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Volume 5 >
Issue 1
(Fall 2006)
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Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Identification of Trade Secret Claims in Litigation:
Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute
Charles Tait Graves and Brian D. Range
*
I. Introduction
¶ 1 Trade secret cases pose special problems
distinct from other intellectual property lawsuits because alleged trade
secrets are rarely defined in advance of litigation. For every patent, registered copyright, or
trademark, there is a document filed with the federal government identifying the
details and boundaries of the asserted intellectual property. But in trade secret cases, the plaintiff's
attorneys typically develop the trade secret claims at the same time that they
file a misappropriation suit against a former employee or business partner - or
afterwards.
¶ 2 Trade secret plaintiffs rarely provide a precise
and complete identification of the alleged trade secrets at issue without a
court order requiring them to do so. This
is a strategy, not an accident. The
tactical advantages a plaintiff gains from non-identification are too tempting for
a plaintiff to voluntarily provide such identification. In a typical case, the plaintiff has filed
suit against a recently departed employee who joined or started a competing
business, and then provide little more than a list of high-level, generic
categories in which its alleged secrets are said to reside.
¶ 3 It is also common for a trade secret plaintiff
to alter its list of trade secret claims as the case proceeds - sometimes
dramatically, by replacing entire categories of information or technology, or by
re-combining slippery, multi-element "combination
trade secret" claims into new subsets.
In a 2006 New Jersey case, for example, the plaintiff first identified
four alleged secrets in an initial interrogatory response, then added six,
later added thirty-nine in an expert report, then claimed ninety-two in a
supplemental interrogatory response, and had its expert give what the court
called "moving target" testimony about the alleged secrets.1 We have seen many similar alterations during
the course of cases in several jurisdictions, and defendants sometimes spend
months disproving one set of allegations only to face a new, replacement set as
the close of discovery nears.
¶ 4 Precise identification of the alleged trade
secrets is a crucial component of trade secret litigation. This is especially true when complex
technology is at issue, but also in cases featuring simpler claims. Without a precise identification of software
code elements, hardware architecture components, or even the names of allegedly
secret customers, the defendant cannot compare the claims against public domain
information to challenge the alleged secrecy of such information. It is difficult to conduct a public domain
analysis if the claims are identified at only a generic level such as "source
code," "ASIC design elements," or "customer lists." Stated differently, the parties and the court
cannot accurately decide the question of whether a trade secret exists without
first understanding what precisely is asserted as a secret.
¶ 5 It is not surprising, then, that disputes over
identification of the plaintiff's alleged trade secrets are common. However, it is notable that courts nationwide
have not yet articulated a set of guidelines and standards to assist judges who
must rule on identification questions.
Indeed, courts in various jurisdictions have issued rulings on the same
identification issues with almost opposite results - a majority requiring more
identification, but a minority allowing the plaintiff to proceed with only
general, conclusory descriptions of the alleged trade secrets. The published rulings indicate that courts
subjectively reach their own conclusions, often with little or no reference to
other published decisions. The problem
is further exacerbated because courts rarely, if ever, quote precise
descriptions of potentially valuable trade secrets in publicly available
opinions, and thus most published opinions do not clarify the degree of
specificity required.2 As a result, the scattered case law in this
area does not always serve as precedent, and it is difficult for parties to
predict the result in any given case.
The lack of a uniform set of guidelines invites trade secret plaintiffs
to avoid identifying their alleged secrets in detail, because there is always a
fair chance that the reviewing court will not require them to do so.
¶ 6 Despite the frequency of disputes over the
identification of alleged trade secrets, the issue has received little
scholarly attention.3 Perhaps this is because the case law is
scattered across multiple jurisdictions, in state and federal courts, without
any unifying doctrine apart from citations to a few well-known cases. Most treatises refer to the problem in only
general terms,4 and a handful of
practitioner-oriented articles note particular cases without a nationwide
survey or detailed proposals.5
¶ 7 Given that most of the identification disputes
on record have occurred in the past decade, the time is right for a detailed
analysis of the identification problem.
We believe that courts nationwide facing trade secret disputes should
apply a recognized set of guidelines and standards to resolve disputes over the
identification of alleged trade secrets in litigation. This would reduce unpredictable and
inconsistent rulings, deter plaintiffs from strategically withholding
information by gambling that any given court will not require a precise
identification, and deter defendants from making the wrong demands as to
identification at the wrong stage of the case. We believe that a proper standard would take
into account the type of information being alleged as secret, the stage of the
case, and the defendant's own diligence in raising the issue.
¶ 8 To that end, we have reviewed substantially all
of the trade secret identification rulings available, including unpublished
rulings and slip opinions, in order to paint a picture of how courts are
reacting to similar arguments and disputes across the country. We will describe both outlier and mainstream opinions
to illustrate why a set of common standards is needed.6
¶ 9 Yet merely summarizing holdings does not provide
sufficient information to propose guidelines.
Few courts have attempted to state rules of general applicability beyond
the dispute at issue. Outlining the
policy grounds supporting detailed identification of trade secret claims is
therefore necessary. We will organize
the discussion by the stage of the case, the type of information at issue, and the
skill with which the defense has properly raised the issue. We will also offer solutions that courts can
apply for the specific types of alleged secrets at issue in a given case.
¶ 10 In short, we offer five proposals as a standard
for identification of alleged secrets in litigation:
(1) Courts
should first separate the question of whether the plaintiff has identified an
alleged secret from the question of whether the information is, in fact, a
trade secret;
(2) Courts
should require a reasonably detailed identification of the alleged secrets
before a plaintiff can proceed with discovery - a rule already required by
statute in California, and by common law in several other states;
(3) Perhaps
most importantly, if a defendant properly requests a precise identification
during discovery, the court should require a precise, complete identification
of whatever type of information is at issue - including an identification of
alleged "combination trade secrets";
(4) No
trade secret plaintiff should obtain an injunction or avoid summary judgment
without a precise identification of alleged secrets;
(5) Trade
secret plaintiffs should not be permitted to alter or amend an identification
of trade secret claims without a showing of good cause.
¶ 11 These standards would remove the uncertainty
that prevails in identification disputes.
A trade secret plaintiff with a valid claim would have incentive to
identify the alleged secrets early on, and a defendant who has misappropriated
trade secrets could more easily be shown to have done so. A trade secret plaintiff with a meritless
claim, however, would more easily be exposed.
These standards would make it more difficult to sue former employees for
harassment purposes and to spend them into the ground with protracted
litigation, and more difficult to claim public domain information as trade
secrets.
¶ 12 We believe that these proposals are equally
applicable in jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and
those which follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under both, a plaintiff must establish that
the information at issue does, in fact, constitute trade secrets.7 Requiring identification is a necessary case management
tool to ensure that the parties and the court accurately understand what
information is being asserted as secret in order to proceed to the secrecy
question.8
¶ 13 This Article is primarily for courts ruling on
identification questions, who must research the issue when parties file
pleadings that cite only decisions that favor their positions, and who may need
a single source for all of the nationwide case law. We believe that courts do not always realize
the degree to which the identification of trade secret claims is a lawyers'
game, where one side holds back information and hopes that the opposing party
will fail to raise the issue, or hopes that that a court will accept the
argument that generic references to complex technology are sufficient.
¶ 14 This Article should also be of use to litigants,
both to plaintiffs who have valid claims and seek to identify them in good
faith and to defendants who lack the time or money to canvass the vast
jurisprudence on identification, or who want to craft the best possible
discovery requests to pin down a trade secret plaintiff and force a precise
identification.
¶ 15 In what follows, we will describe the common
mistakes that courts make when ruling on identification disputes, the problems
that arise in the absence of a precise identification of trade secret claims, and how courts nationwide have ruled
on identification disputes. We will then
offer specific proposals for resolving identification questions.
II. The Problem
¶ 16 A trade secret case usually begins shortly after
a former employee has resigned and either joined a competitor or formed a new,
competing business. The plaintiff files
a lawsuit that accuses the defendant of misappropriating trade secrets, but the
complaint contains only generalities about the nature of the alleged secrets. Once the parties have entered into a
protective order that allows the confidential sharing of information between
the parties and their attorneys,9
the plaintiff sometimes issues a written statement that purports to identify
the trade secret claims at issue, and sometimes provides such a statement as a
discovery response. Because the
statement rarely if ever identifies the alleged secrets with precision, a
dispute over the specificity of the identification often arises within the
first three months of the litigation. In
other cases, the identification dispute arises later, when the plaintiff alters
its claims or raises a new set of claims.
¶ 17 In the typical dispute over identification of
alleged trade secrets, the defense argues that the plaintiff's list of
categories and concepts is not specific enough, and then cites a scattering of
cases that may not have been decided at the same stage of the case, that may
not have addressed the same type of information, or that provided no real
guidance on how much precision was required.
The plaintiff, in turn, often responds by arguing that the defendant
already knows what the alleged trade secrets are because the defendant knows
what it stole, and thus no identification is necessary. The plaintiff will typically argue that a
list of high-level concepts is sufficient and make selective citations to cases
so holding, and it may also argue that because it alleges "combination" trade
secrets rather than individual trade secrets, no identification should be
required.10 Also, if the case is at an early stage, the
plaintiff may argue that it cannot yet know every trade secret that was stolen
and therefore cannot identify all trade secrets claims it may assert in the
future.
¶ 18 Assessing an identification dispute can be
difficult given the lack of uniformity in the published cases and the absence
of a set of standards to which courts can look, especially in jurisdictions
where trade secret lawsuits are less common.
A. Twelve Policy Considerations
Relating to Vague Trade Secret Allegations
¶ 19 The best place to begin is to step back from the
facts of the case at issue and outline the policy reasons why requiring a
detailed identification of the trade secret claims makes sense. We believe that there are at least twelve
such considerations. Courts have cited
some of these considerations when requiring identification, and we have come to
recognize the others in the course of litigating scores of trade secret cases.
¶ 20 The first consideration is that the
identification of an alleged trade secret can only come from the plaintiff, because
there is no other pre-existing source one can look to for the details of the
alleged intellectual property. Trade
secrets are not listed claim-by-claim like patents or set forth in their
entirety like registered copyrights or trademarks. There is no public source to which the
defendant can look in order to determine what potential trade secrets the
plaintiff possesses. The plaintiff's
decision on what to claim as its trade secrets in litigation is a subjective
one. Even if a former employee defendant
could guess what trade secret claims the former employer might make, the
specifics of the actual claim could differ from that speculation. On this point, it is important to note that
the plaintiff's identification of its own alleged intellectual property does
not depend on the defendant's documents, because the preliminary question is
whether the plaintiff has a trade secret, which must be answered before
determining whether the defendant used the secret in its products or services.
¶ 21 The second consideration is that requiring an
early and precise identification of alleged trade secrets will encourage
compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and similar state rules governing
frivolous pleadings. Such statutes and
the Uniform Trade Secret Act all require that a trade secret plaintiff make
allegations of misappropriation in good faith - either directly or through
general rules against meritless accusations.11 Any plaintiff's pre-lawsuit review of a
potential trade secret matter should therefore consider whether the basic elements of the tort claim can be met, such as (1)
the existence, in fact, of a trade secret; (2) the plaintiff's use of
reasonable measures to maintain that secrecy; and (3) the defendant's
misappropriation of one or more such secrets.12 A plaintiff cannot adequately investigate
these elements without internally identifying the trade secret claims under
consideration. A vague identification of
alleged trade secrets once the litigation has begun suggests that the plaintiff
did not undertake a pre-lawsuit review.
If parties know that identification will be required early in
litigation, they have greater incentive to do a careful review before filing
suit.
¶ 22 Third, and similarly, a lax identification
standard could allow a party to avoid the statute of limitations. As one court noted on this point:
These facts of cutting edge technological life, to say
nothing of the limitations of language generally, have the effect of giving the
person asserting trade secret claims in these kinds of cases, very wide definitional
latitude, and, with that, considerable power to manipulate the articulation of
claims for tactical purposes, e.g., to escape what might otherwise be a
perfectly sensible application of the statute of limitations.13
¶ 23 The fourth consideration is that an exact
identification is necessary to set the proper bounds and scope of discovery -
the areas in which discovery will be permitted.
Litigating parties often make and sell products outside the scope of the
alleged trade secrets, and requiring a precise identification prevents
burdensome and expensive discovery into irrelevant areas. Also, without a detailed identification, a
plaintiff may later define its alleged secrets by first looking at the
defendant's documents and then crafting claims that match those documents, but
that do not match the plaintiff's own information.
¶ 24 The fifth consideration is that requiring a
detailed identification early in a lawsuit may reduce future disputes over
identification and thereby reduce the length of the discovery process. By contrast, a plaintiff who identifies the
claims only later may cause new rounds of depositions and other discovery as
the parties scramble to assess the newly-provided information. Knowing the claims early allows for a focused
and efficient discovery plan from the start, and thus serves as a useful case
management tool.
