security staff, and to (2) "[f]ormaliz[e] relations between Total subsidiaries and governments on security issues."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note137" name="137">137</a></sup></span> The difficult standing that oil corporations have when operating in countries with repressive regimes has become patent in the recent debate over political sanctions against the military regime in Myanmar. In this context, home governments have urged MNCs -- and especially Total -- to freeze their investments in Myanmar.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note138" name="138">138</a></sup></span> Total continues to operate in Myanmar arguing that "[f]ar from solving Myanmar's problems, a forced withdrawal would only lead to our replacement by other operators probably less committed to the ethical principles guiding all our initiatives."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note139" name="139">139</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA33DVB"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAA4DVB"></a>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Forced Displacement in Sudan</span></div><a name="para48" id="para48"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;48</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In 1998, Canadian oil corporation Talisman Energy Inc. ("Talisman") acquired a stake in a major oil project in Sudan.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note140" name="140">140</a></sup></span> On November 8, 2001, Talisman was charged with complicity in crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed by government forces contracted to secure local oil projects.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note141" name="141">141</a></sup></span> The plaintiffs claimed that Talisman aided and abetted the forced displacement of non-Muslim Sudanese from its oil extraction area in South Sudan, as well as the resultant extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and physical destruction of civilian homes.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note142" name="142">142</a></sup></span></p><a name="para49" id="para49"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;49</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In its defense, Talisman claimed that its management was unaware of the forced displacement conducted in and close to their oil concession areas.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note143" name="143">143</a></sup></span> The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that "the government was [in fact] heavily engaged in providing security for the GNPOC [Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company Limited as the entity conducting operations on behalf of the Consortium members under their agreements with the government] concession."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note144" name="144">144</a></sup></span> In particular, the court substantiated that Talisman worked on drafting guidelines for the Consortium's interaction with the military in terms of providing logistical support.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note145" name="145">145</a></sup></span> Even though the court held that there was evidence "that Talisman was informed that Government forces forcibly displaced civilian populations to create a buffer zone around oil development sites,"<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note146" name="146">146</a></sup></span> the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on September 12, 2006, since the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that Talisman "performed any act that assisted the Government in its violations of international law."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note147" name="147">147</a></sup></span></p><a name="para50" id="para50"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;50</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;With regard to Talisman's decision to withstand public pressure to close its operations in Sudan for a long time, a Senior Manager at Talisman explained that as an indirect investor in the pipeline project, the corporation was able to continue its "advocacy with the Government of Sudan for tolerance and the protection of human rights" and be actively engaged in community development programs in the oil concession areas.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note148" name="148">148</a></sup></span> Elaborating on the developments surrounding Talisman's withdrawal from Sudan, he recalls that public pressure peaked in 2001, when the U.S. House of Representatives passed a version of the Sudan Peace Act that would have led to the delisting of Talisman shares from the New York Stock Exchange. The final bill adopted by Congress did not contain these sanctions; still, it provided the backdrop against which Talisman announced in October 2002 the sale of its interest in the project.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note149" name="149">149</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA5AS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDACBS0"></a>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Alleged Human Rights Violations in the Mining Industries</span></div><a name="para51" id="para51"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;51</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Companies in the mining sector have also frequently been accused of complicity in human rights violations against local communities committed by private or public security forces. For example, such accusations have been brought against Barrick Gold in Papua New Guinea<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note150" name="150">150</a></sup></span> and AngloGold Ashanti in the Democratic Republic of Congo.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note151" name="151">151</a></sup></span></p><a name="para52" id="para52"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;52</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Rio Tinto also faced intense public and judicial scrutiny for human rights violations that occurred in connection with security operations surrounding its mine on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note152" name="152">152</a></sup></span> Rio Tinto allegedly requested government support to suppress the uprising of local residents protesting against environmental damage caused by Rio Tinto's mining operations, as well as against its racially discriminatory hiring practices.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note153" name="153">153</a></sup></span> The military intervention, the plaintiffs claimed, unleashed secessionist efforts, an ensuing civil war and finally a military blockade that lasted for several years and cut island inhabitants off from medical and other supplies from the mainland.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note154" name="154">154</a></sup></span> A lawsuit was filed in U.S. courts against Rio Tinto Limited, an Australian corporation, and Rio Tinto Plc., a company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales, for crimes against humanity and war crimes.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note155" name="155">155</a></sup></span> In 2002, the District Court for the Central District of California confirmed U.S. courts as the legal forum of the dispute,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note156" name="156">156</a></sup></span> but dismissed all claims against Rio Tinto on the basis of the political question doctrine.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note157" name="157">157</a></sup></span> In 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling since the District Court erred in holding that the claims raised non-justiciable political questions.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note158" name="158">158</a></sup></span></p><a name="para53" id="para53"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;53</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The case of Rio Tinto shows a mutual interdependence, with MNCs relying on the government's support to launch and maintain their business operations, and the government relying on MNCs for the profit. Such intertwined private-public interests entangle MNCs in highly complex political situations that may give rise to corporate liability, liability that used to apply primarily to state actors. </p><a name="IDA3DS0"></a><h2 class="section2"><a name="IDAAES0"></a>III.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Human Rights in a Business Context: the Manufacturing Industries</h2><a name="para54" id="para54"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;54</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Human rights problems faced by manufacturing industries differ significantly from those faced by the extractive industries. Whereas human rights violations in the extractive sector stem primarily from excessive acts under corporate security arrangements, those in the manufacturing sector occur mainly within the supply chain and infringe labor standards in the workplace. Accordingly, this section argues that the corporate structures of MNCs in the manufacturing industries, particularly the textile sector, are decisive in determining whether MNCs may be held responsible and liable for human rights violations of their supplier factories. </p><a name="para55" id="para55"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;55</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The following section will briefly unfold patterns of human rights abuses in supplier facilities, and discuss the liability risks that MNCs might encounter for these violations. For this purpose, this section will first focus on the case study of Nike and then proceed to illustrate the findings in other manufacturing sector cases.</p><a name="IDAHFS0"></a><div class="section3">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Corporate Structures </div><a name="para56" id="para56"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;56</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Many companies in the manufacturing sector are called upon to take responsibility for sweatshop working conditions in their subcontracted supplier factories, especially in the sports apparel and footwear industries. These industries rely heavily on a so-called "triangle" manufacturing system, which entails the outsourcing of labor-intensive products to subcontracted companies in newly industrialized, low-wage countries.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note159" name="159">159</a></sup></span> Inherent in this business strategy is a formal detachment of the parent companies from their subcontractors, which are incorporated as independent legal entities; this formal detachment served as the basis of the positions adopted by many MNCs in the early 1990s vis-a-vis charges of human rights violations in subcontracted factories and enabled MNCs -- particularly in the textile sector -- to displace blame onto its subcontractors who were mainly located in Asia and Central America.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note160" name="160">160</a></sup></span></p><a name="para57" id="para57"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;57</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In response to alleged poor working conditions Nike took this "detachment defense" when it declared: "We don't make shoes."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note161" name="161">161</a></sup></span> This position was technically true, as Nike had adopted the widely used outsourcing strategy, and the violations were committed by legally independent subcontracted companies, not by the corporation's own managers or their plants.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note162" name="162">162</a></sup></span></p><a name="para58" id="para58"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;58</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;An anti-sweatshop movement has sharply criticized the working conditions in subcontracted companies overseas. The movement's principal target has been Nike, being the largest company in the global sports shoe and apparel industry.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note163" name="163">163</a></sup></span> However, Nike's major competitors, Reebok and Adidas-Salomons, have also faced similar criticism for production practices in supplier factories.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note164" name="164">164</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDAWHS0"></a><div class="section3">B.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Case of Nike</div><a name="para59" id="para59"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;59</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The allegation that conditions in Nike's supplier factories violate core labor standards and human rights has become emblematic of the problems facing the manufacturing, and especially the textile, industries overall. Therefore, this section explores patterns of human rights abuses in supplier facilities and potential liability risks by analyzing primarily, but not exclusively, the case of Nike. </p><a name="IDATIS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAWIS0"></a>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">An Account of Sweatshop Working Conditions</span></div><a name="para60" id="para60"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;60</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;NGOs and other stakeholder groups have vigorously criticized Nike for the sweatshop working conditions in its subcontracted supplier factories, particularly in Indonesia, but also in Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and other countries. These groups allege that workers in supplier factories are paid legal minimum levels that are below living wage levels and thus do not provide for the basic needs of the workers and their families.