Federally
Mandated Destruction of the Black Family:
The Adoption and Safe Families Act
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to matters of the
home, the constitutional provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment give substantial
deference to the independence of the familial unit to make its own
decisions.
[1] There are instances, however, where the
government deems it necessary to intrude upon the independence of the familial
unit. This intrusion is especially
evident in the foster care system.
Although the system by its very definition requires some governmental
intervention for the welfare of the child, the goal of foster care should be
assistance and eventually reunification to allow the family to function as an
independent entity. The Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASFA) represents a stark deviation from that goal. With black children representing an
overwhelming percentage of the foster care population, the ASFA represents
federally mandated destruction of black families. The ASFA devalues the essentialness of
preserving the familial bond with regard to black children. It advocates earlier termination of
parental rights and makes adoption, instead of reunification, its priority.
This comment criticizes ASFA and its
aim of removing black children from their homes as a means to achieve permanency
in their lives. Preservation of
black families is essential to the advancement of the black community. Legislation must be directed at
addressing the underlying social ills that are at the root of foster care
dependence. Instead, under the
pretext of advancing child welfare, ASFA promotes destruction of black familial
bonds and represents a serious threat to black communities.
This comment begins by providing a
brief history of child welfare legislation in the United States. It discuses the political tide of the
country and political justifications for the creation of ASFA. It examines its specific provisions and
details how the legislation disproportionately impacts black children and
families. This comment also
examines the socio-economic factors of extreme poverty, incarceration, and
substance abuse that plague black communities, and advocates dealing with these
situations through a holistic approach that works in conjunction with familial
reunification efforts instead of against them. Finally, this comment argues that the
termination of parental rights has constitutional implications. The legislation has an impact on
substantive and procedural due process as well as equal protection rights. Although the comment does not attempt to
pose a solution to the child welfare system, it does advocate a shift in the
focus of the system. The familial
bond is essential to black children, and family preservation and reunification
should be the goal of any child welfare system.
II. BRIEF History of Child Welfare Policy
In historical terms, state
intervention for the protection of children is a recent development,
particularly as it relates to children of color.
[2] Although the institution of slavery
dismantled black families, it also fostered a unique system that maintained and
cared for black children who were separated from their biological parents.
[3] When children were stripped from their
parents and sold away to other plantations, the slave community as a whole took
on the responsibility of ensuring these children were cared for.
[4] After emancipation from slavery and the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, black children were not welcomed into
the formal child welfare system.
[5]
They were excluded from the late
nineteenth-century orphanages established to rescue destitute immigrant
children.
[6] Furthermore, Jim Crow laws prevented
black children from being cared for by the institutions of white society that
tried to place orphans in adoptive homes.
[7] Even after such discriminatory laws were
dismantled, black children were still denied access to most formal child welfare
institutions because they were undesirable to white adoptive parents.
[8] A few "colored orphan asylums" existed,
but they were overcrowded and generally inferior.
[9] Black people were forced to rely
primarily on other resources such as extended family networks and churches to
take care of children whose parents were unable to meet their needs.
[10] It was not until the late twentieth
century that the child welfare system allowed blacks to participate in services
that had long been reserved for the white community.
[11]
The Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) served as the beginning of pivotal federal
legislation in the modern day child welfare arena. The AACWA was the first attempt at
providing federal funds to reduce the amount of time children spent in foster
care.
[12] The government provided financial
incentives for states to change child welfare policies and attempt to move
children out of foster care and encourage permanent placement through
reunification and adoption.
[13] This policy was influenced by the theory
that disruption of the parent-child relationship caused a great deal of
emotional damage.
[14] Therefore, the policy encouraged
permanent placement with a family, either biological or adoptive, as opposed to
the child becoming “trapped in the system” and spending a long period of time in
foster care.
[15]
With its emphasis on family
preservation, the AACWA made kinship foster care a viable addition to the child
welfare system.
[16] Kinship foster care occurs when
relatives become foster parents for children in state custody.
[17] In 1979, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Youakim established kinship
foster care as a means to deal with the increasing foster care population.
[18] The
Court ruled that
kin are entitled to receive the same federal financial support for foster care
as non-kin foster parents.
[19] Kinship care and the concept of extended
family child rearing originated in Africa and have been relied on by black
families throughout history.
[20] The child welfare system began to
embrace this concept because it found there was less trauma and disruption in
the lives of children placed with kin as opposed to children placed with
non-kin.
[21] There was also evidence that the "sense
of family identity, self-esteem, social status, community ties, and continuity
of family relationships" in kinship arrangements was important to a child.
[22] The child welfare system therefore
determined that children do better within their own families and that placement
with kin should be given priority when possible.
[23]
In addition to allowing for kinship
care, the AACWA required “reasonable efforts” to reunify families.
[24] Although the Act provided little
guidance as to what constituted “reasonable efforts,” most states determined
that such efforts included delivering social services.
[25] Caseworkers attempted to create an
individualized approach with both soft and concrete services to treat
families.
[26] Their services included instituting a
plan of “positive parent-child interaction and problem solving” within the home,
as well as ensuring the basic needs such as adequate food, safe housing and paid
utilities had been met.
[27] Termination of parental rights was
allowed only when the state’s “reasonable efforts” to preserve the familial
structure failed.
[28]
Child welfare as it relates to foster care is intrinsically linked to
general welfare policy in this country.
[29] Although initially the AACWA was a
success, with the foster care population decreasing by over fifty percent, from
500,000 to 243,000, between 1980 and 1982,
[30]
the decrease came right before a period in our history when homelessness,
substance abuse and HIV began to overwhelm the country.
[31] By 1983, the foster care population
again began to rise and by 1998 it had more than doubled.
[32] Expenditures for social service programs
increased dramatically.
[33] Frustrated with the increasing economic
and social cost of the welfare system, the country deemed efforts, including
child welfare policies like the AACWA failures.
[34]
Tensions grew as the political tide
was quickly turning to the right.
“Individual responsibility” became a prevailing political value,
replacing the idea of “social responsibility” that was at the core of the
AACWA.
[35] In the general welfare arena,
politicians vehemently attacked public assistance programs, and their attacks
included a very strong racial element.
[36] They proliferated the racist notion that
black people were “living off” the system.
[37] Images of the black welfare queen and
the black crack addicted mother spread throughout the media.