¶ 25 The sixth consideration is that without a
precise identification, the defense lacks the information it needs to conduct
public domain research and challenge the alleged secrecy of the information at
issue. Seventh, and for the same
reasons, the reviewing court cannot rule on a secrecy claim with accuracy and
confidence if the exact parameters of the information remain unclear. Without details, who can be sure that the
alleged secret has not been published elsewhere, by a market competitor, an
engineering publication, or in academic work?
¶ 26 The eighth consideration is that requiring a
precise identification prevents a plaintiff from making overbroad secrecy
claims encompassing vast categories of information. Plaintiffs sometimes use the trade secret
claim as a sort of non-competition covenant by listing wide areas of technology
that encompass the former employee's entire set of skills, knowledge, and
experience. Ninth, and on a related
point, a defendant cannot formulate its arguments for differentiating its
technology from the alleged trade secrets at issue without knowing precisely
what those trade secrets are. For
example, a former employee may well have worked in good faith to ensure that
software written for a subsequent employer would not copy or otherwise make use
of the former employer's non-public information, but cannot make that
distinction if the plaintiff asserts only general functionalities common to
that general type of software.
¶ 27 The tenth consideration is that expert reports
from both sides will be more useful and focused if the exact nature of the
alleged secrets is known before they begin their work. Without an exact identification, the
plaintiff's expert may simply declare that broad areas of technology are trade
secrets, without actually conducting specific public domain research that could
support a valid scientific opinion.
Meanwhile, the defense experts may be forced to spend a great deal of
effort researching and opining on wider areas of technology than are at issue,
without being able to focus on the exact technology the plaintiff claims as
intellectual property.
¶ 28 The eleventh consideration is that the trade
secret plaintiff should not be able to unilaterally alter and amend its claims
without judicial review as the lawsuit proceeds. Too many trade secret cases feature a kaleidoscope
of amorphous, frequently-altered claims that prevent the defense from pinning
down and defeating any solid set of claims.
Requiring an early and precise identification of alleged secrets can make
attempts at unsupervised alteration apparent.
By contrast, a broad and non-specific list of
concepts and categories allows a plaintiff to alter the details of the
claims in a manner more likely to escape judicial review.
¶ 29 Finally, and perhaps most broadly, requiring a
detailed identification protects employees' interests in moving to the jobs of
their choice and using public domain information, as they have a right to
do. When a plaintiff makes vague trade
secret claims against a former employee without narrowly defining the actual
items at issue, it is essentially requesting a court-created non-competition
agreement against the defendant.14 Such claims cut into the former employee's
general right to take non-secret knowledge, skills, and experience from job to
job.15 But when discovery focuses only on detailed
clams susceptible to examination and study, there is less risk that these
important public policy interests will be encroached upon.
¶ 30 At the same time, we do not agree with all of
the policy grounds that courts have given for requiring a detailed
identification of alleged trade secrets.
Some courts and commentators have asserted that identification is needed
to prevent a malicious plaintiff from filing suit for the purpose of getting
into the defendant's own information and taking the defendant's trade secrets.16 While we have learned from experience that
attorneys are willing to assist their clients by altering claims and by not defining
claims, we believe that it is less likely that a law firm would assist a
client's scheme to take information from a competitor by filing a lawsuit
against the competitor and turning over information produced in discovery and
designated as confidential under a protective order. We believe that courts should avoid relying
on this purported basis for requiring an identification, and focus instead on the real problems caused by
non-identification.
B. Mistakes Courts Make When Ruling
on Identification Questions
¶ 31 Reflecting on these policy considerations should
assist courts in making a ruling appropriate to the case at issue, and in
avoiding the mistakes courts sometimes make when deciding identification
questions.
¶ 32 Several such mistakes merit special
attention. To begin with, a tiny
minority of courts have nullified the identification requirement altogether, refusing
to require a trade secret plaintiff to identify the trade secret claims even in
the face of the defendant's discovery requests or controlling law in the
jurisdiction. As one example, a
California trial court sanctioned a trade secret defendant in a 2006 case for
not providing discovery after the plaintiff failed to serve a trade secret
identification statement, and it took an appeal to reverse the sanctions - even
though California has a statute requiring that a trade secret plaintiff provide
a reasonably particular identification of alleged secrets before pursuing
discovery.17 In another case, a Massachusetts court repeatedly rejected the
defendant's efforts to learn the details of the alleged secrets.18
¶ 33 Rulings like these are outliers. But three other mistakes that courts make are
more common, and perhaps less obvious.
One is not recognizing that the identification of the trade secret
claims is a separate issue distinct from whether the information at issue is
secret, because that identification is a necessary preliminary step leading to
the secrecy analysis. In such cases,
courts conflate identification questions with the secrecy question, confusing
the discussion.19
¶ 34 The second mistake is assuming that descriptions
of technical categories and concepts such as "source code" or "placement of
capacitors in the schematic for the ABC project" are sufficient to identify
alleged secrets - perhaps because courts do not always recognize how much
public domain information exists in such broadly defined technical
categories. We will describe several
such rulings below.
¶ 35 The third common mistake, and perhaps the worst,
is accepting a plaintiff's argument that because "combination trade secrets"
are claimed, the plaintiff need not make a precise identification of such
alleged secrets. A "combination trade
secret" is a multi-element claim that, when valid, ties non-secret items of
information together in a unique manner to form a trade secret. The concept is dangerous, however, because
trade secret plaintiffs often string together non-secret items that have no
functional interrelationship to avoid a defendant's showing that the individual
items are non-secret. Attorneys also use
the "combination" concept to alter claims, and to create more sets of alleged
intellectual property than the plaintiff ever actually thought about or linked
together. But combination claims can
fail for a number of reasons, just as individual trade secret claims can, and
thus they should not provide a shield against identification.20
¶ 36 Trade secret plaintiffs use the "combination"
argument during identification disputes to confuse courts and escape a precise
identification of the alleged secrets.
If a defendant argues for a precise identification, the plaintiff will
often respond that it claims "combination" secrets in an "entire process"
rather than individual secrets, and that identifying individual elements should
therefore be unnecessary. Or, to the
same effect, the plaintiff argues that its secret is its entire base of
software source code, its entire chip design, and so forth, without regard to
identifying what exactly about those broad categories are asserted as an
allegedly misappropriated secret.
¶ 37 The "combination" concept can create a major
loophole for a plaintiff seeking to avoid identification. Perhaps most dangerous, a plaintiff can use
the "combination" theory to alter and revise its claims in different mixes of
subsets, to gerrymander a claim so that the defense cannot focus its research
efforts on defeating the final version.
If we take, for example, seven software algorithms and assume that five
are in the public domain, the plaintiff might alter the claim several times to
create subsets of the seven where at least one of the included algorithms is
secret, in order to claim the non-secret algorithms as secret as well. With a simple set of seven, there is a
multiplicity of mathematically possible variations of subsets of two or more
elements. Of course, the algorithms may
not in reality interoperate together, and perhaps should properly be defined as
individual trade secret claims rather than "combination" claims. But without requiring a precise
identification of the "combination" trade secret at issue, the defense may be
unable to raise that argument. Courts
need to be aware of this common litigation tactic and nail down exactly what
permutations and subsets are actually claimed as secret.
¶ 38 But all too often, courts have confused the
question of (1) whether the plaintiff claims "combination" secrets instead of
individual secrets with (2) whether the plaintiff should be required to
precisely identify its alleged trade secrets regardless of whether they are
claimed in combinations or individually.
¶ 39 There are several published rulings where courts
have failed to require a precise identification of the alleged secrets as a
result of conflating these two issues.21 In one, a plaintiff vaguely claimed secrets
somewhere within 500 pages of materials, and the defendant argued on appeal
after a jury verdict that the plaintiff did not specify what the secrets
were. The court merely noted that a
plaintiff can have a combination trade secret in material that includes
elements that are individually non-secret, and did not ask whether any such
combination had been properly identified.22 And in one of the most questionable trade
secret rulings on record, a Pennsylvania district court rejected a defendant's
identification argument by holding that the plaintiff's set of generalized
business concepts for running a tanning salon was an "entire methodology" that
added up to form a trade secret, without any specific identification. By avoiding the identification analysis and
stringing together vague business concepts into a combination trade secret, the
decision essentially created a non-competition agreement and held the defendant
liable for violating it.23 Of course, a plaintiff certainly is capable
of properly identifying an alleged combination trade secret.24 Indeed, many courts have required precise identification
of "combination trade secrets." We will
discuss those cases below when proposing solutions.
¶ 40 With these policy considerations and common
mistakes in mind, we will survey the nationwide case law, and then offer specific
proposals for addressing identification disputes.
III. How Courts
Nationwide Have Addressed Identification Disputes
¶ 41 There are several stages of a case where courts
face disputes over the identification of alleged trade secrets: the pleading stage, on a request for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, just before discovery
begins, during discovery, on a motion for summary judgment, during trial, and
after trial.
¶ 42 For the most part, the majority trend is to require
a detailed identification of alleged secrets - particularly on a request for an
injunction, during discovery, and on a motion for summary judgment. Rulings are inconsistent at the pleading
stage, probably because of liberal notice pleading requirements. In turn, rulings after trial often go against
the defendant, likely because the defense waited too long to raise the
identification issue and, more importantly, because courts are loath to
overturn jury verdicts.
A. The Pleading Stage
¶ 43 In some cases, trade secret defendants have
moved to dismiss the complaint, or to obtain a more definite statement, when
the plaintiff is vague regarding the alleged secrets. Some courts have required more information at
the pleading stage,25
though plaintiffs obviously need not disclose material believed to be secret in
a public complaint, and liberal notice pleading standards often mean little is
required.26 As one court explained the general rule, "courts
are in general agreement that trade secrets need not be disclosed in detail in
a complaint alleging misappropriation . . . .
The query is whether the allegations provide the defendant with notice
as to the substance of the claims." 27 In some cases where courts have required more
detail in a complaint, it is unclear whether the amended complaint would be
filed under seal, though it would seem that a confidential or redacted filing
would be appropriate.28
B. Requests for Injunctive Relief
¶ 44 Many trade secret cases begin with a
rushed request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction. At that stage, trade secret
plaintiffs sometimes make only vague references to the alleged secrets, without
providing details. As a result, courts have
repeatedly used the identification requirement as a ground to deny the request.29 Given the courts'
general reluctance to enjoin a defendant's employment or business on an
expedited proceeding without a careful review of the evidence, it is not
surprising that plaintiffs' failures to identify the information at issue
provides a ready reason for a denial.
¶ 45 Of course, some trade
secret plaintiffs do provide a sufficient identification of their claims
when seeking injunctive relief.30 Indeed, one would expect that in egregious
cases - where, say, a former employee downloaded key non-public files the day
before resigning - a plaintiff should easily be able to make a precise
identification of the alleged secrets to support its request.
¶ 46 At least one court has required little
identification on a request for injunctive relief. That court held that "source code" was a
sufficient identification on a request for a preliminary injunction, and
attacked the defendant for considering its own software to be confidential
while also seeking a better identification of the plaintiff's claim.31 The court may have conflated the separate
considerations of whether or not alleged trade secret is truly secret and
whether or not the plaintiff adequately identified the alleged trade secret,
because it did not provide a separate analysis for identification and then
secrecy in sequential order.
¶ 47 An issue related to injunctive relief is whether
the court itself properly identifies the alleged secrets in the order so that
the defendant knows exactly what it is forbidden from using. Some appellate courts have reversed orders
for injunctive relief on this basis. 32 It stands to reason that if a trade secret
plaintiff fails to provide a precise identification of its alleged secrets, a
court will not be able to issue an appropriately specific order against the
defendant.
C. The Pre-Discovery Stage
¶ 48 If a defendant does not challenge the
specificity of the complaint, and if the plaintiff does not seek immediate
injunctive relief, the next phase of the case where identification disputes
arise is the moment when the plaintiff seeks to commence discovery on its trade
secret accusations. Several
jurisdictions have required that trade secret plaintiffs make at least a
"reasonably particular" identification of their alleged secrets as a condition precedent
to seeking discovery from the defendant.
In those jurisdictions, pre-discovery identification disputes are
common.