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note165" name="165">165</a></sup></span> NGOs also claim that overtime work -- though voluntary according to contract provisions -- has coercive features in the daily practice of these companies; refusal to work overtime is often followed by intimidation, harassment or threat of dismissal.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note166" name="166">166</a></sup></span> Moreover, non-compliance with national and international health and safety standards in the contracting factories threaten the health and life of workers (e.g. inadequate workers' protective equipment in production lines, or high level exposure to toxic chemical vapors and substances).<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note167" name="167">167</a></sup></span> It is also claimed that worker intimidation and harassment were common practices in contracted factories, and intended to interfere with workers' freedom of association, in particular their union involvement and strike participation.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note168" name="168">168</a></sup></span> Nike recognized most of these deficiencies in its first Corporate Responsibility ("CR") Report published in 2001.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note169" name="169">169</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDACKS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAFKS0"></a>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">The Range of Liability Risks</span> </div><a name="para61" id="para61"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;61</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Even though infringements of workers' rights clearly touch on human rights related issues, whether and to what extent workers' rights can be classified as human rights is debatable and not yet settled.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note170" name="170">170</a></sup></span> Regardless of such classification, the U.S. Supreme Court in <i>Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain</i> held that violations of a "narrow class of international norms" are actionable under the ATS.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note171" name="171">171</a></sup></span> In contrast, European jurisdictions apply mostly international criminal law categories of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in human rights litigation in their domestic courts.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note172" name="172">172</a></sup></span> Therefore, in both instances, the liability risks of MNCs before domestic courts are restricted to a narrow set of gross violations of international law. </p><a name="para62" id="para62"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;62</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Thus, leaving aside the discussion of whether workers' rights are human rights, courts are most likely to consider violations of core labor standards,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note173" name="173">173</a></sup></span> particularly the use of child labor and forced labor, as falling into a narrow realm of these statutes.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note174" name="174">174</a></sup></span> In fact, a lawsuit was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Nestle, Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS and the TVPA. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were liable for abuses by their agents, employees, partners, and otherwise contracted farms.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note175" name="175">175</a></sup></span> In particular, the three native Malian plaintiffs claimed that they were trafficked and forced to labor in Cote d'Ivoire cocoa plantations; furthermore they claimed that they were subjected to torture while working on the cocoa plantations.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note176" name="176">176</a></sup></span> However, to date, no court has ruled on forced child labor as a cause of action under the ATS. </p><a name="para63" id="para63"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;63</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Even though some authors claim that all core labor standards can be enforced under the ATS,<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note177" name="177">177</a></sup></span> courts have only scarcely regarded the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, as well as the elimination of discrimination, as a cause of action under the ATS. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, a prominent scholar in the field, refers to one case where the court considered the rights to associate and organize as actionable under the ATS inasmuch as the rights "are generally recognized as principles of international law."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note178" name="178">178</a></sup></span></p><a name="para64" id="para64"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;64</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Apart from child labor and forced labor, other gross human rights violations that occur in the sphere of the workplace of supplier facilities -- such as human trafficking, torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment -- may be considered to fall in the narrow realm of "violations of the law of nations," as defined in <i>Sosa</i> and the international crime categories under European jurisdiction statutes. Thus, a lawsuit filed before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Nestle for alleged complicity in the murder of a trade union leader by the Columbian paramilitary forces could hold promise in the future.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note179" name="179">179</a></sup></span> However, the substantial scope under these statutes needs yet to be defined further by domestic courts. </p><a name="IDA1NS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDA4NS0"></a>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Allegations of Child Labor</span></div><a name="para65" id="para65"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;65</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The most severe allegation that Nike has faced since the mid-1990s concerns the employment of children by its contracting companies. In 1996, Life magazine first reported that children as young as ten years old were manufacturing Nike products in Pakistan.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note180" name="180">180</a></sup></span> In fact, in its 2001 CR report, Nike itself acknowledged that the "worst experience and biggest mistake was in Pakistan, where we blew it" and that "[o]f all the issues facing Nike in workplace standards, child labor is the most vexing."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note181" name="181">181</a></sup></span> Nike further recalled the revelations documented in the 1996 Life magazine article, which branded Nike as a "child labor company." According to its 2001 CR report, Nike had ordered hand-stitched soccer balls from the city of Sialkot and realized soon thereafter that production was to be carried out through village contractors that employed children.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note182" name="182">182</a></sup></span></p><a name="para66" id="para66"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;66</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Subsequently, Nike "reversed course" and subcontracted its production to a single company that guaranteed minimum age standards for employment.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note183" name="183">183</a></sup></span> However, Nike has faced practical problems in implementing Nike's prescribed minimum age standards of eighteen years old for footwear manufacturing and sixteen years old for apparel and equipment; for example, verifying the real age of applicants due to the lack of reliable birth records has been particularly difficult in Pakistan and Cambodia.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note184" name="184">184</a></sup></span> Despite these difficulties, Nike holds itself accountable for compliance with minimum age standards and devotes itself to guarantee improved compliance with minimum standards.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note185" name="185">185</a></sup></span></p><a name="para67" id="para67"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;67</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Particularly public scrutiny of the incidents in Pakistan changed Nike's approach from avoidance and denial towards acknowledgement of and engagement with the problem. On May 12, 1998, Philip Knight, CEO and Founder of Nike Inc., appeared at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, where he laid out six commitments to improving working conditions in Nike's supplier factories.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note186" name="186">186</a></sup></span> Subsequently, Nike initiated steps to ensure an independent monitoring system of its contractors. Along with other corporations, Nike joined the Fair Labor Association ("FLA"), incorporated by President Clinton in 1999 as a cooperation of apparel and footwear companies and NGOs. FLA aims to create a monitory system that ensures corporate compliance with its labor standards.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note187" name="187">187</a></sup></span> But Nike's most significant reform -- which has had a tremendous impact on other companies in the textile sector -- was its disclosure of its subcontracted factories (nearly 800 in number).<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note188" name="188">188</a></sup></span> As the first major apparel manufacturer that voluntarily opened its entire supply-chain to independent monitoring and external assessment, Nike has thus set an important precedent for the entire apparel and footwear industry. </p><a name="IDA2QS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDA5QS0"></a>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">The Role of Public Security Forces </span></div><a name="para68" id="para68"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;68</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Local supplier companies often request and employ government forces in order to provide security for factories, especially during times of unrest. Even though physical violence is only occasionally reported, these security forces still serve to intimidate and deter workers from exercising their freedom of association.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note189" name="189">189</a></sup></span></p><a name="para69" id="para69"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;69</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The employment of government forces is not the only consequence of the interdependence between the state and corporations. Representatives of trade unions have also been arrested and detained by government forces, often under vague charges.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note190" name="190">190</a></sup></span> In such cases, corporations may be charged with beneficial complicity based on a blurred private-public divide and the mutual interest in profit that complicates the attribution of responsibility for human rights violations. </p><a name="IDAPSS0"></a><div class="section3">C.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Beyond Nike: MNCs' Responsibility for Human Rights Performance of Supplier Factories</div><a name="para70" id="para70"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;70</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;While receiving the most public attention, Nike is not the only case of human rights violations in the supplier facilities of MNCs. Several MNCs have been charged with a variety of human rights violations associated with their manufacturing supply-chains.</p><a name="IDAJTS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDAMTS0"></a>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Health and Safety in the Workplace</span></div><a name="para71" id="para71"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;71</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;MNCs have been scrutinized for low health and safety standards in overseas supplier factories that jeopardize the health and lives of workers. For example, a major fire that broke out on May 10, 1993 in the four-story factory complex of the Kader Industrial Toy Company near Bangkok illustrates the magnitude of the problem. The Kader Industrial Toy Company was a supplier to major corporations such as J.C. Penney and Fisher-Price.