Northwestern University Law Review : Colloquy : 2009 : Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, Part IISymposium: The Future of Law and Development, Part IIMariana Prado, Susan D. Franck, & John Cioffi Should We Adopt a "What Works" Approach in Law and Development? My comments will be
mostly connected to Tom's third question, relating to the future,[1] and I would like to start by
responding to Salil Mehra.[2]
I generally agree that there is an excessive focus on replicable "tools"
and "best practices" in Law and Development studies, but I think there are a
lot of questions to be asked regarding Mehra's suggestion that the way forward
involves addressing embedded cultural practices and institutions. In fact, there are currently a number of
scholars (myself included) emphasizing the importance of looking at the
interaction between so-called informal institutions (such as cultural practices,
social norms, and historically entrenched attitudes and values). The problem is that although most of these
analyses are very helpful in understanding what went wrong and why the "toolkit"
did not work in a given context, they do not tell us how to improve our efforts
going forward. So, like the "blueprint"
Law and Development scholars, the "context matters" Law and Development
scholars are not helping the field move forward. The problem becomes
even more pressing when we move out of specific legal fields, such as best
practices for antitrust or telecommunications regulators, to something like the
rule of law. There seems to be some palpable
and measurable outcome in the former (for example, we can assess whether the
telecommunications sector is operating with lower rates or greater competition),
but not in the latter. Brian Tamanaha
argues that this explains why rule of law projects continue to receive generous
financial support, despite their poor results:
One could argue that
measuring success in the fields of antitrust and telecommunications regulation
also presents difficulties. As Daniel
Sokol suggests in his contribution to this Symposium, we can always ask if
rates could have gone even lower than they did, or if the benefits of regulatory
reforms could have been better distributed among society.[4] Indeed, such questions make it hard to define
what constitutes success in antitrust and telecommunications regulation. Those issues notwithstanding, in these fields
there does seem to be a threshold line between failures and non-failures. There are outcomes (such as efficiency,
prices, and competition) that allow us to assess whether reforms improved—at least
in some respect—the utility services provision, or if regulation had any impact
on market structures. In other words,
although it might still be hard to define absolute success, it seems easier to
identify a "broken factory" in these sectors than in rule of law reforms. Katharina Pistor tries to tackle the lack-of-measurable-outcomes problem in rule of law reforms by suggesting that we should identify our ends (and reject the idea that rule of law is an end in and of itself) and "begin to disentangle the relation between specific legal reform efforts and [ ] social and economic indicators . . . ."[5] In other words, she suggests a "what works" approach. This seems like a healthy shift of focus, because it allows us to consider alternative legal and institutional arrangements, avoiding the "toolkit" approach. Also, defining our ends seems to be what was missing in the idea that "context and difference matters": by knowing what we are trying to achieve, it will be easier to search for successful examples and change or adapt them to devise similar solutions in other contexts. Recovering a bit of Tamanaha's 1995 optimism, "the end result may be the achievement around the world of successful, indigenous permutations of the rule of law, maintaining its core elements yet altering it to fit local circumstances."[6] There are a number of
issues, however, that need to be considered before we follow this path. First, although the "what works" approach
might open our eyes (and minds) to ingenious solutions developed by insiders
and locals, it can also quickly turn into a race around the world, wherein
legal reformers try to find innovative solutions to replicate elsewhere. The experience of participatory budgeting in
Porto Alegre, Brazil,[7]
seems to be a clear example: when replicated in other Brazilian cities and
throughout Latin America, it did not always work as well as it did originally.[8] This transfer-failure routine will not happen
if we "disentangle the relationship between specific legal reform efforts and [
] social and economic indicators," but until that happens, there could be a
strong temptation to simply replicate successes. Second, the "what
works" approach can create an obsession with social and economic indicators
that might generate the wrong incentives for developing countries. For instance, those who do not want reforms to
happen might manipulate the numbers.