[38] These images supported the position that
assistance programs were not helping people in need rehabilitate themselves;
they were providing a means for poor blacks to continue their destructive
lifestyles.
[39]
This burgeoning political
transformation and desire to decrease reliance on welfare programs swept the
country. It prompted Congress to
enact the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, otherwise known as the Welfare Reform Act (“the Act”).
[40] The Act was designed to eliminate
federal entitlements and cut government expenditures and essentially dismantled
the federally funded Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
[41]
Although the Welfare Reform Act was
created to drastically cut social welfare expenditures, it left entitlements for
foster care and adoption assistance programs uncapped.
[42] The increasingly pervasive belief was
that it was better to place children out of the home instead of working to
correct the social ills that required states to intrude into the home in the
first place. Newt Gingrich, the
Republican Speaker of the House at that time, echoed this sentiment when he
argued that government funds going to children born to welfare mothers should be
diverted to programs that would put their babies up for adoption or place them
in orphanages.
[43] Reflections of this sentiment are
apparent in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA).
III. The
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
The ASFA made adoption the core
means of achieving permanence in the lives of children in the foster care
system. Although the previous
legislation, the AACWA, favored permanent placement and created some incentives
for adoption, it still funded and focused on solutions that prevented child
removal. The AACWA’s initiatives
were aimed at achieving permanence through “reasonable efforts” for
reunification and maintaining the familial structure.
[44] ASFA, however, effectively eliminated
the “reasonable efforts” requirement and focused on adoption as the best
solution to ensure permanent placement of children in foster care.
[45]
Maintaining the foster care system
is a major expense, requiring a great deal of government resources.
[46] This expense increases significantly
when government programs to rehabilitate families become a meaningful part of
the foster care system.
[47] When it created the ASFA, Congress, in
effect, concluded that reunification efforts were not worth the expense and
began strongly pushing adoption for foster care children.
[48] The House Report from the ASFA
recognized “that adoption is an effective way to assure that children grow up in
loving families and that they become happy and productive citizens as adults.”
[49] With a new focus on finding foster care
children permanent adoptive homes instead of rehabilitating families, Congress
exponentially reduced its expenditures.
[50] The ASFA’s focus on termination of
parental rights and assistance for adoption, has nothing to do with protecting
children from abuse or neglect. To
reduce costs, Congress shifted its focus from the concerns of the family as a
whole, to reducing the amount of time a child needs state support.
“The Adoption and Safe Families Act is
designed to force states to quickly seek a hearing on termination, to facilitate
permanent adoptions, rather than waste time and money on temporary
solutions!”
[51] Therefore, after parental unfitness has
been established, under the ASFA, states are required to hold permanency
hearings and file a petition to terminate parental rights after a child has been
in foster care for fifteen months.
[52] After the state files a petition to
terminate, a Juvenile Court Judge determines if it is in the best interest of
the child for the parental rights to be terminated.
[53] If the judge determines that termination
is in the child’s best interest, the child’s parents are no longer responsible
and have no legal rights to their child.
[54] The parents lose the right to
participate in the child’s upbringing and to interact with the child in any
way. After termination, the child
permanently loses any legal connection to his or her natural family.
Additionally, ASFA provides
financial incentives to states that place children in adoptive homes.
[55] To accomplish this goal, Congress
abandoned the social policy that placing black children in black homes was
important to the development of black children.
[56] Instead, through the Multi-Ethnic
Placement Act (MEPA)
[57]
and the Inter-Ethnic Adoption Act
[58],
Congress denied federal funding to agencies that placed children according to
their race or took race into consideration when making placement decisions. Congress’s justification for the change
in policy was that race-matching policies, “damage black children by not only
denying them placements with white adoptive parents, but also by causing them to
languish in foster care.”
[59]
IV. The
ASFA disproportionately affects the Black Community
Although the ASFA refers to child
welfare policies generally, it has a disproportionate impact on black children
and the black community. Black
children represent an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of children in the
foster care system, comprising forty percent of the foster care population but
only fifteen percent of the general population under the age of eighteen.
[60] For every 1,000 white children in the
U.S., five were in foster care as of September 20, 2000. Compared with twenty-one black foster
care children for every 1,000 black children in the U.S.
[61] In cities where there is a sizeable
minority and foster care population, the percentages are even more
staggering. For example, Chicago
has a foster care population that is ninety-five percent black.
[62] In New York City in 1997, of the 42,000
children in the foster care system, only 1,300 were white children.
[63] These statistics reveal the foster care
system is generally a population of black children, and any social policy
addressing the system must take this into consideration.
Contrary to popular opinion, most
children are not in foster care because they have been seriously abused. Instead, neglect is the most prevalent
reason children enter foster care.
[64] There are substantial differences
between abuse and neglect. Child
abuse is an act of commission, in which parents or others act violently or
cruelly toward the child.
[65] In contrast, child neglect is an act of
omission and is often related to poverty.
[66] Children who are considered neglected
are usually chronically deprived of basic needs, such as food, clothing and
adequate shelter or adequate parenting practices including hygiene, health care,
safety precautions, and minimal nurturing and attention.
[67]
Statistics illustrate there is a
strong correlation between foster care placement and poverty.
[68] A 1998 study reported that abuse and
neglect are reported to be twenty-two times higher among families with incomes
less than $15,000 per year than with families with incomes of more than $30,000
a year.
[69] This is especially significant because
half of all black children are born into poverty in the United States.
[70] Furthermore, black children are more
than three times as likely as whites to live in extreme poverty.
[71]
Extreme poverty itself is
responsible for creating circumstances that lead to neglect. For example, “poor nutrition, serious
health problems, hazardous housing, inadequate heat and utilities and
neighborhood crime” all can result from living in extreme poverty.
[72] Child welfare authorities can remove
children from poverty stricken homes if they can demonstrate parental
carelessness will increase the likelihood that these hazards will result in
actual harm to the child.
[73]
Black children are much more
susceptible to state intrusion since they often live in poverty and as a result
are frequently forced to interact with government agencies. The state must have probable cause to
enter the homes of most American families.
If the family is receiving public assistance, however, such privacy
rights are substantially eroded because, in order to receive assistance, you
must allow state social workers to enter your home.
