Defensive and offensive acquisition services in the market for patents

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Abstract

We theoretically and empirically examine recent business models of defensive and offensive patent trading by specialized service firms also called non-practicing entities (NPEs). We develop a theoretical model of competition between NPEs and operating firms to win a patent auction, wherein operating firms have private information on their exposure to infringement. We show that an offensive NPE can nevertheless outbid operating firms due to a greater ability to extract damages from infringers. Defensive acquisition services yet obtain even better results by using a combination of private information aggregation and catch and release strategy to preempt the most valuable patents. Using patent reassignment and litigation data, we then provide evidence that patents acquired by defensive entities are significantly more valuable than patents acquired by offensive NPEs (patent assertion entities). We also find clear evidence that defensive NPEs do implement the catch and release policy in practice.

Keywords: Patent; Non-practicing entity; Patent assertion entity; Defensive patent aggregator; Patent auction; Market for patents; Catch-and-release

JEL Classification: K11; L24; O34

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1 Introduction

We theoretically and empirically examine recent business models of defensive and offensive patent trading by specialized service firms also called non-practicing entities. Defensive patent acquisition services may aggregate (accumulate) patents or simply buy and later sell patents having provided licenses for their members. Offensive patent acquisition services, also called patent assertion entities, acquire patents with the intent to monetize them either through licensing or litigation (cf. Scott Morton and Shapiro, 2013).

Patent acquisition services are different from patent pools and intellectual property (IP) exchanges that have previously been extensively studied. In contrast to pools, the goal of patent acquisition services is not to provide consistent package licenses for patents related to a particular technology (e.g., an IT standard), but to share risks, costs of, and possibly returns to, patent litigation and associated patent transactions whenever this is possible.

We argue that patent acquisition services have introduced novel and important business models: organizational responses to the legal and competitive problems posed by the evolving and extremely aggressive market for technology. According to venture capitalist Izhar Armony, the most sophisticated [technology companies] are inventing more and filing more patents. They buy more defensively, assert more patents, do more cross-licensing deals, and participate in defensive groups like RPX\(^1\) (see also Chien, 2010).

Whereas offensive non-practicing entities have been studied in some detail (e.g., Reitzig, Henkel, and Heath, 2007; Scott Morton and Shapiro, 2013), defensive patent acquisition is an emerging cooperative strategy for technology companies, and its internal functioning and competitive implications are not yet well understood. We attempt to address this research gap.

The goal of our research is to theoretically highlight fundamental facts about and empirically generate basic insights into new patent acquisition business models and their implications for the market for patents. We theoretically describe how patent acquisi-

tion services work. We also empirically examine associated behavior in patent trading and litigation and discuss their potential impact on the IP marketplace. In particular, we highlight the fine line between defensive and offensive models and consider the commitment of defensive aggregators not to litigate their patents. The quantitative patent reassignment (trading) and litigation data are helpful to distinguish how defensive and offensive patent acquisition services operate in the market and in litigation, and how their strategies differ from and complement those of major technology companies. We finish by discussing the longer-term implications of cooperative ownership of IP assets for innovation strategies of operating technology companies.

2 Business models in intellectual property markets

2.1 Innovation in intellectual property intermediation

An early wave of innovation in the market for technology concerned the intellectual property licensing model that challenged the traditional production model (Gans and Stern, 2003). The licensing model commercialized inventions through the market for intellectual property rather than through the market for products. A very different competitive dynamic follows from this strategic choice. In the IP licensing model, revenues are generated from one-off licensing fees and/or royalty revenues based on subsequent product sales by clients; costs are primarily fixed and related to R&D and marketing rather than actual production or service—there is no need to build in-house production facilities or distribution networks and primary customers are product suppliers rather than product users. This innovation was arguably enabled by the strengthening of the patent regimes, particularly in the United States (Maskus, 2000). E.g., the creation of the United States Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit in 1982 significantly reduced the probability that challenged patents were invalidated (Henry and Turner, 2006). Relatedly, Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) find that stronger patent regimes have been associated with increasing international technology transfer.

The stronger IP rights also ushered in the next wave of innovation in IP markets,
namely the Non-Practicing Entity model, NPEs. These are firms that acquire intellectual property rights without using them to produce a final good, i.e., they do not practice the patents. Some NPEs have also been called patent-assertion entities (PAEs) because of their focus on acquiring and enforcing patent rights (Layne-Farrar, 2012). The novelty of this IP licensing business model is to expand into legal competition through patent enforcement rather than simply market competition to license inventions. PAEs also typically do not invest in R&D to develop the inventions themselves, but instead acquire patents in the IP market. These types of offensive IP intermediaries have become a tremendous market force that has altered innovation competition in many high-technology markets. The Obama administration in the United States explicitly viewed them as a net negative force on high-tech innovation (Executive Office of the President, 2013).

