TOO BIG TO BE ACTIVIST

JOHN MORLEY*

August 1, 2018

ABSTRACT. Big investment management firms, such as Vanguard and Fidelity, have accumulated an astonishing amount of common stock in America’s public companies – so much that they now have enough corporate votes to control huge swaths of American industry. What will they do with all of this power? The answer, this Article suggests, is that they will do much less than we might think.

I focus specifically on the possibility that a large investment manager might start an activist hedge fund. In theory, a large manager could run an activist hedge fund more effectively than a smaller manager, because a large manager could support an activist hedge fund with the vast voting power of the manager’s many mutual funds and other clients. In practice, however, no large asset manager has ever started an activist hedge fund, even as the market for activism by smaller hedge fund managers has been booming.

The explanation for large managers’ passivity is paradoxical: these managers are simply too big to be activists. Their size creates internal conflicts of interest that make activism extremely difficult. The way large investment management firms attain their great size is by simultaneously managing many different investment funds and other business lines at the same time. Blackrock, for instance, simultaneously manages hundreds of different mutual funds, hedge funds and other vehicles. This diffusion of clients divides a manager’s loyalties and potentially pits the clients against each other, creating intense conflicts of interest. And shareholder activism tends to aggravate these conflicts by harming one of a manager’s clients even as it helps others. If one Blackrock fund invests in a company’s debt, for example, and another Blackrock fund invests in the company’s equity, then any attempt by either fund to influence the company’s capitalization will inevitably harm the interests of the other fund. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and other laws also create conflicts by ensuring that if one of a manager’s funds becomes an activist, all of the manager’s other funds will suffer potentially catastrophic legal consequences, even if they are not activists themselves. These conflicts grow more severe as a manager grows larger and as its efforts at activism grow more intense. The effect is that although a large manager can sometimes support the activist efforts of a smaller manager or practice gentle forms of activism on its own, a large manager can almost never control a company directly.

* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. john.morley@yale.edu. I thank Mark Andriola, Aslihan Asil, Eli Jacobs, John Jo, and Alex Resar for excellent research assistance. For helpful conversations and comments, I thank Vince Buccola, Florian Ederer, Marcel Kahan, Roy Katzovicz, Chuck Nathan, Roberta Romano, Dorothy Shapiro, Robert Zack, and workshop participants at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, NYU Institute for Corporate Governance and Finance Corporate Governance Roundtable, UCLA Law School, and the Wharton School Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. **INVESTMENT MANAGERS AND CORPORATE INFLUENCE**........ 7  
   A. *The Investment Management Industry* ........................................ 7  
   B. *The Possibility of Hedge Fund Activism* .................................. 10  
   C. *The Continuum of Manager Size and Intensity of Activism* .......... 13  

II. **LEGAL CONFLICTS** ..................................................... 13  
    A. *Exchange Act Section 13(d)* ............................................... 14  
    B. *Exchange Act Section 16(b)* ............................................... 19  
    C. *Poison Pills* ...................................................................... 22  

III. **PRACTICAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST** ............................... 25  
    A. *Other Business Lines* .......................................................... 25  
    B. *Differing Tastes for Activism* .............................................. 26  
    C. *Differing Strategies for Engagement* ........................................ 27  
    D. *Cost and Profit Allocation* ................................................... 28  
    E. *Political Risk* ..................................................................... 29  

IV. **THE CONTINUUM OF MANAGER SIZE AND INTENSITY OF**  
    **ACTIVISM** ........................................................................ 30  
    A. *Intensity of Activism* ............................................................ 31  
    B. *Size and Complexity* ............................................................. 33  

V. **OTHER THEORIES OF PASSIVITY IN PERSPECTIVE** ............ 36  

VI. **POLICY IMPLICATIONS** ................................................... 39  

VII. **CONCLUSION** .................................................................... 39
INTRODUCTION

The future of American capitalism belongs to a handful of giant investment managers. Registered investment companies like mutual funds collectively hold stocks, bonds and other assets worth $19.2 trillion, enough to give them 31% of the outstanding common stock of America’s public companies. And of this amount, fully 64% – or $12.2 trillion – belongs to just four massive investment management firms: Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street, and Fidelity. Blackrock alone has more than $5 trillion in assets under management, and Vanguard more than $4 trillion. These giants are growing much faster than their smaller competitors. In 2006, the four biggest investment managers held 51% of all assets in mutual funds; by 2015, they held 68%.

Vanguard’s growth has been especially impressive. Between 2006 and 2015, Vanguard took in 8.5 times as many mutual fund assets as all 4,000 other firms in the mutual fund industry combined.

With so much wealth under management, the biggest investment managers have enormous potential to control the companies in which they invest. Vanguard, Blackrock, and State Street hold so many shares in America’s public companies that they each control one of the five largest stakes in at least 23 of the 25 largest U.S. corporations. If we combined the holdings of Vanguard, Blackrock, and State Street, they would collectively be the largest shareholder in 88% of all firms on the S&P 500. Blackrock and Vanguard manage one of the ten largest stakes in 65% of all publicly traded firms, State Street in 35%, and Fidelity in 28.

---

2 Id. at 14.
5 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, The World’s Largest Managers, tbl.4A (Oct. 1, 2007) (indicating that the four biggest managers held $5.7 trillion in 2006); INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 9. See Table 3 (indicating that in 2006, assets in mutual funds totaled $11.2 trillion).
6 Gregg A. Runburg, Table: The World’s Largest Money Managers, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, tbl.4B (Oct. 31, 2016), www.pionline.com/article/20161031/INTERACTIVE/161029928, (indicating that the top four managers held $12.3 trillion in 2015); INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 9 tbl.3 (indicating that all mutual fund managers held $18.1 trillion).
March 2016, Blackrock was the beneficial owner of 5% or more of the stock of 2,632 different companies – more than half of all publicly listed companies in the United States.\(^{11}\) Vanguard controlled 5% or more of 1,855 publicly listed companies and Fidelity, 1,309.\(^{12}\) At least fifteen other investment managers beneficially owned 5% or more of more than 200 companies.\(^{13}\)

The immense power of these big investment managers has inspired equally immense fear – and hope – that they will use their influence to change the way companies do business. Academics in both law and economics have generated a tidal wave of research – much of it in the last two years – contemplating what this consolidation in corporate ownership will mean. What is at stake are both the hopeful possibilities that big managers will improve shareholder oversight of corporate boards,\(^{14}\) and also the darker risks that these managers will launch vast programs of political influence or destroy the delicate balance of power between shareholders and directors.\(^{15}\) Antitrust scholars and economists have written in especially prolific and worrisome terms about “horizontal” or “common” ownership – the possibility that a big investment manager might become a sort of de facto monopolist by gaining control over every company in a given industry.\(^{16}\)

---

\(^{11}\) Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 9, at 14.

\(^{12}\) Id.

\(^{13}\) Id.


What, then, will these big managers actually do with all of their potential power? The answer, I argue, is that they will do much less than we might think. And the reason is paradoxical: the biggest managers are simply too big to be activists. Their great size creates intense conflicts of interest that render aggressive forms of shareholder activism extremely difficult or even impossible.

Large investment managers attain their great size by simultaneously managing money on behalf of many different clients. In a large investment management firm, the clients can number in the hundreds or even thousands and include a wide array of separately incorporated hedge funds, private equity funds and mutual funds, each with a distinct legal existence, a distinct set of owners, and a distinct investment strategy. A manager’s investment in a particular company tends to be spread across each of these various clients, so that even if the aggregate ownership of all of a manager’s clients amounts to 10% of a company’s shares, the shares that make up that ownership might be spread so thinly among so many different clients that no individual client holds more than a sliver of a percent.

Consider, then, the possibility that a big manager such as Blackrock might unite the collective holdings of its many clients toward a program of corporate influence by starting a new hedge fund devoted to shareholder activism. In theory, such a fund would be very effective, because even if the activist hedge fund held only a few billion dollars in assets, it could count on the votes of the many trillions of dollars in assets that belong to Blackrock’s mutual funds and other clients. With such a powerful source of support, a Blackrock activist hedge fund could become a corporate governance juggernaut.

To date, however, no large investment manager has ever started an activist hedge fund. Though large managers operate dozens of hedge funds and other funds with all manner of different investing styles and sometimes support the activist efforts of smaller managers, no large manager has ever started a fund that focused specifically on influencing the governance of companies. Hedge fund activism remains exclusively the province of small investment managers.

The reason, I argue, is that if a large manager were ever to start an activist hedge fund, the manager would face a debilitating set of conflicts of interest between the activist fund and the manager’s other funds and business lines. Some of these conflicts would be practical and economic. If a Blackrock activist hedge fund invested in a company’s equity, for example, while a Blackrock mutual fund invested in the company’s debt, then if the company ever approached insolvency, Blackrock would face a direct conflict of interest. No law firm would ever try to represent two investors with such obviously opposing interests, and neither, I argue, would Blackrock. Similarly, the newspaper coverage of the activist hedge fund’s efforts would likely damage the reputation of Blackrock’s other business lines, such as investment banking, and make these other business lines into potential targets for political attack.

A Blackrock activist hedge fund would also push Blackrock into conflicts of interest over law and regulation. Many of the rules that regulate the activism of large shareholders, such as poison pills and sections 13(d) and 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,17 have a peculiar tendency to combine an investment manager and all of its various funds into a single unit for purposes of regulation. The result is that the funds that share an investment manager also have to share each other’s regulatory burdens. Activism by one of a manager’s funds can have catastrophic regulatory consequences for the manager’s many other funds, even if the other funds are not engaged in activism themselves.

These conflicts over activism tend to grow more severe as a manager grows larger and its activism grows more intense. A manager may engage in activism so long as the manager remains small or the activism remains mild. But no truly large investment manager has ever become aggressively activist. Large managers sometimes support the activism of smaller managers, but they never become aggressively activist themselves.