Such practices might become even more pernicious if these indicators
become the measurement used to determine if developing countries should receive
loans, garner support for rule of law reforms, or attract foreign direct
investment. Third, I take
Katharina Pistor[9]
and Daniel Kaufmann's[10]
point about the gap between law in the books and law in reality, but there is a
conceptual question about ends and means here.
How much can we tell our ends and means apart when we are concerned, for
instance, with the issues raised by Katharina Pistor: discrimination and the
status of women in society? Are women's
rights just a means to reach equality, or an end in itself? Can we set up a linear path in which we say
that women's rights is a means and de facto equality is an end, or is it the
case that the concern with de facto equality is embedded in the idea that there
is an effective legal system to protect women's rights when necessary? Sometimes it might not be clear what the end
point looks like. Fourth, the "what
works" approach may create the temptation to adopt shortcuts to achieve
immediate ends or goals, without necessarily considering the broader institutional
implications of these strategies. One
example is investment treaty arbitration (ITA).
As Susan Franck shows, there is a great deal of empirical evidence that
allows for a cautioned optimism about the integrity of ITAs in solving
investment disputes.[11] However, investors may use ITAs because they
want to avoid corrupt judiciaries or do not want to rely on a dysfunctional and
inefficient court system. If this is the
case, then the availability of ITAs will eliminate some of the political pressure
that could mobilize powerful interest groups to press for judicial
reforms. Thus, the goal of solving
disputes and attracting investments needs to be considered within context;
these benefits may bring with them a risk of reduced judicial reform, a reform
that could benefit not only investors, but also the population at large. Finally, if the "what
works" approach becomes predominant among Law and Development institutions,
what is the role that scholars can and should play? On the one hand, they can "engage with the
projects while providing serious scholarly analysis and critique," as John
Ohnesorge suggests, in an attempt to avoid the abovementioned problems.[12]
On the other hand, there is always the risk that "toolkit" people will
misappropriate any scholarly critical work, exacerbating the problems noted
above. A careful analysis disentangling
the relationship between specific legal reform efforts and well-identified
social and economic indicators, for example, can always be misread as
suggesting an empty emphasis on social and economic indicators. The same analysis, focusing on one specific
case of successful legal innovation, can be misused as a suggestion that this
particular experience should be transplanted into other contexts. In sum, "toolkit" people can always convert a
scalpel into an axe. The question, then,
is whether scholars can do anything to prevent such misuse. Investment Treaty Arbitration and Law & Development Tom Ginsburg's initial post raises a series of fascinating
questions about the future of Law and Development. These questions encourage us to think about
the utility of different methodological approaches, basic definitions, and the
implications for institutional change. Investment
treaty arbitration (ITA)—which gives foreign
investors the right to arbitrate directly against a host government for
arguable violations of their substantive investment right—provides a unique opportunity to explore these issues in a
tangible manner. So I beg your
indulgence as I reflect upon a specific application (namely, ITA) to highlight
some of the themes raised by my fellow bloggers. As the legitimacy of ITA becomes a matter of heated debate,
who wins the dispute has become a matter of particular interest. Suggesting that ITA is unfairly tilted toward
the developed world, various countries have withdrawn from World Bank dispute
resolution bodies or are considering the elimination of arbitration.[13] Rather than relying on anecdotal evidence,
supposition, or political rhetoric, it is vital to provide systematic data to
aid stakeholders in the assessment of the ITA process and consider the implications
for international development. Ideally,
a mixed-methods approach that both (1) capitalizes on the strengths of the
individualized, sociological, and qualitative approaches advocated by Katharina
Pistor[14] and John Ohnesorge,[15] and (2) contextualizes specific experiences within the
framework of a larger puzzle offered by broader quantitative research, could
provide particularly useful insights.[16] Given the availability of data from public arbitration
awards, this Essay focuses upon quantitative aspects of a mixed-methods
approach. Previous research has shown that although both investors and governments won investment treaty arbitration cases, the respondent states were more likely than investors to win (57.7% for states as compared with a 38.5% win rate for investors). In cases where there was a violation of the underlying international investment agreement (IIA), tribunals awarded amounts that were smaller than what investors claimed. More particularly, while investors claimed an average of $343 million in damages, the average award was in the order of $10 million. In sum, far more investors lost than won, and when investors did win, they usually received far less than they originally claimed.[17] The open question was whether the outcomes reported were