Because strong patent rights create opportunities to develop and trade intellectual property rights, the market for technology has become more lucrative and allowed entry by new types of IP intermediaries with innovative business models. However, because of the non-rival and only partially excludable nature of intellectual assets (Romer, 1990), unintended flows of technological knowledge must be resolved through the legal system. As a result, the necessary complement to a vibrant IP marketplace is a vibrant litigation scene. Moreover, it has been argued that a patents intrinsic (technological) value may differ from its exclusion value (its power to exclude rivals from the marketplace, see Chien, 2010: 325), which would make it possible that marginal inventions, from a technological viewpoint, obtain exorbitant valuations in lawsuits and settlements, depending on their strategic implications within complex technical systems.

2.2 Offensive NPEs

Patent assertion entities (PAEs) NPEs with an explicit strategy to enforce patents through litigation have become a force to be reckoned with. According to industry estimates, there were 550 IP lawsuits in the United States in 2010 against 3000 defendants.
that is, over 2000 unique companies (some of which were sued more than once\(^3\)). Many of these legal cases were concentrated in the communication technology industry, particularly smart phones, and an estimated 17% of lawsuits were brought by NPEs in 2008\(^4\).

It appears that PAE litigation is particularly vibrant in novel and complex technology areas (cf. Cohen et al., 2000).

Steiner and Guth (2005) observe that PAEs, often buy patents and then wait until the associated product market takes off. Once irreversible investments in manufacturing assets have been made, operating companies are not easily able to stop using the technology. Then, PAEs are able to obtain compensations that are higher than what potential licensees would have been willing to pay ex ante (Reitzig, Henkel, and Heath, 2007). Non-practicing entities are also able to extract higher settlement fees than operating companies would in a similar context. Having no R&D or production activity, they are indeed unexposed to patent suits which deprives the defendant from wielding the threat of counter-suit as a bargaining argument. More generally, they are not bound by the broad cross-licensing agreements or reputation concerns that may prevent patent disputes between operating companies (Shapiro, 2001; Galasso, 2012).

There are relatively few empirical studies of NPEs acquisition and litigation strategies. Fischer and Henkel (2012) suggest that the probability that a traded patent is acquired by an NPE rather than a practicing entity (operating company) increases in the scope of the patent, in the patent density of its technology field, and in the patents technological quality. Many other empirical analyses confirm these findings and indicate that NPEs in fact hold patents of similar or even higher quality than operating companies and do not generally engage in flighty litigation as it has sometimes been described by critics (e.g., Shrestha, 2012; Risch, 2012). Levko et al. (2009) suggest that NPEs differ from practicing entities primarily in terms of litigation strategies. For instance, they tend to name multiple defendants to maximize settlement revenues and minimize legal costs. NPEs also seem to be less successful in their litigation than practicing entities (29% rate

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of success compared with 41% for practicing entities, ibid.).

2.3 Defensive patent acquisition services

Our focus in this paper is to examine in detail the most recent innovation in the IP market: defensive patent acquisition services. These are cooperative organizations that respond to the competitive and legal challenge presented by PAEs by pooling information about and resources to acquire problematic patents.

Fuelled by the emergence of NPEs and furious patent litigation among practicing entities themselves, technology manufacturers have come up with novel organizational strategies to fend off legal threats (McDonough, 2006; Wang, 2010; Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). Defensive patent acquisition involves collectively acquiring patents so that they do not end up in the hands of parties that are likely to assert them. The service provider then extends member companies licenses to the patents in exchange for a fee. Defensive NPEs thus provide freedom of operation and safety from litigation for their operating company members or partners (firms that also manufacture goods for the product market).

The two most advanced defensive NPEs are companies called RPX and AST (Allied Security Trust). Whereas certain offensive NPEs, such as Intellectual Ventures or Mosaid, also provide defensive services, RPX and AST are the most purely defensive in their stated objectives. Their stated foci are on pooling risks, costs, and transaction activities related to acquiring or licensing problematic patents in high-technology industries. However, the business models of these two companies are quite distinct in terms of their bidding mechanisms and post-acquisition monetization.

Defensive NPEs pool the licensing contracting related to external patents. For example, RPX may negotiate licenses with external PAEs to license or acquire their IP that is alleged to be infringed by RPX members. Thus, RPX pools the bargaining power of its members to obtain licenses to relevant IPRs. This may reduce the licensing or acquisition prices paid to IP sellers. Their core service offering involves pooling information about threatening patents to acquire while at the same time disguising the identities and needs of clients in such negotiations.
However, RPX and AST are structured rather differently from one another. AST is a non-profit company that attempts to return as much of the value back to its clients. In stark contrast, RPX as a publicly-traded entity attempts to capture as much of the created value as possible and utilize it to grow its businesses and at the same time generate reasonable benefits for members. AST engages in patent acquisition based on (confidential) ex-ante bids by its individual members. It is therefore likely that this mechanism suffers from free riding of the members, and as a result, AST probably buys fewer patents than is optimal for its members. Meanwhile, RPX also pools information from its clients regarding patent threats and litigation exposures, but its clients do not need to commit to bidding ex ante. RPX can thus operate more independently in negotiations with problem patent holders.

