The Horner Model:
Successfully Redeveloping Public Housing
William P. Wilen [1]
Introduction
The redevelopment of the Governor Henry Horner public housing development on Chicago’s Near West Side began in 1995 as a result of a class action lawsuit filed by the tenants there in 1991. I first represented these tenants in 1990, as an attorney working for the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago. Since 1996, I have represented them as an attorney at the Shriver Center in Chicago. This article aims to recount the history of Horner and its redevelopment, from the legal counsel’s point of view,
First, the article provides a history of the Horner public housing and its redevelopment. This discussion shows what obstacles the residents faced in their efforts to revitalize Horner, and explains how those obstacles were overcome. In Chicago, as in every other city undergoing revitalization of its public housing inventory, many stakeholders are involved. The Horner residents had to reach agreement with the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the City of Chicago, the Horner developers, all as represented by their attorneys. Because construction of new pubic housing units in Chicago is governed by orders entered in the landmark desegregation case of Gautreaux v. CHA, the Horner residents also had to reach agreement with the attorneys representing the plaintiff class in Gautreaux. [2]
Next, the article discusses various measures of success that experts use to analyze the redevelopment of public housing and how the Horner development fared in achieving those measures. These measures include smooth implementation, recognized design quality, improved tenant organization capacity, enhanced maintenance and management performance, improved security, progress on socioeconomic development, resident satisfaction, and minimizing displacement. This analysis shows that that the Horner redevelopment effort has achieved all of the objective measures of success.
Since the Horner redevelopment effort satisfies the objective measures of success, the question then arises, “Why has it been successful?” The article answers this question by isolating five principal reasons for its success: (1) demolition was phased, so displacement was minimized; (2) reasonable screening criteria were in place, so that Horner residents could qualify for the new replacement units; (3) there was effective resident participation in the redevelopment process, so that the Horner residents had an actual stake in its outcome; (4) there existed enforceable procedures to protect residents’ interests, so that Horner residents had a process to resolve important issues, and (5) there were adequate social services to and representation of individual Horner residents, so residents could transition into and remain in revitalized public housing.
Next, the article compares the Horner redevelopment process to that being employed by CHA in its on-going transformation efforts to determine how residents in other developments are faring when compared to the residents at Horner. The article determines that the Horner process protects residents’ interests much better than CHA’s current practices.
Finally, the article concludes that the successful redevelopment of
Horner should serve as a model for
current and future public housing redevelopment efforts not only in Chicago but
also nationwide .
From 1935 to 1956, CHA constructed 27 separate public housing developments containing over 14,000 units. [3] Then, from 1957 to1968, CHA embarked on a massive new construction program during which time almost 16,000 units were completed. [4] All but roughly 700 were located in high-rise buildings. This was the most ambitious period of public housing high-rise and mid-rise constructions in Chicago’s history. [5] Most of the apartments were large and spacious, containing three, four or five bedrooms. [6]
The very first development to be constructed during the period 1957 -1968 was the Henry Horner Homes, completed in 1957. [7] It was located on Chicago’s Near West Side in a 10 city-block area, bounded by Hermitage Avenue on the east, Lake Street on the north, Damen Avenue on the west, and Washington Boulevard on the south. Henry Horner Homes consisted of eleven buildings containing 920 units—seven that were 7-stories tall, and four that were 16-stories. The prestigious Chicago architectural firm, Skidmore, Owens and Merrill, designed the eleven buildings. [8] They had exposed concrete frames with infill of common brick in some buildings and finished brick in the others. Constructed at a cost of $13,182 per unit, the Henry Horner Homes were the cheapest development constructed by CHA during the period 1957-1968. [9]
By 1961, the Henry Horner Extension was completed, adding another 736 units to the Horner development. [10] The Extension, covering 12 city blocks, was bounded by Damen Avenue on the east, Lake Street on the north, Oakley Boulevard on the west, and Washington Boulevard on the south. Quinn and Christiansen designed the site, consisting of seven buildings—four that were 14-stories tall (placed diagonal to Lake Street) and three that were 8-stories (placed parallel to Lake Street). The Extension uniquely featured duplex apartments (living room, dining and kitchen area on the lower level and bedrooms and a bathroom on the upper level). However, these buildings were the typical Chicago “gallery-style” high-rises, with wire fencing of the galleries on both sides of the elevator shaft on each of the upper floors. [11]
The final complex to be completed at Horner was the Horner Annex, located a few blocks south of the Homes and Extension. By this time, the Gautreaux plaintiffs had obtained a judgment order against CHA, but the judgment order exempted almost 1,500 housing units from its coverage, including the Horner Annex, as these had already been selected and allocated federal funding. [12] Thus, in 1969, the Horner Annex was completed, and consisted of 109 units located in a seven-story mid-rise building and two, three-story, 18-unit walk-ups. [13] The Annex was located on one city block, bounded on the east by Wood Street, on the north by Monroe Street, on the west by Honore Street, and on the south by Adams Street.