This understanding of how size and activism collide is useful, because it allows us to perceive deeper questions about corporate governance than existing research. Researchers have been writing for decades about why large institutional investors tend to be so passive, but they have not yet seen the question I ask here. Their focus has landed on the individual incentives of large mutual funds and why various features of these funds have made them uninterested in activism.18 This way of thinking ignores the possibility that even if a big manager’s mutual funds might not engage in activism, its hedge funds might. The focus on mutual funds also fails to keep step with the conceptual move at the heart of the new research on horizontal shareholding, which is to collapse all of a manager’s many funds into a single analytical unit and treat them as though they might act together as a group.19 This Article assesses this possibility of coordinated action head-on and considers how realistic it might be. In so doing, this Article is the first to fully come to grips with the implications of horizontal shareholding for corporate governance and securities law and the broader limits on a large investment manager’s power.

This Article proceeds as follows. First, I explain how large investment managers are structured and how they come to contain so many conflicts. I then show how activism inflames those conflicts and how they grow more intense with

17 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78p(b).
19 Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
the aggressiveness of activism and the size of a manager. I consider other possible explanations for large investment managers’ passivity and show how an awareness of conflicts makes more sense than these alternatives. I conclude by contemplating the implications for legal reform.

I. INVESTMENT MANAGERS AND CORPORATE INFLUENCE

To understand the conflicts over shareholder activism in large investment managers, we first have to understand how investment managers come to take on so many different obligations to so many different clients in the first place.

A. The Investment Management Industry

Investment managers adopt a distinctive pattern of organization that I have elsewhere called, “the separation of funds and managers.”20 This pattern accounts for much of what makes investment managers and their funds unusual and it creates many of the most interesting problems in investment management regulation and contracting. The conflicts of interest that plague activism by big investment managers are a product of this distinctive pattern.

Fundamentally, the business of an investment manager is to invest other people’s money.21 Individuals and institutions entrust their money to an investment manager in the hope that the manager will earn a better investment return at less cost and inconvenience. In exchange for this service, the investment manager charges a fee, often as a percentage of the assets under management and sometimes as a percentage of investment returns. An investment manager invests money in a variety of ways, but the most common – and the one that has the greatest effect on corporate governance – is to buy stocks, bonds, and other securities of public companies. An investment manager might invest its clients’ money, for example, in the common stock of General Motors, IBM, or Microsoft.

Sometimes an investment manager might hold its clients’ money directly, as when a client opens a brokerage account to invest its money. More often, however, an investment manager will aggregate its clients’ money into various corporations, trusts and other legal entities known as “funds.” Investment funds can take a variety of different regulatory forms. Mutual funds are often the largest types of funds. They are registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and may accept investments from the general public. Hedge funds and private equity funds are not registered with the SEC and may accept investments only from wealthy institutions and individuals.

20 John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014) (describing the separation of funds and managers); see also John Morley, Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities Regulation?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS, (William A. Birdthistle & John Morley, eds., forthcoming 2018) (arguing that this pattern is the best explanation for why mutual funds are subject to distinctive securities regulation).

The modern investment managers who account for the bulk of the industry’s assets tend to be large corporate firms with diversified financial businesses. Examples include Fidelity, Blackrock, Goldman Sachs and TIAA-CREF. Crucially, the benefits of the investment management industry’s growth have not been equally distributed among all of these firms. A handful of the very largest management firms have grown astonishingly quickly in recent years, with the effect that the industry’s assets are becoming increasingly concentrated among the very biggest firms, such as Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity.22

One of the key facts about a large investment manager is that it does not work for just one client.23 A large manager like Fidelity or Blackrock works simultaneously for many different investment funds, each with its own investment strategy, its own owners, and its own distinct corporate existence.24 The accumulation of all these different clients is part of what accounts for a big investment manager’s great size. Fidelity, for example, is best known for managing mutual funds, and it operates nearly a hundred of these funds, including the Fidelity Magellan Fund, the Fidelity 500 Index Fund, and the Fidelity Ohio Municipal Income Fund.25 These funds attract a variety of investors, including individuals saving for retirement and institutions seeking returns on their endowments.26 In addition to these mutual funds, Fidelity could also manage (and many large managers do also manage) an array of private equity and hedge funds. Fidelity further manages thousands of so-called separately managed accounts, which are individualized accounts, similar to bank accounts, that each contain the assets of only a single investor. Fidelity also runs a trust company, which invests the money of donative trusts of the kind that grandparents commonly establish for their grandchildren.27 The net effect of all these investment funds, individual accounts and trusts is to give Fidelity and similar large investment managers a huge number of distinct clients, possibly reaching into the tens of thousands.

Crucially, each of Fidelity’s many investment funds relies on Fidelity for its operations. Each fund has a contract with Fidelity that specifies the terms of Fidelity’s authority and the fee the fund will pay to Fidelity. Very often, Fidelity will have almost total discretion about how to manage a fund. The fund will have no employees of its own, and only minimal mechanisms of corporate governance. A Fidelity fund is effectively controlled and dominated by Fidelity.28

It is thus easy to conflate Fidelity with its various clients, but we must nevertheless keep them conceptually distinct, because the clients of an investment manager are not all pooled together, and their assets do not formally belong to the

---

22 Fichtner, et al., supra note 9.
23 I use the term “client” to refer both to an investment fund and to an individual investor who opens an individual investment account (often known as a “separately managed account”) distinct from an investment fund.
26 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 1.
manager. Each Fidelity investment fund is a separate legal entity with a separate group of shareholders and a separate set of investments. The stocks and other investment assets of the fund legally belong to the fund, and not to Fidelity or to Fidelity’s other clients.\footnote{Some investment management clients, such as the ones who set up separately managed accounts, may not formally own the investment assets in their portfolios in separate legal entities. Instead, the assets will formally belong to the manager, with the client merely having a contractual claim against the manager. Although this ownership formality is important for purposes of creditors’ rights, it is not important for purposes of fiduciary duty. Whether or not a client holds separate title to its investments, each client is a separate site of fiduciary duty.}

The distinctions between a manager’s many clients are important, because they mean that each client is a separate locus of fiduciary duty. An investment manager’s fiduciary obligation runs not to all of the clients in the aggregate, but to each client individually. Like a lawyer who represents multiple clients at the same time, an investment manager has a fiduciary responsibility – rooted in the laws of agency, trusts, corporations, and contract – to serve the interests of each client individually without sacrificing that client for the benefit of any other.

The proliferation of these sites of fiduciary duty does not stop with the manager’s investment management clients. Investment management is often just one of many businesses in a much larger financial conglomerate. Goldman Sachs, for instance, operates a huge investment management business covering mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and separately management investment accounts. But Goldman is best known for its many other financial services businesses, including investment banking, commercial lending, securities underwriting, consulting, and derivatives underwriting. Goldman also has its own proprietary investing operation, in which it invests its own money for its own benefit. A large investment manager thus has to balance not only the interests of its many investment management clients, but also the interests of customers in its many other business lines—not to mention the manager’s own shareholders.

Balancing all of these loyalties can be difficult, because an investment manager often holds extensive discretion. It often has total authority to make decisions about matters as basic as how to invest the money and what to do with it.\footnote{Morley, \textit{supra} note 24, \textit{passim}.} This system of delegating total authority makes sense for reasons I have described elsewhere.\footnote{Morley, \textit{supra} note 24, \textit{passim}.} But it nevertheless forces a manager to make difficult decisions with extensive implications for fiduciary duties.

Figure 1 illustrates the structure of a large investment management company. It shows an investment manager with just three different funds, but of course a big manager would have many more. It shows the management company and the funds as separate corporate entities with separate owners, united only by the contracts (represented by dashed lines) that bind the various funds to the manager. In addition, the manager has other business lines beyond fund
management that the manager runs inside of a larger corporate conglomerate.

Figure 1. Structure of a Large Investment Management Complex

Manager

Clients

Owners

S&P 500 Mutual Fund

Owners

Corp. Bond Mutual Fund

Owners

Long/Short Hedge Fund

Owners

Other business lines

Management Company

B. The Possibility of Hedge Fund Activism

Could a large manager with this organizational structure ever unit its clients’ holdings into a single, focused program of shareholder activism? To date, research on corporate governance has failed not only to answer, but even to acknowledge importance of this question. Research on big institutional investors has focused overwhelmingly on the incentives of individual mutual funds, rather than the larger investment management complexes of which they are a part. Economists and lawyers have argued, basically, that the various funds on the right side of Figure 1 tend not to engage in activism because they do not find activism profitable. There are many reasons. One is that the mom and pop investors who buy shares in ordinary mutual funds are not excited enough about activism to pay the high fees necessary to cover the activism’s costs. Another reason is that the index investing strategies used by mutual funds makes activism unprofitable, because if an index fund spends money on activism to improve a company’s stock price, the benefits of the increase will be shared by all of the fund’s competitors who invest in the same company and the same index, even though none of them paid any of the costs of the activism.

These explanations for why mutual funds do not find activism profitable are surely correct, but they miss the real heart of the problem. They examine the incentives of mutual funds individually, but the right unit of analysis might

32 Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
actually be the larger investment management complexes of which the funds are a part. In other words, instead of looking at individual funds, we could look instead at a manager and all of its funds as though they were a single unit.

This way of thinking is implicit in the rapidly growing literature on horizontal shareholding, which worries that big managers by turn into de facto monopolists by controlling every company in a given industry.\textsuperscript{34} Without self-consciously thinking about it, the horizontal shareholding literature has implicitly treated management complexes as though they were unitary things. In the eyes of the horizontal shareholding literature, the key actor in corporate governance is not a fund, but the group of funds controlled the fund’s manager.

Consider, then, the possibility that the large manager depicted in Figure 1 might unite its various funds in a program of shareholder activism by adding to its various offerings an activist hedge fund. This possibility appears in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Large Investment Management Complex with Activist Hedge Fund

Figure 2 tells us that even if \textit{mutual funds} do not find activism profitable, other funds very well might. We know that hedge funds can turn a profit with activism, because for decades now, the market for hedge fund activism has been booming.\textsuperscript{35} And because a large manager already tends to offer a wide variety of

\textsuperscript{34} Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{35} Anna L. Christie, \textit{Hedge Fund Activism and the Market for Corporate Quasi-Control}, (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 51/2017) (showing that hedge fund activism has been increasing); Ajay Khorana, et al., \textit{The Evolving Shareholder Activist Landscape (How Companies Can Prepare for It)}, 29 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2017) (showing that 2015 was a record year for hedge fund activism).
different funds, it seems plausible that an activist hedge fund might reasonably number among them.