All in all, it appears that AST is more distinct from offensive NPEs such as Intellectual Ventures and Mosaid than RPX. It buys, licenses, and sells patents but does not enforce them. In contrast, and aligned with PAEs, RPX aggregates and enforces patents, but is committed to litigation only indirectly through holding companies. AST’s main orientation appears to be to solve the PAE problem for its members, whereas RPX appears to intend to position itself as the trading platform for valuable patents between its members and patent holders (often NPEs). They thus have fundamentally different approaches, although they both attempt to provide defensive patent services to their clients or members.

3 A model of patent acquisition

3.1 Model setup: firms versus offensive NPE

We consider the auction of a patent which, once bought out, may threaten a set \( N \) of operating firms if enforced. Bidders include the \( n = |N| \) operating firms, but also an offensive NPE. We denote by \( B = N \cup \{AE\} \), with \( |B| = n + 1 \) this set of risk neutral bidders (common knowledge).

Each operating firm \( i \in N \) is characterized by a different degree of exposure to the
patent (its \textit{type}) \theta_i, which can be thought as the probability that a court deems the patent valid and infringed by firm $i$. Types are assumed to be identically and independently drawn from a distribution $F$ (common knowledge) over full support $\Theta = [0, 1]$ with associated density $f$, \textit{i.e.} firms are \textit{ex ante} symmetric.

Importantly, we posit that a firm \textit{privately} knows her type once confronted with the patent, but remains uninformed about others’ precise degree of exposure. In contrast, the offensive NPE does not hold any private information about the true patent threat. Therefore the offensive NPE has an information disadvantage in the auction as compared with operating firms.

The patent is auctioned through a second-price sealed-bid auction, where it is assigned to the highest bidder who pays the second highest bid. In case of a tie, we assume that the patent is randomly assigned to one of the two highest bidders. We do not endogenize the patent seller’s behavior. The seller exogenously sets a reserve price which does not exclude any bidder from participating in the auction. Finally, the winner of the auction may enforce his rights against all potential infringers.

For the NPE, the expected benefit of buying the patent is obviously to assert it against operating firms so as to collect damage fees. In that case, litigation entails a symmetric cost $L > 0$ borne by both plaintiff and defendant, and results in damages $D > 0$. We posit for simplicity that the litigation process quickly reveals the true type of the alleged infringer to both parties, so that both parties are thus better off by reaching a settlement agreement, whereby the defendant pays the expected damage $D\theta_i$ to the patent holder\footnote{More precisely, we assume that the true type of the defendant is truly revealed to the plaintiff after both parties have incurred a share $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ of the litigation cost, and that $\alpha$ is small enough to be negligible.}. However, this is acceptable for the defendant only if litigation by the offensive NPE is a credible threat, that is if

$$D\theta_i \geq L \Leftrightarrow \theta_i \geq \frac{L}{D} \equiv \bar{\theta}$$

For operating firms, the benefits of winning the auction are twofold. First, this makes it possible to save the cost of paying damages to another firm. Second, this also allows
the new patent owner to sue the other $n-1$ operating firms. In that case, the expected damage $D$ is however discounted by a factor $\delta \in (0, 1]$, reflecting the potentially lesser capability of operating entities to extract damages from each other (due to e.g., the risk of countersuing or reputation concerns in a context of repeated interactions). Conversely, we can think of $(1 - \delta)$ as the damage premium of the NPE. Accordingly, the expected settlement damage becomes $\delta D \theta_i$, provided that litigation is credible ($\theta_i \geq \theta/\delta$). In the sequel, we will finally assume that $\delta D > L$, so that an operating firm can at least credibly assert the patent against highly exposed firms.

3.2 Outcome of the auction

Let us first characterize the players’ optimal bidding strategies during the patent acquisition process. The patent value for any bidder is equal to the benefit he can get from owning that patent. Thus, the offensive NPE’s value is equal to the total expected damages he can get when asserting the patent against the whole set of operating firms:

$$v_{AE}(\theta) = D \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E}[\theta_i \mathbb{1}\{\theta_i \geq \theta\}] = nD\mu$$

where

$$\mu \equiv \int_{\theta}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \theta f(\theta) d\theta$$

Instead, the patent value of a firm $i \in N$ has two components. The first one equals the expected damages she would have to pay if the patent were to be enforced, i.e., the expected loss she would incur as a defendant. Note that this damage is taken into account based on the true value of $\theta_i$. The second component instead reflects the value of holding
a patent that she could enforce against the \( n - 1 \) other operating firms:

\[
v_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = D\theta_i + \delta D \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbb{E}[\theta_j \mathbb{1}\{\theta_j \geq \theta_i/\delta\}]
\]

\[
= D\theta_i + \delta(n - 1)D\eta(\delta)
\]

where

\[
\eta(\delta) \equiv \int_{\theta_i/\delta}^{1} \theta f(\theta) d\theta < \mu
\]

It can be easily checked\(^6\) that bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for any bidder, i.e. \( b_i(v_i) = v_i \ \forall i \in \mathcal{B} \), so that the profile of bids \( b^* = (v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_n, v_{\text{AE}}) \) constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game. Let \( \theta^\text{max} \equiv \max_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \theta_i \) be the type of the highest bidder among operating firms. Noting that \( \mu = \eta(1) \), it then comes easily that the offensive aggregator wins the auction if

\[
\theta^\text{max} < \mu + (n - 1) [\eta(1) - \delta \eta(\delta)]
\]

Observe first that when the NPE and operating firms have the same ability to extract patent damages, i.e. for \( \delta = 1 \), condition (C1) reduces to \( \theta^\text{max} < \mu \). That is, the offensive NPE wins the patent whenever there is no operating firm with above average exposure. It is also worth noticing that in this case the actual profit of the NPE is necessarily below its expectation.