¶ 49 Courts in several states (or federal courts
applying state law) have required a pre-discovery identification procedure by
common law: Delaware,33
Illinois,34
Massachusetts,35
Minnesota - which requires the most detail36
- and possibly Florida.37 In addition, a federal court in New York has addressed a
defendant's argument that the plaintiff should not be able to start discovery
on the trade secret claim without first making an identification of the alleged
secrets by sending the dispute to a discovery master, but it did not attempt to
craft a rule of general application to other cases. 38
¶ 50 California is the only state to codify a pre-discovery identification rule by statute.39 California's
legislature
enacted what is now Code of Civil Procedure section
2019.210 in 1985 as part of the state's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The impetus for the statute came from a state
bar memorandum to the state legislature proposing the text of the
statute and noting the discovery abuses that trade secret plaintiffs often
engage in when they fail to identify the alleged secrets:
One area not addressed by the Uniform Act is the area of
plaintiff's abuse in initiating trade secret lawsuits for the purpose of
harassing or even driving a competitor out of business by forcing the
competitor to spend large sums in defending unwarranted litigation. For example, when a plaintiff's employee
quits and opens a competing business, a plaintiff often files a lawsuit for
trade secret misappropriation which states that the defendant took and is using
plaintiff's trade secrets, but does not identify the trade secrets. The plaintiff can then embark upon extensive
discovery which the new business is ill equipped to afford. Furthermore, by not informing the defendant
with any degree of specificity as to what the alleged trade secrets are,
defendant may be forced to disclose its own business trade secrets, even though
those matters may be irrelevant, and the defendant may not learn the exact
nature of the supposedly misappropriated trade secrets until the eve of trial.40
¶ 51 Courts and commentators have identified a number of salutary
policy goals California's
statute serves,41 though
again we do not agree with all of them and find their summaries
incomplete. Federal courts in California have applied the statute in trade secret cases
under the Erie Doctrine,42 and courts
elsewhere have also used it in cases under California law. 43
¶ 52 Because so many trade secret cases have arisen in
Silicon Valley, rulings on the degree of specificity required under California's
pre-discovery statute have been common in the federal Northern District of
California.44 One such ruling is worth quoting, to
illustrate how courts applying California
law differ from courts in those jurisdictions which lack a pre-discovery
identification requirement:
¶ 53 The Amended Identification of Trade Secrets
shall be narrowed to include only items that Plaintiff considers are its actual
trade secrets, and only those trade secrets that Plaintiff has reasonable
grounds to allege were misappropriated. . . . If Plaintiff contends that a trade secret
consists of a specific combination of items, it shall so state and concisely
describe the combination. If Plaintiff
contends that its specific use of an otherwise publicly known item constitutes
its secret, it shall so state and concisely describe the use. All trade secrets shall be described in
narrative form, rather than by cross-reference to other trade secrets or
documents. If Plaintiff references a
document as setting forth one or more trade secrets, it shall specify precisely
which portions of the document describe the trade secret(s).45
¶ 54 And in 2005, a California
appellate court for the first time issued a ruling providing guidelines for
what the statute requires. The court
held that while absolute precision is not required at the pre-discovery stage,
enough must be provided to separate alleged secrets from matters known to the
trade:
The letter and spirit of section 2019.210 require the
plaintiff, subject to an appropriate protective order, to identify or designate
the trade secrets at issue with "'sufficient particularity'" to limit the
permissible scope of discovery by distinguishing the trade secrets "'from
matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those
persons . . . skilled in the trade.'" . . .
The degree of "particularity" that is "reasonable" will differ,
depending on the alleged trade secret at issue in each case. Where, as here, the alleged trade secrets at
issue consist of incremental variations on, or advances in the state of the art
in a highly specialized technical field, a more exacting level of particularity
may be required to distinguish the alleged trade secrets from matters already
known to persons skilled in that field.46
¶ 55 It remains somewhat unclear what "reasonable
particularity" means in any given case.
Does it mean that a plaintiff must provide 51 percent of the details
that would be necessary for a completely precise identification of each claim, 67
percent, 75 percent, or more? None of
the jurisdictions that require a pre-discovery identification with "reasonable
particularity" have yet defined exactly what minimum degree of precision a
trade secret plaintiff must aim for.
D. The Discovery Stage
¶ 56 The discovery stage is the heart of where
identification disputes arise, because discovery is the means by which the
defense can demand a complete, precise identification of each alleged
secret. Again, however, the courts have
been inconsistent in the amount of detail they have required - though the skill
with which the defense demands identification no doubt plays a role in the
varying holdings.
¶ 57 Some courts have readily granted defense motions
to compel a detailed identification of the trade secret claims, usually in
response to defense interrogatories.47 In a 2006 Washington case, for example, the defendant
served an identification interrogatory.
In response, the plaintiff "referenced its complaint and then listed
generic categories of trade secrets:
'installer list/network,' 'pricing strategy and policies,' and 'customer
lists.'" It also included the evasive phrase "among other things." The court granted a motion to compel, noting
that "[d]efendants are entitled to discovery related to all of the so-called
'other things' allegedly misappropriated."48
¶ 58 In turn, a 2005 Texas case describes how, on a motion to
compel, a trial court addressed a plaintiff's recitation of generic concepts in
its initial response by flipping those categories back at the plaintiff and
requiring a precise identification regarding each of them:49 There, the court ordered the plaintiff to
"state specifically the identity of each 'functionality,' 'data
field,' 'rule,' reflex,' 'structure,' 'design,' 'architecture,' 'integration of
combination of various components,' 'negative knowledge,' 'method or process
utilized for manipulation information,' 'trigger,' 'calculation code,' 'formula,'
'distribution,' and 'format, content, sequence, total structure and record selection
of various reports,' or other feature, function or element of [plaintiff's]
automobile dealership management system or related written materials that is
the subject of this case that [plaintiff] contend[s] is a trade secret accessed
or misappropriated by [appellees]. Each
trade secret claimed by [plaintiff] shall be separately identified by [it] in
such answers."50
¶ 59 In another case, a court rejected the plaintiff's
initial interrogatory response, which listed a set of generic and conclusory
phrases and made generalized references to a "ratio of ingredients." The court noted that the plaintiff "does not
state how the ratio of ingredients relates to the manufacturing process, nor
does it precisely describe how the manufacturing process varies according to
the factors it has recited." In
requiring a better response, the court held that the plaintiff's "answers
concerning the nature of its alleged trade secrets are evasive, ambiguous, and
incomplete."51
¶ 60 Similarly, a Pennsylvania court in an early case
from 1972 found a trade secret plaintiff's responses to interrogatories seeking
a specific identification of the alleged secrets "wholly evasive and
nonresponsive," and reacted to the plaintiff's recitation of generic categories
by rhetorically asking the plaintiff what within them was alleged to be secret:52 "The answers to #20 can hardly be construed
to enlighten Defendants as to the information allegedly misappropriated. What are the confidential materials? Who are the confidential suppliers of such
materials? What are the confidential
names and addresses of such customers, potential customers, dealers,
distributors and health department officials?"53
¶ 61 Other courts have ruled against the plaintiff
based on issues arising during a deposition,54
or sent the matter to a special master to oversee the identification process.55
¶ 62 But at least two courts have allowed plaintiffs
to respond to interrogatories with more generalized information such as
categories in which the alleged secrets fall.
These appear to be the minority position, and it is not clear from the
rulings how the defense worded its discovery requests.56 At least one court has not ordered more
detail where the defendant's request was badly constructed.57
E. The Summary Judgment Stage
¶ 63 A plaintiff's failure to identify its alleged
secrets during discovery can, and often does, lead to summary judgment. Courts have frequently granted summary
judgment for the defense based on a failure to sufficiently identify the trade
secret claims.58
¶ 64 In one of the most famous such cases,59
the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on a trade secret claim where the
plaintiff asserted secrets in a film projection system. The plaintiff failed to identify the precise
dimensions and tolerances that constituted its alleged secrets in responding to
discovery requests, and the court affirmed the district court and noted that
the lack of identification in a "sophisticated and highly complex projector
system" left the defendant unable to "prepare its rebuttal."60
¶ 65 In another case, the Seventh Circuit used harsh
language against the plaintiff when affirming summary judgment on a
software-based trade secret allegation.61 The plaintiff argued that it had identified
its trade secret claims in a 43-page document, but the court rejected that
attempt:
According to IDX, "a 43-page description of the methods and
processes underlying and the interrelationships among various features making
up IDX's software package" is enough.
No, it isn't. These 43 pages
describe the software; although the document was created for litigation, it
does not separate the trade secrets from the other information that goes into
any software package. Which aspects are
known to the trade, and which are not?
That's vital under the statutory definition. Likewise, IDX's tender of the complete
documentation for the software leaves mysterious exactly which pieces of
information are the trade secrets.62
¶ 66 In another detailed ruling on a software
analysis, a Wisconsin court affirmed a grant of summary judgment on a software
claim by noting the many components that make up a software system, and faulted
the plaintiff for not identifying what about its own CAD software was distinct
from "general knowledge in this niche" of the CAD software industry.63
¶ 67 But some courts, in our view, have gotten it
wrong and allowed a plaintiff to survive summary judgment based on generic and
non-specific sets of claims.64 As an example, a federal court in Illinois denied a
summary judgment motion where a plaintiff pointed to a long list of items which
apparently included such high-level category descriptions as "[a] series resonant
inverter driven by a half-bridge" and "[m]eans for reducing the cathode heating
voltage after lamp ignition." The court
found these non-specific categories to be "quite specific" in denying the
motion.65
¶ 68 In another highly questionable ruling, a federal
court in Connecticut denied a motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff
apparently identified alleged secrets surrounding an executable software
program in seven generic categories such as "'descriptions . . . with regard to
the concept of how the program worked,'" (ellipsis in original) and "'the
program itself.'" The court appears to have
allowed the "combination trade secret" tactic described above, and held that
because combination trade secrets can exist, the plaintiff's "metaphorical 'recipe'"
was a good enough trade secret claim to survive the motion.66
¶ 69 And in some cases, of course, the plaintiff does
provide detail sufficient to defeat the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.67
F. The Pre-Trial, Trial, and
Post-Trial Stages
¶ 70 In some cases, the plaintiff evades
identification until the pre-trial stage, and courts sometimes react strongly
against the plaintiff.68 In other cases, some cases make it all the
way into trial or post-trial proceedings before the identification dispute
comes to a head. In many of these cases,
it appears that the defense failed to raise the issue earlier, and sometimes the
waiver is apparent.69 Some courts have ruled against the plaintiff,70
but in many others, especially those after a final judgment, courts leave the
ruling against the defendant in place.71
¶ 71 It is worth noting that the defendant's failure
to raise the issue until the last minute leads to post-hoc justifications for a
faulty judgment or jury verdict, when a timely argument might have changed the
course of the case.72 Because appellate courts tend to uphold jury
verdicts, untimely argument can lead to questionable holdings. In one case, a plaintiff apparently failed to
identify any specific alleged secrets within its software during a long jury
trial, but the defendant does not appear to have raised the issue until
post-trial motions. The district court
affirmed the jury verdict by resorting to the all-too-familiar "combination
trade secret" evasion, essentially validating the plaintiff's
non-identification.73
IV. Proposals
¶ 72 Having reviewed the policy reasons why
identification of alleged secrets is a crucial question, the mistakes courts
all too often make when ruling on identification disputes, and the nationwide
case law, we are in a position to offer guidelines and standards for ruling on
identification disputes in trade secret litigation.
¶ 73 As a general proposition, we believe that courts
should require trade secret plaintiffs to identify their alleged secrets in
detail as early as possible in the litigation.74 What follows are proposals tied to the stage
of the litigation and the type of information claimed as secret, with general
guidelines appropriate to all identification disputes. We also propose a model interrogatory requesting
a precise identification of the plaintiff's trade secret claims.
A. General Guidelines
¶ 74 Some general considerations are appropriate for
all identification disputes.
-
Separating Identification From the Secrecy Analysis: As described above, courts should always
treat the identification requirement as a separate, threshold question before
reaching the distinct issue of whether the claimed information actually amounts
to a trade secret. Identification is not
so much a fact issue as a drafting issue.
-
Non-Confidential Identification: Courts should be wary of plaintiffs'
purported identifications that list only general, high-level categories or
technical terms. One general rule might
be that if the list of alleged secrets is not marked as a confidential document
or could have been listed verbatim in the complaint without actually disclosing
the plaintiff's alleged trade secrets, the list is prima facie insufficient. No plaintiff making a good faith identification
would disclose its alleged secrets in a non-confidential document.75
-
Incomplete Identification: Another basic consideration is that if an
identification list expressly includes phrases suggesting that it is incomplete
- such as "including," and "among other things" - it should likewise be prima facie
insufficient. Some courts have noted the
problem of such "catch all" phrases when requiring more.76
-
Avoid References to Voluminous Documents: Courts should not allow trade secret
plaintiffs to point to documents in which trade secrets are said to reside as a
substitute for a detailed identification.