B. Horner’s Glory Years (1957-1981)
There is no question that in the beginning, these apartments, in spite of their location, tenant-mix, racial make-up and physical problems did provide residents with a new sense of hope and community.
The architects who designed Horner and the other public housing high-rises wanted to “move the towers back from the filthy, packed slums. . . . Let them stand in the middle of oversized blocks or ‘superblocks,’ made by closing off streets of the traditional city grid. Give everybody plenty of space, as well access to light and air. Line the faces of the towers with breezeways, ‘streets in the sky,’ where mothers could rock their baby carriages.” [14]
Long-time Horner residents have informed Horner counsel that, in the beginning, the buildings were clean and well-maintained, in-coming families were strictly screened, housekeeping and grounds-keeping rules were enforced by CHA, tenants who violated their leases were evicted and their apartments quickly made ready for a new tenant family who soon moved into the vacant unit. The apartments themselves were well heated, had hot and cold running water, were reasonably clean, and stood in stark contrast to the residents’ previous housing. Most CHA residents had lived in slum tenements before moving to public housing. [15] The new buildings, even with their limitations, offered a much better life for the residents. As told by Alex Kotlowitz in his story of Horner, There Are No Children Here, Horner in its early years was an exciting place to live, especially for the children:
In those early years, the children of Horner thrived. LaJoe and LaGretta joined the Girl Scouts. They attended dances and roller-skating parties in their building’s basement. They delighted in the new playground, which boasted swings, sliding boards and a jungle gym. Their brothers frequented the project’s grass baseball diamond, which was regularly mowed.
All of them spent time at the spanking new Boys Club, which had a gym and in later years an indoor Olympic-size swimming pool. On Friday nights, the family attended fish fries. LaJoe joined the 250-member Drum and Bugle Corps, a group so
popular among the area’s youth that some came from two miles away to participate. The marching teenagers, attired in white shirts, thin black ties, and black jackets, were a common sight in city parades. [16]
Likewise, the Horner Annex was a very nice place to live. It was separated from the 18 Horner high-rises and mid-rises lining Lake Street a few blocks to the north, and referred to as “The Valley” by Horner residents. In a statement submitted to the Horner court in 1992, the son of the long-time Annex head-janitor described the Annex in the 1970’s and early 1980’s as a well-maintained living environment:
The condition of the Henry Horner Annex today is strikingly different than what it was 10 years ago. My father, James Williams, was Head Janitor at the Annex from 1971 until he retired and I often accompanied him on his rounds. The three Annex buildings were kept spotless. Every day he and his two assistant janitors, Mr. Grear and Mr. Hubbard, would sweep all the hallways and ramps in the building. Each day the garbage would be pulled from the incinerator and hauled away. All of the halls and ramps would be mopped down every other day.
When my father was janitor, there were very few, if any, vacant apartments. When an apartment would become vacant, my father would clean it immediately. The stove and refrigerator would be pulled from the apartments, taken to the janitor’s room, completely cleaned, and returned to the apartment. After the painters re-painted the apartment, the floors would be mopped and waxed. The apartment would usually be re-rented within a week. . . .
. . There was never any graffiti in the Annex until about three years
ago. Now the Annex is covered with graffiti on all the floors of the three buildings. [17]
C. Horner’s
Decline (1981-1991)
Because these buildings had been constructed “on the cheap,” they had numerous physical problems. [19] They had no actual lobbies on the first floor, but rather small open spaces by the elevator, with hallways of units radiating out on each side. There was no communication system by which visitors or guests could contact residents on the upper floors. Because the lobbies were virtually open to the outside, during winter many times the elevator cables would freeze and become inoperable. The open buildings allowed easy access to any persons entering the buildings with criminal intent—so drugs, guns and gang-violence became prevalent in the buildings. The trash chutes located on each floor were too narrow to handle all the trash and other materials inserted into them, causing pile-ups of basement trash and occasional fires in the chutes. There was hardly any overhead lighting in each apartment, and the medicine cabinets in the bathrooms were built adjacent to each other, so that by pushing out the medicine cabinet, one could gain access to the apartment next door. Finally, the walls of the apartments were cinder block, rather than finished plaster, which gave the apartments a prison-like feel (but they did contain noise very well). [20]
In 1991, CHA stated that in the opinion of many residents, staff and
housing activists, Horner “is the authority’s most troubled development,” and
“one of the most distressed public housing properties in the nation.”