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note191" name="191">191</a></sup></span> With 188 workers killed and 469 seriously injured, the fire was referred to as the "worst industrial fire in history" to date.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note192" name="192">192</a></sup></span> The safety precautions were wholly insufficient as there were no fire extinguishers, alarms, or emergency exits, and external exits were blocked. With flammable fabrics everywhere, the fire spread quickly.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note193" name="193">193</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDAQUS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDATUS0"></a>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Human Trafficking</span></div><a name="para72" id="para72"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;72</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One of the largest human trafficking cases in the recent past involved the Daewoosa apparel factory in American Samoa, which had entered into a contract with an intermediate supplier to J.C. Penney, a U.S. department store. U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft described the working conditions in the Daewoosa factory as "modern day slavery."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note194" name="194">194</a></sup></span> Instead of hiring locals, the owner of the factory imported workers from Vietnam and China. Upon arrival in American Samoa, it was reported that Daewoosa paid only a fraction of what was promised while charging excessive fees for room and board. Payment was suspended if the factory ran out of orders, but charges for accommodation and board continued to be deducted from the workers' salaries. An investigation by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration found "inhuman living conditions," including deprivation of food, high temperatures in the factory, and overcrowded dorms.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note195" name="195">195</a></sup></span> Allegedly, food was withheld as a form of punishment.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note196" name="196">196</a></sup></span> Furthermore, it was reported that the workers' passports were confiscated to prevent them from fleeing the factory. </p><a name="para73" id="para73"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;73</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Eventually, the U.S. Justice Department stepped in and the factory owner was put on trial before a federal court in Honolulu. In 2002, he was convicted of holding the workers in "involuntary servitude."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note197" name="197">197</a></sup></span> J.C. Penney reacted promptly after it had taken notice of the conditions in the Daewoosa factory. According to Tim Lyons, a spokesman for J.C. Penney, the company stopped selling apparel produced in the Daewoosa factory and suspended its contracts with the supplier that was receiving its goods from there. Furthermore, J.C. Penney claimed it was unaware that its supplier obtained products from the Daewoosa factory.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note198" name="198">198</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDAPWS0"></a><div class="section4"><a name="IDASWS0"></a>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class="decorate">Forced Child Labor</span></div><a name="para74" id="para74"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;74</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The chocolate industry has long been subject to public scrutiny for allegations of forced child labor on their suppliers' cocoa farms in West Africa, especially in the Ivory Coast. A 2001 BBC article brought the issue to public attention, reporting that many parents sold their children to work in the cocoa plantations where they "have to work so hard they get sick and some even die."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note199" name="199">199</a></sup></span> Subsequently, the International Labour Office ("ILO") investigated 1500 farms across West Africa and found children working twelve hours per day and using machetes that exposed them to a high risk of injuries. According to the ILO, two-thirds of the children were under fourteen years old and most did not attend school.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note200" name="200">200</a></sup></span></p><a name="para75" id="para75"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;75</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Nestle and other chocolate corporations have faced increased criticism for buying cocoa from plantations that allegedly employ forced child labor. As a result, on its corporate webpage, Nestle makes clear that it "does not own cocoa farms or plantations in West Africa, nor [does it] employ workers on farms" but that it is nevertheless committed to ensuring that child labor is not used on cocoa plantations.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note201" name="201">201</a></sup></span></p><a name="para76" id="para76"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;76</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Nestle's approach marks a potential new corporate human rights policy that steers away from denying responsibility on formal grounds (along the lines of Nike's former "detachment defense") and moves towards acknowledging and assuming responsibility for actions of business partners. In fact, the problem of child labor in cocoa cultivation has received great attention by the chocolate and cocoa industry. In a joint statement with various stakeholder groups, the global cocoa and chocolate industry restated the urgent need to put an end to "the worst forms of child labor [1] and forced labour [2] in cocoa cultivation and processing in West Africa" and reaffirmed its commitment to this end.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note202" name="202">202</a></sup></span> In 2002, the global cocoa and chocolate industry established the International Cocoa Initiative, a multi-stakeholder foundation "working towards responsible labor standards for cocoa growing."<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note203" name="203">203</a></sup></span></p><a name="IDA5YS0"></a><h2 class="section2"><a name="IDACZS0"></a>IV.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Conclusions</h2><a name="para77" id="para77"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;77</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This analysis of human rights abuses for which MNCs are being scrutinized for responsibility reveals eight discernable tendencies. First, there is increasing sensitivity to human rights issues on the part of MNCs. This is reflected in the various multi-stakeholder initiatives to which MNCs have subscribed in the last several decades, such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the International Cocoa Initiative. However, even though many MNCs have created social and economic development programs, they continue to distance themselves from responsibility for the concrete human rights abuses at issue, as evidenced by the various suits against MNCs for human rights violations in numerous jurisdictions around the world.</p><a name="para78" id="para78"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;78</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Second, most cases demonstrate MNCs' tendency to shift from formalistic denial to acknowledgment of their responsibility for abuses committed by government forces and subcontracted factories. Thus, rather than rebuffing calls for responsibility and arguing that subcontracted supplier factories are not legally owned or operated by Nike, for example, MNCs have begun to accept responsibility for labor and human rights violations in these factories.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note204" name="204">204</a></sup></span> This trend shows that MNCs are prepared to enter into a dialogue with the various stakeholder groups and discuss possibilities to prevent future human rights abuses in relation with their business operations. </p><a name="para79" id="para79"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;79</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Third, it is difficult to allocate responsibility for human rights abuses since the abuses are often linked both to business operations and the political and economic situation in the host country. The situation becomes more complex where corporate and governmental interests are closely intertwined, as is the case in oil extracting countries where the industry is often nationalized and conducted as private-public joint ventures.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note205" name="205">205</a></sup></span> Thus, the distinction between governmental and corporate responsibilities becomes blurred.</p><a name="para80" id="para80"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;80</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Fourth, extractive industries show the following pattern with regard to human right problems: human rights abuses are often committed by government security forces or government authorities of the host country, leaving the corporation to face complicity charges for gross violations of human rights that qualify as international crimes.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note206" name="206">206</a></sup></span> Thus, the responsibility of oil and mining corporations for human rights abuses is closely related to the political context in the host country and depends primarily on the relation with the host government as regards the business and security operations.</p><a name="para81" id="para81"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;81</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Fifth, the human rights problems within manufacturing industries abroad mostly involve allegations of abuse within the corporate production and supply chain, and mostly pertain to the situation in the workplace. In many cases, abuses amount to infringements of International Labor Standards. Also, as in the extractive industries, manufacturing industries face complicity charges in abuses by government forces or paramilitary groups; however in the manufacturing context, abuses usually occur as infringements of the freedom of association and collective bargaining. </p><a name="para82" id="para82"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;82</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sixth, the analysis has shown that the number of cases in domestic courts charging MNCs for human rights violations in relation to business ventures has increased significantly since the 1990s. However, most cases pending before domestic courts involve gross violations of human rights, such as crimes against humanity, forced displacement, summary execution, extrajudicial killing and torture, whereas infringements of core labor standards have been primarily subject to corporate self-regulation<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note207" name="207">207</a></sup></span> rather than litigation. If brought before courts, labor-related ATS claims, including infringements of core labor standards such as forced labor, child slavery and abuse of trade unionists by security forces, could be found to constitute gross human rights violations that satisfy the narrow category of "violations of the law of nations" that are actionable under the ATS, as well as the specific set of international crimes that are actionable under European universal jurisdiction statutes.</p><a name="para83" id="para83"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;83</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Seventh, the sector-specific patterns of human rights problems might translate into a sectoral divide with regard to the extraterritorial adjudication of the abuses in domestic courts. The divide might come to depend on the civil or criminal nature of the domestic liability systems. Civil human rights litigation is a phenomenon peculiar to the U.S.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note208" name="208">208</a></sup></span> European jurisdictions, on the other hand, provide for criminal prosecution for direct redress of international human rights violations. Thus, there is a divergence in civil and criminal remedies for violations of international human rights norms.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note209" name="209">209</a></sup></span> This divergence in remedies also implicates the causes that are actionable under the respective domestic system. Whereas the ATS is quite vague and open in providing remedies for a "violation of the law of nations" (28 U.S.C. &#167; 1350), European statutes prescribe remedies for human rights violations along the lines of the international law categories of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The reason for the divergence is that many of these European provisions were introduced in national codes as an implementation of international treaties and conventions, in particular the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note210" name="210">210</a></sup></span> Thus, redress is confined to abuses that qualify as international crimes -- a risk to which the extractive industries are especially prone; whereas redress for environmental damages and infringements of labor rights -- a risk to which the manufacturing industries are prone -- are more difficult to prosecute under these legal systems.