Documents such as design specifications may contain far more information
that what is claimed as trade secrets, and reading a complex document may not
inform the reader what precisely is being asserted as secret.77 As an example, the Southern District of New
York once recognized this problem by holding that a mere list of documents was
an insufficient identification. The
court required the plaintiff to identify all trade secrets claims, to list all
documents referring to such claims, and "to key all documents or portions
thereof to specific trade secrets and confidential information alleged to have
been misappropriated" because "[a]t the very least, a defendant is entitled to
know the bases for plaintiff's charges against it."78
-
Requiring Identification of Combination Trade
Secret Claims: We also believe that
courts should require identification of alleged "combination trade secrets,"
and should not confuse the existence of such allegations with whether
identification of particular combinations is necessary. We described above several rulings, mistaken
in our view, where trade secret plaintiffs asserted "combination" secrets and
avoided having to identify them. But many
other courts have correctly held that trade secret plaintiffs must identify "combination
trade secret" claims just as they must identify individual trade secret claims.79 We believe that these decisions reflect the
better reasoning, and should be followed by other courts. One such ruling, an early 1958 decision by a
federal court in
Wisconsin
,
is worth quoting for the court's indignation at the plaintiff's refusal to
identify its combination claims of one hundred unspecified modifications:
Just specify the hundred different machines you
claim, and diagram them. Let's find out
what you claim was a trade secret that was improperly communicated to and used by
the defendant. If there are a hundred,
let's have a hundred, but let's have it specific so when this case comes on for
trial, or if the defendant wants to take further discovery on those matters
they will know what the issues are going to be and the court will know what the
issues are going to be, and we won't come in here with a broad shotgun charge
and be weeks putting in testimony on matters that could be handled in very
short order. I think they are entitled
to have that made very definite.80
-
Keep the Identification Within the Scope of the
Complaint: A final general consideration
applicable at any stage of the case is that a plaintiff should not be permitted
to allege trade secrets outside of the fact pattern pleaded in the
complaint. While this may be rare, we
have seen at least one case where a plaintiff alleged a customer list-type set
of allegations in a complaint against its former salespeople, but then generally
described hardware-based trade secrets in its
California
identification statement. In an unpublished ruling, the court granted
the defendants' motion for an order limiting the scope of the trade secret
claims after the defense raised the basic principle that the alleged secrets
were beyond the claims and defenses at issue in the complaint.81
B. Type of Information
¶ 75 Another important consideration is that the
possibilities for identification differ according to the type of information
being claimed as trade secrets. Some
information can only be identified by naming it, such as customer contact
information. With information in source
code, however, there can be more than one plausible way to provide a precise
identification.
-
Customer
Lists and Business Information
: It
should be clear that in cases involving simpler types of information such as customer
lists, there are no choices other than defining exactly what the alleged secret
is or merely listing generic categories.
When a plaintiff claims trade secrets in customer list information,
pricing or sales information, or business or marketing plans, it should be easy
to tell the defendant exactly what the alleged secrets are - the plaintiff can
simply name the supposedly secret customers, prices, ideas, and the like.82
-
Formulas,
Measurements, and Mathematical Information
:
As complex as chemical formulas, measurements, and math-based calculations
can be, they too can be identified only by stating exactly what the item
is: the numerical measurements or
dimensions, the calculation expressed in mathematical terms, and so on. The same precise and detailed nature that can
make this type of information secret also makes it easy to fully identify.
-
Software
Code
: Identification of trade secret
claims in software code can take many forms.
For example, trade secrets could exist as (1) the functionality of
compiled and executable object code; (2) source code implementing higher level
algorithms that may or may not be secret; (3) information or formulas within
source code; (4) algorithms or architecture; or (5) data structure items.83 At the same time, software can contain non-secret information in those same categories, as well as auto-generated
code, open source material, or basic code mandated by the programming language
or type of program. Identification of
each of these categories is thus worthy of independent consideration.
¶ 76 In the rare case where a trade secret plaintiff
alleges that executable object code was misappropriated, the plaintiff should
name the executable files, and identify what about their functionality is
alleged to be secret.84 Second, where the plaintiff
alleges misappropriation of source code, it should identify the specific lines
of code or programs claimed to be secret by, for example, printing out the code
on paper with numbered lines and identifying the allegedly misappropriated
lines by page and line number, by highlighting, or by color-coding.85 Third, algorithms or formulas existing within
code should be identified with exactitude just like mathematical
information. Fourth, in the case of
algorithms, the plaintiff should identify the precise combination of functions
which comprise the algorithms at issue.
Similarly, the higher-level architecture of the software should be
identified by detailing the combination of the specific algorithms
employed. Fifth, where secret data
structures are alleged, the nature of those structures should be defined with
particularity.86
- Mechanical
Devices: Trade secrets might be
embodied in mechanical devices that include secret parts unknown to the public
or a secret combination of publicly known parts.87 A plaintiff alleging trade secret claims
about a secret part should identify that part in detail. If the plaintiff alleges that the trade
secret is a combination of publicly known parts, the plaintiff should identify
that combination, and the court should limit the plaintiff's ability to modify
the alleged combination.88
- Chemical
Mixtures and Recipes: Mixtures,
whether for something as simple as some food product recipes or the combination
of ingredients in a certain brand of gasoline, should be identified by the
combination of publicly known elements - including the measurements or ratios
for each ingredient.
- Negative
Information: Negative information -
sometimes called "what not to do" - can pose difficulties. One prominent commentator believes that
because the total invention history of a combination-type trade secret can
contain a body of negative knowledge in the sense of many steps not taken and
choices not made, identifying that sum total should not be required.89 We agree in part. It is unlikely that the defendant will be
accused of actually taking and using that whole panoply of negative items, and
thus there is no need to force the plaintiff to draft a complete invention
history. However, where a plaintiff
specifically accuses a defendant of taking and using one or more items of
negative information, we see no policy reason not to require that those items
also be defined in detail.
- Destroyed
Information: Perhaps the hardest
question involves an extreme scenario where a defendant physically destroys
information that was valuable and secret, without leaving any copies behind. We know of no cases on this subject, and have
never seen it in practice. A deserving
plaintiff may have no ability to precisely identify what was destroyed, but a
malicious plaintiff could claim purported value in information that never
really existed, or that was of little actual value. This is an area where courts should have wide
discretion to assess the facts of particular cases. For example, if it were impossible for
plaintiff to identify the destroyed secret, a court could require
identification of the circumstances of the alleged creation, destruction, and
plaintiff's ownership in the information.
C. Stage of the Case
¶ 77 As discussed above, a court's handling of the
identification dispute differs depending on the stage of the case. We believe that the pleading stage is not the
time to consider identification questions, except in cases where the complaint
fails the ordinary rules for indefinite statements.90
¶ 78 However, we believe that when a trade secret
plaintiff requests preliminary injunctive relief that could seriously impact
the defendant - by shutting its business, limiting a person's employment
options, scaring away investors and customers, and the like - courts should
require an identification of the alleged trade secrets at issue with a
substantial degree of detail. There
might be exceptions for highly unusual circumstances - where, hypothetically,
there is concrete evidence that the defendant is planning an imminent foreign
transfer of an immense amount of stolen software code, and there is no time to
provide all the details. Courts are
capable of separating such extreme facts from routine motions against departing
employees who have just started a new company.
¶ 79 Most important, we believe that courts in
jurisdictions that have not yet enacted a pre-discovery identification
requirement for trade secret cases should do so, both as a valuable case
management process and to encourage pre-lawsuit investigations. In addition to the trade secret pre-discovery
cases described above, the approach several federal courts have taken in patent
cases provides a useful analogy. Federal
district courts in California, Georgia, Pennsylvania,
and Texas
have enacted special local rules for patent cases that require a more specific
identification of the patent claims than already exist in the published
patent. Specifically, these districts
require patentees to explain with precision at a very early stage exactly what
patent claims are being asserted and why the allegedly infringing product or
process satisfies each element of the asserted patent claims.91 As one court explained, the patent local
rules were adopted to "place the parties on an orderly pretrial track,"
"require the plaintiff to carefully prepare for the filing of a patent suit,"
and "require parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in the
litigation and to adhere to these theories once they have been disclosed."92
¶ 80 The benefit of identification in the trade
secret context is even greater. In a
patent case, the court and the defendant have notice of the patent's claims and
have a description of the invention from the published patent itself. The local rules described above go a step
further by removing any mystery about what particular claims the plaintiff will
assert and how the plaintiff intends to argue that those claims cover an
accused product or process. In a trade
secret case, and absent an identification requirement, the court and the
defendant cannot know how the plaintiff will allege that trade secrets were
misappropriated, and, even worse, cannot know what the trade secret claims
are. The need for identification in
trade secret cases is thus more critical than in patent cases. Enacting local rules akin to these patent-based
rules would be a worthy goal for trade secret law. In any event, courts can require
pre-discovery identification by common law for case management purposes.
¶ 81 Finally, detailed identification should always
be required by the summary judgment stage, assuming that discovery has taken
place. But where a defendant fails to
raise the identification issue until after trial, it is understandable why so
many courts have refused to reverse on that basis.
D. Defendant's Discovery Request
¶ 82 As discussed above, the defense sometimes
compounds the identification problem by serving badly-phrased discovery
requests or, more importantly, failing to timely raise the issue. By failing to ask for a totally precise
identification, a defendant can allow the plaintiff to get by with generic
concepts and categories, and alter its claims without judicial review.
¶ 83 In one case, for example, the defendant's
interrogatory apparently requested only that plaintiff describe the alleged secrets and documents in which they were
contained. When the plaintiff responded
with a generalized statement pointing to 17 pages and describing a "manufacturing
process" "including" seven general concepts, the defendant moved to
compel. But the court found the
generalized identification sufficient.93 Perhaps if the defendant had served a
better-worded interrogatory demanding precision, the result would have been
different.
¶ 84 Likewise, a defendant in a California
case made a mistake when it tied its identification interrogatory to California's pre-discovery statute - which does not
require absolute precision - instead of asking for complete precision.94 Yet another defendant asked only for the
identification of documents in which the plaintiff's alleged secrets were to be
found, instead of asking for a precise identification of the claims themselves.95 It therefore failed to seek the maximum
degree of detail it could have requested.
Similarly, a failure to press for complete identification in deposition
questioning can allow the plaintiff latitude to alter its claims afterwards.96
¶ 85 We believe that a well-worded interrogatory or other
discovery request should demand a totally precise, complete identification of
each alleged trade secret. A model
interrogatory with an accompanying definition is as follows:
¶ 86 Identify with precision and specificity each and
every alleged trade secret [Plaintiff] contends [Defendant]
misappropriated. "Identify with
precision and specificity each and every alleged trade secret" as used herein
means to provide a specific description of each such alleged trade secret, on
an individual basis for each such alleged trade secret, in such a manner that
the exact identity, scope, boundaries, constitutive elements, and content of
each such alleged trade secret are fully disclosed in writing, including any
asserted combinations, [and with precision above that required by California
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210].
Plaintiff should not rely on any vague or conclusory phrases that do not
separately list and describe each such alleged trade secret.
¶ 87 This model request requires a totally precise
identification of each alleged secret, without dissembling or deliberate
obfuscation. It alerts the reader to
typical evasion practices, and thus educates a court ruling on a motion to
compel about what exactly is sought and what is insufficient. The request also makes clear that more is
sought than what some jurisdictions require at the pre-discovery stage - California law in this
model - though of course the request can be adapted to different jurisdictions.
E. Amendment
¶ 88 The question sometimes arises whether a trade secret
plaintiff can unilaterally amend its identification of trade secret claims as
the case proceeds. One can envision
circumstances where amendment would be proper, such as where a plaintiff learns
that a defendant has misappropriated trade secrets beyond those first believed
to be at issue. But one can also
envision circumstances where the plaintiff drops one set of meritless claims in
order to pursue another, alters claims to avoid summary judgment or to add in
new claims just before trial, or changes definitions of existing claims to
confound the defendant's ability to research the public domain.
¶ 89 A 2004 federal court case applying California law created a
rule that we believe makes sense and should be widely adopted. The court held that because a statement
identifying the plaintiff's alleged trade secrets is akin to a pleading, the
plaintiff would have to show good cause to amend the statement, just as it
would have to do in order to amend its complaint.97 Subjecting amendments and alterations to judicial
review would help prevent the problems we have experienced in many cases where
the alleged secrets change repeatedly as the case proceeds, often as the close
of discovery nears.
¶ 90 Another good practice is to prevent the
plaintiff from amending its identification of alleged secrets in order to avoid
a defendant's pending summary judgment motion.98
The same practice should apply if the
plaintiff claims a "combination trade secret" and tries to alter its
sub-elements in the face of a summary judgment motion.99
While this might be inappropriate where discovery has only just begun and the
motion is filed too early, we believe that courts would promote and invite
litigation abuses if they allowed trade secret plaintiffs to alter the claims
and escape a motion for summary judgment filed after significant discovery has
taken place.
¶ 91 In turn, some courts have refused to allow
amendment and addition of new trade secret claims after discovery closes, and
that too should be a universal rule.100
F. Sanctions
¶ 92 Courts have issued sanctions in several trade
secret cases where plaintiffs failed to identify their alleged secrets despite
defense efforts to obtain more information.101 Others have declined to award sanctions even
where the failure to identify (among other problems) was manifest.102 Rule 11 and similar state rules already
require that a plaintiff understand precisely the alleged secrets that it
accuses the defendant of misappropriating, and there is no reason the plaintiff
should be unable to share this understanding - essential to the plaintiff's
core case—with the defendant. Because
non-identification is a lawyers' tactic used to gain an unfair litigation
advantage, we believe that sanctions should be readily awarded where a trade
secret plaintiff tries to supply as little information as possible and hopes
that the court will not require more.
V. Conclusion
¶ 93 Disputes regarding identification of alleged
trade secrets are common in trade secret litigation around the country. Courts thus far have not articulated a
uniform set of standards and guidelines to address the problem. But such rules are needed, because trade
secret plaintiffs generally refuse to precisely identify their trade secret
claims unless the court forces them to do so.
Our proposals would ensure that the many policy grounds supporting a
precise identification of alleged secrets would be satisfied in any given case.