When the offensive NPE benefits from a positive damage premium (\( \delta < 1 \)), the right hand side of (C1) goes up, thereby increasing its chances to win the patent. Moreover, the effect of this damage premium is increasing in the number of operating firms. Accordingly, an offensive NPE is more likely to preempt the patent if it enjoys a damage premium which it can leverage in a large industry. We generalize these findings in Proposition 1.

**Proposition 1** There exists a threshold \( \hat{\delta} \) of the operating firms’ ability to extract damages such that

\(^6\) The proof is provided in Appendix 1.1
• if $\delta = 1$, the most exposed firm wins if her type lies above the average risk $\mu$

• if $\delta \in [\hat{\delta}, 1)$, the most exposed firm wins if her type exceeds a risk threshold $\hat{\theta} > \mu$

• if $\delta < \hat{\delta}$, operating firms have no chance of winning the patent

where $\hat{\delta}$ is defined by $\hat{\delta} \equiv \frac{\eta(\delta)}{(n-1)\eta(\delta)}$ and increases with the size of the exposed industry $n$; and $\hat{\theta}$ is defined by $\hat{\theta} \equiv \mu + (n-1)[\eta(1) - \delta\eta(\delta)]$, which decreases with $\delta$ and increases with $n$.

Proof. See the Appendix 1.2

Proposition 1 confirms that there are two conditions for an operating firm to be able to purchase a patent. First, she must be strongly exposed to this patent; second, her ability to extract damages must be close to that of the NPE. Conversely, the NPE preempts any patent that does not strongly threaten one operating firm in particular. As its damage premium and/or the size of the industry increases, the threshold of exposure above which an operating firm can win the auction becomes more stringent. Beyond a certain level, the threshold disappears and the NPE is able to preempt all patents.

3.3 Defensive versus offensive NPE

We now turn to an auction whereby an offensive NPE competes with a defensive on to purchase the patent. Drawing on Proposition 1, we also assume for simplicity that no operating firm takes part in the auction.

In exchange of a fixed membership fee $f > 0$, the defensive NPE offers first to search for patents that might threaten its pool of clients, and participates in the auction for patent buyout. Then, it provides its whole set of clients with licenses to its acquired patents, thereby annihilating risks of patent infringement. We denote by $K \subset N$ the set of the defensive NPE’s clients, with $|K| = k \leq n$. We will first focus on the auction outcome given $K$, before discussing the incentives for operating firms to join the defensive NPE as clients as a second step.
Our goal is to study the role of private information and catch-and-release strategy in the viability of defensive NPE’s business models. Once a patent has been identified, we indeed assume that the defensive NPEs is able to collect and aggregate private information on its clients’ true types before the auction takes place. Accordingly, it enjoys an information advantage in the auction with respect to the offensive NPE. Another key parameter of the defensive NPE’s business model is the use of “catch-and-release” strategy. Once a patent has been purchased, this strategy denotes the option to derive an extra revenue from asserting the patent against non-clients–either by suing them directly, or by reselling to others the right to sue non-clients. Catch-and-release is an explicit part of the business model of a defensive NPE like AST. Available evidence also suggests that it is practiced at least in some cases by other ones (see next section). In order to allow for different models, we posit that catch-and-release may not be systematic: the DA randomly resorts to this strategy, which is captured by a parameter $\lambda \in [0,1]$.

Letting $K' \subset K$ be the subset of the $k' = |K'|$ defensive NPE’s clients with types at risk $\theta_i > \theta$, its valuation of the patent knowing its clients’ true types is then equal to the clients’ opportunity cost of being sued by the offensive NPE, plus the benefits of catch-and-release:

$$v_{DA} = D \sum_{i \in K'} \theta_i + \lambda(n-k)D\mu$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Let $S_k = \sum_{i \in K'} \theta_i$ denote the aggregate risk of the defensive NPE’s clients. Depending on the content of this private information, the offensive NPE might still manage to preempt the patent. Comparing the bids of both NPE indeed implies that the defensive NPE wins the auction if

$$S_k > \mu[n - \lambda(n-k)] \equiv \hat{S}_k$$  \hspace{1cm} (C2)

This condition firstly states that the defensive NPE uses private information on its clients’ types to preempt the patents that are the most valuable (that is, most dangerous) for them. By contrast, it cannot prevent the offensive NPE from buying patents that are less dangerous for its clients.