[21] In January 1991, the conditions at Horner
included: non-functioning elevators,
darkened hallways, lobbies and stairwells, broken, boarded-up and leaking
windows, broken trash chutes and common areas cluttered with refuse, missing
exit, stairway and fire escape signs, broken or missing stairwell doors,
defective stairway handrails, treads and landings, presence of human and animal
waste in public areas and open, vacant apartments, broken screen doors and
windows, numerous vacant units and abandoned laundry rooms with open or missing
doors.
[22]
II. The Revitalization of the Henry Horner Public
Housing Development (1995-2010)
A. Horner Phase I: The Construction of New
Public Housing Units (1995-2000)
[23]They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against CHA and HUD, including an order prohibiting them from continuing their “de facto demolition” of Horner and requiring them to maintain reasonably full occupancy at the development, after, among other things, making all the residential units there habitable. [24]
In 1995, the Horner parties reached agreement on the terms of a consent decree that would resolve the litigation. [25] In April 1995 the Horner court, Judge James B. Zagel, presiding, approved the consent decree. Under the decree, Horner was to be redeveloped in phases, with demolition phased so that displacement would be minimized. Each Horner family was to be offered their choice of replacement housing and for each Horner unit demolished, one replacement unit would be provided. In May 1995 the Horner families living in the high-rises of the Horner Homes and Extension (the families who would be moving in Phase I of the redevelopment effort) were given detailed presentations by plaintiffs’ counsel describing the residents’ four replacement housing choices. [26] Of the Phase I families who made selections, roughly 50 percent elected to remain at Horner and 50 percent elected to move out. Of those who elected to remain, only a handful elected to move into a rehabilitated Horner Extension mid-rise. [27]
The Horner plaintiffs and CHA therefore agreed that the three Horner Extension mid-rises could be demolished along with the Horner Extension high-rises, for a total of 466 units. Federal law at the time required these units be replaced on a one-for-one basis. [28] Since HUD and the Gautreaux plaintiffs agreed to provide additional public housing for higher income families (families between 50 and 80 percent of area median income), the net result was an agreement for a total of 699 replacement units. [29] In September 1995, the Horner court approved an amended consent decree.[30] After the amended consent decree entered, the Gautreaux Receiver began overseeing construction of the on-site and neighborhood replacement housing in Phase I, which lasted from 1996 to 2000. In Phase I, 466 units of Horner public housing were demolished, and 461 units of public housing were constructed at a cost of $50 million. [31]
B. Horner Phase II: The Construction of New
Mixed-Income Units (2001-2010)
When the amended decree was entered, the one-for-one replacement law was still in effect. However, HUD was actively lobbying Congress to repeal it. The parties agreed in the amended decree that all units demolished in Phase I had to be replaced on a one-for-one basis, whether or not Congress repealed this requirement. [32] But, if Congress subsequently repealed the requirement, the parties would have to renegotiate the number of replacement housing units to be provided in Phase II to the remaining Horner residents as a result of future demolition.
In the fall of 1999, with Phase I well underway and Congress having repealed the one-for-one replacement requirement, the Horner parties, the Gautreaux plaintiffs and the Gautreaux Receiver began their negotiations over the provision of Horner Phase II housing. The Horner residents—those residing in the seven remaining Horner Homes mid-rises, were permitted to make their replacement housing choices. This time, over 75 percent of the residents elected to remain at Horner and move to newly constructed or rehabilitated, on-site, mixed income housing. Of the 75 percent who elected to remain, 40 percent of these opted to move to a rehabilitated Horner Homes mid-rise. [33]
The negotiations over Phase II were more difficult and lasted for over a year. [34] The parties eventually turned to a mediator, John R. Schmidt, a former Justice Department attorney, who helped the parties agree on a plan for Phase II. [35] The terms of the agreement were entered as an agreed order by the Horner court in February 2000. [36]
The parties then negotiated for ten-months over the precise language of a request for qualifications (RFQ) to solicit bids on the Phase II work. The RFQ, which was issued in November 2000, established the Horner Working Group to select the developer and oversee implementation of Phase II. [37] The RFQ drew responses from four developers.[38] Ultimately the Horner Working Group selected the Illinois-New Jersey joint venture, the Brinshore-Michaels development team. In Phase II (from 2001-2010), the remaining Horner high-rises and mid-rises are slated to be demolished and an additional 746 mid-rise, low-rise and town-home units will be constructed at a cost of over $200 million. Of these 271 will be public housing units (248 will be for very low income Horner families) 132 affordable units and 361 market rate units.
Phase II.A. (West Haven Park) is now completed, and consists of 155 low-rise and town-home units, of which 87 are public housing units (78 for Horner residents), 31 are affordable units and 37 are market-rate units.
Demolition
of all the Horner high-rises has been completed. At the time of the publication of this
article, only two mid-rises remain. They
house the last of the Horner families, who will be moving into their new
housing under the amended decree and agreed order starting in mid-2006.