ENDNOTES
* Charles Tait Graves and Brian D. Range are associates at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati in San Francisco, California
and Austin, Texas.
This article is the fourth in a series that seeks to clarify frequently
litigated but obscure areas of trade secret law, in the interest of protecting
employee mobility and the right to use information in the public domain.
1See, e.g., Civil Action No. 01-4677
(SRC) 2006 WL 1344084, at *1-3 (D.N.J. May 16, 2006) (acknowledging plaintiff's
"moving target" allegations but holding that defense had sufficient opportunity
to take discovery on shifting claims); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Richards
Mfg. Co., No. Civ. 01-4677, 2006 WL 902148, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2006)
(barring some expert testimony).
2See Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., No. Civ. A.
00C-10-149JRS, 2004 WL 1965869, at *6-7 (Del.
Super`. Ct.
Aug. 16, 2004) (redacting alleged trade secrets).
3
The single full-length article we have found devoted to the identification
question is Kevin R. Casey,
Identification
of Trade Secrets During Discovery: Timing and Specificity, 24
AIPLA Q.J. 191, 281 (1996) (summarizing
case law and noting different stages of the case, but apparently recommending
that "precise" detail need not be disclosed until trial; no specific focus on
identification of different types of information). We disagree that identification should be
withheld until trial, for reasons discussed below. The majority of the case law since 1996
supports our position.
4See, e.g.,
Rudolf Callmann, Callmann
on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 14:30 (4th ed. Supp.
2006) (briefly noting issue with citations);
Melvin
A. Jager, Trade Secrets Law §§ 5:32, 9:8 (West 2006) (1985) (general description of some identification
cases);
Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets §§
15.01[1][d][i], 16.01[5][b] (Matthew Bender 2006) (1967) (general summary of
issue and its importance with a few citations);
Robert I. Weil & Ira A. Brown, Jr., California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial § 8:58
(2006) (general description of California's Code Civ. Proc. sec.
2019.210). The most detailed existing
commentary on the identification question is
James
Pooley, Trade Secrets § 11.02
(Supp. 2005). However, we respectfully
disagree with the view expressed there that courts should not always require
precise identification, especially during the discovery stage, because without
precision the plaintiff has too easy an opportunity to continually alter its
claims, and because plaintiffs who file multi-million dollar technology
lawsuits are fully capable of providing such precision. Moreover, we have seen many cases where
highly technical details were located in the public domain, and such research
would have been impossible absent precision.
5See, e.g.,
John F. Hornick & Margaret A. Esquenet, Trade Secret
Identification of Timing in Discovery (2005),
http://www.finnegan.com/publications/news-popup.cfm?id=1248&type=article
(focusing on jurisdictions with pre-discovery requirements); Brent Caslin,
Secret Weapon: Understanding What
Constitutes "Reasonable Particularity" Can Be the Decisive Element in Trade
Secret Litigation,
L.A. Law.,
Apr. 2004, at 44 (noting leading cases and advising defendants about various
motions to file regarding an insufficient identification); York M. Faulkner
& Margeret A Esquenet,
Putting an End
to the Trade Secret Plaintiff's Game of Bait and Switch,
IP Litigator, Sept. 2001, at 24-25
(noting problem and describing a few leading cases); Randy Kay,
Identifying Trade Secrets in Litigation -
Managing the Process, 28
New Matter
1/2, Sept. 2003, 19-22 (noting problem and providing advice for
plaintiffs and defendants); James R. Mckown,
Discovery of Trade Secrets, 10
Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 35, 47 (1994) (noting leading cases
on identification disputes as of 1994 in article about procedural aspects of
disclosing trade secrets in various litigation contexts); David R. Sugden,
C.C.P. Section 2019.210: A Sword, Not a
Shield,
Orange County Law.,
Mar. 2006, at 51-55 (advising defense counsel to take advantage of California's
pre-discovery identification statute and use a plaintiff's failure to identify
to move for summary judgment later in the case).
6 Of
course, rulings on most identification disputes take place on discovery
calendars in trial courts and thus are never published, so a complete
nationwide survey is not possible.
7See, e.g.,
Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)(1) (West 2006) (California Uniform
Trade Secrets Act provision defining trade secrecy);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1979) (Restatement
definition of trade secrecy).
8 We
note, however, that identification may not always matter in jurisdictions where
a former employer can use contract law to bind former employees with
non-competition covenants that bar use of non-secret material for some period
after resignation.
See, e.g., Lason Serv.,
Inc. v. Rathe, No. Civ.A.3:02CV2110-D, 2003 WL 21728184, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
14, 2003) (rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiff failed to identify
allegedly secret customers because non-solicitation covenant barring
solicitation of customers was valid in jurisdiction and it was rrelevant
whether customers were secret or non-secret);
Paper Mfg. Co. v. Weiss, No. 1040, 1972 WL 15994, at *3 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Mar. 13, 1972) (denying motion to require identification of alleged
trade secrets given that plaintiff's claim was premised on restrictive
non-competition contract valid in that jurisdiction, and thus plaintiff need
not prove trade secrets to prevail).
9 A
protective order in a trade secret case usually creates a three-tier
classification for information produced in discovery: material that is designated as
non-confidential, material that is designated such that only the parties can
view it and not the public, and material that only the attorneys and expert
witnesses can view. The parties usually
agree on terms allowing the individuals actually accused of misappropriating
trade secrets to see the list of items they are accused of having stolen. In most cases, employees of the parties
rarely see documents and other information produced by the other party, so
there is little if any risk that one side will misuse information produced by
the other.
10 For a discussion
of courts which have accepted this "combination trade secret" argument, see
infra Section III.A.
11 For
example, California's
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides remedies for bad faith trade
secret claims, and the state also has a general statute governing frivolous
pleadings.
See Cal. Civ. Code §
3426.4 (West 2006);
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(b) (West 2006).
12See,
e.g.,
Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1 (West
2006) (definitions of elements of a trade secret claim).
13
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 634, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(regarding trade secret statute of limitations under California's UTSA).
14 It
should be noted that an employee seeking to act in good faith may have no
affirmative ability to obtain a specific list of potential trade secrets in
order to avoid using them. In
Lane v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 905
S.W.2d 39, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), a former employee sought a declaratory
judgment that would force his former employer to list any trade secrets that it
contended the former employee could not utilize in his new job. The court held the issue was not justiciable
because the former employee had "not invented, and may never invent, anything
that is of concern to Baxter."
Id.
at 42. Thus, the former employee's
attempt to use a declaratory judgment action to determine how he could fairly
compete with his former employer failed.
15 The
concept that former employees are free to use general skills, knowledge, and
experience is well established.
See, e.g.,
Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining
& Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 143-144 (9th Cir. 1965)
("[plaintiff's] former employees cannot be denied the right to use their
general skill, knowledge and experience, even though acquired in part during their
employment by [plaintiff]); Eaton
Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp
., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (N.D.
Ind. 1981) ("the general knowledge and skill obtained by an employee during his
employment belongs to that employee and can be utilized by him after terminating
his employment"),
aff'd, 688
F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1982)
.
16See, e.g., Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980,
985 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (identification "prevents plaintiffs from using the
discovery process as a means to obtain the defendant's
trade secrets."); Data General Corp. v. SCI Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 5662, 1978
WL 22033, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (identification serves to prevent the
plaintiff from going through the defendant's
information to gain "an unfair business advantage.");
Weil & Brown, supra note 4, at § 8:58 (claiming that purpose of California's
identification statute is "to prevent plaintiff from conducting 'fishing
expeditions' into competitors' business files by unfounded claims of trade
secret misappropriation.").
17See Roup v. Super. Ct., No. B188652, L.A.S.C. No. BC328972,
2006 WL 710891, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2006) (unpublished).
18See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-12102-RWZ, 2005 WL 283200, at *1 (D. Mass Feb. 7, 2005)
(referring to unspecified "rules" when refusing again to require detailed
identification: "CHE objects to the Master's denial of yet another attempt to
gain detailed identification of Storage Tech's copyright and trade secret
claims. Much of what the Master
rejected, the court had previously ruled out of order, or Storage Tech had in
the interim supplied. The rules do not
sanction the degree of detail CHE seeks to extract."); Storage Tech. Corp. v.
Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-12102-RWZ, 2003 WL
22462494, at *1 (D. Mass Oct. 30, 2003) (on pre-discovery order in software
case, rejecting defendant's attempt to find out exactly what source code was
claimed as secret: "Defendant proposed that plaintiff provide a detailed list
of the trade secret allegedly misappropriated to which plaintiff objects. This appears to be another request for the
identification of each line of the maintenance source code implicated in these
proceedings. I remain unpersuaded that
defendant is either entitled to discover that level of detail or that such is
necessary to mount an adequate defense.").
19See, e.g., Excelligence Learning Corp. v. Oriental Trading Co., No.
5:03-CV-4947 JF (RS), 2004 WL 2452834, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2004)
(reviewing whether plaintiff's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. sec. 2019.210
identification statement was sufficient and asking whether the information was
secret instead of whether identification was sufficiently specific); Momswin,
L.L.C. v. Lutes, No. Civ.A. 02-2195-KHV, 2003 WL 21554944, at *7 (D. Kan. July
8, 2003) (denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for failure to
establish conclusively that information was secret, but seemingly conflating
identification requirement with secrecy requirement in discussion); Lovell
Farms, Inc. v. Levy, 641 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming denial
of request for temporary restraining order and requiring that plaintiff first
show existence of trade secret; seemingly blending an identification
requirement and proof of secrecy through an in-camera review procedure);
Gabriel Int'l, Inc. v. M&D Indus. of Lou., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 522, 524-25
(W.D. La. 1989) (in confusing ruling, court required that a trade secret plaintiff
prove the existence of a secret early in the lawsuit, apparently before seeking
third party discovery, but in so doing appears to have conflated the need to
identify the alleged secrets with the ultimate proof of secrecy or
non-secrecy).
20 For a
detailed description of "combination trade secret" claims and citations to
numerous cases where such claims have failed, see Tait Graves & Alexander
Macgillivray,
Combination Trade Secrets
and the Logic of Intellectual Property, 20
Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 261 (2004).
21 Courts
sometimes sidestep the identification question by accepting a plaintiff's
argument that its entire process or software was at issue.
See,
e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 662 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusing to overturn jury
verdict despite plaintiff's failure to identify precise secrets, and affirming
on questionable ground that entire object code software was secret without
addressing whether any secrets were identified in the functionality or other
aspects of the executable software; even with finalized object code, we believe
that a plaintiff should identify what about the software is not generally known
to the trade); Touchpoint Solutions,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 345 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28-29 (D. Mass. 2004) (granting
in part plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction despite defendant's
argument that plaintiff had not specifically identified alleged secrets; court
accepted plaintiff's characterization of "source code, implementation, overall
design and 'distributed computing model'" as a design that was "unique,
complex, and apparently valuable" without focusing on whether specific details
had been identified).
22See 3M Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587,
595-96 (7th Cir. 2001).
23See Tan-Line Studios, Inc. v. Bradley,
Civ.A. No. 84-5925, 1986 WL 3764, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1986) (ruling
following bench trial; referring to general definition of a combination trade
secret).
24See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem.
Co., 689 F.2d 424, 432 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff claimed combination trade
secret in chemical process and "did put in evidence detailed descriptions of
the Process," though specificity unclear from published decision).
25See, e.g., Metis Int'l, L.L.C. v. Ace INA Holdings, Inc.,
No.Civ.A.SA.04CA-1033-XR, 2005 WL 1072587, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2005)
(granting Rule 12(e) motion and requiring plaintiff to plead more about the
categories of alleged secrets being claimed); Cambridge Internet Solutions, Inc. v. Avicon Group, No. 99-1841,
1999 WL 959673, at *2 (Mass. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1999) (granting in part motion
for a more definite statement where plaintiff alleged that some alleged secrets
where in specific document, but did not do so for alleged "customer material"
secrets); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 253 (Cal. Ct. App.
1968) (sustaining demurrer to third amended complaint where plaintiff failed to
provide more than highly generalized description of alleged secrets; "the
complainant should describe the subject matter of the trade secret with
sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in
the trade or of special knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the
trade, and to permit the defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within
which the secret lies."); AMP, Inc. v. McCaughey, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 109, 118
(Pa. Ct. Cm. Pl. 1966) ("In requiring a more specific pleading, we are not
indicating that plaintiff must plead trade secret processes, trade secrets, or
the like. However, it is apparent that
plaintiff can provide defendants with at least an identification and nature of
the products, persons, time and places involved, so as to permit them to know
that against which they are to prepare a defense.").
26See, e.g., Automed Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (general references to categories of alleged secrets sufficient to
withstand motion to dismiss, but "plaintiff will ultimately need to identify
which specific designs, software or research defendant allegedly misappropriated.");
Kosower v. Gutowitz, No. 00 Civ. 9011(JGK), 2001 WL 1488440, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2001) (general references to claimed secrets permissible because facts
as alleged must be treated as true; motion to dismiss denied); Labor Ready,
Inc. v. Williams Staffing, L.L.C, 149 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(denying Rule 12(e) motion because general identification of alleged secrets
met notice pleading standards; noting that more would be required at the
summary judgment stage;); Cinebase Software v. Media Guaranty Trust, Inc., No.