Indeed, it would seem on first impression that a large investment manager ought to be the very best kind to run an activist hedge fund, because a large manager could theoretically support an activist hedge fund by bolstering it with the voting power of the many other funds in the management complex that surround it. A large manager, in other words, could direct its various mutual funds to support its activist hedge funds.

If a large manager were ever to try this strategy, the result could be a shareholder activist of unprecedented power. Whereas Pershing Square, a small manager with a prominent activist hedge fund, has only two funds and about $9 billion dollar under management, Fidelity, the investment management giant, has hundreds of funds and about $2.5 trillion under management. If Fidelity ever added a $9 billion activist hedge fund to its stable of other clients, then Fidelity could form a voting bloc several orders of magnitude larger than Pershing Square. Fidelity could make the bloc especially huge by directing its other funds not only to vote alongside its activist fund, but also to invest alongside it as well. With more than $2 trillion under management, Fidelity could theoretically accumulate controlling majority ownership stakes in dozens and maybe even hundreds of America’s largest companies.

It seems plausible that large investment managers could consolidate the voting of their various funds, because most of them already do it. In off-the-record interviews, I spoke with about a dozen current and former lawyers and executives at several of America’s largest investment management firms and asked them how their firms voted their clients’ shares. Their responses all indicated that a degree of centralized control over the voting of each of their various clients.

In one common pattern, a senior executive of a management company leads a dedicated department whose job is to formulate voting policy for the entire firm. This central voting office decides how to vote all of the shares of the manager’s different clients on each matter presented in each portfolio company. If a hedge fund, a mutual fund and a separately managed account each own shares in Delta Airlines, for example, the centralized voting office decides how all three clients will vote casts all of their votes the same way. The central voting office might, on occasion, give the portfolio manager of a particular fund the right to vote the fund’s shares differently from the rest of the firm. But in most large managers, such freedom tends to be exercised only very rarely.

38 The account I offer here finds support in the empirical evidence of Bubb and Catan, who tally the corporate voting of individual mutual funds and find, among other things, that funds that share a manager all tend to vote almost exactly the same way. Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, *The Party Structure of Mutual Funds*, (Feb. 14, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124039.
Some firms are a less centralized than this. Some firms place responsibility for the initial decision-making about voting directly in the hands of the portfolio managers of individual funds. If three different funds each hold shares in Delta, the managers of each different fund may make the decision about how to vote the shares independently without any central guidance. Such a decentralized firm will nevertheless almost always have a central voting office with a small staff whose purpose is to safeguard the reputation of the firm as a whole. The office will not allow an individual portfolio manager to issue a public statement on a sensitive corporate governance dispute unless the firms’ central voting office agrees to take the same position as well. In this way, even investment managers with relatively decentralized voting operations show both the willingness and the capacity to coordinate voting among their clients.

C. The Continuum of Manager Size and Intensity of Activism

It seems possible, then, that a large manager might start an activist hedge fund and use a centralized voting office to direct its other clients to support the fund. But what exactly would it mean for the hedge fund to be an “activist?” The answer is complex, and I will say much more about exactly what I mean later, in Part IV. For now, though, I wish to make it clear that activism exists along a continuum of aggressiveness and that the sorts of conflicts between clients that I am concerned about tend to be most serious at the more aggressive end of the continuum. Mild forms of activism tend to be relatively unproblematic.

Some large investment managers, such as T. Rowe Price, for example, tend to think of themselves, even now, as being seriously committed to activism. They sometimes vote in support of smaller managers’ activist hedge funds and they occasionally meet with corporate executives to talk about how the companies are faring. For reasons that will become clear in a moment, these relatively mild forms of activism tend to create comparatively few conflicts for a large investment manager.

The forms of activism that concern me most here are more aggressive. They involve not merely voting for someone else’s nominees to a corporate board, but actually nominating candidates directly. They also include things like running proxy contests on mergers and publicly pushing for changes to a company’s capital structure. Again, for reasons that will become clear, these more aggressive kinds of activism are where conflicts between clients become truly debilitating.

II. LEGAL CONFLICTS

Let us turn, then, to the heart of the matter by examining the nature of the conflicts that activism can generate. Conflicts over activism tend to come from two sets of sources, one legal and one practical. We begin with the legal conflicts.

Activism poses a host of legal challenges and they tend to make it difficult for any shareholder to become an activist. But in a large manager, the legal challenges of activism are greatly aggravated by their tendency to spill from one client to another. Legal rules governing shareholder activism often treat an investment manager and its various clients and business lines as a single unit, with the effect that the activism of one client can damage the regulatory status of every other client.

A. Exchange Act Section 13(d)

The first problem is Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.\(^{40}\) Roughly speaking, section 13(d) requires anyone who “beneficially owns” more than 5% of any class of a company’s equity securities to file a report with the Securities and Exchange Commission within 10 days after the acquirer crosses the 5% line.\(^{41}\) The contents of the report can vary – more on this in a moment – but the report must generally disclose the extent and character of the owner’s investment and the owner’s intentions for future voting and control. The purpose of section 13(d) is to let an issuer and other shareholders know when a potential controlling shareholder is amassing a big interest.\(^{42}\)

Section 13(d) is a headache for anyone who attempts to influence a public company, but it is especially painful for a large investment manager with many clients. The special problem for a big investment manager is that section 13(d) and its administrative rules combine a manager and all of its various clients into a single legal unit. If Fidelity has 100 different clients that each own stock in Delta Airlines, for example, it is Fidelity – not the various clients – that becomes the “beneficial owner” for purposes of section 13(d) reporting. Hence, even if each of Fidelity’s 100 clients owns only 0.06% of Delta’s common stock, so that none of them would cross the 5% threshold individually, all of these holdings will nevertheless be added together and attributed to Fidelity, bringing the total to an even 6%. Fidelity will thus have to file a 13(d) report in its own name reporting its beneficial ownership. The lesson is that as a manager and its clients get bigger, the 5% threshold becomes easier and easier to cross.

The reason a manager and its clients get aggregated in this way is that regulations under section 13(d) define the term “beneficial owner” very broadly. Rule 13d-3(a) says that the term “beneficial owner” of a security includes anyone who has the “power to vote” or the “power to dispose” of the security.\(^{43}\) This broad definition clearly reaches most investment managers, because the essence of an investment management contract is to give a manager discretionary authority to vote and dispose of a client’s securities. Thus, the beneficial owner for purposes of section 13(d) in most investment management relationships is not

\(^{42}\) Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (“The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party.”).
only the fund that owns the shares, but also the manager that decides how to vote them.

Managers and their clients face a further risk of aggregation through the concept of a “group.” For purposes of the 5% threshold, section 13(d)(3) can combine together even persons who count as distinct beneficial owners so long as the persons act together as a “group...for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of the securities of an issuer.” Thus, if two hedge funds work together to acquire 2% and 3% of an issuer’s securities, respectively, then even if they are distinct “beneficial owners,” their holdings can nevertheless be added together to total 5%, because they are working together as a group. Both hedge funds must then comply with section 13(d) and report each other’s shares as their own.

The definition of a group has been elaborated extensively by the courts, and the inquiry is highly fact-specific, making the resolution of particular cases very hard to predict. But we can nevertheless say with confidence that if two clients have both given over control of their portfolios to the same investment manager who directs them to both acquire shares in the same company, the clients will be at grave risk of being treated as a group if the manager has not already been treated as the beneficial owner of both funds’ securities under Rule 13d-3(a).

The logic of the group concept and the broad beneficial ownership definition is to prevent clever strategies for avoiding the reporting obligation in section 13(d). In the absence of these aggregation rules, an investor could easily subvert the 5% limit by simply spreading its investment across multiple subsidiary entities. A shareholder could allocate 2% of a company’s shares to each of five different entities that the shareholder controls, and thereby gain 10% of the company’s shares without ever having to report a 5% ownership stake under section 13(d). The aggregation rules prevent this kind of gamesmanship.

There was a time when the 5% threshold of section 13(d) was high enough to allow large managers to purchase all the shares they liked for their many clients without running into problems. But as the biggest investment managers have grown, the 5% threshold has come to sweep in a huge number of investment positions for large investment managers. As of March 2016, Blackrock was the beneficial owner of 5% or more of the stock of 2,632 different companies, or more than one half of all publicly listed companies in the United States. Vanguard held a similar position in 1,855 companies and Fidelity did so in 1,309 companies.

---

46 Note that if the two hedge funds are combined under the “group” definition – rather than having their ownership attributed to their manager under the definition of “beneficial owner” – then it is technically the funds, rather than the manager, who bear the burden of compliance.
47 E.g., Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Investments, 553 F.3d 1351 (2008) (holding that in order to be a member of a group, a person must be a beneficial owner of a security.)
48 H.R.Rep. No. 90-1711 at 7 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2818 (making it clear that the goal of section 13(d)(3) is to “prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading the provisions of the statute because no one individual owns more than [five] percent of the securities”).
49 Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 9, at 14.
companies. At least fifteen other investment managers beneficially owned 5% or more of more than 200 companies.

My basic thesis is that, whatever their policy logic, these aggregation rules make it very difficult for a large and diversified investment manager to acquire large stakes and convert them into influence. Because these policies combine a manager and its clients for purposes of reporting and tallying ownership, they effectively yoke a manager and all of its various clients together for purposes of liability and obligation. Activism or share purchases by one client can trigger section 13(d) problems for every other client.

Consider, for example, what may happen if a client of a large investment manager tries to execute a so-called quiet acquisition of shares in a public company. In a quiet acquisition, an investor slowly accumulates up to 4.9% of the target company’s shares and then buys as many shares as it can over a period of ten days after crossing the 5% threshold. Quiet acquisitions are a common strategy for governance activists, because section 13(d) gives an investor a grace period of ten days after crossing the 5% threshold before the investor has to disclose its ownership publicly. Quiet acquisitions are controversial—Hillary Clinton threatened to crack down on them in her presidential campaign—but virtually everyone seems to agree that they are central to both the success and the profitability of an activism strategy.