<span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#note211" name="211">211</a></sup></span> Despite the restrictive interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, the ATS still provides enough flexibility in its terms to potentially accommodate the latter cases in the future. Thus, this civil/criminal divergence may translate in the future into a divide among different industrial sectors with regard to liability risks, depending on the respective legal system that can assert jurisdiction over MNCs.</p><a name="para84" id="para84"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;84</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Lastly, even though major human rights litigation against corporations has been brought primarily under the U.S. ATS, European legal systems, like that of Belgium, are well-equipped to hold corporations extraterritorially liable for violations of international humanitarian law, and are thereby able to exercise jurisdiction over crimes that were committed abroad by non-Belgians as well. However, liability litigation in this context is confined to the category of international crimes provided by the Rome Statute. </p><a name="para85" id="para85"></a><p class="paragraph"><span class="paragraphMarker">&#182;&nbsp;85</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In sum, despite the increased scrutiny of corporate practices, MNCs continue to face liability risks in numerous sectors. As legal systems continue to evolve to accommodate claims against MNCs for human rights violations, identifying common problems and risk areas in major industries should serve to facilitate increased corporate human rights compliance and responsible global corporate citizenship. </p><br><br><hr width="100%"><br><h2 class="section2">E<span class="sectionHead">NDNOTES</span></h2><br><a name="IDAC5S0"></a><div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#*" name="note*">*</a></sup></span> PhD Candidate, University of Trento, Italy; Research Associate, Northwestern University School of Law </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#1" name="note1">1</a></sup></span> Business &amp; Human Rights Resource Center, A Brief Description, <a href="http://www.business-humanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription">http://www.business-humanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription</a> (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (quoting Mary Robinson, Director of the Ethical Globalization Initiative, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and President of Ireland). The Center tracks the human rights performance of over 3000 corporations in over 180 countries.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#2" name="note2">2</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See As Myanmar Cracks Down on Protesters, Oil Companies Keep up Controversial Ties</span>, <span class="smallCaps">Int'l Herald Tribune</span>, Sept. 28, 2007, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/29/business/AS-FIN-Myanmar-Fueling-the-Junta.php">http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/29/business/AS-FIN-Myanmar-Fueling-the-Junta.php</a>; <span class="noteSee">Global Firms Provide Lifeline to Myanmar's Junta</span>, <span class="smallCaps">Agence France-Press (AFP)</span>, Sept. 29, 2007, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jono5w9ykIWMyXNPZgt4JiKLKDTg">http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jono5w9ykIWMyXNPZgt4JiKLKDTg</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#3" name="note3">3</a></sup></span> MNC for the purpose of this article is defined as the parent holding company as distinct from the local subsidiary operating in the host state. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#4" name="note4">4</a></sup></span> The ATS, passed by the Congress in 1789, confers on the district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. &#167; 1350. For a discussion on legal pluralism with regard to ATS litigation, see Luisa Antoniolli, <span class="noteSee">Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law before U.S. Federal Courts</span>, 12 <span class="smallCaps">Ind J. of Global Legal Stud.</span> 651 (2005).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#5" name="note5">5</a></sup></span> European jurisdictions provide for criminal prosecution rather than civil damages in order to redress international human rights violations. Many European legal systems, however, do not allow for criminal liability of legal entities, since it goes to the very heart of the controversy surrounding collective moral responsibility. <span class="noteSee">See </span>Kai Ambos, <span class="noteSee">Art. 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in</span> Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 475, 477-78 &#182;&nbsp;4 (Otto Triffterer ed. 1999). It is argued that a corporation, as any collective, has "no soul to damn" and "no body to kick," and thus can be subject neither to moral blame nor criminal liability. John Coffee, <span class="noteSee">"No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment</span>, 79 <span class="smallCaps">Mich. L. Rev. </span>386 (1981). This leads to a situation where corporations cannot be held criminally liable in domestic courts. However, there are some exceptions. France and Belgium, for example, provide for corporate criminal responsibility and thus allow the indictment and prosecution of legal persons and corporations in particular. <span class="noteSee">See </span>Bruno Demeyere, Fafo AIS, Survey Response, Laws of Belgium, 'Commerce, Crime and Conflict: A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions' 38 (Sept. 6, 2006), <span class="noteSee">available at</span> www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyBelgium06Sep2006.pdf; Abigail Hansen &amp; William Bourdon, Fafo AIS, Survey Response, Laws of France, 'Commerce, Crime and Conflict: A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions' 4-7 (Sept. 6, 2006), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyFrance06Sep2006.pdf">http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyFrance06Sep2006.pdf</a>. <span class="noteSee">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#6" name="note6">6</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Belgium Reopens Myanmar Humanity Crimes Probe Against Oil Giant Total</span>, <span class="smallCaps">Agence France-Press (AFP), </span>Oct. 2, 2007 [hereinafter <span class="noteSee">Belgium</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee"> Reopens</span>], <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g84fzhRA8Y6IvW-gmt7YmonfEBKg">http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g84fzhRA8Y6IvW-gmt7YmonfEBKg</a></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#7" name="note7">7</a></sup></span> This essay is confined to the analysis of the risk for MNCs to be held liable in courts of their home state, i.e. where they are incorporated, under active nationality jurisdiction or in courts of a third state under universal jurisdiction. It does not address the adjudication of abuses in courts of the host state, i.e. where an MNC operates through its local subsidiaries.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#8" name="note8">8</a></sup></span> Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#9" name="note9">9</a></sup></span> Unless specified otherwise, Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian Subsidiary are henceforth referred to as "Shell."</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#10" name="note10">10</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Hum. Rts. Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities</span> 12 (1999) [hereinafter <span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>], <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf">http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#11" name="note11">11</a></sup></span> Evidence is established through corporate statements regarding human rights-related incidents, substantial claims from non-governmental organizations, civil society and the international press, as well as findings in related court proceedings primarily brought before U.S. courts.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#12" name="note12">12</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>J. George Frynas, <span class="noteSee">Global Monitor: Royal Dutch/Shell</span>, 8 <span class="smallCaps">New Pol. Econ.</span> 275, 279-80 (2003).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#13" name="note13">13</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Richard Boele et al., <span class="noteSee">Shell</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">, Nigeria</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee"> and the Ogoni. A Study in Unsustainable Development: I. The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People - Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and Prospects for Resolution</span>, 9 <span class="smallCaps">Sustainable Dev. </span>74, 82 (2001).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#14" name="note14">14</a></sup></span> Boele, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 13, at 82 (quoting <span class="smallCaps">Shell International, Management Primer on Human Rights</span> (1999)).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#15" name="note15">15</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 68-71.<span class="underline">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#16" name="note16">16</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Watts, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 22, at 390. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#17" name="note17">17</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Boele, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 13, at 75; J. Paul Martin, <span class="noteSee">Royal Dutch Shell: How Deep the Changes, in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, </span>93, 95 (George Andreopoulos et al. eds., 2006). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#18" name="note18">18</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 3-6.<span class="underline">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#19" name="note19">19</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 3, 10. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#20" name="note20">20</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co<span class="noteSee">.</span>, 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002); Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006), <span class="noteSee">leave for interlocutory appeal granted, </span>Nos. 06-4800 &amp; -4876 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#21" name="note21">21</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 10, 14. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#22" name="note22">22</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Michael J. Watts, <span class="noteSee">Righteous Oil? Human Rights, The Oil Complex, and Corporate Social Responsibility</span>, 30 <span class="smallCaps">Ann. Rev. of Env't and Resources</span> 373, 390-91 (2005).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#23" name="note23">23</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000); Eighth Amended Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief at 26-42, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 5760 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#24" name="note24">24</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#25" name="note25">25</a></sup></span> Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2006), <span class="noteSee">leave for interlocutory appeal granted, </span>Nos. 06-4800 &amp; -4876 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#26" name="note26">26</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 226 F.3d at 92; Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 20, at 1.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#27" name="note27">27</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id.</span> at 1-2; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 02 Civ. 7618, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71421, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#28" name="note28">28</a></sup></span> Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 20, at 6-7; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386 &amp; 01 Civ. 1909, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65601, at*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#29" name="note29">29</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 20, at 6-7; <span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *5.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#30" name="note30">30</a></sup></span> MOSOP is the representative organization of the Ogoni people and forms an opposition against Shell's operations in the region. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at **4-5; Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 20, at 7-8.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#31" name="note31">31</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 226 F.3d 88 at 92; Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 20, at 7.