C98-1100 FMS, 1998 WL 661465, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1998) (on motion to
dismiss, identification "in general terms" sufficed, but "plaintiff will have
to identify its alleged trade secrets with much greater particularity in order
to prevail on this claim"); Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., No. CIV.A. 00C-10-249JRS,
2002 WL 393056, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Del. Mar. 14, 2002) (dismissing third amended
complaint with prejudice where plaintiff did not provide any detail for
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets, even though complaint filed partially
under seal and plaintiff pointed to attached documents, claiming "whole
process" as secret),
rev'd, 812 A.2d
894, 897 (Del. 2002) (reversing based on liberal pleading standards).
27See Dick Corp. v. SNC-Lavalin Constr
., Inc., No. 04 C 1043, 2004 WL 2967556
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2004) (on motion to dismiss and for a more definite
statement, general reference to "Joint Venture Data" sufficed).
28See Combined Metals of Chi. Ltd. Part.
v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (to prevent
cross-plaintiff from modifying claims later, and to provide fair notice, court
ordered party to identify "specific, concrete secrets" in amended
cross-complaint).
29See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing preliminary injunction in
part where plaintiff failed to "specifically identify" alleged secrets claimed
to reside within a "diagnostic software and operating system"); Litton Sys.,
Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying apparent
federal common law to affirm denial of preliminary injunction where, among
other things, "Litton's Achilles Heel on this record is its insistence on
postponing identification or description of such a broad universe of
thousands of unidentified trade
secrets"); Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970)
(noting that trial court had correctly denied earlier permanent injunction
request because plaintiff had no first "specifically identified and proved" its
alleged secrets); Internet Inc. v. Tensar Polytech., Inc., No. Civ.
05-317RHKAJB, 2005 WL 2453170, at *6 n.8 (D. Minn. Oct. 3, 2005) (denying
request for preliminary injunction when, inter alia, plaintiff did not "identif[y]
specific products that have been successfully modified with the use of
information from Brand, much less with the use of specific information alleged
to be Internet's trade secrets"); Diamond
Power Int'l, Inc. v. Clyde Bergemann, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1346 (N.D.
Ga. 2005) (denying motion for preliminary injunction when plaintiff claimed
secrets in dry hub carriage for sootblower cleaning system but could not
identify specific items claimed as trade secrets); Hypred S.A. v. Pochard, No.
Civ.04-2773(JNE/JGL), 2004 WL 1386149, at * 5 (D. Minn. June 18, 2004)
(rejecting trade secret portion of requested preliminary injunction because
plaintiff failed to identify specific alleged secrets and claimed only generic
categories of "product formation and manufacturing secrets"); Vital State Can.,
Ltd. v. Dreampak, LLC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521-23 (D.N.J. 2003) (denying
preliminary injunction where plaintiff identified "overbroad and vague"
technology categories, and repeatedly "shifted" its attempted identifications);
Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 19, 2003) (rejecting motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff
claimed secrets in "unique combination of functions and capabilities" in
certain software, "customer preferences," product documentation, and source
code; court rejected claims, noting "As for its source code, Compuware has for
whatever reason failed to identify any specific lines of source code that have
been taken by IBM."); Motorola, Inc. v. Dbtel Inc., No. 02 C 3336, 2002 WL
1610982, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2002) (plaintiff offered somewhat
detailed testimony making general claims about several aspects of its
technology, but court found that evidence "confusing, inconsistent, and lacks
specificity;" court was unable to tell what exactly plaintiff wanted to enjoin,
particularly where "many aspects of Motorola's process for creating a cellular
phone involve publicly available equipment and standards," and refused to issue
injunction); FSI Int'l v. Shumway, No. CIV.02-402RHKSRN, 2002 WL 334409, at *9
(D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2002) (same where plaintiff sought temporary restraining
order but offered only generalized categories instead of identifying alleged
secrets); Newleaf Designs, L.L.C v. Bestbins Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1039,
1043-44 (D. Minn. 2001) (same where plaintiff failed to identify several
alleged secrets); Am. Sci. & Eng'g Inc. v.
Kelly, 69 F. Supp. 2d 227, 238 (D. Mass. 1999)
(preliminary injunction denied where plaintiff failed to identify alleged
secrets in collimator device); Visionair, Inc. v. James, 606 S.E.2d 359, 364
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming denial of request for preliminary injunction
where plaintiff "has failed to identify with any specificity the trade secrets
allegedly misappropriated, mentioning only broad product and technology
categories."); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 100 (D. Minn.
1992) (same where plaintiff admitted that its descriptions of alleged disk
drive secrets "do not purport to define precisely the boundaries of each trade
secret."); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., Civil Action No. 81-2216-S, 1981 WL 2162
(D. Mass. Dec. 3, 1981) (request denied where plaintiff failed to identify
alleged secrets); Lee Pharms. v. Den-Mart, Inc., 1976 WL 21026 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(somewhat confusing early case where court delayed hearing on requested
preliminary injunction in part because plaintiff had refused to identify
alleged secrets); Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E.2d 449, 453-54
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming denial of motion for preliminary injunction
where plaintiff claimed combination trade secret in chip designs, submitted
documents and schematics, and listed general concepts such as "the overall
design and implementation of Analog's 94xx products"; Court stated "Analog
invites this Court to acknowledge the existence of trade secrets in the
submitted information without bearing the burden of identifying those trade
secrets. We will not read into Analog's
claims specific identification of devices worthy of trade secret protection
when it is Analog's burden to come forward with evidence of such devices.");
Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 2006 WL 551367, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006)
(unpublished) (motion to reconsider denial of preliminary injunction denied
where plaintiff "fails to specifically identify a trade secret" in "processes
and formulations"); Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, 880 A.2d 657, 665-66 (Pa. Ct.
App. 2005) (denying preliminary injunction based on "inevitable
disclosure"-type theory denied, in part because plaintiff failed to identify
allegedly confidential information at issue); Southwest Research Inst. v.
Keraplast Tech., Ltd., 103 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (vacating
temporary restraining order where plaintiff "failed to identify any specific
trade secret that should be protected," and instead broadly claimed that
everything defendant learned from plaintiff was secret).
30See
e.g., Whyte v. Schlage
Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1453 (2002) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently
identified alleged secrets during request for temporary restraining order
though combination of generic categories and "descriptions made pursuant to"
California Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210 and other pleadings;
published opinion did not quote from the latter documents, no doubt to preserve
the claimed secrecy, thus leaving unclear what level of precision was
supplied); Lowell Anderson,
Litigation
Issues,
in Trade Secrets Practice in California §
11.21 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) ("Unfortunately for practitioners seeking guidance on
§2019(d), the court based its ruling in part on information contained in the
plaintiff's §2019(d) statement, which was not disclosed in the published
opinion."). At least two subsequent
federal cases have incorrectly assumed that
Whyte
stood for the proposition that California's
section 2019.210 allows identification by generic categories - though the
subsequent
Advanced Modular Sputtering
case, discussed below, mooted the question by setting forth the California standard.
See, e.g., Pixion, Inc. v. Placeware, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1233,
1242 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Excelligence Learning Corp v. Oriental Trading Co.,
Inc., No. 5:03-CV-4947 JF (RS), 2004 WL 2452834, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 14,
2004).
31See Cisco Sys., Inc v. Huawei Tech., Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555-56 (E.D. Tex. 2003)
(granting preliminary injunction; no sign in published opinion that plaintiff
provided specific identification of alleged software code trade secrets).
32See, e.g., Corning Inc. v. Picvue Elec., Ltd., 365 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004)
(remanding where trial court's preliminary injunction was too vague under FRCP
Rule 65; impossible to tell from order what information was subject of the
injunction); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (two post-judgment inunctions overbroad under Rule 65(d) for failure
to specify exactly what information was barred from use); American Can Co. v.
Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 333 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing preliminary injunction
in part because order was too vague under Rule 65(d); order barred used of
"compositionally similar" inks which could be "attributed principally" to the
plaintiff's trade secrets without identifying precisely what was barred); E.W.
Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1114-15 (8th Cir. 1969)
(setting aside preliminary injunction where order was "excessively broad" under
FRCP 65(d) and listed only high-level technical categories instead of
specifying exactly what information was subject of injunction); Microstrategy,
Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 431 (E.D. Va. 2004) (in
post-trial, permanent injunction following finding of misappropriation,
plaintiff's proposed injunction "too broad" in scope; limiting injunction to
"specific documents identified as trade secrets").
33See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied
Extrusion Tech., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. Del. 1991) (denying discovery
against defendant because plaintiff's statement too high-level); Miles Inc. v.
Cookson Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 12,310, 1992 WL 136381, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 16,
1992) (unpublished) (statement generally outlining alleged secrets insufficient
to take discovery against defendant); Magnox v. Turner, Civ. A. No. 11951, 1991
WL 182450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1991) (unpublished) (same where plaintiff
served discovery without first making identification of alleged secrets with
reasonable particularity); Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 33
(Del. Ch. 1986) (same where plaintiff failed to make required statement with
reasonable particularity); Data Gen.
Corp. v. SCI Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 5662, 1978 WL 22033, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov.
27, 1978) (unpublished) (early case allowing defendant to file papers with
court stating which alleged secrets in plaintiff's identification it was
"unable to comprehend" in order to rule on motion for protective order).
34See Automed Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F.
Supp. 2d 915, 925-26 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Delaware law to hold that plaintiff must
identify alleged secrets with "reasonable particularity" before taking
discovery "so that we can evaluate the relevance of plaintiff's discovery and
address any objections.").
35See L-3 Comm. Corp. v. Reveal Imaging
Tech., Inc., 2004 WL 2915743, at *13 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. Dec.
2, 2004) (holding that plaintiff must specifically identify alleged secrets
before commencing discovery). This
decision is only an unpublished trial court order, however, so the status of
pre-discovery identification remains unclear in Massachusetts.
36See Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake,
Inc., 187 F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Minn. 1999) (where plaintiff described only six
high-level concepts, court held that trade secret plaintiffs must provide an
identification with "the same specificity" required on a motion for preliminary
injunction or at trial; "The orderly disposition of cases involving claims of
misappropriation of trade secrets cannot permit a situation where the details
concerning the claimed trade secrets are not disclosed at an early date in the
litigation.").
37See Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (applying both California pre-discovery statute and
Florida common law to require identification with reasonable particularity in a
case where some discovery had already begun; not entirely clear whether court believed that district courts applying Florida
trade secret law should apply a pre-discovery identification procedure in
future cases).
38See Power Conversion, Inc. v. Saft Am.,
Inc., 1985 WL 1016, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1985) (where both parties accused
one another of misappropriation, matter sent to independent expert to receive
parties' submissions and designate areas for discovery). It should be noted that discovery masters are
subject to confidentiality requirements - often as defined in the parties'
protective order governing the case.
39Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210 (West
2006) ("In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . before commencing discovery relating to the
trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade
secret with reasonable particularity subject to any orders that may be
appropriate under [the UTSA subsection relating to confidentiality orders].").
40 Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc.,
50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting from statute's
legislative history).
41
Policies cited include (1) preventing overbroad trade secret accusations that
improperly include information in the public domain; (2) giving the defendants
fair notice of the exact charges against them before discovery begins; and (3)
preventing plaintiffs from conducting "fishing expeditions" into the files of
business rivals in order to concoct charges against them.
See id.
at 985;
Weil & Brown,
supra note 4, at § 8.60 (describing
purposes of statute);
Milgrim, supra note 4,
at § 16.01[5][b] (noting fair notice aspect of the statute).
42See Computer Econ., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (detailing
purposes of statute and its legislative history).
See
also Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Med., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that using the statute in a manner inconsistent with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding amendments could create an
Erie
problem).
43See, e.g., Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 2002 WL 14361, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2002) (noting that special master had ruled on section
2019.210 issues such that discovery could commence).
44See, e.g., Myrio Corp. v. Minerva Network Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461,
at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 2001) (finding statement insufficient); Sys. Am.,
Inc. v. Softline, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, at *1 (N.D. Cal. October
30, 1996) (finding statement "insufficient" and "extremely broad" where it
outlined "a number of categories of documents"); Cal. Micro Devices Corp. v.
Universal Semiconductor, Inc., 1995 WL 705144, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1995)
(noting that because plaintiff had provided Cal. Civ. Proc. Code sec. 2019.210
statement, defendant had to respond to deposition questions by plaintiff).
45See Myrio Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461, at *1-3.
46See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 835-36 (2005).
47See Dapco Indus., Inc. v. Matec Corp.,
1998 WL 563847, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of
complaint because plaintiff did not respond to identification interrogatory or
court order on motion to compel requiring the same); StonCor Group, Inc. v.