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7The proof of truthful bidding strategies is analogous to the one provided in the Appendix 1.1
Against this background, condition (C2) also shows that for $k < n$, the use of catch-and-release increases the defensive NPE’s chances to win the auction, and all the more so as the number of non-client firms is large. Indeed, catch-and-release then neutralizes the offensive NPE’s ability to monetize the patent against non-clients. It is especially interesting to observe that a higher frequency of catch-and-release can be used here as a substitute for the number of client firms within the industry.

We summarize these findings in Proposition 2.

**Proposition 2** The defensive NPE succeeds to buy any patent that exceeds a threshold \( \hat{S}_k = \mu [n - \lambda (n - k)] \) of aggregate value at stake for its clients, while the offensive NPE wins the auction otherwise. The level of this threshold is lower the more clients of the defensive NPE, and the higher the frequency of its catch-and-release strategy.

Note that when the defensive NPE does not use catch-and-release, *i.e.* when $\lambda = 0$, condition (C2) reduces to $S_k > n \mu$. Therefore the aggregate true valuations of the clients must exceed the expected patent valuation over the entire industry. On the other extreme, a *full* catch and release policy ($\lambda = 1$) implies that the defensive NPE purchases the patent whenever $S_k > k \mu$ that is, when the average risk faced by its members exceeds the expected risk faced by the whole population of firms. From an *ex ante* perspective (that is, before the defensive NPE learns its clients’ profile of types), the expected valuations of the defensive and offensive NPEs are the same, implying that the former will be able to preempt any patent with above average value for its clients, letting the offensive NPE purchase the below-value patents.

### 3.4 Implications for empirical analysis

We have shown first that operating firms are unlikely to prevent offensive NPEs from preempting dangerous patents when the NPE is able to leverage a damage premium over a large enough set of target firms in the industry. Against this background, our analysis also suggests that a defensive NPE is able to perform better by aggregating private information from its clients to preempt the patents that put them the most at
risk. Conversely, the offensive NPE still manages to purchase patents that represent a lesser risk for the defensive NPE’s clients. The use of a catch-and-release strategy and the number of clients enable the defensive NPE to preempt a larger set of patents. In other words, they change the threshold of aggregate exposure above which the defensive NPE preempts, but the threshold exists in any case.

A key implication of this result is that the set of patents "for sale" is eventually split in two subsets - those purchased by the offensive and the defensive NPEs - with respectively low and high degrees of exposure for the latter’s clients. Since in our model the degree of exposure to a particular patent follows the same independent distribution for all operating firms, it follows that the subset of patents preempted by the defensive NPE are expected to also be more "valuable" at the entire industry scale.

4 Quantitative evidence of the different NPE business models

In this section we compare the patent acquisition strategies of defensive and offensive services and other types of companies engaged in patent acquisition through analyses of patent reassignment data. These descriptive analyses complement the theoretical model by providing information about how the different models work in practice.

4.1 Description of the patent reassignment data

We gathered data on patents reassigned to the defensive and offensive NPEs and created a matched sample of patents having the same characteristics in terms of grant year, reassignment year and type of assignee that were reassigned to practicing entities. This approach sheds light on those patents that were acquired by defensive services, as most of these firms do not file their own patents.

In total, our database contains 2608 patents that were reassigned to NPEs between 1988 and 2012. 865 of these were bought by the purely defensive entities Allied Security Trust and RPX Corporation, and the rest by PAEs including 1st Technology, Acacia

Based on this database of 5216 reassigned patents, we gathered data on litigation involving these patents using the Stanford IP Litigation database. From our matched samples of reassigned patents, 284 were litigated during the period 1999-2010. 52 of these litigated patents were reassigned to defensive NPEs, 111 to offensive NPEs, and 121 were reassigned to practicing entities, in other words, technology companies operating in product markets.

4.2 Characteristics of reassigned patents

Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the patents in our three samples. There are a few interesting differences between the defensive, offensive and practicing entities. Defensive entities tend to acquire patents that are significantly older and more highly cited than those of offensive and practicing entities. Although the average ages of patents reassigned to defensive and offensive entities differ by less than a year, this statistically significant age difference may reflect that defensive organizations acquire patents that are already known to be problematic or valuable, whereas offensive organizations and practicing entities might acquire patents on a more speculative basis.

Regarding the number of forward citations, the patents bought by practicing entities and defensive NPEs are indistinguishable in terms of citations, whereas PAEs have bought

\[\text{\footnote{However, we were unable to reliably distinguish the reassignments to Intellectual Ventures, because the company appears to operate through so many different funds, subsidiaries, and limited liability companies that this would require substantial amount of detective work to compile (cf. Avancept. 2011. The Intellectual Ventures Report. Second Edition. Retrieved from http://avancept.com/iv-report2Ed.html on May 8, 2012).}}\]

\[\text{\footnote{The most represented practicing entities in our database are: NEC (211 patents), Infocus Corporation (44 patents), Nortel Networks (36 patents), Siemens AG (28 patents), Harris Corporation (27 patents), Infineon Technology (27 patents), Electronic Data System Corporation (19 patents), Legerity Inc. (19 patents), AT&T Corporation (15 patents) and Fujitsu (15 patents).}}\]
significantly less-cited patents than the other two groups. Forward citations are usually interpreted to reflect patent quality; hence it seems PAEs tend to acquire lower quality patents.