What makes a quiet acquisition so useful is that it offers an activist its best opportunity to buy shares at a low price before the public learns about the activist’s plan and drives up the price by buying shares. Once the public knows the activism campaign is coming, the activist’s opportunity to buy at a low price will disappear. Quiet acquisitions are delicate affairs, because the act of acquiring shares can tip off other investors of the impending campaign. Leaks of information are a constant problem, and an activist manager’s acquisitions are watched extremely carefully.

Quiet acquisitions thus face a host of obstacles, but for a large manager, by far the largest is the way section 13(d) brings various clients into conflicts. When a client of a large investment manager attempts a quiet acquisition, the client cannot actually buy 5% of the target company’s stock before it crosses the 5% threshold and has to report its shares, because the client is part of a “beneficial ownership” unit that may already hold several percent of the target company’s stock even before the client buys its first share. Imagine, for example, that an activist hedge fund wishes to buy 10% of Netflix, Inc. (as an activist fund managed by Carl Icahn did in 2012). For a fund like Icahn’s that works independently of a large management group, 10% is a fairly attainable goal. The fund can buy 4.9% slowly and quietly and then buy another 5.1% over a 10-day

---

50 Id.
51 Id.
period of rapid acquisition before making its actions public in a Schedule 13D. By
contrast, for a fund managed by a large manager such as T. Rowe Price, acquiring
10% would be much harder. As of year-end 2015, T. Rowe Price clients
collectively owned 3% of Netflix.\footnote{\textit{T. Rowe Price Assocs. Inc., Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership by Individuals (Subject: Netflix Inc.) (Schedule 13G) (Dec. 31, 2015).}} Hence, if T. Rowe Price started an activist
hedge fund, the fund could only buy 2% of Netflix’s stock before the 10-day
clock began ticking, rather than 4.9%. Things would be harder still if, instead of
being managed by T. Rowe Price, this hedge fund were managed by Blackrock or
Vanguard. At year-end 2015, Blackrock and Vanguard clients already owned
6.6%\footnote{\textit{BlackRock Inc., Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership by Individuals (Subject: Netflix Inc.) (Schedule 13G) (Dec. 31, 2015).}} and 5.6% of Netflix, respectively.\footnote{\textit{Vanguard Grp. Inc., Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership by Individuals (Subject: Netflix Inc.) (Schedule 13G) (Dec. 31, 2015).}} As a result, if Blackrock or Vanguard
were ever to start an activist fund, the fund would have to disclose its acquisitions
almost immediately any time it purchased an additional 1% of Netflix’s shares.\footnote{\textit{Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (2016).}}

Section 13(d) thus makes it relatively difficult for a client of a large
investment management company to accumulate a stake in a public company
through a quiet acquisition. But this is not the end of the problem. If ever a client
of a large manager did manage to get a large stake, section 13(d) would create
even more serious problems if that client tried to turn its stake into influence.

The problem is that aggressive forms of activism can change a manager’s
obligations under section 13(d). Most large investment managers, it turns out, do
not actually file reports under section 13(d). Instead, they file under section
13(g).\footnote{\textit{Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2016); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 13G TEMPLATE, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1021917/000091228202000355/madsen13g.htm.}} Section 13(g) imposes a 5% disclosure requirement similar to the
requirement in section 13(d), but the contents of the disclosure are much less
demanding than under 13(d). Under section 13(d), the form prescribed for
disclosure, which is known as Schedule 13D, has to be updated every time a
beneficial owner’s holdings change by more than 1% of the target company’s
stock.\footnote{\textit{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2016).}} And each the time form is filed or updated, the beneficial owner has to
disclose all trades made 60 days prior to the time the schedule is filed or
updated.\footnote{\textit{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 Item 5(c).}} In addition, the filer has to disclose its intentions for its shares,
including any intentions that might affect the control of the company.\footnote{\textit{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 Item 4.}} In contrast
to this demanding set of requirements in Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G only has to be
updated once a year, does not require disclosure of prior trades, and requires no
mention of the acquirer’s intentions about the future.

Eligibility for the lighter requirements of Schedule 13G turns on an
investor’s intentions for control. An investor who intends to exercise control must
file on Schedule 13D; an investor who does not intend to exercise control can file
on Schedule 13G.\footnote{\textit{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (2016).}} The definition of “control” under section 13(d) and Rule 13d-

\footnote{T. Rowe Price Assocs. Inc., Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership by Individuals (Subject: Netflix Inc.) (Schedule 13G) (Dec. 31, 2015).}
\footnote{BlackRock Inc., Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership by Individuals (Subject: Netflix Inc.) (Schedule 13G) (Dec. 31, 2015).}
\footnote{Vanguard Grp. Inc., Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership by Individuals (Subject: Netflix Inc.) (Schedule 13G) (Dec. 31, 2015).}
\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2016).}
\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 Item 5(c).}
\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 Item 4.}
\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (2016).}
1 is difficult to pin down precisely, because the statute and rule contain no express
definition and the SEC’s guidance prescribes only a multifactor inquiry that
depends on the specifics of a given circumstance.\textsuperscript{64} Nevertheless, it is clear that
even fairly modest forms of influence can qualify. According to guidance
provided by the SEC, examples of control include “engag[ing] with an issuer’s
management on matters that specifically call for the sale of the issuer to another
company, the sale of a significant amount of the issuer’s assets, the restructuring
of the issuer, or a contested election of directors.”\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, Item 4 of Schedule
13D requires a shareholder to disclose its intentions with respect to a very broad
array of activities that likely qualify as “control,” including any intention to affect
an extraordinary corporate transaction, a sale or transfer of a material amount of
assets of the issuer, a change in the board of directors, a material change in
capitalization, a change in the charter or bylaws, or “[a]ny other material change
in the issuer’s business or corporate structure.”\textsuperscript{66}

The small investment managers who operate activist hedge funds often do
things that count as control within this convoluted definition, because activist
hedge funds commonly nominate directors, demand dividends, and run proxy
contests in support of sales and mergers—all of which are clearly named as
indicia of control. Bigger managers, by contrast, almost never cross the threshold
into 13d-1 control. Though they often vote in support of smaller managers’ efforts
at “control,” they will almost never engage in control themselves.

The reason is that, whatever the meaning of “control,” the analysis of
whether a person has engaged in control applies at the level of the beneficial
owner, which, in the case of an investment manager, is the manager itself,
including all of its clients. Thus, for a manager to file on Schedule 13G, not only
the manager but also each and every one of its various clients must avoid
exercising control. If just one activist hedge fund exercises control over an issuer
within the meaning of section 13(d), then the entire investment management
complex— including the hundreds of mutual funds, hedge funds, trusts, and
individual accounts the manager might manage— will tip from Schedule 13G to
Schedule 13D status.

A fall from 13G to 13D status would do major to the manager and its
various clients. Every professional I spoke with in the investment management
industry insisted that the distinction between 13G and 13D was by far the most
important problem they worried about when they considered the possibility of
influencing a portfolio company. The biggest challenges, they say, are technical.
The prompt updating and prior trade disclosure requirements of Schedule 13D—
which are absent from Schedule 13G—are exceedingly costly for a large
investment manager. The technical difficulties of constantly updating filings and
adding prior trade information multiply exponentially with the number and

\textsuperscript{64} Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, 63 Fed. Reg. 2854 (Jan. 16,

\textsuperscript{65} Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial
Ownership Reporting, Questions and Answers of General Applicability, Question 103.11,

\textsuperscript{66} 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 4(b)-(g).
diversity of the manager’s clients. Regular reporting is difficult when a manager has many clients, because the clients’ portfolios change constantly, as does the size of mutual funds whose shareholders can constantly withdraw and add money. If, for instance, a large manager operated a large S&P 500 index fund, an activist hedge fund, and a few thousand individual client accounts, the manager’s holdings could easily increase or decrease by more than 1% – the threshold for filing an update – over the course of a single day. And it could happen day after day after day. A manager could thus be required to update its holdings in a company at a level of maddening frequency.

Updating all of the reports for a large number of clients and issuers would be difficult enough by itself, but it becomes especially difficult when it is added to the 60-day trade reporting requirement. Though trades that occur on the same day within $1 of each other can be consolidated on a single line, the number of trades that might have to be tracked and consolidated could be enormous – numbering, perhaps, in the hundreds of millions.67

Even if the technical challenges of consolidating millions of trades could be overcome, a responsible manager would still worry about the huge privacy breach involved in doing so. If a manager were to disclose every one of its trades over the 60-day periods required by regular updates to Schedule 13D, it would end up giving away a huge amount of information about its transacting habits, which other traders could then use to front-run and otherwise game the manager’s future trades. And the cost of this intrusive disclosure would not be borne exclusively – or even mainly – by the one client that triggered the obligation. The activist hedge fund that tripped the 13D trigger would only be just one of many clients that would have to throw open their trading histories.

Of course, one might argue that many of these problems under Section 13(d) can be avoided if a manager just restricts its efforts at control to a few companies on behalf of just a few clients. But this is easier said than done. As noted above, a large investment management firm serves so many clients that that many of them will inevitably want to invest in the same companies, making it impossible to limit the number of clients that accumulate holdings in a particular company. Further, even if a manager were able to focus its influence on just a few companies for just a few clients, it would simply prove my point, which is that a large manager cannot influence anything more than a small number of companies for a small number of clients. Turning the holdings of many clients into a focused program of corporate influence in major companies is tremendously difficult.

B. Exchange Act Section 16(b)

Section 13(d) is just one of many legal rules that aggregate an investment manager and its clients for purposes of a regulatory ownership threshold. Another one is section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.68 Section 16(b) requires a certain kind

---

67 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting, Questions and Answers of General Applicability, Question 110.08, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/reg13d-interp.htm (last accessed August 1, 2018).
of investor known as a “statutory insiders” to disgorge profits on trades it makes within six months of each other. A purchase of Facebook stock at $100 and a sale four months later at $105, for example, can be matched together under section 16(b) to produce a $5 profit, which the trader must then disgorge to Facebook. Section 16(b) creates an express private right of action in any holder of the issuer’s securities to sue for disgorgement, and plaintiffs’ lawyers often use this right of action in the hope that they can take a portion of the settlement as a legal fee for themselves. In addition to requiring disgorgement of profits, section 16(b) has a companion provision in section 16(a) that requires a statutory insider to disclose its ownership on forms known as Form 3 and Form 4. The statutory insiders covered by the statute include officers, directors, and—most important for my purposes—shareholders who own more than 10% of an issuer’s equity securities.