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#32" name="note32">32</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 9.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#33" name="note33">33</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 at *5; <span class="noteSee">Kiobel</span>, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71421 at *2.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#34" name="note34">34</a></sup></span> Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 20, at 8.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#35" name="note35">35</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *5.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#36" name="note36">36</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at *2.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#37" name="note37">37</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Kiobel</span>, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468. (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2006), <span class="noteSee">leave for interlocutory appeal granted, </span>Nos. 06-4800 &amp; -4876 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#38" name="note38">38</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 463-67.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#39" name="note39">39</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id. </span>at 467-68.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#40" name="note40">40</a></sup></span> Celia Wells &amp; Juanita Elias, <span class="noteSee">Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International Stage, in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Non-State Actors and Human Rights</span> 141, 163 (Philip Alston ed. 2005).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#41" name="note41">41</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Anita Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations</span>, 20 <span class="smallCaps">Berkeley</span><span class="smallCaps"> J. Int'l L.</span> 91, 103 (2002).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#42" name="note42">42</a></sup></span> Examples of direct complicity are German corporations, in particular I. G. Farben, Flick and Krupp, that used forced labor during World War II. <span class="noteSee">See </span>Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102. Ines Tófalo applies a different metric in these cases of direct complicity by showing that the human rights violations are "symbiotic joint actions, where the state and the TNC [transnational corporation] act in concert." Ines Tófalo, <span class="noteSee">Overt and Hidden Accomplices: Transnational Corporations' Range of Complicity for Human Rights Violations, in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Transnational Corporations and Human Rights</span>, 335, 339 (Olivier de Schutter ed. 2006). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#43" name="note43">43</a></sup></span> Wells, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 39, at 173; Klaus Leisinger, <span class="noteSee">Business and Human Rights, in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Embedding Human Rights in Business Practice </span>50, 56 (UN Global Compact Office ed. 2004).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#44" name="note44">44</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors</span> 221 (2006) (quoting <span class="noteSee">Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 56th Session of the General Assembly</span>, at &#182;&nbsp;111, U.N. Doc. A/56/36/2001 (2001)).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#45" name="note45">45</a></sup></span> Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 103.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#46" name="note46">46</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#47" name="note47">47</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#48" name="note48">48</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 554.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#49" name="note49">49</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 557.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#50" name="note50">50</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See Khulumani</span>, 504 F.3d at 264. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's dismissal of the ATS claims holding that the District Court erred when it held that the ATS does not allow for claims of aiding and abetting liability.<span class="noteSee"> See id. </span>at 260. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#51" name="note51">51</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#52" name="note52">52</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Tófalo, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 41, at 340-44, 350-51; Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#53" name="note53">53</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102-03.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#54" name="note54">54</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>United Nations Global Compact, The Ten Principles: Principle Two, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html">http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#55" name="note55">55</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102. The categorization of the different complicity cases is often difficult and differs among academic scholars. Thus, for example, Tófalo considers the state commission of abuses in furtherance of a joint venture as a case of direct, rather than indirect complicity. Tófalo, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 41, at 340-41.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#56" name="note56">56</a></sup></span> Even though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to rehear the case en banc, the case was finally vacated due to an out-of-court settlement by the parties. Thus, the ruling does not stand any longer; however, the court's elaborations with regard to the requirements of corporate complicity are often referred to. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 255.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#57" name="note57">57</a></sup></span> Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2002). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#58" name="note58">58</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 951 (quoting Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment &amp; Sentence, &#182;&nbsp;180 (Jan. 27, 2000)).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#59" name="note59">59</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102, 145; <span class="noteSee">see also</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 221-22, 257.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#60" name="note60">60</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102-03; Ralph G. Steinhardt, <span class="noteSee">Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Non-State Actors and Human Rights</span> 177, 199-200.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#61" name="note61">61</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id.</span> at 198-202; Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102-03.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#62" name="note62">62</a></sup></span> Steinhardt, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 59, at 200.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#63" name="note63">63</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See Unocal</span>, 395 F.3d at 947-48; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000). <span class="noteSee">See also </span>Andrew Clapham<span class="noteSee">, The Complexity of International Criminal Law: Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility to the Responsibility of Organizations, Corporations and States</span>, <span class="noteSee">in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: the Search for Justice in a World of States</span> 233, 242 (Ramesh Thakur &amp; Peter Malcontent eds., 2004). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#64" name="note64">64</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Tófalo, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 41, at 343-44; <span class="smallCaps">Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 257.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#65" name="note65">65</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Unocal</span>, 395 F.3d at 950 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion &amp; Judgment &#182;&nbsp;688 (May 7, 1997)).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#66" name="note66">66</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Tarekt F. Maassarani, <span class="noteSee">Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act</span>, 38 <span class="smallCaps">N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &amp; Pol.</span> 39, 39 (2005); <span class="noteSee">Unocal</span>, 395 F.3d at 946-51.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#67" name="note67">67</a></sup></span>Reference to these principles for third-party liability is made particularly when federal common law rather than international law is deemed the appropriate source of law in these cases. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">id.</span> at 964-69. However, as Judge Reinhardt in his concurring opinion in <span class="noteSee">Unocal</span> points out, joint liability and agency principles are well established under international law as well. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 972-73. <span class="underline">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#68" name="note68">68</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *41 n.14.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#69" name="note69">69</a></sup></span> Tófalo, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 41, at 342.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#70" name="note70">70</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at **40-41. Corporate human rights liability generally requires a sufficient nexus to state action (Exceptions were recognized by U.S. courts for slave trading, genocide, war crimes, and forced labor. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps"> Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 255). In <span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, the plaintiffs employed the "joint action" test to establish Shell Nigeria's involvement in the government abuses. <span class="noteSee">Wiwa</span>, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *40. Under the "joint action" test, private actors are considered state actors provided that they are "willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents." <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#71" name="note71">71</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at **41-43. The court stressed that it is merely deciding upon a motion to dismiss; thus, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs is not analyzed with the same rigor as with regard to a motion for summary judgment. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at **45-46.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#72" name="note72">72</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at *5.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#73" name="note73">73</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#74" name="note74">74</a></sup></span> Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 20, at 9-10.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#75" name="note75">75</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 14.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#76" name="note76">76</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Frynas, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 12, at 282.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#77" name="note77">77</a></sup></span> Principle One of the Global Compact states that "businesses should support and respect the protection of international human rights within their sphere of influence." United Nations Global Compact<span class="noteSee">, </span>The Ten Principles: Principle One [hereinafter Principle One], <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html">http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html</a>. The Global Compact principles do not elaborate in more detail what is considered to be the corporate "sphere of influence." <span class="noteSee">Id.</span> However on its official webpage the Global Compact provides indications on how the sphere of influence should be mapped. Precisely, the "sphere of influence" involves the inner sphere of corporate human rights compliance "in the workplace" and the outer sphere of human rights commitment "in the community." <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. Furthermore, the corporate "sphere of influence" extends to the situation when corporations rely on security forces for the protection of their company facilities and these security forces violate international standards for the use of force. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. When moving from a corporation's inner to its outer sphere of influence a decrease in legal density of corporate human rights duties can be observed. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 220. Accordingly, this gradual conception of the sphere of corporate influence can be aligned to the three dimensions of human rights obligations, namely the obligation to respect human rights (in the workplace), the duty to protect human rights (for example by preventing the use of force by external security forces), the duty to promote human rights (by contributing to the human rights debate in the wider community). <span class="noteSee">Id.</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#78" name="note78">78</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 13.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#79" name="note79">79</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Boele, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 13, at 80. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#80" name="note80">80</a></sup></span> This is reflected for example in the endorsement of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights by many major corporations from the extractive sector, where the latter subscribe themselves to best practices regarding their relationship with private and public security forces.<span class="noteSee"> See</span> Int'l Bus. Leaders Forum &amp; Bus. Soc. Responsibility, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, <a href="http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/">http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/</a> (last visited Apr. 13, 2008). <span class="underline">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#81" name="note81">81</a></sup></span> Frynas, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 12, at 282.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#82" name="note82">82</a></sup></span> Boele, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 13, at 84 (referencing SPDC (Shell Nigeria) as of 1998).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#83" name="note83">83</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 14; Ramasastry, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 40, at 102. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#84" name="note84">84</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 15.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#85" name="note85">85</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id</span>. at 4, 152.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#86" name="note86">86</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 17.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#87" name="note87">87</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises And The Law</span> 141 (2007).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#88" name="note88">88</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#89" name="note89">89</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 148-49.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#90" name="note90">90</a></sup></span> Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 94-95. The two holding companies "jointly control and operate the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, a vast, international, . . . network of affiliated but formally independent oil and gas companies." <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 92.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#91" name="note91">91</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 93. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#92" name="note92">92</a></sup></span> All shares of the Shell Oil Company are held by Shell Petroleum Inc., the U.S. subsidiary company of the parent holding companies.<span class="noteSee"> Id. at 93.</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#93" name="note93">93</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 93, 96-98.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#94" name="note94">94</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps"> Shell International Limited (SI), The Shell Report: People, Planet and Profits: An Act of Commitment</span> 29 (1999).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#95" name="note95">95</a></sup></span> Principle One<span class="noteSee">, supra</span> note 76.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#96" name="note96">96</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 79.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#97" name="note97">97</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Martin, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 16, at 105.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#98" name="note98">98</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Shell International Limited (SI)</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 93, at 29. <span class="noteSee">See also </span>Martin, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 16, at 107-09 (expressing criticism about Shell's human rights agenda). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#99" name="note99">99</a></sup></span> The corporation operated under the name "ChevronTexaco" since its merger with Texaco in 2001 until 2005 when it changed its name back to "Chevron."</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#100" name="note100">100</a></sup></span> Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2004). From 2000 until late 2006, Chevron filed a series of motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment directed both at the entire case and at specific claims. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#101" name="note101">101</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#102" name="note102">102</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">The Price of Oil</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 10, at 3,11.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#103" name="note103">103</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Bowoto</span>, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1233; <span class="noteSee">see also</span> Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59374, at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2007).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#104" name="note104">104</a></sup></span> Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., Order re: Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Pls.' Claims 10 Through 17, No. C 99-02506 SI, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Cal. August 14, 2007).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#105" name="note105">105</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id.</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#106" name="note106">106</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Bowoto</span>, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#107" name="note107">107</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Marcos Simmons, <span class="noteSee">Chevron to Stand Trial for Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria: Federal Judge Finds Evidence that Chevron was Complicit in Murder of Nigerian Villagers</span>, <span class="smallCaps">EarthRights International, </span>Aug. 15, 2007, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/chevron_to_stand_trial_for_human_rights_abuses_in_nigeria.html">http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/chevron_to_stand_trial_for_human_rights_abuses_in_nigeria.html</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#108" name="note108">108</a></sup></span> David R. Baker, <span class="noteSee">Chevron Paid Nigerian Troops after Alleged Killings: Villagers in Lawsuit Say 4 People Died - Oil Company Questions If Attacks Took Place</span>, <span class="smallCaps">S.F. Chron.</span>, Aug. 4, 2005, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/08/04/MNGAJE2I2K1.DTL">http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/08/04/MNGAJE2I2K1.DTL</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#109" name="note109">109</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Bowoto</span>, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#110" name="note110">110</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 1246.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#111" name="note111">111</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id.</span> at 1241-46.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#112" name="note112">112</a></sup></span> The motion regarding plaintiffs' claims under the ATS was granted merely as to the charges of crimes against humanity. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI,<span class="noteSee">&nbsp;</span><p class="note">2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59374 (N.D. Cal. 2007).</p> </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#113" name="note113">113</a></sup></span> Simmons, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 107. <span class="noteSee">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#114" name="note114">114</a></sup></span> Unocal was acquired by Chevron in 2005. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#115" name="note115">115</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Global Firms Provide Lifeline to Myanmar's Junta</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 2.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#116" name="note116">116</a></sup></span> Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#117" name="note117">117</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 255.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#118" name="note118">118</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Unocal</span>, 395 F.3d at 937; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#119" name="note119">119</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Unocal</span>, 395 F.3d at 952. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#120" name="note120">120</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#121" name="note121">121</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Unocal</span>, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#122" name="note122">122</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee"> Unocal</span>, 395 F.3d at 953.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#123" name="note123">123</a></sup></span> Marianne Lavelle, <span class="noteSee">The Court of Foreign Affairs: U.S. Corporations Face a Slew of Lawsuits Alleging Human-Rights Abuses</span>, <span class="smallCaps">U.S.News</span>, June 15, 2003, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/030623/23suits.htm">http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/030623/23suits.htm</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#124" name="note124">124</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 38, 78; <span class="smallCaps">Hansen</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 19-20.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#125" name="note125">125</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Belgium Reopens</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 6.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#126" name="note126">126</a></sup></span> Precisely, French courts exercised jurisdiction under the principle of active nationality (i.e. the perpetrator is a national of the adjudicating state). <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law</span> 277 (2003).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#127" name="note127">127</a></sup></span> Belgian law, however, puts an additional restriction on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Relying on jurisdictional prescriptions under the principle of "passive nationality," Belgian law requires the victim of the abuses either to be a Belgian national, have an effective, usual, and legal residential status in Belgium for at least three years, or, since May 2006, have a recognized refugee status in Belgium. <span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 57-58.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#128" name="note128">128</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Belgium Reopens</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 6.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#129" name="note129">129</a></sup></span> At the time when the case was lodged, private individuals could initiate criminal proceedings through the mechanism of "constitution de partie civile." <span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 38.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#130" name="note130">130</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Belgium Reopens</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 6.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#131" name="note131">131</a></sup></span> In 2003, the Belgian universal jurisdiction statute of 1993, and amended in 1999, was repealed and most of the law's substantial provisions were integrated into the Belgian Criminal Code. Thus, new arts. 136<span class="noteSee">bis</span>-136<span class="noteSee">octies</span> were introduced in the Belgian Criminal Code incorporating genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes into the substantial scope of actionable crimes under Belgian law. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 21-24.