[74]
In addition to public assistance,
under-privileged black families lead more public lives than their middle-class,
white counterparts. Instead of
visiting private doctors, these families are more likely to visit public clinics
or emergency rooms for routine medical care.
[75] They are more likely to encounter public
building inspectors, instead of hiring contractors to repair their homes, and
they often run their errands using public transportation instead of private
vehicles.
[76] Because these families interact with
public and governmental agencies so regularly their problems are more visible to
child protection authorities.
[77] This results in their children being
placed in the foster care system more frequently.
Poverty alone, however, does not
explain the overrepresentation of black children in foster care population. It is the convergence of both race and
class bias that leave black children particularly susceptible to foster care
placement. Child protective
agencies are far more likely to place black children in foster care then they
are to place white children in foster care.
[78] With black families, foster care is used
as a solution to the problems of the home, instead of offering government
assistance that is less traumatic to the family.
[79] A 2002 study by the Minnesota Department
of Human Services found that only forty percent of black families receive family
centered prevention based counseling compared with sixty percent of white
families.
[80] Additionally, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services reported that black children were more likely than
whites to be in foster care placement.
[81] In 1998, fifty-six percent of black
children who entered the child welfare system were placed in foster care, nearly
double the percentage for white children.
[82]
Instead of the state keeping the
child in the home and providing counseling and in-home services to the family,
black children were placed in foster care even when they faced the same issues
as white children.
[83] Even under identical circumstances, most
white children in the child welfare system are allowed to stay with their
families, while black children are ripped from their families and placed in
foster care.
Removing children from families due
to maternal substance abuse has led to an increase in the number of black
children in the foster care system.
[84] The system of detecting and reporting
drug use during pregnancy, which leads to the removal of the newborn from the
care of its mother, is plagued by race bias.
[85] A study in Pennelas County Florida of
reporting of prenatal drug usage found that despite similar rates of drug use,
black patients were ten times more likely to be reported to child protective
authorities for drug usage during pregnancy than white patients.
[86] The desire to remove these children from
the care of their mothers can be attributed to pervasive stereotypical images of
black crack babies and pregnant black crack addicts.
[87] This racist stereotyping ultimately
contributes to the disproportionate number of black children in the foster care
system.
Finally, incarceration requires
black children to enter the foster care system and places incarcerated black
parents in danger of having their parental rights terminated.
[88] In 2000, 1.5 million children had at
least one parent in prison and a disproportionately high percentage of these
parents were black.
[89] In general, children of incarcerated
fathers do not end up in the foster care system because they continue to reside
with their mothers.
[90] In contrast, when mothers are
incarcerated, their children are frequently placed in foster care.
[91] Although kinship foster care is a viable
option to avoid placing the child outside the familial context, oftentimes the
extended family is unable to support the needs of the child, and state foster
care placement outside the family becomes the only option.
[92]
Nearly eighty percent of
incarcerated women are mothers who have two or more children that they had the
primary responsibility of caring for prior to incarceration.
[93] Some of these women have children who
were forced to enter the foster care system for the first time after their
incarceration.
[94] The percentage of incarcerated mothers
is particularly devastating to the black community; nearly half of all
imprisoned parents are black.
[95] Black women are six times more
likely to be incarcerated than their white counterparts.
[96] Felony conviction or incarceration is an
appropriate ground for a judge to terminate parental rights.
[97] While these incarcerated mothers are
serving their sentences they cannot “rehabilitate and resume custody” of their
children and demonstrate their ability to parent.
[98] This makes it easier for a judge to
terminate their parental rights and place children of incarcerated black mothers
up for adoption.
V. The ASFA Devalues and Dehumanizes the Black
Family
Historically, the Supreme Court has held the view that the family is a
private institution where individuals are free to pursue their goals without the
threat of government intrusion.
[99] The Constitutional basis for family
privacy is rooted in the guarantee of “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[100] Family privacy protects the
rights of parents to claim authority over their children and provide the
“personal, financial, or custodial responsibility” for their growth into
adulthood.
[101] As far back as 1943, the Supreme Court stated, “[i]t is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of a child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”
[102] These “obligations” include preparing
the child to participate in social and political life when he or she reaches
adulthood.
[103]
The law clearly protects the rights of parents to participate in the
nurturing and rearing of their children.
In the context of divorce, even if a parent was neglectful or abusive
prior to the divorce, he is still entitled to be a part of his child’s
life. The goal is to make divorce
less onerous on the child.
[104] A court may even prevent a custodial
parent from relocating out of state to allow the child’s relationship with both
parents to continue after the divorce.
[105] Although a stepparent may obtain rights
with respect to his or her stepchild, these rights do not interfere or replace
the rights that the law grants to a natural parent. There is a general understanding that
the maintenance of family and biological parental ties are beneficial to the
child.
The ASFA reveals, however, that
Congress places no such value in maintaining the bonds between a black child and
her biological parents. Deeply
rooted stereotypes about black family dysfunction place no value on the
relationship between poor, black parents and their children.
[106] With the proliferation of images such as
the black welfare queen and crack addicted mother, black mothers are
characterized as “deviant and uncaring.”
[107] They are criticized for “transferring a
degenerate lifestyle of welfare dependency and crime to their children.”
[108] Black fathers are simply seen as absent
from the lives of their children.
[109] These racist stereotypes about black
family dysfunction are indiscriminately applied and make it difficult to imagine
poor, black parents actually caring for their children. With legislation like the ASFA, the
child welfare system becomes a misnomer.
It focuses on punishing what white America has deemed “disgraceful
parenting” instead of deciding what is actually best for the child. The attempt to penalize “bad mothers”
and bad parenting ultimately hurts the child.
[110] Separating a child from its familial
bond is extremely destructive.
The University of Florida conducted a study of infants born addicted to crack cocaine. [111] Researchers followed one group of babies that were placed in foster care and another group that remained with their birth mothers. [112] Although the birth mothers were struggling with addiction, they were still able to care for the infants. [113] After six months, the babies were measured with regard to infant development. [114] The children placed with their birth mothers consistently developed better than those placed in foster care. [115] Researchers concluded the separation from their mothers was more toxic than the cocaine to the foster care children. [116]
The goal of the child welfare system
should be to reunify families so that children will not suffer the toxic loss of
their familial bonds. Instead, the
ASFA provides incentives to states for placing black children in adoptive
homes. Joyce Pavao, a family
therapist who specializes in adoption issues tells the story of a foster child
whose parents had their rights terminated.
