Past Antitrust Economics Conferences
Thirteenth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 17, 2021
The Northwestern Center on Law, Business, and Economics at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern will present the Thirteenth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy to be held virtually via WebEx. This year’s conference will be a one-day event and will run from approximately 9:00 AM to 2:00 PM (Central) on Friday, September 17, 2021.
The Fourteenth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy will be held in-person on Friday, September 16 — Saturday, September 17, 2022 at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in Chicago, IL.
We are delighted to announce that Compass Lexecon has agreed to provide the funding to support both this year’s and next year’s conference. As always, conference organizers will be solely responsible for choosing papers and speakers.
Papers
Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms (with Andrew Rhodes and Matthijs Wildenbeest)
Justin P. Johnson, Cornell University
Insider Imitation (with Nikhil Vellodi)
Erik Madsen, Department of Economics, New York University
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment and Vertical Integration
(Appendix) (with Leslie Marx)
Simon Loertscher, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
(with Miguel Antón, Mireia Giné and Martin Schmalz)
Florian Ederer, Yale School of Management
Competition Policy and Big Tech: The European Approach: The Digital Markets Act Proposal (presentation slides)
Monika Schnitzer, Department of Economics, University of Munich
For registration details please contact clbe@law.northwestern.edu
Twelfth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 20-Saturday, September 21, 2019
The conference is co-sponsored by the Northwestern Center on Law, Business, and Economics and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Attendance for this conference is by invitation only. To request an invitation, send an email with your full professional contact information to clbe@law.northwestern.edu.
Papers
Merger Remedies in Multimarket Oligopoly (with Andrew Rhodes)
Volker Nocke, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim
Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers (with Volker Nocke)
Michael Whinston, MIT, Department of Economics
Testing the Theory of Common Stock Ownership (with Lysle Boller)
Fiona Scott Morton, Yale School of Management
The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership (with Marcel Kahan)
C. Scott Hemphill, New York University School of Law (Keynote Address)
Steering Incentives on Platforms: Evidence from the Telecommunications Industry (with
Aviv Nevo, Zachary Nolan and Jonathan Williams)
Brian McManus, Department of Economics, University Of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill
Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions (with Kevin Bryan)
Erik Hovenkamp, USC Gould School of Law
Anticompetitive Vertical Restrictions
Joseph Farrell, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
Vertical Integration and Foreclosure: Evidence from Production Network Data (with
Jan Sonntag)
Johannes Boehm, Sciences Po, Department of Economics
The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the
Introduction of National Leniency Programs (with Sven Heim, Kai Huschelrath and Ulrich
Laitenberger)
Yossi Spiegel, Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University
Panel on Antitrust, Regulation, and Digital Competition Policy
- Unlocking Digital Competition Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel (Jason Furman, Chair, Digital Competition Expert Panel)
- The Case for the Digital Platform Act ( Harold Feld, Senior VP, Public Knowledge)
- Competition Policy for the Digital Era ( Jacques Cremer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, and Heike Schweitzer)
- Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech Titans, Labor Markets (Carl Shapiro)
- Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee (Fiona Scott Morton)
Eleventh Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 21-Saturday, September 22, 2018
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Attendance for this conference is by invitation only. To request an invitation, send an email with your full professional contact information to searlecenter@law.northwestern.edu.
Papers
Killer Acquisitions (with Colleen Cunningham and Song Ma)
Florian Ederer, Yale School of Management
An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly (with Nicolas Schutz)
Volker Nocke, UCLA Department of Economics
Coordinated Effects (with Leslie Marx)
Simon Loertscher, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics
Common Ownership and Competition in the Ready to Eat Cereal Industry (with Matthew Backus and Christopher Conlon)
Michael Sinkinson, Yale School of Management
The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence (with Pauline Kennedy, Minjae Song and Keith Waehrer)
Daniel P. O’Brien, Compass Lexecon
Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power (with Eric A. Posner and Glen Weyl)
Suresh Naidu, Department of Economics and School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Repositioning and Market Power After Airline Mergers (with Sophia Li, Joe Mazur, Yongjoon Park, James Roberts and Jun Zhang)
Andrew Sweeting, Department of Economics, University of Maryland
Multiproduct Mergers and Quality Competition (with Andrew Rhodes)
Justin Johnson, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
Tenth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 15-Saturday, September 16, 2017
The goal of this conference is to provide a forum where leading scholars from across the country can gather together with Northwestern's own distinguished faculty to present and discuss high quality research relevant to antitrust economics and competition policy.