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#132" name="note132">132</a></sup></span> In 1999, a new art. 5 was introduced in the Belgian Criminal Code providing for criminal liability of legal persons. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 12-13. Belgian Criminal Code, art. 5, does not contain any restrictions as to the crimes covered by its scope of application. Therefore, it is widely agreed that Belgian Criminal Code, art. 5, also regulates criminal liability of legal persons, in particular corporations, for international crimes committed abroad. <span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 37-38. Of particular relevance with respect to criminal liability of corporations is Belgian Criminal Code, art. 136<span class="noteSee">ter </span>point 3, which incriminates slavery as a crime against humanity in accordance with Rome Statute, art. 7, &#182;&nbsp;1(c). <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 22, 28.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#133" name="note133">133</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Belgium Reopens</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 6.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#134" name="note134">134</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Total S.A., Total in Burma: The Yadana Pipeline Project,</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://burma.total.com/">http://burma.total.com/</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#135" name="note135">135</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Total S.A., Sharing our Energies 2006: Corporate Social Responsibility Report </span>15 (2006), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.total.com/static/en/medias/topic1606/Total_2006_CSR_en.pdf">http://www.total.com/static/en/medias/topic1606/Total_2006_CSR_en.pdf</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#136" name="note136">136</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 24. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#137" name="note137">137</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee"><span class="smallcaps">I</span>d</span>. at 15.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#138" name="note138">138</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">French Fm Kouchner: Oil Giant Total Would Not Be Spared from Possible Sanctions vs Myanmar</span>, <span class="smallCaps">Herald Trib. Eur.</span>, Oct. 2, 2007, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/02/europe/EU-GEN-France-Total-Myanmar.php">http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/02/europe/EU-GEN-France-Total-Myanmar.php</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#139" name="note139">139</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">As Myanmar Cracks Down on Protesters, Oil Companies Keep up Controversial Ties</span>,<span class="noteSee"> supra </span>note 2 (quoting Jean-Francois Lassalle, vice-president of public affairs for Total Exploration &amp; Production).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#140" name="note140">140</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Reg Manhas, <span class="noteSee">Talisman in Sudan: Impacts of Divestment</span>, <span class="smallCaps">Global Compact Q.</span> (2007), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article000775162.cfm?x=b11">http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article000775162.cfm?x=b11</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#141" name="note141">141</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 12, 2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#142" name="note142">142</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id</span>. at 665-66.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#143" name="note143">143</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Hum. Rts. Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights 36-38 (2003).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#144" name="note144">144</a></sup></span> Presbyterian Church, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 649. In its examination of the facts, the court stressed that the admissibility of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs had not yet been evaluated and witnesses had not yet been brought forward by plaintiffs. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 642. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#145" name="note145">145</a></sup></span> The guidelines stipulated that communication facilities of the Consortium should be made available to the military, and accommodation and medical care should be provided. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 649-50.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#146" name="note146">146</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 670-71.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#147" name="note147">147</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 679.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#148" name="note148">148</a></sup></span> Manhas, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 140. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#149" name="note149">149</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#150" name="note150">150</a></sup></span> David Martinez, CorpWatch, Barrick's Dirty Secret: Mining in Papua New Guinea (2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#151" name="note151">151</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Hum. Rts. Watch, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo (2005).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#152" name="note152">152</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">CorpWatch, Associating with the Wrong Company: Rio Tinto's Record and the Global Compact</span>, July 13, 2001, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=623">http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=623</a>; <span class="noteSee">see also </span>Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#153" name="note153">153</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id.</span> at 1121-26.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#154" name="note154">154</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 1124-27.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#155" name="note155">155</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 1120.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#156" name="note156">156</a></sup></span> The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action on <span class="noteSee">forum non conveniens</span> grounds in favor of an Australian forum. <span class="noteSee">See id</span>. at 1175. In order for a dismissal to be granted, defendants must show that (1) there exists an adequate alternative forum, where they are amenable to process and the subject matter of the suit is cognizable, and that (2) private and public interests favor trial in the alternative forum. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 1164-65. The court dismissed the defendants' motion holding that the "plaintiffs' claims are not cognizable in Australia. <span class="noteSee">Id</span>. at 1177-78.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#157" name="note157">157</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 1198. According to the political question doctrine, a claim that presents a political question is not justiciable. The doctrine has its roots in the principle of separation of powers and intends to ensure that the judiciary is not interfering with decisions constitutionally committed to one of the other branches of government. <span class="noteSee">See id.</span> at 1193-95. In <span class="noteSee">Baker, </span>the U.S. Supreme Court defined the factors that a court has to consider in order to determine whether a claim involves a political question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#158" name="note158">158</a></sup></span> Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Plc., 487 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007). <span class="noteSee">&nbsp;</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#159" name="note159">159</a></sup></span> Graham Knight &amp; Josh Greenberg, <span class="noteSee">Promotionalism and Subpolitics</span>, 15 <span class="smallCaps">Mgmt. Comm. Q.</span> 541, 543 (2002).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#160" name="note160">160</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See id</span>. at 558.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#161" name="note161">161</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Richard McIntyre, <span class="noteSee">Are Workers Rights Human Rights and Would It Matter If They Were?</span> 6 <span class="smallCaps">Hum. Rts. &amp; Hum. Welfare</span> 1, 1 (2006).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#162" name="note162">162</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Knight, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 159, at 558.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#163" name="note163">163</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Tim Connor, Global Exchange: Still Waiting for Nike to Do It</span> (2001).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#164" name="note164">164</a></sup></span> Knight, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 159, at 543.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#165" name="note165">165</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Connor</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 163, at 4, 52.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#166" name="note166">166</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Timothy Connor, We Are Not Machines: Indonesian Nike and Adidas Workers</span> 19 (Clean Clothes Campaign et al. eds., 2002).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#167" name="note167">167</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Connor</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 163, at 4; <span class="smallCaps">Connor</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 166, at 24.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#168" name="note168">168</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee"><span class="smallcaps">I</span>d.</span> at 11. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#169" name="note169">169</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Nike Inc., FY01 Corporate Responsibility Report</span> (2001), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/#crreport/fy01_cr_report">http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/#crreport/fy01_cr_report</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#170" name="note170">170</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> McIntyre, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 161, at 9; Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, <span class="noteSee">Enforcing International Labor Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act</span>, 37 <span class="smallCaps">Vand. J. Transnat'l L. </span>203, 231-32 (2004).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#171" name="note171">171</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Maassarani, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 65, at 46; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#172" name="note172">172</a></sup></span><span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 21-24.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#173" name="note173">173</a></sup></span> The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up adopted in 1998 (henceforth: 1998 Declaration) incorporates the core labor conventions which are considered to be obligatory for all ILO members. As enumerated by the 1998 Declaration, the fundamental rights enshrined in the core labor conventions include: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.<span class="noteSee"> Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work</span>, ILO, 86th Sess. (1998), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&amp;var_pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT">http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&amp;var_pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#174" name="note174">174</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Pagnattaro, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 170, at 211.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#175" name="note175">175</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Nestle S.A., No. 05-5133, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#176" name="note176">176</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id.</span> at 1. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#177" name="note177">177</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See, e.g., </span>Pagnattaro, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 170, at 231.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#178" name="note178">178</a></sup></span> Rodriguez v. Estate of Drummond, 256 F.3d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Pagnattaro, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 170, at 243-44.