somehow related to variables such as the parties' or arbitrators' development
background. Finding the answer to this
question raises an issue echoed by John Cioffi, namely that "large-n
quantitative analyses of law related variables . . . [are] deeply problematic" when "these studies lump together highly developed
countries" and developing countries.[18] Given the possible
disparate impact on the developing world, it is critical that research consider
the difference in outcomes between these two groups. If outcome is reliably associated with—let alone causally influenced by—the development background of the respondent state or
presiding arbitrator, serious questions about the integrity of ITA could arise. But even recognizing the difference between developed and developing countries raises a question: what is "development status"? In the context of quantitative research, operationalizing terms properly and establishing measurement validity is one of the thorniest issues. "Development status" can mean different things to different people in different contexts. In order to benefit from standard terms and begin the process of creating more nuanced analysis, my own research started by using pre-existing measures and categories for defining development. In particular, the research considered "development status" in two ways, namely by analyzing categories, including: (1) membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and (2) World Bank classification as a High Income, Upper-Middle Income, Low-Middle Income, or Low Income country.[19] Although this was a relatively straightforward metric for
defining the development status of respondent states, defining the "development
status" of arbitrators was more difficult. Arbitrators' development status might have
been measured in various ways, including pure nationality of origin, country of
residence, country of legal training, number of advanced degrees, membership in
professional organizations, average annual income, or some combination thereof.
For the purposes of this initial,
limited study, development status for arbitrators was defined as a function of
arbitrator nationality, in part because of the historical focus upon arbitrator
nationality and the belief that nationality is a proxy for adjudicative
neutrality.[20] A presiding
arbitrator's status was, therefore, measured by considering the OECD or World
Bank classification of his/her country of origin. Bearing in mind how "development" was operationalized in this research, and recognizing that different constructions may require different methodological approaches and definitions, the newest generation of research considered whether there was a reliable statistical link between development status and ITA outcome.[21] One study considered only the impact of a respondent's development status on outcome. The results of statistical analyses demonstrated that there was no statistically significant relationship between a government's development background and the outcome of ITA.[22] A second study considered the relationship among outcome, the development status of the respondent state, and the development status of the presiding arbitrator's country of origin. The results generally showed that outcome was not reliably associated with the development status of the respondent, the development status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interaction between those two variables. This lack of relationship held true for both: (1) winning or losing investment treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts tribunals awarded against governments.[23] There were, however, two statistically significant simple effects—found in one sub-set of potentially non-representative cases[24]—that suggested tribunals with presiding arbitrators from Middle Income countries awarded different damages in cases against High Income countries. Specifically, if the presiding arbitrator was from a Middle Income country, High Income countries received statistically lower awards than either: (1) Upper-Middle Income respondents, or (2) Low Income respondents. Awards by Middle Income presiding arbitrators for High Income and Lower-Middle Income respondents were statistically equivalent.[25] The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1)
ITA is the equivalent of tossing a two-headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the
developing world is treated unfairly in ITA, and (3) arbitrators from the
developed and developing world decide cases differently. The evidence creates a basis for cautious
optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests radical overhaul, rejection,
or rebalancing of procedural rights in International Investment Agreements
(IIAs) is not necessarily warranted. Although the follow-up tests and limitations
of the data suggest optimism must be tempered properly, a sensible approach
would involve creating targeted solutions to address particularized problems
and enacting targeted reforms to redress perceived concerns about the
international investment regime. In the context of ITA, Salil Mehra's point that the "way