The likelihood of litigation is the highest for patents reassigned to defensive NPEs and the lowest for those reassigned to practicing entities. The number of lawsuits per litigated patent is also the highest for defensive NPEs, and lowest for practicing entities. This reinforces the previous result and suggests that defensive acquisition services are able to identify the most problematic or valuable patents. However, the differences in litigation rates are not statistically significant, because of the large variation around the means. Overall, these statistics suggest that the defensive NPEs RPX and AST acquire high-quality patents that are highly valuable, i.e. likely to be problematic or litigated.

### 4.3 Early value indicators of patents reassigned to defensive and offensive NPEs

The theoretical model predicts that defensive NPEs should be able to preempt more valuable patents than PAEs. Whereas there is no objective way to assess the value of reassigned patents, we will use the number of forward-citations that is often considered as a proxy of patents value. Of course, using the number of forward-citations for

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Defensive NPEs</th>
<th>Offensive NPEs</th>
<th>Practicing entities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of patents</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>1743</td>
<td>2608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean application year (SD)</td>
<td>1996.51 (4.83)</td>
<td>1997.23 (5.42)</td>
<td>1997.54 (3.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean forward citations (SD)</td>
<td>17.07 (13.49)</td>
<td>14.96 (13.05)</td>
<td>16.97 (15.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of litigation (SD)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.050 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of cases / litigated patents (SD)</td>
<td>12.73 (11.57)</td>
<td>10.17 (17.81)</td>
<td>8.93 (15.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Characteristics of the reassigned patents

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10 Excluding self-citations. The results remain stable if we use the number of forward citations including self-citations.

11 This number is one of the measures needed to assess the economic and technological significance of a patent. These citations allow for the identification of prior art for an invention. They are thus carefully controlled by patent offices because they help to define the scope of the claims of the patent. For a discussion of this indicator, see for instance: Harhoff et al. (1999), Giummo (2003), and Hall et al. (2005).
patents of different ages and reassignment yearshas problems. First of all, the number of citations is correlated with the age of the patent. Second, citations and reassignments could be subject to reverse causality (reassignments causing subsequent citations). Thus, any difference in the number of citations between PAEs and defensive aggregators could just be generated by a higher number of reassignments or a different timing of reassignment between patents reassigned to offensive and defensive NPEs. To overcome this difficulty, we chose to use the number of self forward citations that occurred during the first five years of the patents excluding all patents that were reassigned during these years (365 out of the 2,608 patents eventually reassigned to NPEs)\(^{12}\). As the theoretical model predicts a significant difference in the value of the patents reassigned to defensive and offensive entities, and as patent value is related to the number of potential infringers, we derived two other indicators of from the number of forward citations within the first five years of the patents life: (1) the number of different assignees for the citing patents (2) the number of different technological classes of the citing patents.

### Table 2: Characteristics of the reassigned patents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Offensive NPEs</th>
<th>Defensive NPEs</th>
<th>Significant difference at 10%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of forward citations (SD)</td>
<td>6.62 (0.21)</td>
<td>7.37 (0.46)</td>
<td>Yes (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of different assignees for the citing patents (SD)</td>
<td>3.89 (0.10)</td>
<td>4.33 (0.18)</td>
<td>Yes (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of different technological classes for the citing patents (SD)</td>
<td>2.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>2.35 (0.08)</td>
<td>Yes (0.01%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see in Table 2, there are significant differences between the patents that are reassigned to offensive and defensive NPEs. Patents reassigned to defensive entities are more highly cited, are cited by a greater number of assignees of the citing patents (are more broadly cited within the industry) and are cited by patents in a greater number of technology classes (are cited more broadly in the technology space), all within the first

five years of the patents life, and before the patent was reassigned. All indicators thus suggest that defensive entities acquire more valuable patents than offensive entities do.

In order to control for observable differences among reassigned patents, we also carried out simple regression analyses. These further explore whether the characteristics of reassigned patents to PAEs and defensive aggregators systematically differ. In the regression framework, we were able to control for basic characteristics of patents and distinguish the types of NPEs involved. We thus regress the three value indicators presented in Table 2 on the types of patent reassignedees. We controlled for the age of the cited patent.

The results of these regressions are presented in appendix 2 and confirm that the value of reassigned patents differ according to the type of NPEs acquiring the patents even if we control for the age of the cited patent. In summary, our empirical evidence reinforces the theoretical claim that a distinct defensive subgroup exists among NPEs and that these defensive entities are able to identify more valuable patents on the markets.

4.4 Do “catch and release” strategies exist?

One of the key predictions of the theoretical model is that defensive NPEs ability to preempt the most valuable patents depends on their use of catch-release strategies. These strategies are not easy to confirm empirically, especially given the timing of patents reassignment to defensive entities. In order to confirm the existence of such strategies, we explore (1) if some of the patents reassigned to RPX or AST were subsequently reassigned to another entity (2) if some of the patents reassigned to RPX or AST were subsequently litigated.