[39]
Thus, in 1995, Horner consisted of 1,775 units of public housing, including 8 high-rise and 11 mid-rise buildings occupied exclusively by very low-income families. After revitalization is completed, Horner will consist of 1,325 units of low-rise and mid-rise mixed-income housing. [40]
III. Measures
of Success in Public Housing Redevelopment
Experts have analyzed efforts
at public housing redevelopment and have identified several “measures of
success,” that constitute objective criteria by which to determine if the
redevelopment effort may be deemed successful.
In 1995, Lawrence J. Vale, a
policy analyst who studied Boston’s attempts at rehabilitation of three public
housing developments in the 1980’s, evaluated various measures of success that
commentators had argued were necessary elements of successful public housing
development.
[41] Vale concluded that there are seven criteria
that are significant measures of success.
In addition, when redevelopment involves mainly demolition, rather than
rehabilitation as studied in Boston, there is an eighth measure of success, the
minimizing of displacement.
Vale’s seven measures of
success, along with the eighth measure involving minimizing displacement, are
discussed below. The Horner
redevelopment process is evaluated using these eight measures of success.
Smooth
Implementation. To the
public housing authority, the overriding challenge is to get the job done, at
budget, on time. This means “coping with
strict budget and timetables,” while, at the same time, “managing the complex
process of construction and resident relocation.”
[42]
In the Boston experience, most of the key
players in the rehabilitation process attributed the superior performance to
the presence of an outside private developer, who, under the “turnkey” process,
was able to bypass much of the red tape involved in the public housing redevelopment
process.
[43]
Horner’s redevelopment efforts, for the most part, have
run smoothly, and the process has proceeded at budget and on time. However, in 1997, when the Phase I developer,
the Gautreaux Receiver, was unable to
complete the project in accordance with the timetable as required by the
amended decree, the Horner court
entered an order modifying the construction schedule and ordering the payment
of liquidated damages to the Horner residents for further delays.
[44] In 2000, the parties agreed on the selection
of an outside private developer, the Brinshore-Michaels team, to implement
Phase II of the Horner redevelopment.
Recognized Design Quality.
Designers and those who work in the design, development and planning
sections of public housing authorities measure this quality of success by the
number and kind of awards that professional societies confer on these
ventures. The residents, of course,
evaluate design quality every day. The
Boston public housing residents noted the most important changes to them
included larger rooms, more convenient layouts, better kitchen facilities,
second bathrooms in larger apartments and laundry room hook-ups.
[45] In addition, good design improves the image
of public housing not only in the eyes of the residents, but also of the
general public, who ultimately decide its future funding.
In November 2003, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied resident issues and changes in neighborhoods in 20 public housing redevelopment efforts across the country. [46] The GAO noted that, “[i]t is generally accepted among researchers that housing values represent the best available index of expectations regarding future economic activity in an area.” [47] Therefore, the GAO then looked at housing values in the 20 sites studied, and found that “[a]verage housing values increased in 13 of the 20 HOPE VI neighborhoods, ranging from a minimum of 11 percent in Tucson to a maximum of 215 percent in Chicago (Henry Horner).” [48] The Horner redevelopment consisted of new units constructed not only on the sites of the original Horner buildings, but also in the surrounding Near West Side community of Chicago. Therefore, the redevelopment effort helped to upgrade not only Horner but the entire neighborhood as well.
The redevelopment of Horner has been recognized by professional societies. In February 2005, the Local Initiative Support Corporation/Chicago, among others, selected Phase II.A .of Horner (consisting of 155 units of newly constructed housing—37 market rate units, 31 affordable units, and 87 public housing units) as the best for-profit neighborhood real estate project in Chicago for 2005. [49] The award stated, in part, that, “Since over half of its leaseholders are former Horner residents, the development team partnered with social service providers for case management, job training and placement assistance. Residents and other local people were hired to work on project construction and maintenance. Praised as a ‘national model for public housing transformation,’ West Haven Park Apartments is the Outstanding For-Profit Neighborhood Real Estate Project for 2005.” [50] In August 2005, Multifamily Executive magazine awarded Phase II A. of Horner the “Grand” Project of the Year in the Mixed Income Category. [51]
Finally,
the residents have been intimately involved in the design process, by reviewing
and approving the designs of the buildings.
At the Horner Annex, the architects met every week with the residents
during the rehabilitation process, and adopted many resident suggestions
concerning the design the units, the size of the rooms, the configuration of
the apartment, and location of laundry room hook-ups.
Improved Tenant Organizing
Capacity. According to Vale, the key here is to help
the residents become active and influential decision-makers in their
developments. This, in turn, builds
their skills to attract additional resources.
In Boston, the housing authority officials recognized from the outset
that transformation of public housing could not simply be imposed on the
residents, but must emerge through negotiation.