[117]
The boy was subsequently adopted by a
new family; however, he would go to a telephone booth and call his biological
grandmother after the adoption was finalized.
[118] He had communicated with this
grandmother for all of his life including while he was in foster care.
[119] Social workers told the adoptive parents
that these lingering connections were illegal and would distract from the
bonding process with the new family.
[120] Pavao disagrees with the validity of
this assumption stating, “[T]here is no true understanding of the need that
these children had for the people who had been positive and present in their
very complicated, and often traumatic, lives.”
[121] The ASFA and its push for adoption does
not value the child’s bonds before foster care. Although there are problematic issues in
the home, these issues do not negate the child’s emotional attachment to his or
her parents and family members.
When describing the ASFA, one
Senator commented, “The law is going to be about the joy of adoption and the
bonding of a ‘real family’ to so many kids.”
[122] It is this notion that black families
are not “real families” that allows our government to rip black children away
from their parents. It is beyond
their imagination that “black children in foster care have a strong, loving,
healthy and emotional attachment to their parents.”
[123] By promoting adoption of black children,
the ASFA permanently severs this emotional attachment.
After the ASFA took effect,
adoptions of foster children increased from 28,000 per year in 1996 to 50,000
per year in 2000.
[124] Although this may seem like a lot, in
reality, this amounts to less than one percent of the children in the foster
care system being adopted.
[125]
Meanwhile, because the ASFA makes it
easier to needlessly take children from their homes, the foster care population
is increasing by an average of four percent a year.
[126] Children are entering the system at a
higher rate than they are being adopted, therefore the ultimate goal of the ASFA
will never be realized. “America is
not going to adopt its way out of the foster care crisis.”
[127]
Furthermore, black children are
considerably less likely to be adopted than white children.
[128] A California study of 3873 children who
were younger than six years old when they entered foster care found that race
had a substantial effect on their experience.
[129] Even when all other things are equal,
white children were five times more likely to be adopted than black children.
[130] A black infant had the same likelihood
of being adopted as a three to five-year-old white child.
[131] Therefore, even after parental rights
have been terminated, black children will continue to drift between foster care
placements. Now, however, any hope
of reunification with their biological parents is lost. Most will never experience “the real
family” policymakers imagined, and instead will become permanent wards of the
state.
VI. The
ASFA Perpetuates Racism against the Black Community
The destruction mandated by the ASFA
not only affects individual black families, it perpetuates racism and disrupts
the entire black community. Family
integrity has always been critical to the welfare of the black community.
[132] After emancipation, many blacks made
efforts to find family members and reunify where slavery had disconnected
them.
[133] They understood the necessity of
familial connections.
[134] The family served as the means of
transferring “survival skills, values and self-esteem” to future generations.
[135]
State interference in the black home
interferes with the black community’s ability to transmit personal and community
identity to its children.
[136]
In addition, by devaluing the
autonomy and relationships of the black family, the ASFA sends a clear message
about the inferiority of the black race.
The message that black people do not have the capacity to govern
themselves and need state intervention in their families devalues black people
and perpetuates the racial hierarchy that continues to oppress the black
community. Growing up under this
shield of inferiority is especially harmful to black children.
As renowned historian Dr. John
Henrik Clarke noted, “[T]he family is the soul, the spirit and the cornerstone
of the nation. If the family dies,
so does the nation.”
[137] With this understanding that families
are the essential network that builds a nation, strong black families are
imperative to the liberation and economic advancement of the black community.
[138] Family associations serve an important
political function.
[139] They both facilitate and constrain the
power of the government by nurturing support and resistance of particular
governmental views.
[140] Disrupting black families harms the
political power of the black community and usurps its ability to effectuate
social change.
[141] It weakens the collective ability for
black people to overcome “institutionalized discrimination and work toward
greater political and economic strength” and ultimately, “reinforces the
continued political subordination of blacks as a group.”
[142]
VII. The
ASFA does not address the sociO-economic context that results in the placement
of black children in foster care
The ASFA represented the first piece
of legislation in which “states have a federal mandate to protect children from
abuse and neglect but no corresponding mandate to provide basic economic support
to poor families.”
[143] It has already been demonstrated that
the ASFA’s goal of adoption will do little to cure the overpopulation of
children in the foster care system.
Instead, policymakers should focus on the underlying social ills of
poverty, incarceration and substance abuse that plague the communities of this
nation’s poor. Dorothy Roberts, an
expert on child welfare policy,
[144]
noted, “[I]n the past several decades, the number of children receiving welfare
services has declined dramatically, while the foster care population has
skyrocketed. As the child welfare
system began to serve fewer white children and more children of color, state and
federal governments spent more money on out-of-home care and less on
in-home-services.”
[145]
Foster care has become the main
resource that the child welfare system provides to black families in need.
[146] The ideology of “rescuing the child” by
removing it from the home has caused caseworkers to separate children from their
parents even when it may not be in the best interest of the child.
[147] Parents may often still be able to care
for their children while they face substance abuse issues.
[148] In most cases “keeping children with
their parents while offering intensive family preservation services and drug
treatment is safer, more stable, and less traumatic for children than placing
them in the care of strangers in the foster care system.”
[149] Child welfare policy needs to place a
greater emphasis on family preservation programs for the sake of the
children.
Although family preservation
programs are essential to combat the increase in foster care placements, local
governments oftentimes do not have the financial resources to fund such
programs.
[150] A 2005 nationwide survey of city
officials released by the National League of Cities and the Institute for Youth,
Education and Families, determined that affordable housing, high-quality child
care, before and after-school programs and substance abuse programs were
significantly lacking in many communities.
[151] The survey also identified a need for
more employment opportunities for adults, parenting education, youth employment
and youth crime prevention programs, child abuse prevention efforts and early
childhood education programs.
[152] All of these programs require a
financial commitment from the state.
Without such a commitment, more children are likely to be removed from
their homes as a consequence of extreme poverty, and black children will
continue to be ripped away from their families.
VIII. the asfa infringes on the Constitutional Right
to Family Integrity
The ASFA can also be analyzed
through the framework of constitutionality. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
family integrity as a fundamental right.