Campton, 2006 WL 314336, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2006) (granting motion to
compel); Excelligence Learning Corp v. Oriental Trading Co., 2004 WL 2452834,
at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2004) (granting motion to compel interrogatory
requesting that plaintiff "identify in detail" alleged secrets where plaintiff
had apparently listed only general categories); Compuware Corp. v. Health Care
Serv. Corp., 2002 WL 485710, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002) (issuing sanctions
where defendant won motion to compel regarding interrogatory requesting
identification of alleged secrets but plaintiff "dragged its feet" in
responding, and merely listed functions of allegedly secret software); Multimedia
Cablevision, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Co-op, Inc., 1996 WL 447815, at *1-2 (D. Kan.
Jul. 30, 1996) (defendant's interrogatory only asked plaintiff to identify the
documents which comprised the basis for
the trade secret claim; nonetheless, court granted motion to compel a better
answer regarding the documents in question and issued sanctions against plaintiff);
Uresil Corp. v. Cook Group, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 168, 174 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(granting motion to compel better interrogatory responses; "[I]t is clear that
Uresil has not identified the components and/or concepts incorporated in the
products Uresil claims Cook misappropriated.
Nor does Uresil identify all information and documents alleged by Uresil
to be confidential and to have been misappropriated by the defendant.");
See also Microwave Research Corp. v.
Sanders Assoc., Inc., 110 F.R.D. 669, 673-75 (D. Mass. 1986) (denying
plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to produce documents where, after
depositions, plaintiff identified only a general list of products in which it
claimed trade secrets; discussion and holding are somewhat unclear).
48See StonCor, 2006 WL 314336, at *1-2.
49See Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v.
Dealer Solutions, L.L.C., 183 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (dicta
discussion of prior case proceedings; holding concerned arbitration issues).
51See Unicure, Inc. v. Thurman, 97 F.R.D.
7, 13-14 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
52See Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 344 F.
Supp. 924, 928 (M.D. Penn. 1972) (granting motion for imposition of sanctions
for failure to answer interrogatories, including designation of facts alleged
by defendants as being established for purposes of litigation).
54See Diversified Tech., Inc. v. Dubin,
156 F.R.D. 132 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (depublished) (issue preclusion sanctions
where plaintiff's refusal to identify alleged secrets included plaintiff's attorney
giving instructions not to answer identification questions during Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition).
55See Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D.
367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (in early case where special master ordered
identification, plaintiff's submission of list of documents in which alleged
secrets were claimed to reside was insufficient).
56See AlliantGroup, LP v. Axiom Custom
Bus. Solutions, Inc., 2006 WL 568363, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (denying motion to
compel regarding interrogatory requesting identification of specific alleged
secrets because plaintiff "has sufficiently identified six categories of
purported trade secret at issue"); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 1994 WL
36874, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying motion to compel where plaintiff attached
further information identifying alleged secrets in its supplemental response
though court did not clearly state whether any precision was supplied and held
only that "IBP has been sufficiently
apprised
of the basis for C&F's trade secret claim.") (emphasis added).
57See Norbrook Labs., Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford
Mfg. Co., 2003 WL 1956214, at *2-4 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (court faulted defendant for
the way it crafted its discovery requests in denying further
identification).
58See VFD Consulting, Inc. v. 21st Serv., 425 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1048-49 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (Minnesota law; plaintiff's "fatal" error of failing to identify
"with any particularity" an alleged secret, referring to "the MedDiag system"
and former employee's "experience and best judgment in the combination of the
research data" for that system); Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-Ducros, 413 F. Supp.
2d 1209, 1222-24 (D. Kan. 2006) (granting summary judgment for defendant where
plaintiff provided no detail at all on allegedly secret technology and
explaining that "Plaintiff has the burden under the KUTSA to define its trade
secrets with the precision and particularity necessary to separate it from the
general skill and knowledge possessed by others"); Mextel, Inc. v. Air-Shields,
Inc., 2005 WL 226112, at *42 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2005) (summary judgment for
defendant on trade secret claim about a "sensor module" where plaintiff failed
to identify what information in documents was allegedly secret); Callaway
Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Am., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215-16 (D.
Del. 2004) (California law; one claim rejected where plaintiff made only
"conclusory allegations" about golf ball technology, referring generally to
information that former employee obtained); Glynn Interactive, Inc. v.
Itelehealth, Inc., 2004 WL 439236, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2004) (summary
judgment for defendant where plaintiff made only exceedingly generic claim that
secrets were in "expertise and information provided" and thus failed to
identify alleged secrets); Nutrition Mgmt. v. Harborside Healthcare Corp., 2004
WL 764809, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2004) (summary judgment for defendant where
fraud and other claims involved a trade secret accusation, but plaintiff did
not identify secret); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 22231544,
at *5-6 (D. Minn. Sep. 25, 2003) (summary judgment for defendant where, among
other things, plaintiff failed to specifically identify alleged secrets in a
network storage appliance); Canter v. West Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1203
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (depublished) (same where, among other things, plaintiff
disobeyed court's order to identify alleged secrets pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code.
sec. 2019.210 by pointing to 21 pages of documents); Utilase, Inc. v.
Williamson, 1999 WL 717969, at *7 (6th Cir. Sep. 10, 1999) (unpublished)
(summary judgment where plaintiff vaguely identified alleged secrets); Lynchval
Sys., Inc. v. Chi. Consulting Actuaries, Inc., 1998 WL 151814, at *5-6 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 27, 1998) (summary judgment where plaintiff pointed only to defendant's
technology instead of identifying alleged secrets in its own technology);
Furniture Consultants, Inc. v. Acme Steel Door Corp., 658 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) (total failure to identify alleged secrets); Julie
Research Lab., Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng'g, 810 F. Supp. 513, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same where plaintiff failed to identify an alleged secret
separate from public domain information),
aff'd,
998 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1993); Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler
Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (same where plaintiff failed
to identify any alleged secrets at all).
59See IMAX Corp v. Cinema Tech., Inc., 152
F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting summary judgment to defendant
where plaintiff claimed secrets in film projector but in response to
defendant's interrogatory failed to specific exact trade secret claims "in the
precise numerical dimensions and tolerances with sufficient particularity").
61See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002).
63See ECT Int'l, Inc. v. Zwerlein, 597
N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment based
on plaintiff's failure to identify alleged software secrets in "software file system"
because it did not "describe which of the components" of the software were
allegedly misappropriated).
64 S
ee Twin Vision Corp. v. Bellsouth
Commc'n Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 385135, at *3 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 1998)
(unpublished) (though affirming grant of summary judgment on some claims, the
court found plaintiff's generic identification of "factory access code" to be
specific enough to identify one trade secret claim);
see also McElmurry v. Fergusson, Inc., 2006 WL 572330, at *19
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2006) (denying motion for summary judgment where plaintiff
pointed to "formulas"; unclear whether any further detail was given).
65See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F.
Supp. 664, 673 (N.D. Ill.
1997). It is possible that the defense
failed to explain to the court that the phrases quoted above are not unique in
themselves, and that any trade secret would exist in the specific
implementation details rather than the broader concepts. For example, the asserted but not identified
"means" might be the place where the actual claimed trade secret would
reside. A phrase that may appear complex
to an outsider may be generic to one skilled in the art, but such distinctions
must be drawn for a court reviewing an identification dispute.
66See Dreamcatcher Software Dev., L.L.C.
v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 276, 282-83 (D. Conn. 2004).
67See Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, 2005 WL 2369815, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(denying motion for summary judgment where plaintiff, in opposition papers,
detailed its alleged software secrets by Bates number and file type. The court noted that plaintiff had previously
been vague in interrogatory responses, but "perhaps in part due to the way in
which Defendants framed the question."); Do it Best Corp. v. Passport Software,
Inc., 2005 WL 743083, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2005) (plaintiff came
"dangerously close" to losing on identification issue, but unlike other cases
provided "specific lines of code and specific software features for which it
claims protection."); Luigino's, Inc. v. Peterson, 2002 WL 122389, at *8-9 (D.
Minn. Jan. 28, 2002) (granting and denying in part motion for summary judgment
where plaintiff sufficiently identified some alleged secrets, though degree of
precision was not described, but alleged only general categories and referred
to documents for others); Thermodyne Food Serv. Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 940 F. Supp. 1300, 1304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denying motion for summary
judgment on trade secret claim where, among other things, plaintiff attached an
identification to complaint that "identifies each component" of alleged secrets
and was thus sufficient; presumably the identification was filed under seal);
Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff identified alleged secrets in
appendix to complaint, but no details given about level of specificity); Savor,
Inc. v. FMR Corp., 2004 WL 1965869, at *6-7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 15, 2004)
(noting that "[w]hen the plaintiff claims a 'compilation' trade secret, courts
generally require that the trade secret be identified with even greater
specificity"; plaintiff's identification, redacted from the published opinion,
was sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment on trade secret
element).
68See Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 2002 WL 485710, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002) (where plaintiff refused to provide exact
identification of alleged secrets until "less than two weeks before the close
of discovery, [it] severely prejudiced [defendant's] ability to chart a course
for discovery and its defense in this case."); Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen
Mfg. Co., 164 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D. Wis. 1958) (dismissing case for
plaintiff's failure to obey pre-trial order and identify its alleged secrets;
"Nor should defendants have to wait until plaintiff puts in its case to see
what it has to defend against.").
69See Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum
& Transp. Corp., 388 F. Supp. 2d 37, 65 n.19 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (on
post-judgment motions, jury misappropriation verdict affirmed and by not
previously objecting, defendant waived argument that verdict form did not
specifically identify alleged secrets).
70See
Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1266-68 (7th
Cir. 1992) (reversing judgment based on jury verdict where plaintiff failed to
specifically identify alleged secrets; noting that specificity was especially
important given that defendant held a patent in the technology at issue); AMP
Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming judgment
for defendant where, among other things, plaintiff "consistently failed
throughout this litigation to identify any particularized trade secrets
actually at risk. Prior to trial, AMP submitted
six single-spaced, typewritten pages listing by general item and category
hundreds of pieces of AMP internal information.
Other courts have warned plaintiffs of the risks they run by failing to
identify specific trade secrets and instead producing long lists of general
areas of information which contain unidentified trade secrets."),
superceded by statute, 765 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 1065 (1988),
as recognized in PepsiCo,
Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.2d 1262, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1995); SL Montevideo Tech., Inc. v. Eaton Aerospace, L.L.C, No. 03-3302, 2006
WL 1472860, at *3 (D. Minn. May 26, 2006) (judgment as a matter of law where
plaintiff claimed combination trade secret in motor design failed to
specifically identify alleged secrets and instead gave only high-level descriptions;
court noted that plaintiff "has not identified the 'guts' of the Montevideo
motor or how the specific component parts of the Montevideo motor are combined
in the 'guts' to constitute a trade secret when taken as a whole."); MBL
(USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 426-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (early case
affirming ruling on motion
in limine
that plaintiff must identify alleged secrets before questioning defendant's
witnesses about defendant's technologies); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled
Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897-98 (Minn. 1983) (in early case on appeal
after trial, court affirmed misappropriation holding for one alleged secret,
but reversed on claimed secrets in brushless motor where no dimensions or
tolerances were identified; to the reader, however, neither alleged secrets
appears to have been identified in detail).
71See Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d
1112, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (losing defendant argued on appeal that plaintiff
failed to prove specific secrets; to the extent this was an identification
argument (which is not entirely clear), court held that plaintiff had proved
specific secrets, but no discussion of how much detail the plaintiff actually
provided in the trial court); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d
655, 662 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusing to overturn jury verdict despite plaintiff's
failure to identify precise secrets, and affirming on questionable ground that
entire object code software was secret without questioning whether any
particular secrets were identified in such code); Static Control Components,
Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 465, 476-77 (M.D.N.C. 2002)
(on post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, court held that
plaintiff's corporate deposition witness failed to identify alleged secrets,
and identification was still an open issue about "one week before trial," but
refusing to grant new trial because of general misconduct by both sides);
Smithkline Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck &
Co., 766 A.2d 442, 447-48 (Del. 2000) (affirming trial judgment for plaintiff
despite defendant's argument that plaintiff had, early on, given only a broad
identification, because a more precise identification was given "following
discovery").
72See 3M Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587,
595-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing to overturn jury verdict; allowing judgment
against defendant based on vague claims that secrets existed somewhere in 500
pages of documents; it is unclear if defendant ever raised identification issue
before appeal); Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1057 (9th
Cir. 1982) (in early case still cited by trade secret plaintiffs seeking to
avoid identification, appellate court rejected identification argument in
cursory language following trial court judgment and jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff; court's reasoning was apparently that because defendant obtained
materials in which plaintiff claimed secrets, identification of precise secrets
was unnecessary); Forscan Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 389, 391-92
(Tex. App. 1990) (rejecting defendant's post-trial argument that plaintiff went
beyond alleged secrets previously identified in interrogatory response;
defendant waited too long to object);.
73See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumann Sys.
Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1993) (plaintiff gave
testimony at trial about its alleged software secrets, but apparently did not
actually define them with precision).
74 To this
end, courts should assist the parties by expediting review of protective orders
that allow the plaintiff to identify the alleged secrets in a confidential
manner, and by permitting identifications of trade secret claims to be filed
under seal when it is necessary to refer to such information in a pleading
before the court. These practices are
routine in jurisdictions where trade secret litigation is common, but other
courts are not as familiar with them.