There the redevelopment was preceded by years of resident organizing.
After redevelopment, 80 percent of the residents who had lived through the
entire redevelopment process in two of the developments stated that the tenants
themselves played the leading role. At
one of the developments, the tenants association entered into a binding
agreement with the housing authority and a private management company. The agreement continues to govern future
management activities and allows the tenants association to fire management
with 30 days’ notice. In short, the
redevelopment process was “intended to lessen the social costs of distant and
top-down management.”
[52]
In its November 2003 report, the GAO found that of the 20 sites studied, Horner Phase I (consisting of 551 newly constructed or rehabilitated pubic housing units), had the highest level of resident participation in the redevelopment process: “Under a settlement agreement, any decisions regarding the revitalization of Henry Horner Homes in Chicago are subject to approval of the Horner Residents Committee.” [53] For over ten years, the seven members of the Horner Residents Committee (HRC) have met on a monthly basis and at “special call” meetings as necessary, and monthly with other Horner tenant leaders, to determine the position of the HRC on the various redevelopment matters. The positions taken by the HRC were determined based on observations and experiences of the HRC members themselves, by input they received from Horner residents, and by information provided to them from their counsel and the HRC’s consultants, a city planner and a structural engineer. [54] Each and every action of the CHA, the developer and Horner management was subject to their reaching agreement with the HRC before implementing the action. As described below, occasionally the Horner court, or, under the Phase II order, the Horner Mediator, John Schmidt, would ultimately have to resolve the issue when the HRC and defendants could not reach agreement. But for the most part, the redevelopment proceeded under the watchful eye of the HRC and through the process of the HRC reaching agreement with CHA, the developer and Horner management.
Enhanced Maintenance and
Management Performance.
Many housing authorities and
other stakeholders measure success by whether management has performed
well. In Boston, the developments
managed by private management companies out-performed those managed directly by
the housing authority.
[55] There, private management set and
enforced high standards, and had maintenance carried out by on-site staff
trained in multiple trades. The residents themselves formulated a set of
community rules, with written standards for maintenance activities. Over a ten-year period, residents have
accepted responsibility for upkeep and behavior in the development, and both
management and the residents seem committed to enforcing high standards.
[56]
At Horner, CHA and Horner management must consult and attempt to reach agreement with the HRC on virtually every aspect of the redevelopment effort, including tenant assignments to new units, selection of higher income, non-Horner families for residency in units reserved for families with 50—80% of area median income for Phase I and 50-60% of area median income for Phase II, approving “family splits” whereby an adult household member with children may separate from the original leaseholder and obtain their own apartment, the timing and manner of management inspection of tenant apartments, the automobile towing policy, the timing and manner of HRC “walk-down” inspections of both new and existing units, the role of Horner social service agencies, and all major contracts.
In 2000, the HRC was encountering difficulties with Horner management
when the new, CHA-supported management company consistently failed to follow
the provisions of the decree. In 2001,
the Horner plaintiffs filed a
contempt motion against CHA and Horner management, seeking to compel compliance
with the amended decree The Court ruled
that all of the items listed above had to be negotiated with the HRC.
[57]
Improved Security. In
redevelopment efforts, residents and management not only have to deal with
on-going construction and rehabilitation, but also with external forces (such
as criminal activity, gangs, guns, and drugs).
Much if not most of the crime in public housing is related to “troubled
surrounding areas.”
[58] Residents in Boston stated that the most
important aspects to improving security involve enhanced community policing,
private security firms, and stricter management practices.
At Horner,
security has improved over the years, but criminal activity is still an
on-going concern, including in Phase II
West Haven Park. In 1997, the Horner
parties agreed to set up the Horner Security Committee where security matters
are discussed at monthly meetings. The
committee is chaired by John Schmidt, the Horner mediator and former Justice
Department attorney. At these meetings,
the status of each eviction action brought against Horner residents is
reviewed, reports of recent criminal activity are discussed, and methods to
increase the effectiveness of police protection at Horner are proposed for
implementation. The meeting is attended by
the local police district commanders, Horner management personnel,
representatives from the CHA legal department, the HRC president, and since
January 2005, by the new Horner Local Advisory Council President
Progress on Socioeconomic
Development. Redevelopment of public housing should redevelop
not only the physical structures of the development, but should also address
the root causes of poverty that forced residents into public housing in the
first place. In the 1990’s, under the
federal HOPE VI program, public housing authorities have focused on efforts to
achieve an economic mix and to develop “consolidated and coordinated” social
service facilities to improve resident self-sufficiency.
[59] In Boston, the housing authority
abandoned its plans for a mixed-income community, but did enhance its tenant
screening process. Vale concludes that
this, in turn, may well have increased the number of employed residents.