The conference featured Keynote Addresses by Joshua D. Wright, University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; and former Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Tommaso Valletti, Chief Competition Economist, Directorate General for Competition, European Commission; and Professor of Economics, Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London.
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Conference Summary (published by TAP)
Papers
Proportional Restraints and the Patent System (with Jorge Lemus)
Erik Hovenkamp, Harvard Law School
Contracts as a Barrier to Entry in Markets with Non-Pivotal Buyers (with Ozlem Bidre-Defolie)
Gary Biglaiser, University of North Carolina, Department of Economics
Evaluating Market Consolidation in Mobile Communications (with Tommaso Valleti and Frank Verboven)
Christos Genakos, Cambridge Judge Business School
Recoupment and Predatory Pricing Analysis
Louis Kaplow, Harvard Law School
A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors (with Eric Posner and Glen Weyl)
Fiona Scott Morton, Yale School of Management
Price Caps as Welfare Enhancing Coopetition (with Jean Tirole)
Patrick Rey, Toulouse School of Economics
Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions (with Heski Bar-Isaac)
John Asker, UCLA Department of Economics
Vertical Integration and Multiproduct Firms: When Eliminating Double Marginalization May Hurt Consumers (with Fernando Luco)
Guillermo Marshall, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Department of Economics
Ninth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 16-Saturday, September 17, 2016
The conference was co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Related Blog Posts
Leading Scholars Discuss Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy – A Searle Center Conference Recap published by TAP
Undesirable Incentives in the Incentive Auction (Emily Schaal and Aleksandr Yankelevich)
Papers
Property Rules vs Liability Rules for Patent Infringement
Carl Shapiro, Walter A. Haas School of Business and Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
A Unifying Analytical Framework for Loyalty Rebates (with Zachary Abrahamson)
Fiona Scott Morton, Yale University School of Management
Exit, Tweets, and Loyalty (with Avi Goldfarb and Mara Lederman)
Joshua Gans, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Beyond Antitrust: The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Inclusive Growth
(expanded version of Keynote Address)
Jason Furman, Chairman, White House Council of Economic Advisers
Vertical MFNs and the Credit Card No-Surcharge Rule
Dennis Carlton, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Ralph Winter, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia
Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction (with Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim and Peichun Wang)
Michael Sinkinson, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania
Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
Daniel F. Spulber, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Maintaining Privacy in Cartels (with Takuo Sugaya)
Alexander G. Wolitzky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
The Tragedy of the Last Mile: Congestion Externalities in Broadband Networks (with Jacob Malone and Aviv Nevo)
Jonathan W. Williams, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
Eighth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 18-Saturday, September 19, 2015
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Papers
Merging Innovation into Antitrust Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act (with Hillary Greene)
Richard J. Gilbert, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
Patent Privateering, Litigation, and R&D Incentives (with Emil Temnyalov)
Jorge Lemus, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics
Mergers Facilitate Tacit Collusion: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Brewing Industry (with Matthew Weinberg)
Nathan Miller, Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business
On the Relevance of Market Power
Louis Kaplow, Harvard Law School
Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership (with Jose Azar and Isabel Tecu)
Martin Schmalz, University of Michigan, Ross School of Business
Insulated Platform Competition
E. Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research, New England
Strategic Incentives When Supplying to Rivals (with Serge X. Moresi)
Marius Schwartz, Department of Economics, Georgetown University
Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach
Volker Nocke, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Seventh Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 19-Saturday, September 20, 2014
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Papers
Anticompetitive Exclusive Dealing without Exclusion
Justin Johnson, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms in Innovative Industries
Exclusionary Conduct When R&D Investment in New Products is Strategic
Jonathan Baker, Washington College of Law, American University
Cooperation, R&D Spillovers and Antitrust Policy (joint with Angel Lopez)
Xavier Vives, IESE Business School
How Vertical Integration Affects Health Outcomes and Total Costs for Medicare Recipients (joint with Thomas Koch and Brent Wendling)
Nathan Wilson, Federal Trade Commission
The Effect of Physician Consolidation on Health Care Costs (joint with Cory Capps and Chris Ody)
David Dranove, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Competition Policy in Selection Markets (joint with Neale Mahoney and André Veiga)
Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research New England
- Discussant Presentation Slides (Joshua Gans)
Outsourcing, Vertical Integration and Cost Reduction (joint with Michael Riordan)
Simon Loertscher, University of Melbourne
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets (joint with Greg Crawford, Robin Lee and Michael Whinston)
Ali Yurukoglu, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Sixth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 20-Saturday, September 21, 2013
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Media