[153] If a right is “fundamental,” it is
entitled to heightened protection from state inference.
[154] Therefore, any state action that
infringes on a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny.
[155] Strict scrutiny requires courts to
perform a two part analysis. First,
the state action must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and
the means chosen must be essential to furthering that interest.
[156] Second, the state action must be the
least intrusive way of furthering the governmental interest.
[157]
Child protection is a compelling
interest and clearly justifies state intervention into the family sphere.
[158] The question then becomes: “Is removal
of the child from the parent’s custody the essential, least restrictive means of
protecting the child?”
[159] Since states have continuously reduced
social service programs, foster care is often the only service available to
protect the child. Courts should
use their authority to require policymakers to develop less “restrictive means”
than the removal of children from their homes to further the interest of child
protection. Without this check from
the bench, legislation like the ASFA will continue to make it easier to remove
black children from their homes.
Even if foster care is found to be
the “least restrictive means” of achieving child protection, serious
constitutional problems arise when the state attempts to terminate parental
rights. The fundamental right the
parent and child have in staying together remains intact, even after temporary
removal through foster care. The
state must have a new interest, aside from child protection, to justify
terminating the parental rights of a parent. While a state may argue that permanency
or providing a safe and stable home for the child is its compelling interest,
terminating parental rights is oftentimes not essential to furthering this
interest.
Under the strict scrutiny standard,
the state must demonstrate that terminating parental rights is essential to
achieving permanency in the life of a child. Terminating parental rights without more
is not an essential means of achieving permanency. Permanency can better be achieved either
through reunification or adoption.
Although terminating parental rights makes the adoption process easier,
as discussed previously, termination alone does not ensure the child is
adopted. Termination is therefore
not an appropriate “means” to achieve permanency. The strict scrutiny standard requires
more. An adoptive home must be in
place before parental rights are terminated. This will ensure rights are only
terminated where a means of achieving permanency exists. Without such an adoptive home, the
fundamental right to the parent-child relationship should not be severed.
Even if a court determines that
terminating parental rights is a means to achieve permanency, the termination
still does not withstand strict scrutiny.
The second part of the strict scrutiny analysis is that the state must
demonstrate that termination is the least restrictive means of achieving a safe
and stable home for the child. This
requirement was put in place to ensure there are no less restrictive
alternatives available that would achieve the same interest without violating a
fundamental right.
[160] There are situations where it is
necessary to terminate parental rights because children are being seriously
abused and are at serious risk of harm from their parents. The ASFA, however, does not distinguish
these serious cases, which are relatively rare, from the majority of cases where
children enter foster care because of neglect. These children have not suffered, nor
are they at serious risk of suffering, child abuse; therefore the state should
not be able to terminate parental rights because less restrictive alternatives
are available.
For example, the state may seek to
terminate the rights of a parent whose child was placed in foster care because
she was living in unsanitary conditions and was often forced to go hungry. Without government assistance, the
parent has been deemed unfit. She
is unable to meet the specifics of the case plan to secure adequate housing and
a steady income. Instead of
severing the fundamental right to a family, a less restrictive means would be
for the state to provide adequate funds for the families’ basic necessities of
food and shelter.
[161] Terminating parental rights is
over-inclusive.
[162] Spending money to provide families with
meaningful aid is a clear alternative to termination. Furthermore, termination does not get at
the heart of the problem that created the neglectful environment. It focuses on punishing the parent for
making bad choices or sometimes for simply being poor.
Additionally, in 2001, the Illinois
Supreme Court held the fifteen month provision of the state’s Adoption Act
unconstitutional.
[163] The law, based on the mandate of the
ASFA, presumed a parent unfit after a child had been in foster care for fifteen
months and moved to terminate parental rights.
[164] In re H.G. involved a parent whose
substance abuse problem prevented her from meeting the requirements stipulated
by caseworkers, and therefore from achieving reunification within the fifteen
month specification.
[165] The Illinois Supreme Court recognized
the fundamental right to family integrity and invoked strict scrutiny to analyze
the state’s action.
[166] The court held the provision was
unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process under both the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution.
[167] The presumption of unfitness was not
narrowly tailored to the compelling goal of identifying unfit parents, because
in many cases the length of a child's stay in foster care had nothing to do with
the parent's ability or inability to safely care for the child, but instead was
due to circumstances beyond the parent's control.
[168] This step by the Illinois Supreme Court
is indeed a victory for black families.
IX. Equal Protection and Procedural Due Process
Limitations of the ASFA
There are additional procedural
challenges to the constitutionality of terminating parental rights. Since poor, black families are
disproportionately affected by the ASFA’s fifteen month parental rights
termination provision, a discrimination claim may be viable because of the
legislation’s disparate impact on blacks.
[169] Washington v. Davis, however, deflates
the hopes of substantiating the claim.
[170] Although the disparity along racial
lines is clear in the foster care system, it can easily be attributed to
economics instead of racial discrimination. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if disparate impact on
racial grounds is explainable on non-racial grounds, then the law is not
unconstitutional.
[171] A recent Tennessee District Court
decision in Brian A. v. Sundquist,
however, acknowledged that race impacted foster care services in Tennessee.
[172] Although the suit was filed on behalf of
all foster children in state custody, it contained a putative subclass of black
children alleging that not specifically the ASFA, but the Tennessee adoption and
permanency services, generally, had a discriminatory effect on black foster
children.
[173] The case was settled on July 30, 2001.
[174] The settlement included general
provisions to reform the foster care system as well as specific provisions to
evaluate if black children “receive disparate treatment or suffer disparate
impact, to assess the causes for such disparities, and recommend solutions.”
[175] Although this settlement holds the state
accountable for its actions on behalf of black children, a more plausible attack
on the constitutionality of the ASFA’s termination provision would be a
disparate impact claim based not on race, but on poverty.
[176]
The unconstitutionality of the
ASFA’s fifteen month termination provision because of its disparate impact on
the poor is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
[177]
In M.L.B., the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not allow a state to condition appeal from a
termination proceeding on an indigent parent’s ability to pay for transcript
fees, where the transcript is necessary for the proceedings.
[178] The Court stated, “[c]hoices about
marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associated
rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in our society’…rights
sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted
usurpation, disregard or disrespect.”