[60]
At Horner, Horner counsel,
with the assistance of two social services agencies, Treatment Alternatives for
Safe Communities (TASC) and Horner Service Connector, the Home Visitors Program
(HVP), represents all of the individual Horner residents in their disputes with
CHA, the developer and Horner management.
[61] In addition, Horner counsel meets
regularly with Horner management in one-on-one sessions where Horner counsel
is permitted to follow-up on existing matters and to resolve emerging
ones. Horner counsel works
closely with TASC and HVP in resolving many different kinds of individual
disputes relating to the resident’s moving into and remaining in the new units.
[62] These efforts have resulted housing stability
for the Horner families moving into mixed-income Phase II units. Of the 78 Horner families who moved into West
Haven Park from December 2003-June 2004, 77 are still residing in their units,
due mainly to the efforts of the two social service agencies in helping the
families resolve issues with Horner management.
Resident Satisfaction. If
the redevelopment effort results in the creation of an attractive, safe and
stable community, where many of those who could choose or afford to leave, choose instead to stay, then the
effort warrants “the highest praise.”
[63]
As noted above, in Phase I,
about 50% of the residents who could choose to leave did so.
[64] However, in Phase II, after the successful
completion of Phase I, over 75% of the residents who could choose to leave
opted to stay.[65] In Phase II, all of the residents who opted
to stay still remain at Horner.
Minimizing Displacement. Given
that Horner involved mainly demolition of the development, rather than only
rehabilitation of developments as studied by Vale in Boston, an eighth measure
of success is the minimizing of resident displacement. Since all residents are literally “displaced,”
when a building is torn down, redevelopment efforts should minimize the costs
and burdens of relocation. Important
measures here are the number of residents who are forced to leave the site, the
time period between people having to leave the development and their ability to
move into a new unit, and the extent to which families are able to move into
the remaining units on site in the interim between the demolition of their
building and the construction and occupancy of the new housing. As set forth below, the Horner redevelopment
effort successfully minimized displacement of Horner residents.
IV. The Reasons Why the Horner Redevelopment
Effort Was Successful
As concluded above, the Horner redevelopment has met all the objective criteria that make for a successful public housing redevelopment effort. The question then naturally arises why has the Horner redevelopment achieved the measures of success that it has. I believe Horner’s successful redevelopment effort was due primarily to five reasons: (1) phased demolition, (2) reasonable screening criteria for public housing residents to return to the revitalized development, (3) effective resident participation in the redevelopment process, (4) the existence of enforceable procedures to protect residents’ interests, and (5) social services to and representation of all individual residents.
1. Demolition Was Phased To Minimize Resident
Displacement.
Demolition must be phased in order to minimize displacement of public housing residents. If demolition is not phased, the likely result will be the re-segregation of the displaced residents into other poor, black areas of the community. That is what happened in Chicago. [66] There is no reason to think that it is not happening in other cities undergoing public housing revitalization efforts.
At Horner, CHA phased its demolition. CHA began demolition on two vacant 16-story Horner Extension high-rises, and on three adjacent Horner Extension mid-rises, two of which were sparsely populated. The existing residents were consolidated, first into one of the Horner Extension mid-rises and then into one of the existing Horner Homes mid-rises. The vast majority of Horner residents remained in their units until their replacement housing was constructed and provided to them. In fact, the residents of the occupied Horner Extension high-rises could look out their windows and see the construction of their new units taking place right before their very own eyes. Thus, none of the Horner Homes and Extension high-rise residents who elected on-site or neighborhood replacement housing at Horner during Phase I were forced to leave the Horner development prior to being provided replacement housing. Most of the residents remained in their original units until their new units were ready.
At the Horner Annex, none of the residents had to vacate the building during rehabilitation. By rehabbing the building in phases and moving tenants to another unit in the building while their unit was being rehabbed, all of the Annex residents were allowed to remain in the building during the rehabilitation process.
In Phase II, at the Horner Homes, residents from five of the mid-rise buildings either moved directly into their replacement housing as it was constructed in Phase II.A (West Haven Park) or were consolidated into the two remaining mid-rises, where they currently await construction of their new housing in Phases II.B.1 and II.B.2.
2. Reasonable Screening Criteria
Allowed Residents a Reasonable Opportunity to Move into Replacement Housing.
Eligibility requirements for obtaining the newly constructed units in mixed income communities must allow a reasonable opportunity for residents to actually move into the replacement housing. If demolition has not been phased, if residents have been temporarily displaced, and if eligibility requirements to return are unreasonable, then the majority of Chicago public housing residents will remain re-segregated in the poorest black areas of the south and west sides of Chicago or will become homeless. [67]
Horner families must meet only five basic criteria. [68] Residents are judged only on their behavior on or after April 4, 1995 (the date the Horner consent decree was entered). All the basic eligibility requirements are “prospective,” in the sense that nothing in the family’s pre-1995 criminal history or other past conduct can be used by CHA to prohibit a family from being eligible for a replacement unit. All of the Horner families were made aware at the time the Horner consent decree was entered that they themselves controlled whether they would be eligible for a replacement unit. Having been informed about the prospective nature of the eligibility requirements, each family knew what it had to do or not to do in the future to remain eligible.