forward for Law and Development [ ] involves embracing and addressing
differences rather than seeking a universal solvent"[26] buttresses this need for individualized solutions. Individualized solutions, in turn, may help
address the concerns raised by Mariana Prado. It suggests that scholars can and should play
a vital role in the Law and Development debate. Part of that role could be encouraging the discourse
to move beyond a dichotomy polarized by "unilateral blueprint" versus "context
matters" models.[27] In the context of
the resolution of international investment disputes, this means encouraging
scholars to: develop methodological insights that operate on multiple levels,
consider different definitions of terms like "development," recognize the
limitations of inferences based upon specific methods and definitions, provide
interpretive guidance about the policy implications, and—in light of those points—develop
theories, subject to the research loop, that respect and reflect the
complexities of variation within the population. Law & Development: Past Performance Is Not Indicative of Future Results I come to the subject
of Law and Development as something of an outsider. My work in law and comparative political
economy focuses on the advanced industrial countries,[28]
where rule of law issues are generally less salient and pressing (at least
until recently). That perspective,
however, has informed my reaction to much of the Law and Development
literature. First, as a conceptual and
methodological matter, I note that the trend towards large-n quantitative
analyses of law-related variables and economic outcomes is deeply problematic;
often, these studies lump together highly developed countries with a
well-established rule of law with those in which the rule of law is as undeveloped
as their economies. Second, much of the
literature builds on questionable but common assumptions about the rule of law,
conceptually rooted in neo-liberalism and its presumptively beneficent relation
to development in general, and certain classes of economic outcomes in
particular. These assumptions elide
critical questions about (1) the arguable necessity of the rule of law, at
least in its neo-liberal guise, to successful economic development, and (2) the
relation of the rule of law to the historically defined social and political
context of legal rules and institutions. As an initial matter,
I regard the relation of law to economic and social development as a matter of
enormous import and one in dire need of sustained thoughtful inquiry. Yet, I also join Anna Gelpern[29]
in avoiding the subject of whether Law and Development is a "field" or not. That question turns on definitional matters,
on what constitutes a field, or a sub-field, or a discipline, etc.—definitions
that are seldom resolved satisfactorily, let alone conclusively. Such debates often provide academics with solid
exercise, but ultimately lend themselves more to professional boundary policing,
ontological combat (or stalemate), and methodological battles without end, rather
than research leading to improved policy proposals. Academic disciplines are littered with these
types of disputes; they are seldom productive or edifying. Perhaps a more useful
way to view Law and Development is from the perspective of why it has been
resurrected, after the dispiriting failures of the original Law and Development
movement of the 1960s, to become such a prominent and a seemingly inevitable
subject of intellectual inquiry and policy activism. This return strikes me as the product of a
particular historical moment. The
renewed emphasis on rule of law and law reform issues in the developing world
reflects the decline of more statist industrial policies, such as import
substitution industrialization policies and state guided (or controlled)
allocation of credit, common to the Japanese-inspired East Asian developmental
model. Statist and corporatist
development strategies were often successful.[30]
However, they were hardly law-centric in
their governance, nor did they use law to convey broad discretionary authority
to public and/or private actors. Statist
strategies, even in successful industrialized countries like France and Japan,
confronted diminishing returns over time. Corruption and rent-seeking on a grand scale,
though varying considerably cross-nationally, helped to discredit statism
further[31]—whether
this discrediting was warranted across the board may now be a moot point. One important casualty of the global economic
crisis may well be export-driven growth models such as those deployed with
notable success in East Asia. The diminution—and
increasing distrust—of state activism, coupled with burgeoning globalization of
trade and finance, left policymakers ever more reliant on markets as primary
allocative mechanisms. And markets
require at least a basic legal infrastructure of rules, enforcement mechanisms,
and functional legal institutions to operate efficiently. To paraphrase Steven Vogel, freer markets
require more rules.[32]
A brutal lesson of the current global
economic crisis is that the increasing complexity and development of a national
economy compels the expansion and maintenance of more complex and
well-administered legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks. Conceptions of the
rule of law rooted in neo-liberalism were poised to fill the vacuum left by