Regarding the existence of subsequent reassignment, our sample suggests that 32% of patents reassigned to RPX Corporation were subsequently reassigned to another entity. However, we are not able to precisely identify, for all reassignments, if the second reassignee was a member of RPX at the time of reassignment. Appendix 3 presents a list of patents that were subsequently reassigned with detailed information on the tim-

\[13\] The majority of patents reassigned to RPX or AST were reassigned in 2009 or later.

\[14\] This analysis would need historical information on RPXs membership.
ing of reassignment and the estimated status of the second assignee. The percentage of secondary reassignments seems to be much higher for AST, around 80%. However, as AST organizes itself through subsidiaries, we do not yet have comprehensive data on the history of its subsequent reassignments.

Regarding the existence of subsequent litigation, our sample suggests that out of those 100 patents that were reassigned to RPX or AST and litigated, 22 patents were part of a litigation that was filed after the reassignment to RPX or AST\textsuperscript{15}. We are not yet able to identify the parties involved in these lawsuits or to confirm whether these patents were part of a litigation initiated by RPX, AST or by subsequent reassignees. However, these cases imply subsequent monetization of the patent through enforcement, which is consistent with a broad definition of the catch-and-release strategy. Note, moreover, that going to court may not be necessary in all cases before reaching a settlement. Accordingly, the number of litigated patents should be seen as a lower bound for the actual use of catch-and-release.

5 Conclusion

This paper examines how defensive and offensive non-practicing entities (NPEs) operate in the patent market. We theoretically model patent auctions with practicing and non-practicing entities and find that, despite lacking information on the true exposure of potential targets, offensive NPEs are able to win patent auctions by leveraging their ability to obtain greater damages on a large number of target companies. Defensive acquisition services, in turn, perform better against offensive NPEs by aggregating private information about their members value at stake (exposure to the auctioned patent) and using it to preempt the most valuable patents. We also find that defensive NPEs will be the most effective in the auction markets when they have a policy of full catch and release, in other words, all the patents that they acquire are subsequently sold back into the IP marketplace. In fact, catch-and-release enables the defensive organization to expand the

\textsuperscript{15}11 of these patents were initially reassigned to RPX and 11 to AST.
set of patents it can preempt, because it has monetization opportunities beyond the ini-
tial auction and membership fees. It is also an effective substitute for private information
when the defensive NPE has a small base of clients. Moreover, although outside of our
model, the catch-and-release policy will motivate practicing entities to join the defensive
entity as they are threatened by the subsequent release. As a result, defensive NPEs will
win more valuable patents than do offensive NPEs.

We explore the validity of these claims with tentative analyses using patent reassign-
ment and litigation data. Using a number of different indicators of patent value, we
find that defensive and offensive NPEs have significantly different acquisition strategies.
Defensive entities acquire patents that are more highly cited, cited by patents held by
a larger number different companies, and cited by patents in a larger number of tech-
nology classes, within the first five years of the patents life and even before they were
reassigned to the defensive entity. These data thus suggest that patents acquired by
defensive entities are significantly more valuable, and more likely to be litigated, than
patents acquired by offensive NPEs (patent assertion entities). We also present prelimi-
nary evidence that defensive NPEs indeed utilize the catch-and-release policy that helps
them acquire high-quality patents, and that patents previously held by defensive entities
are sometimes subsequently litigated by other entities.

Our analyses attempt to highlight key features of defensive and offensive strategies in
the patent marketplace by focusing on the information and bidding advantages of different
types of NPEs. Our empirical analyses, however, are based on the behavior of just two
defensive entities, RPX Corporation and Allied Security Trust. Only these two companies
are thus far known to be purely defensive in their stated missions and actual operations.
Our empirical base is thus rather limited, even though these companies are major players
in the patent market. We find that these two companies indeed provide services to defend
their members or clients against patent assertion entities, but also subsequently monetize
their patents by selling them to their own members/clients, other practicing entities, or
even patent assertion entities for further monetization and possibly litigation. Thus, what
makes them defensive is the fact that they enable sharing of risks, costs, and information
related to patent threats among the members. The defensive business model thus does not necessarily mean that patents are frozen and left unmonetized on the shelf. As of early 2014, AST and RPX have not engaged in significant litigation themselves, but it would not be surprising if RPX decided to do so in the future, as it is holding a large and growing portfolio of unmonetized assets. Otherwise, its limited catch-and-release of the acquired patents may prevent it from acquiring some valuable targets, and hence from providing the best defensive services.