As the first replacement housing units started becoming available, the Horner parties agreed to an additional screening process in a Phase I Memorandum of Agreement, which was signed in June 1997. [69] Because Phase II involved tax-credit and other financing, the parties agreed to a Phase II Memorandum of Agreement signed in December 2002. [70] The Horner screening process, together with case-managed social services, results in nearly 90 percent of the Horner families being able to move into the new units.
3. Effective Resident
Participation in the Redevelopment Process Endowed the Residents With a Stake
in the Outcome.
There must be effective resident participation in the decision-making process of the redevelopment effort so that residents will have a stake in the outcome, and the housing authority, the developer, or management must not compromise resident leadership.
In Chicago, resident leadership takes the form of Local Advisory Councils (LACs). LAC members are elected by the development residents in public housing authority tenant elections that are held every three years. Each development is divided into “buildings, blocks or areas.” Residents run for representative positions on the LAC from each such designated place in the development. Residents also elect the President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer of the LAC. Each LAC President is permitted a seat on the citywide Central Advisory Council (CAC). Federal regulations charge the CAC to represent the interests of all the public housing residents. [71]
Many public housing advocates have noted over the years that at most LACs, the resident leadership is closely aligned with CHA, the developer and/or development management. Indeed, at Horner, the Henry Horner Mothers Guild sought to elicit the LAC’s participation in filing their lawsuit but to no avail. This refusal was not surprising—since the LACs were created in 1966, only one LAC had ever sued CHA, the Cabrini-Green LAC, under the activist tenant leadership of Carol Steele, in 1996 and again in 2004. [72] The Henry Horner Mothers Guild and the individual Horner plaintiffs and applicants were left to litigate the lawsuit without the support or participation of the official resident leadership.
However, after four years of litigation, and settlement negotiations taking place, the Horner plaintiffs realized that they would have to reach agreement with the official Horner resident leadership if the case were to be settled, and the settlement successfully implemented and enforced. [73] So, in 1995, the Horner LAC and the Horner plaintiffs agreed to the appointment of a seven-member resident committee called the Horner Residents Committee (HRC), which would consist of seven Horner LAC members. The Horner plaintiffs and the Horner LAC then agreed on “rules and procedures for the operation of the HRC.” [74] Under the amended decree, the CHA, development manager and Horner management have to negotiate and attempt to reach agreement with the HRC on all aspects of the redevelopment effort. If agreement cannot be reached, the parties may present the matter to the Horner court for resolution. As the Horner court subsequently described the process: “An amended decree governs the relationship of the parties in this case and I am charged with refereeing disputes, armed with the contempt power of this court.” [75]
4. Enforceable Procedures to
Protect Residents’ Interests Allowed Resident Issues To Be Resolved Fairly.
There must
be enforceable procedures to protect the residents’ interests when problems
arise. Such problems at Horner included
when delays occurred in construction of replacement housing, when other
stakeholders objected to aspects of the on-going redevelopment process, or when
the developer, the housing authority or the management company failed to follow
agreed-upon rules and procedures.
In the Horner case, the Horner court or the Horner Mediator resolves these types of issues. For example, as noted above, in 1996 when the Gautreaux Receiver had failed to construct the new Phase I units in the time period required by the amended decree, CHA ultimately filed a motion with the Horner court to set a new schedule of construction. The Horner court, in granting the motion, determined that the difficulties of completing the project with the decree’s deadlines and the inability of the Receiver to act within the constraints of the decree constituted unforeseen circumstances. But the court ordered the Gautreaux Receiver to pay liquidated damages ($6 per day per unit to the Horner residents) if further delays occurred. [76]
In 1997, when the Gautreaux plaintiffs (some of whom were also Horner class members) disagreed with Horner class counsel regarding the screening for Horner residents moving into the new Phase I units, the Gautreaux plaintiffs filed a motion for intervention with the Horner court to resolve the “sharply divergent” positions of respective counsel. [77] In August 1997, the Horner court denied the motion, finding in part that the Horner class counsel adequately represented the Gautreaux plaintiffs because they have the same ultimate objective—the revitalization of the Horner development. [78] However, the parties subsequently entered into the Phase I Memorandum Agreement, which gave CHA and Horner management additional authority to screen tenants for Phase I units. [79] The parties also agreed to set up the Horner Security Committee, which meets regularly to discuss and resolve Horner security issues.