[179] The Court concluded that termination of
parental rights was comparable to a criminal punishment.[180] Unlike loss of custody, the termination
of parental rights is irrevocable and results in the loss of one of the most
fundamental relationships.
[181] This decision introduces the precedent
that termination proceedings cannot disparately impact the poor.
[182] Indigent parents cannot be forced to
endure the severity of a termination of their parental rights because of their
poverty.
Under the M.L.B. precedent, it could be argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment should protect not only the ability to a pay
transcript fee, but also other limitations imposed by poverty such as the
ability to secure housing or obtain adequate heating or utilities. An indigent parent who is unable to
retain custody of their children within the ASFA’s fifteen month provision
because of challenges created by extreme poverty should be able to argue a
viable disparate impact challenge to termination.
[183]
Another way to challenge the
constitutionality of terminating the parental rights of black parents is through
the Due Process Clause.
[184] In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires at least
clear and convincing evidence in a proceeding to terminate parents’ rights to
their children.
[185] The Court noted the evidence presented
at termination hearings is very subjective.
[186] Value judgments are often included in
appraisals of the nature and quality of the parent-child relationship.
[187] Additionally, the agency’s power in the
vast majority of cases is far greater than parents’ best efforts at defending
themselves.
[188] The Supreme Court held that because the
process is highly susceptible to error, it is entitled to heightened procedural
protection.
[189] The Court therefore concluded that proof
by preponderance of the evidence is inappropriate and a termination requires at
least the intermediate standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence.
[190]
Instead of the clear and convincing
evidence standard the Court dictated in Santosky, a more appropriate standard of
proof would be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
[191] The reasonable doubt standard is used in
criminal matters and stems from societal concern regarding the risk of error.
[192] Criminal conviction results in
incarceration and a deprivation of physical liberty. In order to subject an individual to
such severe punishment, our society demands this heightened, reasonable doubt
standard of proof. The Supreme
Court has stated, “the risk of error to the individual must be minimized even at
the risk that some who are guilty might go free.”
[193]
Termination of parental rights is
comparable to a criminal conviction and should require the reasonable doubt
standard of proof. In Santosky, the Court admits a termination
proceeding “bears many of the indicia of a criminal trial.”[194] Comparing incarceration to a termination
of parental rights, Justice Stevens commented that “often the deprivation of
parental rights will be the more grievous of the two.”
[195] Incarceration is usually only for a
specific period of time, while termination is irreversible and severs the
familial bond forever. Therefore,
society should demand the strictest standard of proof before severing familial
bonds.
Congress did apply the reasonable
doubt standard of proof to the termination of parental rights in the Federal
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
[196] The ICWA was enacted because Congress
recognized the problems associated with excessive state intrusion into Native
American families.
[197] They wanted to combat the
disproportionately high percentage of Native American children removed from
their homes.
[198] The ICWA takes the viewpoint that the
best interest of the child is to remain with his or her family.
[199] The legislation assures parents the
procedural protection of assistance of counsel and removes a child from the home
only upon the ultimate finding, established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that continued parental custody would probably result in serious damage to the
child.
[200]
Congress understood that removing
Native American children from their families resulted in the general destruction
of Indian culture, but demonstrates no such understanding when it comes to black
families and culture. The ICWA
adopts the position that it is in the best interests of a Native American child
to remain with his or her family and implements this presumption through
jurisdictional provisions.
[201] In contrast, the ASFA takes the position
that adoption, often to white homes, is in the best interest of black children.
X.
Conclusion
The ASFA devalues black families by
severing the bond between black children and their parents. Under the guise of achieving permanency
in the lives of children, the legislation terminates parental rights and makes
adoption, instead of reunification, its priority. The ASFA provides financial incentives
to terminate the rights of black parents and place their children up for
adoption, but no financial support for programs to reunify their families.
Family is the foundation of a
community. Preservation of black
families is essential to the advancement of the black community. By destroying black families, the ASFA
disrupts the political power of the black community and prohibits the community
from transferring culture and a sense of identity to future generations. Furthermore, the ASFA’s termination of
parental rights raises issues of constitutionality on substantive and procedural
due process and equal protection grounds.
The child welfare system must take
into account the disproportionate effect and destruction the ASFA has on the
black community. A shift in the
focus of the system, with legislation directed at addressing the underlying
social ills that are at the root of foster care dependence is essential. Respect
for the familial bonds between black children and their parents must be
supreme. Our child welfare system
must focus its efforts on family preservation and reunification instead of
permanently severing the relationship between black children and their parents.
[1] See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d
336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (noting the living standards of a family are a matter of
the family's concern, not the court's); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (recognizing the traditionally private realm of family life in which the
state must not interfere without a compelling
justification).
[2] Zanita Fenton, Foster Care: The Border of Family Identity
Maintaining, (Re)creating, Destroying, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 59, 60-61
(2001).
[3] Id. at 60.
[4] See generally Nathan I. Huggins, Black Odyssey 154-82
(1977) (describing the effects of slavery on the black
family).
[5] See Joyce A. Ladner, Mixed Families: Adopting
Across Racial Boundaries 67 (1978).
[6] Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support
for Children, 76 Chi.-Kent. L.
Rev. 1619, 1622 (2001).
[7] Ladner, supra note 5.
[8] Id. at 67-68 (citing Andrew Billingsley
& Jeanne Giovanni, Research
Perspectives on Interracial Adoption, in RACE RESEARCH &
REASON: SOCIAL WORK PERSPECTIVES
139-73 (Roger Willer ed., 1969)(“When these
agencies were unable to place black children as fast as white children, the
agencies began to define the children and the families as problems . . . The
fact that the agencies had long excluded black children and families, and were
thus inexperienced in serving them, was quickly
forgotten.”)).
[9] Roberts, supra note 6, at
1622.
[10] Id.
[11] See Ladner, supra note 5, at 67 (“Billingsley and
Giovanonni assert that it was immediately following World War II that adoption
agencies began trying to include black children in their
programs.”).
[12] Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Note, Permanency at What Cost? Five Years of
Imprudence Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y
617, 623 (2002).
[13] Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
[14] This theory is called the
“psychological parent” theory. See Wilhelm, supra note 12, at 624 (citing Mary
O’Flynn, Comment, The Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental
Substance Abuse, 16 J. Contemp.