75 For a
useful article providing advice for a plaintiff seeking to identify alleged
secrets in good faith, see Victoria A. Cundiff,
How to Identify Your Trade Secrets in Litigation, 574 PLI/Pat 557
(1999).
76See StonCor Group, Inc. v. Campton, No.
C05-1225J1R, 2006 WL 314336, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2006) (granting motion to compel;
plaintiff used phrase "among other things"); Systems Am., Inc. v. Softline,
Inc., No. C96-20730 RMW PVT n1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 1996) (finding plaintiff's Cal. Civ. Proc. § 2019.210 statement
"insufficient" in part because it employed a "catch-all" phrase concerning
"relevant business activities"); Struthers Scientific Int'l Corp. v. Gen. Foods
Corp., 51 F.R.D. 149, 154 (D. Del. 1970) (where plaintiff's response to
defendant's identification interrogatory included a "'catch-all' provision"
claiming additional unspecified combination trade secrets, motion to compel
more specific answer granted; "Struthers should be required to specifically
describe what particular combination of components it has in mind, how these
components are combined, and how they operate in a unique combination. This matter cannot be left to pure
speculation and conjecture.").
77 We have
seen a case, for example, where the trade secret plaintiff attempted to
identify its alleged trade secrets by pointing to over one thousand documents
and more than forty million lines of source code. The case settled before any ruling on that
tactic, but we believe that the practice is not uncommon.
78See Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D.
367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
79See Staffbridge, Inc. v. Gary D. Nelson
Assoc., Inc., No. 024912BLS, 2004 WL 1429935, at *4 (Mass. June 11, 2004)
(where plaintiff failed to identify alleged secrets in software product
"literally on the eve of trial," and where plaintiff's expert report seeking to
make such identification was too vague and conclusory, plaintiff ordered to
serve a affidavit "that sets forth with rigorous and focused particularity
what, and only what, the plaintiffs claim to constitute the trade secrets
allegedly misappropriated by either of the defendants" or face summary judgment);
Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 19, 2003) (rejecting motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff
claimed secrets in "unique combination of functions and capabilities" in
certain software, "customer preferences," product documentation, and source
code; court rejected claims, noting "As for its source code, Compuware has for
whatever reason failed to identify any specific lines of source code that have
been taken by IBM."); Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d
691, 699-700 (Minn. 1982) (affirming summary judgment where court was "plagued
with the elasticity of plaintiff's claim. Simply to assert a trade secret
resides in some combination of other known data is not sufficient, as the
combination itself must be delineated with some particularity in establishing
its trade secret status."; rejecting plaintiff's various efforts at cobbling
together an alleged combination trade secret); Struthers Scientific Int'l Corp.
v. Gen. Foods Corp., 51 F.R.D. 149, 154 (D. Del. 1970) (where plaintiff's
response to defendant's identification interrogatory included a "'catch-all'
provision" claiming additional unspecified combination trade secrets, motion to
compel more specific answer granted; "Struthers should be required to
specifically describe what particular combination of components it has in mind,
how these components are combined, and how they operate in a unique
combination. This matter cannot be left
to pure speculation and conjecture."); Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co.,
164 F. Supp. 904, 907, 910 (E.D. Wis. 1958) (rejecting plaintiff's effort to
avoid identifying alleged secrets by asserting "a hundred different
modifications" of technology at issue; dismissing case for failure to identify
on motion to compel compliance with pre-trial order).
80See Package Mach. Co., 164 F. Supp. at
910.
81See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Verplex
Sys., Inc., No. 5:00-CV-20562, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2001) (order granting
defendants' motion for protective order).
82See,
e.g.,
Anderson,
supra note 30, at § 11.23 (noting that
with categories like customer lists, "there is no middle ground between
identifying a customer and not making such an identification").
83 One
court has stated that "a computer program generally 'includes source code,
which is the developer's tool in creating software, object code, and other
technical information, including program architecture, design definitions or
specifications, flow diagrams and flow charts, data structures, data compilations,
formulae and algorithms embodied and used in the software.'" ECT Int'l, Inc. v. Zwerlein, 597 N.W.2d 479,
483 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in part due to failure to
identify trade secrets adequately) (quoting Robert C. Scheinfeld & Gary M.
Butter,
Using Trade Secret Law to Protect
Computer Software, 17
Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 381, 383 (1991) (footnotes omitted)). We find this characterization confusing. Source code is the human readable version of
the instructions the computer will carry out.
A computer program called a "compiler" transforms source code into
executable object code that the computer may read directly. The "other technical information" referenced
in the article could be characterized as either specific formulas embodied by
and readable within a few lines of source code or overall high-level plans for
what the program should accomplish and how it will accomplish it through
certain algorithms and structure.
84 Trade
secret cases about executable software are rare because the final, executable
software product is often the version sold to the public, while the underlying
source code remains secret. Such a case
could arise if, for example, the plaintiff maintains executable object code as
a tool used secretly for internal purposes rather than selling it and then
accuses the defendant of taking it.
Identifying the functionality provided by object code seems necessary to
establish that the object code has economic value and differs from other,
publicly-available executable files.
After all, object code is not source code, and misappropriating an
object code file would not be misappropriation of the source code used to make
that file. A plaintiff could not
accurately identify alleged secrets in object code by describing the source
code used to create it. Indeed, in a
different trade secret litigation context - that of reasonable measures used to
protect the alleged secret, rather than identification of the alleged secret -
courts have consistently held that there is a valid distinction between object
code and source code, and that revealing object code does not disclose alleged
secrets in source code.
See generally Fabkom, Inc. v. R.W. Smith
& Assoc., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 4552 (MBM), 1996 WL 531873, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 1996) (same; software "distributed to its customers only in its
executable object code form. . . . This
means that any person attempted to reveal the programming instructions would
see an incomprehensible sequence of numbers . . . ."); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (plaintiff's "computer
programs are only distributed in object code, which is not intelligible to
human beings."); Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("Only the object code is publicly available; this is the version of the
program that is intended to be read by the computer and cannot be understood
even by expert programmers.") (citing Glenn J. MacGrady,
Protection of Computer Software—an Update and Practical Synthesis,
20
Hous. L. Rev. 1033, 1063
(1983) ("Secrecy will not be destroyed by the wide distribution of computer
programs if they are distributed in object form only.")).Barr-Mullin, Inc. v.
Browning, 424 S.E.2d 226, 229 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (plaintiff used reasonable
measures to protect source code, and sold only object code software made from
that source code to the public). Thus,
identification of alleged secrets provided by object code differs from
identifying trade secret claims in source code, and the two should not be
confused.
85See Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No.
02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2003) (rejecting
motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff claimed secrets in "unique
combination of functions and capabilities" in certain software, "customer
preferences," product documentation, and source code; court denied preliminary
injunction, noting: "As for its source code, Compuware has for whatever reason
failed to identify any specific lines of source code that have been taken by
IBM.").
86
Databases can contain specific content and combinations of content in
fields. A plaintiff may believe that
such data constitutes trade secrets and, if so, that information should be
identified.
87 In the
case of computer hardware, "parts" could include source code - either firmware
or software - integrated with physical hardware.
88See infra Section III(E).
89See Pooley,
supra note 4, at § 11.02 ("[T]he
nature of a secret process, with its underlying platform of accumulated
negative data, is such that it cannot practically be restated in exhaustive
detail.").
90See,
e.g.,
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(f)
(permitting a demurrer to an "ambiguous and unintelligible" pleading);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (permitting a
motion for a more definite statement).
91See N.D. Cal. Patent. L.R. 3-1; N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.1;
W.D. Penn. LPR. 3.2; E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-1.
92See Integrated Circuit Sys., Inc. v.
Realtek Semiconductor Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
93See Norbrook Labs., Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford
Mfg. Co., No. 5:03CV165(HGH/GLS), 2003 WL 1956214, at *2-4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2003).
94See Synapsis, L.L.C v. Evergreen Data
Sys., Inc., No. C 05-1524 JF, 2006 WL 2053512, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2006)
(granting motion to compel where plaintiff refused to respond).
95See Multimedia Cablevision, Inc. v. Cal.
Sec. Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1130-MLB, 1996 WL 447815, at *1-2 (D. Kan. July 30,
1996) (Defendant's interrogatory which only asked plaintiff to identify the
documents which comprised the basis for
the trade secret claim; nonetheless, court granted motion to compel a better
answer regarding the documents in question and issued sanctions against
plaintiff.).
96See Cacique, Inc. v. V&V Supremo
Foods, Inc., No. 03 C 4230, 2004 WL 2222270, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2004)
(denying motion to strike portions of declaration submitted by plaintiff in
opposition to motion for summary judgment; although defendant argued that
declaration added additional trade secret claims not previously identified,
court noted that defendant failed to "ask any follow-up questions" at
deposition regarding area in which alleged secrets were claimed).
97See Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Med.,
Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal.
2004). This rule is intended to prevent
the "shifting sands" problem in intellectual property cases where a plaintiff
changes its claims around as the case proceeds.
See id. (noting the problem to
be "a concern which applies with equal force to trade secret allegations.").
See also
Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34, 51 n.16 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (prior case under California law finding "no error" in fact that
plaintiff amended statement identification statement "several times," but
providing no information as to whether trial court oversaw such amendments).
98See Pixion, Inc. v. Placeware, Inc., 421
F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (although court's incorrect view of
what level of specificity is required under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 2019.210 is clear
under the subsequent California state court ruling in
Advanced Modular Sputtering,
supra
note 40, court refused to allow plaintiff to avoid summary judgment motion
by going beyond identification previously stated to be complete by claiming new
details of functionality as trade secrets; court instead ruled on claims as
previously asserted in identification statement).
99See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114
F.3d 108 (8th Cir. 1997). In
American
Airlines, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
ruling against the trade secret plaintiff, American Airlines. The plaintiff's expert testified that its
combination trade secret consisted of five elements and implementation
algorithms.
Id. at 110. After discovering that the defendant had not
acquired all five elements, the plaintiff attempted, through expert testimony,
to claim that the other four elements constituted a valid combination trade
secret.
Id.
The court, rejected this "sham" definition of the combination trade secret
and upheld the district court's summary judgment based on the original definition
of the combination trade secret that included all five elements of the
plaintiff's system.
Id. at 111-12. The court concluded "After
careful examination of American's expert's testimony we agree with the district
court's conclusion that American attempted to manufacture a material issue of
fact just to evade the impact of summary judgment by inexplicably changing its
testimony. Thus, the district court correctly disregarded the subsequent
manufactured contradictory testimony of American and concluded that no factual
issue for trial existed for the reason that KLM never received any trade secret
of American's.").
100See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest
Flavors Int'l, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 760, 770 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (prohibiting
plaintiff from submitting 36 new trade secret claims after discovery closed;
prior interrogatory response had identified 31
other alleged secrets); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev Indus.,
Inc., No. 84 C 6740, 1992 WL 162241, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 1992)
(excluding allegedly secret drawings raised after discovery closed).
101See Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., No. 01 C 0873, 2002 WL 485710, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002) (the court
issued sanctions where defendant won motion to compel regarding interrogatory
requesting identification of alleged secrets but plaintiff "dragged its feet"
in responding and merely listed functions of allegedly secret software);
Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., No. 98-CV-0312 TW (CGA), 1999 WL
33178020, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1999) (awarding defendant attorneys' fees
for many reasons, including plaintiff's claims of "trade secret protection over
several vague classes of unprotectable information"); Multimedia Cablevision,
Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1130-MLB, 1996 WL 447815, at *1-2 (D.
Kan. July 30, 1996) (sanctions issued against plaintiff where defendant's
motion to compel better interrogatory answer on documents containing alleged
secrets granted); Diversified Tech., Inc. v. Dubin, 156 F.R.D. 132 (S.D. Miss.
1994) (depublished) (issue preclusion sanctions for plaintiff's repeated
refusal to identify alleged secrets; "With trial of this matter set for less
than a week from today, the prejudice to defendants is immeasurable.");
Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Sharp Packaging, Inc., No. 88-C-0656, 1989 WL
223755, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 1989) (fees awarded for meritless request for
preliminary injunction where "[t]he plaintiff's case fails because of its
inability to establish any sort of identifiable trade secret which could lend
itself to an injunctive proceeding."); Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 344 F. Supp.
924, 927 (M.D. Penn. 1972) (awarding discovery sanctions where defendant moved
to compel over inadequate interrogatory responses on identification of alleged
secrets).
102See Clearwater Sys. Corp. v. Evapco, Inc., No.
Civ.A 305CV507SRU, 2006 WL 726684, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2006) (refusing to
award UTSA attorneys' fees despite baseless lawsuit; "Clearwater's ineffective
identification of the trade secrets pursued in this case left much to be
desired and doubtless increased EVAPCO's costs in defending the
litigation. Still, I am not convinced
that Clearwater's
problems with trade secret identification reflect a calculated strategy to gain
an advantage in the litigation or to unfairly compete with EVAPCO.").
| © Copyright 2006 by Northwestern University School of Law, Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual
Property |
Volume 5
Issue 1
(Fall 2006)
|