As noted above, in 2000, the Horner plaintiffs were encountering difficulties with Horner management when the new, CHA-supported management company consistently failed to follow the provisions of the decree. In 2001, they filed a contempt motion against CHA and Horner management, PM One, seeking to compel compliance with the amended decree. [80]
In 2003 and 2005, the Horner plaintiffs encountered problems with CHA when it refused to provide Horner on-site replacement units to family members to whom CHA had granted a “family-split.” Under the decree, adult family members with children of their own are allowed to “split off’ from the family and obtain their own new unit. CHA insisted that these families were only entitled to a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher. The Horner Mediator resolved the issue in favor of the Horner plaintiffs, ruling that the split families could receive new housing in West Haven Park rather than being forced out of Horner with a Section 8 voucher as CHA was insisting. [81]
5. Social Services to and Representation of All Individual Residents Helped Residents Transition into and Remain in Revitalized Public Housing.
Each individual public housing resident must be assisted by competent social service providers, and an ombudsman or other representative, including legal representation when necessary. These services help residents maintain residency, resolve issues relating to the residents’ current housing, assist the residents in meeting the eligibility for replacement housing, and deal with issues arising after moving into the replacement housing. The most important of these issues involve adapting to life in mixed-income communities.
Under the Horner screening criteria, the Horner parties contemplated that each Horner Phase I family would be provided a “family needs assessment” by a social services organization prior to moving into the new units. [82] But Phase I Horner families moved without the benefit of a family needs assessment because CHA failed to contract for such services. However, all of the Phase II Horner families received case-managed social services by TASC prior to and after moving into the new units. These services include the conducting of a complete “family needs assessment” in the family’s apartment. TASC then provides pre- and post- move social service counseling and referrals to ready the family for the move to mixed-income housing and to deal with issues that will arise after they move. In addition, many Horner residents utilize the services of HVP to assist them in resolving issues. The Phase II results have promoted stable housing: 77 of the 78 Phase II families from the Horner Homes mid-rises who moved into West Haven Park from December 2003-June 2004 are still residing in their units. [83]
Regarding representation of individual residents, Horner counsel, with the assistance of Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) and Horner Service Connector, the Home Visitors Program (HVP), represents all of the individual Horner residents in their disputes with CHA, the developer and Horner management. [84] In addition, Horner counsel meets regularly with Horner management in one-on-one sessions where Horner counsel is permitted to follow-up on existing matters and to resolve emerging ones. Horner counsel works closely with TASC and HVP in resolving many different kinds of individual disputes relating to the resident’s moving into and remaining in the new units.[85]
V.
How the CHA’s Redevelopment Efforts Minimize the Protection of
Residents’ Interests
The Horner redevelopment effort affects several hundred Chicago public housing residents. On the other hand, CHA’s ongoing redevelopment efforts affect several thousands of Chicago public housing residents. Therefore, it is a fair question to inquire how these residents are faring compared to those at Horner. The objective answer is that they are not faring nearly as well.
No Phased Demolition. Although CHA had been considering massive demolition of its inventory of housing since 1995, CHA finally reached agreement with HUD and the tenants’ Central Advisory Council in 2000 on a redevelopment plan, the Plan for Transformation. [86] CHA is now in its seventh year of its 10-year redevelopment plan, funded in large significant part by the federal HOPE VI program. Under the Plan, CHA will demolish its entire inventory of high-rise and mid-rise housing, and in some cases, low-rise housing (about 22,000 units). CHA will then rebuild or rehabilitate 25,000 very low-income public housing units over a 10-year period (2000-2009). Approximately 6,200 units will be constructed in mixed-income communities.
Under the Plan for Transformation, CHA did not phase the demolition as was done at Horner. Rather, wrecking balls swung and bulldozers rolled from one end of CHA developments to the other, forcing residents to move temporarily to other units in the development. [87] Eventually, many had to move out with a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher, or to other, unrehabilitated public housing developments.
As of September 2005, demolition had far outpaced new construction and rehabilitation. [88] Due to the massive demolition and lack of newly constructed or rehabilitated housing, as many as 4,851 CHA families, who are members of the Gautreaux plaintiff class, were forced to relocate involuntarily from their public housing units with Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers. [89] Between 1995 and 2005, they moved into the private market. [90]
CHA had entered into a Relocation Rights Contract with the residents that promised to help displaced families move into neighborhoods more racially and economically integrated than those from where they were displaced. The CHA’s relocation process produced the opposite result. CHA residents were relocated by CHA into neighborhoods that were just as racially segregated, and nearly as poor as the communities from where they were forced to move. [91]
In order to remedy this situation, the Shriver Center and the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law litigated the Wallace v. CHA case, which was filed in January 2003 and settled in May 2005.