what Susan Strange called "the retreat of the state."[33]
This liberal vision of law and its role
in ordering economic affairs has much to recommend it, but it suffers from at
least two glaring problems. First, the
ideological biases of neo-liberalism toward regulatory minimalism introduce a
tension at the center of the law reform project. Fears of legally-enabled rent-seeking and
efficiency-destroying juridification are at cross-purposes with the need to
develop strong autonomous legal institutions, codes, and standards suitably
tailored to different national settings. Second, and more important, is the neo-liberal
tendency to frame law reform as something of a one-size-fits-all set of
policies that can be imported without regard to extant socio-political
conditions. Establishing the rule of law,
as a means of both constituting and delimiting state power, and as a means of establishing
the ground rules for market-led growth, is intensely politicized and
notoriously difficult. (Indeed, much
political and constitutional theory is devoted in some way to this core problem
of law and politics.) It is also an
inherently case-specific process.[34]
Hence, large-scale comparative studies
may give us some valuable information, but miss the central political economic
dynamics that determine the juridical and material outcomes that concern us. The problem of
determining "what works," as Katharina Pistor has called on us to do,[35]
is complicated by the paucity of reliable data. Even in the United States, where legal and
regulatory issues are politically sensitive and intensively studied, legal
variables are notoriously difficult to measure, as are their effects on
behavior. The problem grows
exponentially worse in less developed countries. Accordingly, studies that are more qualitative
and case-specific are likely to be most useful in informing us about the
relationships between law and economic behavior and the process by which the
rule of law and reasonably efficient legal frameworks can be developed. In this sense, I agree with John Ohnesorge
that detailed sociological investigation is unavoidable.[36]
I would add to this the necessity of
finer-grained institutional analysis that bridges economic and sociological
theoretical approaches. But, of course,
what we gain in vividness and concrete understanding, we lose in generalizability.
I fully recognize how unsatisfying this
conclusion is, but in a domain of scholarly inquiry and policymaking that so
often seems in search of magic bullets (or perhaps magic weapons systems), a
certain degree of disenchantment is inevitable. Finally, "what works"
is subject to substantial doubt and debate, even when substantive issues of
social development (such as women's rights) are left aside and we focus with
hard head and shriveled heart on narrower metrics of economic growth. For example, I speculated above that the
export-led growth model may be a casualty of the current global economic crisis
and the likely long-term reduction in U.S. consumer demand (the global consumer
of last resort for over two decades). Hopefully, the bubble-driven growth model of
the United States and many other developed countries in recent decades will
also take its place on the scrap heap of history. A further victim of the crisis is the
finance-centered vision of the firm and economy. The vast literature on the legal requisites of
financial globalization and its beneficial developmental role is premised on
analytical assumptions regarding the long-term efficiency and optimizing
influence of financial markets. It also
relies on economic data produced by an international financial and economic
order that is collapsing around us. Caveat
emptor, caveat legislator: Past performance is not indicative of
future results. ———— *. Assistant Professor, Faculty of
Law of the University of Toronto. 1. Tom
Ginsburg, The Future of Law and
Development, in Symposium: The Future
of Law and Development, Part I, 104 Nw.
U. L. Rev. Colloquy 164,
165 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/37/LRColl2009n37SympLaw&DevPartI.pdf
(link). 2. Salil
Mehra, The Alchemy of Law and Development, in Symposium: The Future of Law and Development,
Part I, supra note 1,
at 166. 3. Brian
Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and
the Failures of Law and Development 34 (St. John's Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-0172, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1406999
(link). 4. D.
Daniel Sokol, Law and Development: The
Way Forward or Just Stuck in the Same Place?, in Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy (forthcoming 2009). 5. Katharina
Pistor, There Is No Single Field of Law
and Development, in Symposium: The Future of Law and Development,
Part I, supra note 1,
at 168, 169. 6. Brian
Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of
Law-and-Development Studies, 89 Am.
J. Int'l L. 470, 477 (1995) (book review). 7. See Rebecca Abers, From Ideas to Practice: The Partido dos Trabalhadores and Participatory Governance in Brazil, 23 Latin Am. Persp. 35 (Autumn
1996). 8. Benjamin
Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America's
Experience with ParticipatoryBudgeting, in The
World Bank, Participatory Budgeting 91, 101–16 (Anwar Shah ed., 2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf (link).