Health L. & Pol’y 243, 251 (1999)).
[15] Id.
[16] Madeleine L.
Kurtz, The Purchase of Families into
Foster Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons They Teach, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1453, 1470
(1994).
[17] U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Report to
the Congress on Kinship Foster Care 5 (2000)[hereinafter REPORT TO
CONGRESS].
[18] Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125
(1979).
[19] Id.
[20] See Sonia Gipson Rankin, Why They Won't Take the Money: Black
Grandparents and the Success of Informal Kinship Care, 10 Elder L.J. 153, 157
(2002).
[21] REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 17, at
9.
[22] Id. at 10.
[23] Id. at 9.
[24] 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)
(1999).
[25] See Wilhelm, supra note 12, at 624.
[26] See Marianne Berry, Overview of Family Preservation, in
Child Welfare for the 21st
Century: A Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 319, 321 (Gerald
P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).
[27] Id. at 320-321.
[28] See Wilhelm, supra note 12, at
623.
[29] In most cases they serve the same
population. See Kathy Barbell & Madelyn
Freunlich, Foster Care Today, in
Child Welfare for the 21st
Century: A Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 504, 506 (Gerald
P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005)(stating that more than half the
children in foster care qualified for federally assisted foster care, which is
tied to eligibility for welfare benefits).
Furthermore, the ability to meet the basic needs of children, such as
food and shelter, can be a direct reflection on a parent’s access to welfare
benefits.
[30] Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales From the Age
of ASFA, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 129, 135
(2001) (citing Leroy Pelton, For
Reasons of Poverty: A Critical
Analysis of the Public Welfare System in the U.S. 6
(1989)).
[31] Id. at 136.
[32] Id. at 135.
[33] Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical
Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J.
Legis. 239, 255 (2002).
[34] Id.
[35] Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical
Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 23
(2001).
[36] See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice In Children’s Rights?: The
Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 112, 132
(1999) [hereinafter
Roberts, Is There Justice].
[37] Id.
[38] See id. at 131.
[39] Id. at 132.
[40] Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] GOP Welfare Plan Would Take Cash from Unwed
Mothers to Aid Adoptions, Chi.
Trib., Nov. 14, 1994, at 7.
[44] See 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(15)(B)(1999).
[45] Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)(codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
[46] See Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring For Our Own: Why American Adoption
Law and Policy Must Change, 30 Colum.
J.L.
& Soc. Probs. 327, 360
(1997)(stating that foster care system in the United States costs around $10,000
to $20,000 per child annually resulting in an annual cost of around $9.1
billion).
[47] See id.
[48] H.R. Rep. No. 105-77 at 8 (1997),
as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740.
[49] Id.
[50] Once a child is adopted, she is no
longer dependant on the state and does not require the governmental aid she
required while she was in the foster care system.
[51] Baldwin, supra note 33, at
260.
[52] Exceptions are possible when there
is a compelling reason why such termination is not in the best interest of the
child. 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(15)(D)(1997).
[53] See Abuse and Neglect Unit,
http://www.countyofkane.org/sao/ABUSE/ABUSE.htm (last visited Apr. 27,
2006).
[54] See id.
[55] See 42 U.S.C. § 671
(1997).
[56] Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and
the Politics of Parenting 94-99 (1993).
[57] Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 551-54, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57
(1994) (repealed 1996).
[58] Removal of Barriers to Interethnic
Adoptions, § 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996).
[59] Id.
[60] Ruth G. McRoy, Overrepresentation of Children and Youth of
Color in Foster Care, in Child
Welfare for the 21st Century: A Handbook of Practices, Policies, and
Programs 623, 623 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds.,
2005)(citing the 2004 statistics from the Adoption and Foster Care Data Analysis
System 8 datasets).
[61] Id. at 624.
[62] Natalie Pardo, Losing Their Children: As State Cracks Down
on Parents, Black Families Splinter, 28 Chi. Rep. 1, 7
(1999).
[63] Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s
Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 1716, 1718 n.11
(2000)(reviewing Elizabeth
Bartholet,
Nobody’s
Children:
Abuse
and Neglect,
Foster
Drift,
and the Adoption
Alternative
(1999)).
[64] See Dorothy E. Roberts, Access to Justice: Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child
Welfare Policy, 1 Wash. U. J.L. &
Pol’y 63, 68 (1999).
[65] Marianne Berry, Overview of Family Preservation, in
Child Welfare for the 21st
Century: A Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 319, 323 (Gerald
P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).
[66] Id.
[67] Id.
[68] McRoy, supra note 60, at
624.
[69] Id.
[70] Id. at 72.
[71] See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 171, 176
(2003) [hereinafter
Roberts, Child Welfare].
[72] See id. at 175.
[73] See id.
[74] See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971)(holding that women receiving New York’s Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (“AFDC”)
must permit state social workers to enter their homes even though the visits
shared some characteristics of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure for which a
warrant would normally be required).
[75] See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers:
Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 577, 584
(1997).
[76] See id.
[77] Id.
[78] Dorothy Roberts, Racial Harm; Dorothy Roberts Explains How
Racism Works in the Child Welfare System, Colorlines, Fall 2002, at 19
[hereinafter Roberts, Racial Harm].
[79] Id.
[80] McRoy, supra note 60, at
628.
[81] Roberts, Child Welfare, supra note 71, at 172 (citing Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t
Health & Human Servs., Child
Maltreatment 1998: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 2000)).
[83] Id. at 173.
[84] Dorothy Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse for Family
Preservation Policy, 3 J. Health Care
L. & Pol’y 72, 85 (1999) [hereinafter Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse].
[85] See Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty 175 (1997).
[86] Id.
[87] Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse, supra note 84, at 86 (stating that “the
public’s willingness to remove so many babies from their mothers is based on
largely racialized myths about crack babies and pregnant crack
addicts”).
[88] Antoinette Greenway, When Neutral Policies Aren’t So Neutral:
Increasing Incarceration Rates and the Effect of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 on the Parental Rights of African-American Women, 17 Nat’l Black L.J. 247, 255 (2004)
(explaining incarceration often causes parents to place their children in
foster care because they have no intervening options for immediate care of their
children).
[89] U.S. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics 2000 (2000).
[90] See Greenway, supra note 88.
[91] See id.
[92] See id.