This 10% ownership threshold could theoretically cover a large number of the positions of big investment managers. As of March 2016, Fidelity was the beneficial owner of 10% or more of the outstanding stock of 506 companies. For Blackrock, the number was 375 companies and for Vanguard it was 163 companies.

The purpose of section 16(b) is to serve as a prophylaxis against insider trading. By categorically prohibiting all profits on short-swing trading by the kinds of people who are most likely to have private information about an issuer, section 16(b) reduces the odds that any of these people will trade while they actually possess private information. Because section 16(b) only applies to certain high-risk categories of statutory insiders, it does not require a plaintiff to prove that an insider actually possessed private information at the time of its trade. The mere fact of insider status is enough to trigger disgorgement if an insider makes a qualifying trade over a short period of time.

For a large investment manager, section 16(b) creates conflicts over activism for the same reasons as section 13(d): it lumps a manager and its clients together for purposes of determining an ownership threshold. Under section 16(b), the relevant threshold is 10%, which is when a shareholder becomes a statutory insider. Exchange Act Rule 16a-1(a)(1) expressly borrows the aggregation framework of section 13(d) by defining a beneficial owner under 16 to mean any person who is deemed to be a beneficial owner under section 13(d) and its implementing rules. Section 16(b) thus combines a manager and all of its various clients together.

Section 16 softens this borrowing provision by providing a special exemption for an investment adviser who has become a beneficial owner of

---

70 Section 16(b) is common cause of action in reported securities cases. Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2091 (1994).
72 Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 9, at 16.
73 Id.
securities merely by virtue of managing the securities for the account of a client.\textsuperscript{75} This has the practical effect of exempting a large investment manager from section 16(b), even if its clients own more than 10\% of a company. The implementing rules under section 16 further soften the aggregation rules by providing that whenever two entities are combined for purposes of determining 10\% ownership, these entities may nevertheless be broken apart for purposes of matching trades under the disgorgement requirement.\textsuperscript{76} In other words, even if an investment adviser were aggregated with its clients to obtain a combined ownership total of more than 10\%, the adviser would only have to disgorge profits on its own trades, and not on the trades of its clients. The adviser’s various clients would similarly be responsible only for their own trades.

These softening exemptions prevent section 16(b) from being completely unworkable, but the key fact about them is that they stop working if a manager or its client becomes an activist. These softening exemptions only apply to an investment manager and its client if the client has bought its shares “in the ordinary course of business” and “without the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer.”\textsuperscript{77} “Control” here has the same hair-trigger manner as in section 13(d), meaning that if a manager’s client solicits proxies in connection with a board election, the exemption that stops a manager from being combined with its client would cease to work, and both the manager and the client could run afoul of section 16. Activism by one client could send shrapnel flying toward the manager itself.

Complying with section 16(b) would be catastrophic. Every time the manager or its activist client bought and sold within a six month period, it would have to disgorge their profits to the issuer. This would be a challenge for many managers, in addition to their clients, because many investment managers run proprietary trading operations—or market-making operations that function like proprietary trading operations—in which they invest their own money.\textsuperscript{78} These trading operations could have to disgorge profits on every short-swing trade as a result of some stray hedge fund’s activism. A large manager might also have to disgorge profits on trades by the private funds it manages. Many large investment managers, such as Goldman Sachs and Blackrock, operate dozens of hedge funds, and the operating agreements in these funds commonly require a manager to own a certain percentage of the fund in order to align with its interests with those of the fund’s investors. A big manager may thus own stakes in dozens of hedge funds at any given time. Under section 16(b), if any of these funds buys shares in a company with regard to which the manager has to comply with section 16(b), then the manager would have to disgorge not only the profits from manager’s own proprietary trades in the company, but also on its proportionate share of any trades by the hedge fund in which the manager owns a stake.\textsuperscript{79} In other words, if a hedge

\textsuperscript{75} 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (2016).  
\textsuperscript{76} Id.  
\textsuperscript{77} Id.  
\textsuperscript{79} 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (2016).
fund’s activism forces a manager to disgorge profits on trades in General Electric and then another one of the manager’s hedge funds makes a short swing trade in General Electric, then the manager will have to disgorge its share of the profits on the trade. If the manager owns 5% of the limited partnership interests of this other hedge fund, then the manager has to disgorge 5% of the fund’s profits on its trade. To keep track of the trades of hundreds of hedge funds in this way would be an accounting nightmare, to say nothing of its direct financial costs.

To summarize: the only thing that keeps section 16(b) from becoming catastrophic for a big manager are those softening exemptions we have just seen. But those exemptions go away once any one of a manager’s clients starts to exercise control over an issuer. Like the control determination that distinguishes section 13(d) from section 13(g), the control determination in section 16(b) is jointly applied to a manager and all of its various clients. The antics of just one client can force the manager into section 16(b) obligations.  

C. Poison Pills

The problems do not stop with sections 13(d) and section 16(b). Poison pills also combine a manager with its clients for purposes of calculating a legal ownership threshold. A poison pill, which may be more formally known as a shareholder rights plan, is an antitakeover device that a company’s board can use to prevent a potential acquirer from accumulating too large a stake in the company without the board’s permission. A poison pill dilutes the ownership of any shareholder who acquires shares in excess of a certain percentage specified by the company’s board. If the acquirer buys more than the specified percentage, then all of the company’s other shareholders – not including the acquirer – get the right to buy new shares in the company at a deeply discounted price. The result is to decrease the acquirer’s ownership of the issuer in terms of both value and percentage, and to increase the ownership of everyone else. Although few companies maintain a poison pill on a regular basis, a company’s directors can adopt a pill at a moment’s notice if ever they perceive a threat.  

Like sections 16(b) and 13(d), a poison pill triggers its obligations upon the crossing of a certain ownership threshold. The exact threshold varies from company to company and pill to pill, but it often hovers between ten and twenty percent. Because “ownership” is so difficult to define, poison pills commonly

---

80 A further problem is that even if a manager could somehow keep itself distinct from its clients under section 16(b), the clients could nevertheless find themselves getting aggregated with one another as a “group,” which is a concept that the rules under section 16 borrow from section 13(d). The definition of a group under section 13(d) combines any two persons who work together for the purpose of acquiring a security. Thus, if an advisor operates two funds, one of which owns 7% of an issuer and another of which owns 4%, the two funds could end up getting lumped into a group of 11% simply by virtue of having the same manager. The risks might be especially severe if one of the clients tried to use its shares for influence, making it appear, perhaps, that the acquisition of shares was part of a deliberate plan to work together.


borrow the conceptual apparatus of section 13(d) to determine ownership and police avoidance. Most poison pills thus define “beneficial ownership” by express reference to the definition in section 13(d) and its implementing rules, sometimes defining “security” and “ownership” even more expansively than section 13(d) for good measure. \(^{83}\) Much like section 13(d), a poison pill usually says that an investment manager and all of its various clients form a single beneficial owner.

Because the limits imposed by a poison pill put a cap on the combined ownership of a manager and all of its various clients, the effect of a poison pill is similar to the effects of sections 13(d) and 16(b): if any one client acquires too many shares, the resulting obligations will be felt equally by all clients. Hence, an acquisition by one client is a potential poison pill problem for every other client.

Many of the resulting difficulties are obvious. The most basic is that, like the limit on quiet acquisitions implicit in section 13(d), the poison pill prevents an activist hedge fund from buying as many shares as it might like. If the poison pill is triggered at 10%, and a manager’s index mutual funds already own 6%, the most the manager’s activist hedge fund can acquire is another 3.99%. This naturally limits how much profit the activist fund can make.

The problems are even more profound for the manager itself. Many investment managers, such as Goldman Sachs Asset Management, are part of larger financial conglomerates that that buy and hold securities in connection with various parts of their far-flung businesses. Goldman, for instance, does a major business in derivatives underwriting. As part of this business, Goldman sells large quantities of swaps and options on other companies. Goldman might agree with some third-party hedge fund, for example, to sell a swap on the stock of Delta Airlines, which requires Goldman to pay the fund the value of any increases in Delta’s stock price and requires the fund to pay Goldman the value of any decreases in Delta’s stock price. Goldman regards this kind of transaction as a financial service, rather than an investment decision, and so it commonly offsets the risk of changes in Delta’s stock price by buying or selling Delta’s shares or economically similar derivatives. \(^{84}\) This ensures that Goldman will have the ability to meet any obligations on the swap as they come due.

The trouble is that as Goldman Sachs accumulates stock, options and derivatives in these hedging positions, Goldman can unintentionally run afoul of a poison pill. Goldman does such a large volume of derivatives underwriting that Goldman could plausibly own or have the option to purchase close to 10% of a company’s outstanding equity securities at any given time. Goldman thus faces a risk that if one of its investment management clients accumulates too large a stake in a company, the client’s holdings will be aggregated with those of Goldman’s derivatives desk and Goldman’s many other investment management clients, with the effect that Goldman’s derivatives desk will topple over the poison pill threshold.


\(^{84}\) Goldman might also buy options on the securities, which would be clearly qualify as “equity securities” under section 13(d). 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (2016).
This problem is not lost on issuers, and they have generally tried to help their passive shareholders by using a device known as a “two-tier” poison pill.\textsuperscript{85} Borrowing once again from the conceptual apparatus of section 13(d), a two-tier poison pill rewards passive investors and punishes activist investors by applying a lower triggering threshold to Schedule 13D filers than to Schedule 13G filers. Since a 13G filer, by definition, does not intend to exercise control, accumulations of shares by a 13G filer pose less threat to an incumbent board than accumulations by a 13D filer. For example, Netflix responded to the activism campaign by Carl Icahn by adopting a pill with a 10% threshold for 13D filers and a 20% threshold for 13G filers.\textsuperscript{86}

Under a two-tier poison pill like this one, a large and diverse manager like Goldman Sachs usually has no problem, since it does not intend to exercise control and files only on Schedule 13G. But imagine if a client of Goldman (or Blackrock, or Vanguard, or any other large manager) began trying to exercise control. The manager and all of its various clients would flip from 13G to 13D status, thus lowering the trigger point for the poison pill. If, for example, Goldman’s derivative desk and asset management clients together owned 13% of Netflix, then Goldman would have no problem under Netflix’s 20% pill threshold, so long as all of the asset management clients remained passive enough to permit Goldman to file ownership reports on Schedule 13G. But if just one Goldman hedge fund owning just 0.5% of Netflix’s common stock solicited a proxy for a Netflix board election, Goldman’s entire operation would suddenly tilt into Schedule 13D status, and Goldman would find itself on the wrong side of Netflix’s 10% poison pill threshold for 13D filers.