Conference Summary via TAP Blog
Papers
Staggered Contracts, Market Power, and Welfare
Luis Cabral, New York University
Discussant: Michael H. Riordan, Columbia University, Economics Department
Collusive Vertical Restraints
Joseph Farrell, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics
Discussant: Louis Kaplow, Harvard Law School
Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence From the Hospital Industry (joint with Gautam Gowrisankaran and Aviv Nevo)
Robert Town, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Discussant: Michael Whinston, MIT
Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition (joint with Jean Tirole)
Patrick Rey, Toulouse School of Economics
Discussant: E. Glen Weyl, The University of Chicago, Department of Economics
Strategic Patent Acquisitions (joint with Fiona Scott Morton)
Carl Shapiro University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics
Discussant: Richard J. Gilbert, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics
On the First Order Approximation of Counterfactual Price Effects in Oligopoly Models (joint with Marc Remer, Conor Ryan and Gloria Sheu)
Nathan H. Miller, Georgetown University McDonough School of Business
Discussant: Liran Einav, Department of Economics, Stanford University
All Units Discounts and Double Moral Hazard
Daniel P. O’Brien, Federal Trade Commission
Discussant: Volker Nocke, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Channel 5 or 500: Vertical Integration, Favoritism, and Discrimination in Multichannel Television (joint with Gregory Crawford, Robin Lee, Bruno Vieira and Michael Whinston)
Ali Yurukoglu, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Discussant: Gregory L. Rosston, Stanford University
Fifth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 21 - Saturday, September 22, 2012
The goal of this conferecne is to provide a forum where leading scholars from across the country can gather together with Northwestern's own distinguished faculty to present and discuss high quality research relevant to antitrust economics and competition policy.
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Agenda | TAP Blog Posting
Slides
Keynote Address: Standard-Essential Patents, Incomplete Contracts and Platform Competition
Fiona Scott Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice and Yale University
Keynote Transcript and PowerPoint Slides
Comments on "Vertical Integration with Complementary Inputs" (Tarantino and Reisinger)
Marius Schwartz, Chief Economist, FCC
PowerPoint Slides
Papers
Vertical Mergers and Bargaining Strength
William P. Rogerson, Harold and Virginia Anderson Professor and Department Chair, Department of Economics, Northwestern University
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy (with Ben Mermelstein and Volker Nocke)
Mark Satterthwaite, A.C. Buehler Professor in Hospital & Health Services Management; Professor of Strategic Management & Managerial Economics, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Michael Whinston, Robert E. and Emily H. King Professor of Business Institutions and Co-director of the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, Department of Economics, Northwestern University
A More General Theory of Commodity Bundling
Mark Armstrong, Department of Economics, Oxford University
Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Multilateral Relations(with Patrick Rey)
Volker Nocke, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Vertical Integration With Complementary Inputs (with Markus Reisinger)
Emanuele Tarantino, University of Bologna, Department of Economics
A Dynamic Model of Predation (with Roy Shalem and Konrad Stahl)
Yossi Speigel, Faculty of Management, Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University
Tying and Bundling in a Nearly Contestable Market
Michael Salinger, Jacqueline J. and Arthur S. Bahr Professor in Management, Boston University School of Management
The Agency and Wholesale Models in Electronic Content Markets
Justin P. Johnson, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
Fourth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 23 - Saturday, September 24, 2011
Agenda
The goal of this conferecne is to provide a forum where leading scholars from across the country can gather together with Northwestern's own distinguished faculty to present and discuss high quality research relevant to antitrust economics and competition policy.
The conference is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Papers
Adverse Selection and Partial Exclusive Dealing
Justin Johnson, Associate Professor of Economics, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University Cornell
Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance (with John Asker)
Heski Bar-Isaac, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University
League Structure & Stadium Rent Seeking–the Antitrust Role Reconsidered
David Haddock, Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Northwestern University School of Law and Department of Economics
Tonja Jacobi, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
Matthew Sag, Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law
Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperabiltiy: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets(with Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenan)
Christos Genakos, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business
Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation Competition Policy in Banking
Xavier Vives, Professor of Economics, IESE Business School
A Model of Market Power in Customer Markets
Liran Einav, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University, and NBER
Paulo Somaini, Department of Economics, Stanford University
Competition or Collusion in Recent Bidding for U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas (joint with Ken Hendricks and Phil Haile)
Robert Porter, William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor, Northwestern University, Department of Economics
The First Order Approach to Merger Analysis
Sonia Jaffe, Harvard University
E. Glen Weyl, Department of Economics, University of Chicago