[93] See Martha L. Raimon, Barriers to Achieving Justice for
Incarcerated Parents, 70 Fordham L.
Rev. 421, 421 (2001).
[94] Christopher J. Mumola, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report: Incarcerated Parents and
Their Children 1 (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf (reporting 10% of mothers and 2% of
fathers in state custody had a child living in a foster home or agency).
[95] Id. at 3.
[96] Thomas P. Bonczar, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report: Prevalence of Imprisonment
in the U.S. Population 1974-2001 5 tbl. 5 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
[97] See Abuse and Neglect Unit, supra note 53.
[98] Greenway, supra note 88, at
258.
[99] See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
[100] See id.
[101] See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446-47 (1990)(holding a parent is entitled to raise their children free from undue state interference).
[102] Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
[103] Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just
Family, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 955, 990
(1993).
[104] See Edwin J. Terry, RELOCATION: Moving Forward or Moving
Backward?, 31 Tex. Tech L.
Rev. 983, 1012 (2000) (stating the belief that if the noncustodial parent
sees the child on a regular basis, the custodial parent continues to be
supported and exercises appropriate discipline and the parents are able to
cooperate without conflict then the child's standard of living changes little;
and the transition is accompanied by no other major disruptions in the child's
life there can be a satisfactory adjustment to the
divorce).
[105] See id. at 988 (stating “the effect of
the move on the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent is a
central concern”).
[106] Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, 26
Conn. L. Rev. 871, 875 (1994)
(“The conception of… the Victorian norm of female domesticity never applied to
black women… Even after emancipation, political and economic conditions forced
many Black mothers to earn a living outside the home. Americans expected Black mothers to look
like Aunt Jemima, working in somebody else's kitchen: ‘outfitted in an
unflattering dress, apron, and scarf (‘a headrag'), she is always ready for work
and never ready for bed.’ American culture reveres no Black madonna; it upholds
no popular image of a Black mother nurturing her child.”).
[107] Roberts, Is There Justice, supra note 36, at
131.
[108] Id.
[109] Id.
[110] Wexler, supra note 30, at
134.
[111] See Family Preservation and Substance Abuse, Issue Papers (citing Kathleen Wobie, et. al., To Have and To Hold: A Descriptive Study of Custody Status Following Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine, (paper presented at joint annual meeting of the American Pediatric Society and the Society for Pediatric Research)(May 3, 1998)), available at http://www.nccpr.org/newissues/13.html#4.
[112] Id.
[113]
Id.
[114] Id.
[115] Id.
[116] Id.
[117] Adler, supra note 35, at
11.
[118] Id.
[119] Id.
[120] Id. at 12.
[121] Id.
[122] Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse, supra note 84, at
75.
[123] Id. at 76.
[124] Wexler, supra note 30, at
144.
[125] Id.
[126] Id. at 145.
[127] Id.
[128] McRoy, supra note 60, at
628.
[129] Id.
[130] Id.
[131] Id.
[133] Id.
[134] Id.
[135] See Roberts, Child Welfare supra note 71, at
179.
[136] Id.
[137] See John Henrik Clarke,
supra note 132.
[138] Id.
[139] David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family: Diversity, Pluralism, Social Tolerance
and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. Cal.
Interdisc.
L.J. 205, 221 (1997).
[140] Dailey, supra note 103, at
997-98.
[141] Roberts, Is There Justice, supra note 36, at
140.
[142] Id.
[143] Id. at 132.
[144] Dorothy Roberts is the Kirkland and
Ellis Professor at Northwestern University School of Law and a Faculty Fellow
for the Institute for Policy Research.
She is a frequent speaker on issues related to
race, gender, and the law and has published more than 50 articles in law reviews
and books. She has also authored
books on the subject including Shattered Bonds:
The Color of Child Welfare and Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and
the Meaning of Liberty.
[145] Racial Harm, supra note 78, at 19.
[146] The Challenge of Substance Abuse, supra note 84, at 83.
[147] Id.
[148] Id.
[149] Id. at 84.
[150] See Cheryl Katz & Christopher Hoene,
Strengthening Families in America's Cities: A Survey on Municipal Conditions,
Policies and Resources for Children and Families, in Research Report on American Cities 4
(National League of Cities 2005), available at http://www.nlc.org/content/Files/RMPstrengtheningfamiliesrpt05.pdf
(finding communities are being constrained by tight fiscal conditions that limit
their ability to address the needs of children and
families).
[151] Id. at 10.
[152] Id.
[153] See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
[154] See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942).
[155] Id.
[156] Theresa D. Legere, Note, Preventing Judicially Mandated Orphans,
38 Fam. &
Conciliation Cts. Rev. 260, 271 (2000).
[157] Id.
[158] Id.
[159] Id.
[160] See id. at 272.
[161] Id.
[162] Id.
[163] In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 874
(Ill. 2001) (holding that the fifteen-month provision of the Illinois Adoption
Act, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 50/1(D) (m-1)(2001), was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution, as it violates substantive
due process).
[164] Id. at 866.
[165] Id. at 867.
[166] Id. at 871.
[167] Id. at 874.
[168] Id.
[169] Wilhelm, supra note 12, at 632.
[170] Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
[171] Id.
[172] Brian A. v. Sundquist, 149 F. Supp.
2d 941 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
[173] Id. at 944.
[174] McRoy, supra note 60, at
629.
[175] Id.
[176] Wilhelm, supra note 12, at
633.
[177] Id.
[178] M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128
(1996).
[179] Id. at 116.
[180] Id. at 125.
[181] Id. at 118-119.
[182] Wilhelm, supra note 12, at
633.
[183] Id.
[184] Legere, supra note 156, at
268.
[185] Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
769 (1982).
[186] Id.
[187] Id.
[188] Id. at 763.
[189] Id. at 769.
[190] Id.
[191] J. Bohl, “Those Privileges Long Recognized”:
Termination of Parental Rights Law, the Family Right To Integrity and the
Private Culture of the Family, 1
Cardozo Women’s L.J. 323, 365 (1994).
[192] See Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. 197, 208
(1977).
[193] Id.
[194] Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
762 (1982).
[195] Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[196] 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)
(1988).
[197] See Bohl, supra note 191, at
358.
[198] Id.
[199] Id. at 359.
[200] 25 U.S.C. §
1912(f).
[201] Bohl, supra note 191, at
359.