Poison pills have recently become even more problematic by virtue of their expanded scope. Poison pills often go further than section 13(d) in consolidating beneficial owners and defining the kinds of securities that they cover. Section 13(d), for instance, only covers “voting securities” and so arguably does not count synthetic equities (which do not carry a right to vote).\textsuperscript{87} Poison pills, however, cover synthetic equities almost routinely.\textsuperscript{88}

---


\textsuperscript{86} Klein, et al., \textit{supra} note 46.

\textsuperscript{87} CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, et al., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), at 546 (Holding that the definition of a voting security under section 13(d) “does not confine itself to the mere possession of the legal right to vote securities, but looks instead to all of the facts and circumstances to identify situations in which one has even the ability to influence voting, purchase, or sale decisions of its counterparties by legal, economic, or other means.”); MORRISON & FOERSTER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SECTION 13(D) AND SECTION 13(G) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 13, \url{https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faqs-schedule-13d-g.pdf}

The lesson, once again, is that in a large investment management firm, everything is connected. The activism of just one client can potentially damage an entire firm.

III. PRACTICAL CONFLICTS

The conflicts of interest are not limited to legal rules. Conflicts can also appear from practical and economic sources.

A. Other Business Lines

One source of conflicts is the damage a client’s activism can do to a manager’s other business lines beyond investment management. As we have seen, investment management is rarely the only thing that a large investment manager does. In addition to managing investments, Goldman Sachs, for instance, also runs business lines in commercial banking, investment banking, securities underwriting, and derivatives underwriting. Other investment managers also operate diverse businesses. Vanguard, Fidelity, and TIAA-CREF each run a business as an administrator of 401(k) accounts for big employers. Fidelity administers the 401(k) plan for Microsoft, for example, by keeping track of each Microsoft employee’s monthly contributions and withdrawals and by providing a web site and phone number that employees can call for customer service. Fidelity profits from this role both by charging Microsoft a fee to administer the employee accounts and by charging each employee a fee when she chooses to invest her 401(k) savings in a Fidelity mutual fund, which Fidelity may promote to Microsoft employees as part of its administrative activities. An investment manager might also hope to include its funds in the portfolio of offerings available through a 401(k) account even if the manager does not directly manage the account. Even though Fidelity is the manager in control of the Microsoft 401(k), for example, TIAA-CREF can lobby Microsoft to have its funds included in the investment menu.

The trouble with lines of business beyond investment management is that they can be hurt by activism. Activism is dangerous to a financial conglomerate’s brand. Consider, for example, investment banking. The investment banking division of Goldman Sachs sells a variety of professional and financial services to big companies, including loans, securities underwriting and advice on mergers and acquisitions. If Goldman Sachs’ asset management unit started an activist hedge fund, the fund’s antics might easily damage Goldman’s client relationships in its investment banking unit. If the fund went around terrorizing the CEOs of S&P 500 companies, how many of these CEOs would hire Goldman for merger


and acquisition advice? Fidelity might face a similar problem if one of its hedge funds became aggressively active. Fidelity’s 401(k) business serves the human resources departments of many of America’s big companies, and an activist hedge fund that attacked these companies might complicate Fidelity’s efforts to build relationships with them. The same would be true even if Fidelity did not manage a company’s 401(k). Fidelity’s desire to have its funds included in the 401(k) menu that another manager assembles for the company would expose Fidelity to the risk of retaliation by the company.

The conflicts between an investment manager’s various business lines has appeared before in the ongoing controversies over analyst reporting. Analysts affiliated with investment banks often sell research reports on public companies that advise investors on whether they should buy or sell the stock of these companies. In the early 2000s, these analysts generated a raft of lawsuits when plaintiffs’ lawyers alleged that the analysts were writing inaccurately positive reports in order to curry favor with companies so that they might later hire the analysts’ banks to provide financial services.  

Just recently, evidence has surfaced of similar conflicts between analysts and their banks’ investment management units. Many public companies permit the clients of some investment managers to speak to the companies’ senior executives, and investment managers sometimes earn money by charging clients for this privilege. Walmart, for instance, might give certain preferred clients of Goldman Sachs the right to speak directly with Walmart executives. Many companies like Walmart, however, have a policy of only permitting an investment manager to grant this kind of access if the manager’s analysts have written positive reports about the company. If a Goldman analyst writes a bad report on Walmart, the access of Goldman’s investment management clients may be cut off.

The controversies over analyst reports are important to understand, because they illustrate the potential for conflicts over corporate governance activism. If Walmart will deny access to Goldman clients on the basis of a Goldman analyst report, then Walmart would surely do the same on the basis of an antagonistic Goldman hedge fund activism campaign.

B. Differing Tastes for Activism

Activism can also bring an investment manager’s clients into conflict because it can affect each of the clients differently. Because of their investing strategies, histories, and tax situations, one client might suffer from activism even when it benefits another client.

The preferences of a manager’s clients might diverge for any number of reasons. The most obvious is the conflict between debt and equity. If a manager operates both a debt fund and an equity fund, and they both invest in the same company, how should the manager vote its holdings if the company becomes

---

91 Randall Smith et al., Wall Street Firms Settle Charges Over Research in $1.4 Billion Pact, WALL ST. J., April 29, 2003.
distressed? The interests of the debt and equity holders will be in direct opposition to one another, since every dollar given to a debt holder is a dollar not given to an equity holder. For this manager to actively influence the outcome of a bankruptcy bargaining process is thus a profound conflict of interest. No law firm would take on such a conflict of interest, and neither would a big investment manager.

Debt and equity can also come into conflict long before a company becomes insolvent. One of the most common tactics of activist hedge funds is to show up at a company and clamor for a distribution of capital to equity holders. Because this kind of distribution pulls money out of the company, it reduces the resources available to debt holders and therefore reduces the value of the debt. A fund that holds debt can thus be hurt by a hedge fund’s activism even if the company remains technically solvent.

Activism can affect bring clients into conflict in other ways as well. Consider taxes. What if one fund is full of taxable investors, such as wealthy individuals, and another is full of untaxable investors, such as 401(k) plans and university endowments? How should the manager of these two funds vote on a campaign to approve a going-private merger transaction that will cause the company’s shareholders to realize profits and tax liabilities? The different funds will have different preferences.

Or imagine that one fund is focused on socially responsible investing and another is not. Should the manager use its influence to make a portfolio company more responsible at the cost of reducing its profitability? Or what if one fund holds stock in Apple and another in Huawei? Since Huawei makes super cheap smart phones that are undermining Apple’s core business, Apple and Huawei are competitors – and so are the funds that invest in them. So as between Apple and Huawei, where should the manager devote its activist time and energy?

The usual answer for a manager when the interests of clients point in opposite directions is to vote each client’s holdings in that client’s best interests, ignoring the interests of the other client. A manager who operates both a debt and an equity fund might vote the debt fund’s holdings in the interests of debt, and the equity fund’s holdings in the interests of equity, even if that means voting the two funds’ holdings in opposite ways. This strategy works fine in most cases, but it only proves my point. By voting its clients’ holdings in opposite directions, a manager effectively gives up on the prospect of turning its various clients’ holdings into a single, unified bloc. To vote clients’ holdings in opposite directions is effectively to adopt a strategy of uncoordinated passivity, not coordinated activism.

C. Differing Strategies for Engagement

A further problem is that even if every one of a manager’s various clients agrees on the need to influence a portfolio company, they might prefer different time horizons and strategies for implementing that influence. Compare, for example, the different preferences of an index mutual fund and an activist hedge fund. An index mutual fund’s investment strategy is to hold the stocks that appear on an index, which is a list of securities compiled by a third party. Examples of
popular indices include the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000. Index funds have
grown enormously in recent years and they now account for nearly a quarter of
the assets of all equity mutual funds.\footnote{\textit{Investment Company Institute}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 46.}

Index funds tend to prefer less assertive forms of activism than other kinds
of funds. Indexers like quiet, closed-door meetings with company executives
more than aggressive public contests. The reason is that an index fund cannot sell
its shares in a company even if its relationship with the company’s executives
turns sour. An index fund has to hold the stocks listed on its index, no matter how
bad the fund’s relationship with the company’s board becomes. This makes an
index fund conservative in the way it relates to a board. An index fund will tend
to want to make peace with the managers, in the hopes of maintaining a
productive long-term relationship.

The preferences of an activist hedge fund stand in sharp contrast. If an
activist hedge fund tries to change a company and fails, the activist can just sell
the shares and move on to another company, leaving the buyers of the shares to
develop a more positive relationship with the company’s directors. Thus, even if
an activist hedge fund and an index fund have identical beliefs about the direction
of a company and the need for activism, they will have different preferences for
how the activism is carried out.

These differing preferences come into conflict, because they cannot be
acted out independently. If both funds are operated by the same manager, then the
reputational consequences of one fund’s actions will inevitably spill over onto the
other fund. In interviews, investment management professionals insist that when a
corporate voting officer from Fidelity shows up in the boardroom of an operating
company like Delta Airlines, Delta’s directors will presume that the Fidelity
officer speaks on behalf of \textit{all} Fidelity clients, not just a single client. If a Fidelity
officer showed up representing an activist hedge fund, anything she says will
therefore almost certainly be attributed to Fidelity’s index mutual funds. If the
activist fund comes in with guns blazing, it seems highly unlikely that the index
fund will ever again be able to get a quiet, closed-door meeting with the
company’s executives.

Such a conflict can also spread beyond the companies that the activist fund
specifically targets. If an activist fund targets Delta, for instance, the fund’s
manager and its other clients may find it hard to get meetings not only with the
board of Delta, but also with the boards of American Airlines, United Airlines and
maybe even Microsoft.