Although our results are tentative, they provide new insights on the distinct patent acquisition strategies of defensive and offensive non-practicing entities, and how they are changing the nature of patent competition. We hope our preliminary ideas and evidence will inspire further research on this topic.
References


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Appendix

Appendix 1: Theoretical proofs

1.1. Truthful bidding in the patent auction

When bidding \( b_i = v_i \), bidder \( i \) wins the patent whenever \( b_i \geq b_{-i} \equiv \max_{j \in B} b_j \). In this case, bidder \( i \) gets \( u_i = v_i - b_i \). Bidding instead \( b_i > v_i \) changes the outcome only if \( v_i < b_{-i} \leq b_i \), and in this case bidder \( i \) receives \( u_i = v_i - b_{-i} < 0 = u_i(b_i = v_i) \). Finally, bidding instead \( b_i < v_i \) changes the outcome only if \( b_i \leq b_{-i} < v_i \), and in this case bidder \( i \) receives \( u_i = 0 < u_i(b_i = v_i) \). Hence, at the patent auction, bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy, \( i.e. \) according to \( b_i(v_i) = v_i \forall i \in B \).

1.2. Proof of Proposition 1

Since \( \theta_i \) is drawn over \( \Theta = [0,1] \), \( v_i \in [(n-1)\delta D\eta(\delta), D + (n-1)\delta D\eta(\delta)] \equiv [\bar{v}, \tilde{v}] \).

Thus,

\[
v_{AE} > \tilde{v} \Leftrightarrow nD\mu > D + (n-1)\delta D\eta(\delta) \Leftrightarrow \delta < \frac{n\mu - 1}{(n-1)\eta(\delta)} \equiv \hat{\delta}
\]

That is, if the operating firms’ ability to extract damages from their counterparts is such that \( \delta < \hat{\delta} \), they have no chance to outbid the offensive NPE at the auction, whatever their true degree of exposure to the patent. Note that \( \frac{\partial \hat{\delta}}{\partial n} > 0 \) meaning that the PAE’s ability to preempt firms through its damage premium increases with the size of the exposed industry.

Let \( v_{max} \) denote the highest exposed firm’ valuation for the patent, \( i.e. \) \( v_{max} = D\theta_{max} + \delta(n-1)D\eta(\delta) \). If this firm’s ability to extract damages is high enough \( (\delta \geq \hat{\delta}) \), she wins the patent if and only if

\[
v_{max} \geq v_{AE} \Leftrightarrow \theta_{max} \geq \mu + (n-1)[\eta(1) - \delta \eta(\delta)] \equiv \hat{\theta}
\]
where
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial \delta} = (n - 1)[-\eta(\delta) - \delta \eta'(\delta)] < 0 \]
since \( \eta'(\delta) > 0 \), and
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial n} = \eta(1) - \delta \eta(\delta) > 0 \quad \forall \delta < 1 \]

Finally, if \( \delta = 1 \), \( v_{max} \geq v_{AE} \iff g_{max} \geq \mu \).
Appendix 2: Regression analyses

We estimate as a baseline model the following cross-sectional model:

\[\text{reassigned\_defensive}_p = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{value}_p + \alpha_3 \text{grant\_year}_p + \epsilon_p\]  

(1)

with:

\(\text{reassigned\_defensive}_p\): Dummy that equals 1 if the patent has been reassigned to a defensive aggregator, 0 if the patent has been reassigned to a PAEs

\(\text{value}_p\): Indicators of value of the reassigned patent approximated by the number of citations of the citing patents, the number of different assignees/private assignees and technological classes of the citing patents

\(\text{grant\_year}_p\): Set of dummies for grant years of the reassigned patent

\(\epsilon_p\) = Error term

Table 3 presents the results concerning the likelihood of reassignment to a defensive aggregator.
Table 3: Results on likelihood of reassignment

Results in table 3 suggest that the likelihood of being reassigned to a defensive aggregator increases with the value of the reassigned patent even if we control for the age of the cited patent. We chose not to control for the technological class of the cited patent as this variable is probably correlated with the ability of the NPEs to identify good value patents.
Appendix 3: Examples of patents reassigned to RPX Corporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Patent number</th>
<th>Initial assignor</th>
<th>Date of reassignment to RPX Corporation</th>
<th>Subsequent reassignment to:</th>
<th>Date of the subsequent reassignment</th>
<th>Estimated status of the subsequent assignee at the time of reassignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>545085</td>
<td>SAXON INNOVATIONS, LLC</td>
<td>04/08/2010</td>
<td>SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.</td>
<td>04/21/2010</td>
<td>Not member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5459484</td>
<td>INFOCUS CORPORATION</td>
<td>11/19/2009</td>
<td>SEIKO EPSON CORPORATION</td>
<td>11/19/2009</td>
<td>Member¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5481590</td>
<td>SAXON INNOVATIONS, LLC</td>
<td>04/08/2010</td>
<td>SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.</td>
<td>04/21/2010</td>
<td>Not member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5793236</td>
<td>HUPPER ISLAND LLC</td>
<td>05/02/2012</td>
<td>HTC CORPORATION</td>
<td>07/18/2013</td>
<td>Member²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5828850</td>
<td>OAR ISLAND LLC</td>
<td>05/02/2012</td>
<td>HTC CORPORATION</td>
<td>08/01/2013</td>
<td>Member²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Epson joined RPX on January 2009.
² HTC joined RPX on December 2009.