9. See Pistor, supra note 5,
at 168–69. 10. See Daniel Kaufmann, The Rule of Law Matters, in Symposium:
The Future of Law and Development, 104 Nw.
L. Rev. Colloquy (forthcoming 2009). 11. See Susan D. Franck, Investment Treaty
Arbitration and Law & Development, infra. 12. John
Ohnesorge, "Beijing Consensus" Anyone?, in Symposium: The Future of
Law and Development, 104 Nw. L. Rev.
Colloquy (forthcoming 2009). **. Associate Professor of Law,
Washington & Lee School of Law. 13. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment
Arbitration Awards, 50 Harv. Int'l L.J. 435, 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development] (link). 14. See Pistor, supra note 5,
at 169–70. 15. See Ohnesorge, supra note 12. 16. See Susan D.
Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty
Dispute Resolution, 48 Va. J. Int'l
L. 767 (2008) (link). 17. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C.
L. Rev.
1, 49–50, 57–62 (2007). Figures are in U.S. dollars. 18. John
Cioffi, Law & Development: Past
Performance Is Not Indicative of Future Results, infra. 19. Franck,
Development, supra note 13,
at 455. 20. See Ilhyung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the International
Arbitrator (with Survey Results), 31 Fordham Int'l L.J. 603, 613–14 (2008). 21. See Susan D.
Franck, Considering Recalibration of International Investment Agreements: Empirical
Insights, in The
Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, and Options (José E. Alvarez et al.,
eds., forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Franck, Recalibration]; Franck, Development, supra note 13. 22. Franck, Recalibration, supra note 21. 23. Franck, Development, supra note 13, at 439–40. 24. See id. at 472 (describing the two
awards and outlining reasons why the awards may be non-representative although
they shared a common presiding arbitrator). 25. Id. 26. Mehra, supra note 2,
at 167. 27. See Mariana Prado, Should We Adopt a "What Works" Approach in Law and Development?, supra. ***. Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of California, Riverside. 28. See, e.g., John W. Cioffi, Adversarialism Versus Legalism:
Juridification and Litigation in Corporate Governance Reform, 3 Reg. & Governance 235 (2009); John
W. Cioffi, Revenge of the Law? Securities Litigation Reform and Sarbanes-Oxley's
Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance, in Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of Regulatory Reform 60
(Mark K. Landy et al., eds., 2007); John W. Cioffi, Corporate
Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance
Capitalism in the United States and Germany, 7 German L.J. 533 (2006) (link);
John W. Cioffi, Restructuring "Germany
Inc.": The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the
European Union, 24 Law & Pol'y
355 (2002); John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences,
and Center-Left Politics in Corporate Governance Reform, 34 Pol. & Soc'y 463 (2006). 29. Anna
Gelpern, Law & Development Narrow and
Law & Development Broad, in
Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, Part I, supra note 1,
at 171. 30. See, e.g., The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
Policy (1993); Robert Wade,
Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian
Industrialization (1990). Cf. John
Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of
Industrial Change (1983) (providing a classic account, inter alia, of post-war Japan's statist
and export-driven industrial policy and its articulation with the national
financial system). 31. See, e.g., S.M. Naseem, Rethinking the East Asian Miracle, 30 J. Econ. Stud. 636 (2003); Edward J. Lincoln, Arthritic Japan: The Slow
Pace of Economic Reform (2001). 32. Stephen K. Vogel, Freer Markets,
More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (1996). 33. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the
State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (1996). 34.
See Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, & Lydia Tiede, The
Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 205 (2008). 35.
Pistor, supra note 5,
at 169. See supra note 5
and accompanying text. 36. Ohnesorge, supra note 12. ———— Copyright 2009 Northwestern University Cite as: 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 174 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/38/LRColl2009n38SympLaw&DevPartII.pdf. Persistent URL: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/38 (Comments) |