\textbf{D. Cost and Profit Allocation}

Further conflicts arise in allocating the costs and profits of activism.
Activism is expensive. If a manager wants to influence the operations of a
portfolio company, it has to pay investment analysts to identify the company and
then develop a plan for improving it. The manager also has to pay lawyers to
strategize around takeover defenses and figure out how to comply with the great
mass of securities regulations and corporate law that burdens activists. The
manager will also have to pay proxy solicitors to send out mailings and recruit investors to vote.

With so many costs to pay, a large investment manager may have a difficult time deciding which of its many clients should pay the costs. If three different funds all buy stock in a target company, which ones should pay the costs, and in what proportions? There is no easy answer, because a large manager may have hundreds of clients invested in a particular public company at any given time. Maybe the manager could ask each of these clients to pay costs in proportion to the size of its investment. But what if a client does not want to pay? Or what if a client’s investment strategy does not permit corporate activism? What if, as in a mutual fund, the client has a fixed fee that does not fluctuate with actual expenses? And what if a client’s proportionate ownership changes over the life of the investment for reasons beyond the client’s control, such as investor redemptions that force a mutual fund to sell off some of its holdings?

Perhaps more difficult than the allocation of costs is the allocation of profits. The profits from activism are inherently scarce, because an investment manager can only buy so many shares in a target company before the opportunities to buy them at a low price disappear. If a manager buys too many shares on behalf of too many clients, the supply of shares will run dry, or the manager’s intentions will become obvious, and the share price will go up. A manager may thus be unable to buy as many shares in a target company as each of its many clients might want. How then should the manager allocate the opportunity to buy shares? The answer involves a conflict of interest.

E. Political Risk

A big manager also faces conflicts over the risk of regulatory and political interference. The actions of a single activist hedge fund can damage the political and regulatory standing of a manager’s other clients and business lines.

The risk of political and regulatory interference is real, because corporate governance activism is deeply unpopular in certain circles. In her 2016 campaign for president, Hillary Clinton promised to “reset” American capitalism by reigning in activist hedge funds.94 Bernie Sanders likewise spoke constantly of his frustration with big banks.95 This hostility to big financial institutions is nothing new. Anger towards Wall Street is a longstanding driver of American financial and anti-trust regulation and a large part of what accounts for the uniquely diffuse ownership of American industry.96

This hostility limits all corporate investors, but it limits large investment managers more than others. One obvious reason is large managers’ size. The American public has always been suspicious of big institutions and big managers are growing astonishingly big. Another reason is the diversity of a large

---

94 Newmeyr, supra note 53.
95 See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, This New York Daily News Interview Was Pretty Close to a Disaster for Bernie Sanders, WASH. POST. (Apr. 5, 2016).
manager’s business. A small activist hedge fund manager like Pershing Square or Value Act capital partners tends to run only a single and very narrow kind of business—activist hedge fund investing—and so it faces little regulation outside of the Securities Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act. A larger manager like Goldman Sachs, by contrast, runs so many different businesses that it faces regulation not only under the Exchange Act and the Advisers Act, but also under the Investment Company Act, various banking statutes, state trust laws, systemic risk regulations, the Commodity Exchange Act, and the regulations of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. If Goldman Sachs sent an activist hedge fund to antagonize a favored corporate patron of a powerful senator, the senator would have a wide array of regulatory arrows to fire. The results could be catastrophic, not just for the hedge fund, but also for Goldman’s derivatives underwriting business, its private equity fund management business, its commercial banking business, and its investment banking business. A large manager is too big to take on the risk of a political attack.

IV. THE CONTINUUM OF MANAGER SIZE AND INTENSITY OF ACTIVISM

Now that we know how activism can deepen a manager’s conflicts, we can see more precisely how conflict, activism, and size relate. As noted above, the relationship between conflicts, activism and size is not binary; it is more in the nature of a continuum. Conflicts grow more intense as (a) activism becomes more aggressive and direct; and (b) a manager takes on larger stakes in individual companies and grows more internally complex. This continuum is worth exploring in more detail, because it makes sense not only of the passivity of big investment managers, but also of the aggressive activism of other kinds of institutional investors.

98 Supra Section I.C.
A. Intensity of Activism

The first dimension of conflict is the intensity of activism: conflicts grow more intense as activism becomes stronger and more direct. Figure 3 expresses this relationship graphically.

Figure 3. Intensity of Activism and Intensity of Inter-Client Conflict

At the weak end of the continuum lies what may be the most ubiquitous form of activism: simple passivity, in which a manager just does nothing, or least nothing very meaningful. A manager and its clients might hold a large stake in a company, and yet never use their power to speak to the company’s executives or become involved in the company’s governance in a meaningful way. This kind of passivity can function as form of activism, because it entrenches the status quo. It acts as a tacit approval of whatever the company’s executives are then doing and soaks up the voting power an activist would need to produce change. This kind of negative influence figures prominently in the recent tsunami of academic research about horizontal shareholding,99 which suggests that when a large manager holds shares in all of the major companies in a given industry, it might diminish competition among the companies by simply failing to encourage competition.100

Doing nothing (or doing very little) is indisputably a popular strategy,101 and its popularity is consistent with my thesis about the high cost of conflicts,

99 Hemphill and Kahan, supra note 16, identify the various ways in which large investment managers might discourage price competition among their portfolio companies.
100 Elhauge, supra note 16, at 1269.
101 Bebchuck, et al., supra note 18.
because doing nothing tends to generate few conflicts. Doing nothing never counts as “control” under Rule 13d-1 and it has very little salience to a manager’s brand or political position. This means, therefore, that the concern about horizontal shareholding is basically consistent with my thesis about the importance of inter-client conflicts. My thesis does, however, imply a kind of upper bound to how directly a big manager can discourage competition. If a big manager like State Street or Fidelity ever tried to discourage competition by nominating candidates to a board of directors or taking other direct action, it would become a controller under section 13(d), a violator of fiduciary duties, and a tempting target for political and regulatory attack. All of these consequences would come in addition to the penalties of anti-trust law.

Other forms of activism lie further up on the continuum of intensity. One is a strategy of quiet, behind-the-scenes engagement. An investment manager might meet with the directors and senior executives of a company and talk about what the investment manager thinks the company should be doing. Another is a strategy of supportive activism. A large manager might vote in favor of an activist’s proposal without ever making any proposals of its own.

Both of these forms of activism are fairly popular among large investment managers, because both of them are mild enough that they generate no debilitating conflicts. Neither of these forms of activism risks being defined as “control” under Rule 13d-1. Figure 3 shows these forms of activism generating slightly more conflicts than total passivity, however, because they can pose significant practical conflicts. If one of a manager’s funds invests in a company’s equity and another invests in the company’s debt, then even mild forms of activism will have a tendency to privilege one fund over the other. These forms of activism can also damage a manager’s brand. Goldman Sachs cannot vote its mutual funds in support of an activist hedge fund at a company without torching the bank’s investment banking relationship with the company’s executives.

The next level of intensity in activism is where conflicts begin to become truly prohibitive for a large manager. Figure 3 shows a sudden vertical increase in the level of conflict when a manager does something that counts as “control” for purposes of section 13(d) and Rule 13d-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This is why we see a limit to how activist large managers will become. A large manager might talk with company executives behind closed doors or vote for smaller managers’ director nominees, but a large manager will never directly nominate candidates to a board of directors, run a proxy contest on an extraordinary corporate transaction, attempt to materially change a company’s

---

102 McCahery, et al., supra note 39.
104 McCahery, et al., supra note 39; Toonkel & Kim, supra note 103.
business or corporate structure, or do anything else that counts as control under Rule 13d-1.

B. Size and Complexity

After the intensity of activism, the next dimension of conflict is a manager’s size. Conflicts grow more intense as a manager gets bigger. A manager’s size may be measured in many different ways, but for purposes of conflicts over activism, there are two that matter most. The first is the aggregate size of the investment a manager and its clients have made in a given company. If the manager and its clients collectively hold a large stake in a particular company, conflicts over activism will tend to be more intense than if the manager and its clients hold a smaller stake.

Note that this measure of size – the size of a manager’s aggregate investment in a given company – is different from a manager’s total assets under management. I am not talking about the total value of all the assets a manager invests on behalf of all of its various clients, but about the percentage of equity ownership a manager and its various clients have amassed in a particular public company. The two measures are distinct, because even a manager with a very large amount of assets under management might have little investment in a particular company if none of the manager’s clients have invested their assets in that company. Nevertheless, the amount of total assets a manager has under management and the percentage of ownership a manager has accumulated in a given public company will tend to be highly correlated, because a manager with more assets will eventually have to invest more of them in individual companies. One of the side effects of having a larger pool of assets to invest is that a manager will have to invest more assets in individual companies. This is how the number of public companies in which Blackrock controlled 5% or more of the stock increased from 1,800 in 2011 to 2,632 in 2016. The increase wasn’t a product of any deliberate strategy by Blackrock to accumulate control stakes; it was an unintentional byproduct of Blackrock’s success in accumulating more assets in its funds.

Figure 4 charts how the size of a manager’s stake in a given company relates to the intensity of conflict over activism. Figure 4 shows that conflict over activism increases as a manager’s aggregate investment in a company increases. The positive slope reflects the tendency of greater ownership to increase a manager’s potential for influence and therefore the potential consequences of activism. The vertical increases at 5% and 10% reflect the legal conflicts generated by Exchange Act sections 13(d), which kicks in at 5%, and 16(b), which kicks in at 10%. We might also include a vertical increase further up on the continuum (e.g., at 15% or 20%) where a company’s poison pill kicks in.

106 Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 9, at 14.
In addition to looking at the number of shares a manager and its clients own in a particular public company, another way to measure a manager’s size is to examine the manager’s internal complexity. As a manager takes on more assets, it tends also to take on more clients and business lines with greater variety and difference. Complexity matters because the more complex a manager is, the more conflicts it tends to face over activism. A manager with only a single client will face almost no conflicts over activism, because there are no other clients with whom that client’s preferences can conflict. A manager with many clients might also face few conflicts if all of the clients invest in the same things. If all of the manager’s funds invest only in equity, then activism will not generate any conflicts between debt and equity. But if a manager has some funds invested in equity and others in debt and then tacks on a large investment bank that write credit default swaps on the side, the potential for conflict becomes much larger.