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#179" name="note179">179</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">International Labor Rights Forum, ILRF sues Nestle for Complicity in Columbian Union Murder</span>, October 26, 2006, <a href="http://www.laborrights.org/end-violence-against-trade-unions/colombia/968">http://www.laborrights.org/end-violence-against-trade-unions/colombia/968</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#180" name="note180">180</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Steve Boggan, <span class="noteSee">'We Blew It': Nike Admits to Mistakes over Child Labor</span>, <span class="smallCaps">The Independent</span>, Oct. 20, 2001, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1020-01.htm">http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1020-01.htm</a>; Sydney H. Schanberg<span class="smallCaps">,</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">On the Playgrounds of America, Every Kid's Goal is to Score: In Pakistan, Where Children Stitch Soccer Balls for Six Cents an Hours, the Goal is to Survive</span>, <span class="smallCaps">Life Mag.</span> 38-48 (June 1996).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#181" name="note181">181</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee"> See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Nike,</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 169, at 29. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#182" name="note182">182</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#183" name="note183">183</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#184" name="note184">184</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">Id</span>.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#185" name="note185">185</a></sup></span>Richard M. Locke, a prominent scholar in the field, argues that the Nike case "symbolizes both the benefits and the risks inherent in globalization" and illustrates Nike's development towards becoming a Corporate Global Citizen. Richard M. Locke, <span class="noteSee">The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike, in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Management: Inventing and Delivering It's Future</span>, 39, 39 (Richard Schmalensee &amp; Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2003). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#186" name="note186">186</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Connor</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 163, at 1-2.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#187" name="note187">187</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Nike,</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 169, at 54-55; Fair Labor Ass'n, FLA History, <a href="http://www.fairlabor.org/about/history">http://www.fairlabor.org/about/history</a> (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#188" name="note188">188</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">M</span>cIntyre<span class="smallCaps">,</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 161, at 2.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#189" name="note189">189</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee"> See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Connor</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 166, at 27. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#190" name="note190">190</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">id</span>. at 13.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#191" name="note191">191</a></sup></span> Dep't of Commc'n &amp; Pub. Info., ILO, <span class="noteSee">Business with a Conscience: Why Best Practice Is Good Practice</span>, 57 <span class="smallCaps">World of Work Mag.</span> (2006), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ilo.org/wow/Articles/lang--en/WCMS_081378/index.htm; Bob">http://www.ilo.org/wow/Articles/lang--en/WCMS_081378/index.htm; Bob</a> Herbert, <span class="noteSee">In America; The Sweatshop Lives</span>, <span class="smallCaps">N.Y. Times</span>, Dec. 28, 1994, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE2DE153BF93BA15751C1A962958260">http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE2DE153BF93BA15751C1A962958260</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#192" name="note192">192</a></sup></span> Bob Herbert, <span class="noteSee">In America; Terror in Toyland</span>, <span class="smallCaps">N.Y. Times</span>, Dec. 21, 1994, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E0D61038F932A15751C1A962958260">http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E0D61038F932A15751C1A962958260</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#193" name="note193">193</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Jill Murray, ILO, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards<span class="smallCaps">,</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/jill.htm ">http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/jill.htm </a> (last visited Apr. 13, 2007); Dep't of Commc'n &amp; Pub. Info., ILO, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 191.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#194" name="note194">194</a></sup></span> John Gittelsohn, <span class="noteSee">U.S. Sends Strong Message to Those Who Traffic in Human Lives</span>, 8 <span class="smallCaps">Global Issues</span>, 14, 14 (2003), <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0603/ijge/ijge0603.pdf">http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0603/ijge/ijge0603.pdf</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#195" name="note195">195</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee"> Id. at 15.</span></div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#196" name="note196">196</a></sup></span> Steven Greenhouse, <span class="noteSee">Beatings and Other Abuses Cited at Samoan Apparel Plant That Supplied U.S. Retailers</span>, <span class="smallCaps">N.Y. Times</span>, Feb. 6, 2001, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E3D6113EF935A35751C0A9679C8B63&amp;n=Top/News/U.S./U.S.%20States,%20Territories%20and%20Possessions/American%20Samoa">http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E3D6113EF935A35751C0A9679C8B63&amp;n=Top/News/U.S./U.S.%20States,%20Territories%20and%20Possessions/American%20Samoa</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#197" name="note197">197</a></sup></span> Gittelsohn, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 194, at 16.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#198" name="note198">198</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">U.S.</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee"> Firms Linked to Samoan 'Sweatshop' in Labor Report</span>, <span class="smallCaps">CNN</span>, Feb. 7, 2001, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://archives.cnn.com/2001/fyi/news/02/07/samoan.sweatshops/index.html">http://archives.cnn.com/2001/fyi/news/02/07/samoan.sweatshops/index.html</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#199" name="note199">199</a></sup></span> Humphrey Hawksley, <span class="noteSee">Mali's Children in Chocolate Slavery</span>, <span class="smallCaps">BBC</span>, Apr. 12, 2001, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1272522.stm">http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1272522.stm</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#200" name="note200">200</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Amnesty International UK, <span class="noteSee">West Africa: Chocolate - Amnesty International Expresses Alarm at Continuing Child Labour in Cocoa Industry</span>, Apr. 4, 2007, <span class="noteSee">available at</span>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=17323">http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=17323</a>. These findings were confirmed by a recent BBC article, as well as by Amnesty International. Humphrey Hawksley, <span class="noteSee">Child Cocoa Workers Still 'Exploited'</span>, <span class="smallCaps">BBC</span>, News April 2, 2007, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6517695.stm">http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6517695.stm</a> (last visited January 18, 2008).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#201" name="note201">201</a></sup></span> Nestle UK Ltd., <span class="noteSee">Cocoa Working Practices</span>, <a href="http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/Cocoa+Working+Practices.htm ">http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/Cocoa+Working+Practices.htm </a> (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#202" name="note202">202</a></sup></span> Nestle UK Ltd., <span class="noteSee">International Alliance Joins Forces to Address Child Labour Abuse in the West African Cocoa Sector</span>, Dec. 2001, <a href="http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/International+Alliance+on+Cocoa.htm">http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/International+Alliance+on+Cocoa.htm</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#203" name="note203">203</a></sup></span> Nestle UK Ltd., International Cocoa Initiative, July 2002, <a href="http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/International+Cocoa+Initiative.htm">http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/International+Cocoa+Initiative.htm</a>. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#204" name="note204">204</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span> Debora L. Spar, <span class="noteSee">Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights</span>, 77 <span class="smallCaps">Foreign aff. 7, 7 </span>(1998).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#205" name="note205">205</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Boele, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 13, at 75. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#206" name="note206">206</a></sup></span> Potentially, abuses could also concern infringements of core labor standards as highlighted in Shell's training material, <span class="noteSee">Human Rights Dilemmas</span>, where a purchasing manager for "Shell Select Shops" might face the problem of child labor when contracted coffee suppliers cannot assure that no child labor was used on their supplier cocoa plantations. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Clapham</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra </span>note 43, at 223-24. Another example of labor-related human rights problems in the extractive industries is the claim against Rio Tinto for racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of the discrimination claim on act of state grounds. <span class="noteSee">See </span>Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 487 F.3d 1193, 1224 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007). </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#207" name="note207">207</a></sup></span> Corporate self-regulation is at the core of Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR"); CSR can be defined as "an extended form of [corporate] governance" under which a firm's fiduciary duties are extended to all stakeholders. Lorenzo Sacconi, <span class="noteSee">Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of "Extended" Corporate Governance: An Explanation Based on the Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism</span>, 142 <span class="smallCaps">LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law, and Econ.</span> 7-8 (2004).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#208" name="note208">208</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation</span> 14-16 (2004). Even though other jurisdictions, such as France and Belgium allow civil claims as adjunct to criminal proceedings, they usually do not adjudicate a unique civil cause of action for human rights violations. <span class="noteSee">See</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Demeyere</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 49-50; <span class="smallCaps">Hansen</span>, <span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 5, at 22, 30.</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#209" name="note209">209</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Olivier de Schutter, <span class="noteSee">The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law</span>,<span class="noteSee"> in</span>&nbsp;<span class="smallCaps">Non-State Actors and Human Rights</span> 288; <span class="smallCaps">Joseph,</span>&nbsp;<span class="noteSee">supra</span> note 207, at 13-14. </div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#210" name="note210">210</a></sup></span><span class="noteSee">See </span>Naomi Roht-Arriaza, <span class="noteSee">Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back</span>, 17 <span class="smallCaps">Leiden</span><span class="smallCaps"> J. Int'l L.</span> 375, 383 (2004).</div> <div class="note"><span class="noteRef"><sup><a href="#211" name="note211">211</a></sup></span>This does not apply in cases in which infringement of labor rights do also qualify as international crimes. </div><br><br><br><table CELLSPACING="0" WIDTH="100%"> <tr VALIGN="TOP"> <td ALIGN="left" WIDTH="35%"><span class="copyright">&#xA9; Copyright 2008 by Northwestern University School of Law, Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights</span></td> <td ALIGN="right" WIDTH="65%"><span class="copyright"> Volume 6 Issue 2 (Spring 2008) </span></td> </tr> </table> </body> </html>