The relationship between internal complexity and conflict over activism appears in Figure 5. Figure 5 shows that as the number and diversity of a manager’s clients and business lines increase, so too does the intensity of conflict over activism. Of course, like the other figures plotting the seriousness of conflict over activism, Figure 5 is only a rough approximation. The main point of Figure 5 is simply to show that conflict over activism increases with a manager’s internal complexity.
Figure 5 is useful, because it does not just explain the passivity of large investment managers; it also explains the activism of other types of institutional investors, including private equity funds, pension funds, and hedge funds with small managers tend. Consider private equity funds. When a private equity fund buys a private company, it tends to own a majority or even an entirety of the company’s shares, usually exercising the power to appoint all of the company’s directors and to dictate every aspect of the company’s business and affairs. This is “activism” in the extreme. So why does it not trigger the conflict of interest problems that plague large managers invested in public companies? One reason is that the companies in private equity portfolios are not public – hence the term “private” equity – and so are not regulated by sections 13(d) and 16(b) of the Exchange Act. A second reason is that private equity managers avoid the complexity depicted in Figure 5. Private equity managers tend not to permit more than one of their funds to invest in given company at the same time, and if they do, they tend to police the conflicts with acute sensitivity.

In addition to private equity funds, pension funds also sometimes become aggressive activists. They occasionally collaborate with hedge funds on the

---

107 Bainbridge, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 11.


nomination of candidates to corporate boards, initiate proxy contests and practice other forms of activism that clearly cross the line into “control” within the meaning of section 13(d). The California State Teachers Retirement System Pension, for instance, recently considered an “engagement fund” to press executives at underperforming companies, and it openly collaborates with activist hedge funds in the nomination of director candidates. Pension funds become activist in this way despite sometimes being very large. The California Public Employees Retirement System pension fund, or CalPERS, ended the 2017 fiscal year with about $326 billion under management.

The explanation for pension funds’ comparative assertiveness is that pension fund managers do not divide their loyalties. Unlike hedge funds, private equity funds, and mutual funds, pension funds internalize their management. A pension fund manager works only for the fund that employs her and no one else. Pension funds do not adopt the separation of assets and management. Because pension fund managers have just one client, they have no conflicts in making the client into an activist.

The last category of highly activist investor is hedge funds operated by small managers. The reason hedge fund activism appears only among small managers should by now be clear: these managers have simple internal structures. Although they too might have significant quantities of assets under management, they tend to spread them across very few funds with highly similar investing strategies and they tend to avoid investment banking and other complicated business lines that might conflict with activism. This is why every high profile activist hedge fund – think of Pershing Square, Third Point, ValueAct, and Trian – is managed by a small firm with only a single client, or, occasionally, two or three clients.

V. OTHER THEORIES OF PASSIVITY IN PERSPECTIVE

Once we properly understand it, the risk of internal conflict can go a long way toward explaining the nuances of the market for activism by institutional investors. But I nevertheless acknowledge that the possibility of conflict is not the only force shaping institutional investor activism. Decades of research on corporate governance has identified other forces as well. Nevertheless, an
understanding of conflicts fills a number of gaps that other explanations for large
investors’ passivity have left open. Although researchers have come up with many
partially accurate explanations for why large investors tend to be passive, none of
these explanations is complete without an understanding of the importance of
conflicts.

The first common explanation for why large investment managers shy
away from activism is that activism does not attract many investors. A manager
cannot find enough investors willing to pay a fee to managers who will try to
influence portfolio companies. This argument usually focuses on mutual funds
and on their investors’ lack of sophistication. Mutual fund investors, it is said,
cannot assess the value of activist investing strategies, and so they will not pay the
high fees required to cover the costs of activism.

This theory certainly has real merit, but it also has serious limitations. The
most important is that investors quite obviously do have an appetite for activism.
This is evident in the success of activist hedge funds in recent years. Pershing
Square Capital, for instance, at one point raised more than $18 billion dollars for a
hedge fund that invests in corporate governance activism and the last two decades
have witnessed a boom in activism by hedge funds.114 So although mutual fund
investors may have no appetite for activism, hedge fund investors clearly do.

Of course, investors’ appetite for activism may be fairly small, but large
managers are not above offering niche products for small groups of investors. The
appetite for investment in corporate influence is probably no more limited than
the appetite for Tennessee municipal debt – and yet one can find several large
investment managers that offer funds specifically devoted to Tennessee municipal
debt.115 The same is true of other niche funds, from airline funds to oil funds, to
high-frequency trading funds.116 So why shouldn’t a large investment manager
start a niche fund focused on activism? The answer, of course, is conflicts of
interest.

Another common explanation for why large managers tilt toward passivity
is that the Investment Company Act of 1940 and its associated tax provisions
prohibit mutual funds from buying large stakes in portfolio companies. The
argument is that if a mutual fund wants to avoid corporate-level taxation, then it
cannot buy securities in any one issuer in excess of certain limits in the tax

114 Deveau, supra note 36.
115 NUVEEN TENNESSEE MUNICIPAL BOND FUND, https://www.nuveen.com/mutual-funds/TN (last
visited Aug. 1, 2018); MFS TENNESSEE MUNICIPAL BOND FUND, https://www.mfs.com/en-
us/individual-investor/product-strategies/mutual-funds/MTNLX-mfs-tennessee-municipal-bond-
116 FIDELITY SELECT AIR TRANSPORTATION PORTFOLIO, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/summary/316390798 (last visited Aug.1, 2018); T. ROWE PRICE NEW ERA FUND,
https://www3.troweprice.com/fb2/fbkweb/objective.do?ticker=PRNEX (last visited Aug.1, 2018);
116 Fidelity alone offers more than 500 different mutual funds. Fidelity Investments, Fidelity by the
This argument was first made by Mark Roe, and it has since become popular with other academic commentators.

This argument is true as far as it goes, but it, too, has a number of serious limitations. First, it only applies to mutual funds. It does not apply to hedge funds. So there is no reason why the restrictions on mutual funds should stop a large manager from setting up an activist hedge fund. Additionally, the Investment Company Act and its tax rules apply to mutual funds individually and not as part of a group under common management. The unit of legal regulation is a fund, not a family of funds managed by a single adviser. Thus, even if the law prohibited the Fidelity Magellan fund from owning more than 10% of the stock of a company like Delta Airlines, there is no reason why the Magellan fund could not combine with the Fidelity’s Stock Select Large Cap Value, S&P 500 Index, Select Transportation, Growth Company, Mega Cap Stock, and Air Transportation funds to cross the threshold of 10%.

Moreover, even when applied to individual funds, the Investment Company Act and its tax rules are not very restrictive. The tax code’s limits on a fund’s concentration in a particular portfolio company are complicated, but in application, they permit a mutual fund to invest in as few as 12 different companies, owning up to 10% of the outstanding equity of each the first ten, 49% of the eleventh, and 100% of the twelfth. This is at least as much concentration and control as an activist hedge fund would typically take – and possibly even more.

A related argument for why large managers are not interested in influence is that mutual funds require too much liquidity. Since a mutual fund permits its investors to withdraw their money every day, the fund needs to be able to raise cash quickly to pay withdrawals. Such liquidity needs are arguably incompatible with a large investment in a single issuer, because a large investment in a single issuer can be difficult to sell. This argument is also true as far as it goes, but it has the same limitations as the argument about regulation of portfolio composition. The need for liquidity does not apply to hedge funds and other private vehicles that can restrict redemptions. And the need for liquidity can be addressed by spreading a holding across many different funds in a larger management company. Though liquidity needs may prevent one fund from accumulating a massive stake, they need not prevent many funds from each holding a small stake that aggregates into a massive stake.


The Investment Company Act only requires a mutual fund to pay redemptions every seven days, but in practice most mutual funds process redemptions daily. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (2016).
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What then does the interactive effect of size, activism and conflicts mean for legal reform. Should we allow large managers to be activists? And could we allow them be activists? Is it there any set of legal reforms that could make it possible for large managers to become activists, and would those reforms make the world a better place?

To these questions, I can offer no definitive answers. The debate about the merits of corporate governance activism is so vast that I cannot hope to resolve it here. Instead, I am content to point out that in certain ways, at least, the debate has been seriously misinformed. Whether activism by large investment managers turns out to be good or bad, it is only ever likely to happen if we understand exactly why it remains so rare. My analysis of the legal sources of inter-client conflicts of interest suggests that if we do indeed want to encourage activism by large investors, then we will need major reforms to poison pills and to sections 13(d) and 16(b) the Exchange Act.

But even these reforms might not be enough, because legal reforms cannot eliminate the many practical conflicts that large investment advisers face. No changes to the wording of Section 13(d) can eliminate the fundamental conflict between equity and debt, or between taxable and nontaxable investors. These conflicts are not legal accidents – they are facts of life. And whether they could ever be eliminated is by no means certain.

My insights do offer some certainty, however, about the ever-growing debate about horizontal shareholding. Though the possibility of quiet, unintentional influence is quite real, there is an upper bound to just how much influence a large investment manager can wield. It cannot influence a company so directly that it triggers debilitating conflicts.

At bottom, the insights I have offered here remain important, because they tell us how the debate about corporate governance activism should proceed in the future. We can now see when activism is realistically likely, and where we must focus our energies if we ever want to make it more or less likely in the future. I cannot resolve the debate about the desirability of corporate governance activism, but I can at least show how the debate could be more realistic.

VII. CONCLUSION

The paradox at the heart of this Article is that as an investment manager gets bigger, its capacity for corporate influence gets smaller. As an investment management firm grows, it eventually becomes too big and complex to be an activist. The constraints on a big investment manager come from a variety of conflicts of interest that appear in both business strategy and law. Each of these conflicts is driven by the fact that everything in an investment management complex is connected. The actions of every client can influence the welfare of
every other client – as well as the manager itself. Activism by one client can send legal and economic shrapnel flying into every corner of a manager’s business.

Together, these conflicts place serious constraints on a large investment manager’s ability to influence public companies. Though a large manager can exercise a degree of influence, the risk of conflicts places an upper bound on how assertive that influence can be. Although the growth of big investment managers raises immense questions, the numerous conflicts these managers face will inevitably limit both the promise and the peril they can bring to the future of corporate governance.